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Abstract 
John Milton argued that customs are antithetical to rational judgment. My 
dissertation, Freedom Under the Law, investigates the conception of rationality that 
underlies the divorce of tradition and reason in the writings of the English Civil Wars 
and Interregnum (1642-1660). In this period, republican authors strive to turn English 
subjects into citizens whose active virtue and rational judgment is unclouded by 
tradition and habits. This dissertation argues that these writers build their arguments on 
a paradoxical depiction of the people as both rationally capable of consenting to political 
association and irrationally bound by custom. In conversation with Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
analysis of the Aristotelian tradition, Freedom Under the Law exposes the tensions that 
arise in the writings of both canonical and non-canonical seventeenth-century authors as 
they attempt to re-imagine and represent the individual, the family, and the 
commonwealth. As this project demonstrates, writers ranging from John Milton to the 
millenarian John Rogers to the Parliamentarian Henry Parker reveal a residual 
understanding of political and social community that owes its vocabulary to medieval 
and classical modes of thinking. However, while Aristotelian models of political 
association closely link reason, habit, and justice, the authors considered in my project 
present an understanding of individuals as capable of rational action independent of 
tradition and custom.  
  
v 
This dissertation traces how this revolutionary account of the individual in 
political association is expressed through a range of often-conflicting formulations of the 
English nation. Freedom Under the Law begins with Milton’s representation of education 
in the virtues in his early theatrical piece, Comus (1634). This first chapter establishes the 
guiding question of the project: how is the relationship between individual and 
community reconfigured in the literature of the seventeenth-century? In chapters two 
and three, I situate Milton’s domestic and political prose of 1643-49 in the context of 
Puritan marriage manuals and Parliamentarian and royalist tracts. Through these 
comparisons, I show that Milton’s distrust of customary laws produces a representation 
of the virtuous individual and the ideal nation as independent of their own history and, 
ironically, driven to constant iconoclastic self-reformation. Chapter four demonstrates 
how impoverished accounts of natural law lead to a devaluing of the people’s legislative 
authority in Edward Sexby’s call for the killing of Oliver Cromwell in Killing No Murder 
(1657), apologias of the Cromwellian dissolution of the Parliament in 1653, and the 
Putney Debates in 1647. Chapter five considers Milton’s Readie and Easie Way (1660) 
alongside Fifth Monarchist pamphlets. This chapter questions J.G.A. Pocock’s distinction 
between a medieval custom-based juristic tradition and a republican understanding of 
rational political life, a distinction adopted widely in Milton studies. I argue that 
comparison with Aquinas’s Aristotelian account of custom and law brings into relief 
tensions in Milton’s model of rational political participation. Throughout the 
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dissertation, I argue that the conception of virtue and reason adopted by Milton and his 
contemporaries allows them to dismiss historically-bound embodiments of justice and 
reason as enslaving accretions. 
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Preface 
The concept of an intelligible action is a more fundamental concept than that of an action.1 
 This dissertation emerged at first from an attempt to trace the role of the virtues 
in John Milton’s thought, an exploration that is often conducted in dialogue with 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s work on virtue ethics. In the chapters that follow, my research has 
been motivated by a desire to make sense of the discrepancy I registered between 
Milton’s “elitism” and his “republicanism.” In both his poetry and prose works, Milton, 
like the Son in Paradise Regained, represents the people as fickle and capable only of 
valuing vulgar things and actions: “what the people but a herd confused,/ a 
miscellaneous rabble, who extol/ Things vulgar” (III.49-51).2 At the same time, Milton 
repeatedly extols the republican ideal that political power resides in “the people.” A 
republican form of government, Milton maintains in the prose works of the 1640s and 
1650s, can turn the “miscellaneous rabble” into a virtuous and self-governing people. As 
I argue throughout the dissertation, the discrepancy between his portrayal of “the 
vulgar” and his attempts to write into existence republican citizens has its roots in the 
conception of virtue, reason, and action that underlies Milton’s writings. The task of this 
                                                     
1 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2007), 209. 
2 The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose of John Milton, ed. Kerrigan, William, John Rumrich, and Stephen M. 
Fallon (New York: Random House, 2007). Throughout the dissertation, all quotes from Milton’s poetry will 
be from this edition and cited parenthetically. 
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preface is to begin to give a motivation for this claim and how I pursue it in the 
dissertation. 
 The epigraph to this preface captures a central claim of After Virtue that guides 
my thinking about the virtues throughout this dissertation. As MacIntyre proceeds to 
explain on the same page, the “importance of the concept of intelligibility is closely 
related to the fact that the most basic distinction […] is that between human beings and 
other beings. Human beings can be held to account for that of which they are the 
authors; other beings cannot” (After Virtue, 209). I want to pause on these two brief 
quotes from MacIntyre because they link two concepts that we often do not see as 
intrinsically connected: action and meaning. MacIntyre’s characterization that 
specifically human actions can be intelligible and that we can be held accountable for 
them is dependent on his claim that human lives are characterized by narrative unity. In 
this account, a narrative concept of the self—creating a unified whole from birth to 
death—makes it possible to understand actions as intelligible and, concomitantly, to 
hold the agent accountable for his actions. As MacIntyre argues throughout his writings, 
such an account of human action and selfhood is alien to modernity. The virtue ethics 
 3 
tradition that links Aristotle to Aquinas is discarded as a new understanding of reason 
takes hold in the late middle ages and the early modern period.3  
 However, this is not to say that early modern writers did not express themselves 
in the language of the virtues. Case in point, in De Doctrina Christiana, Milton describes 
the virtues in terms of habits: “The IMMEDIATE CAUSES of good actions are, generally 
speaking, good habits. These are called VIRTUES, and in them is comprised the whole 
sum of our duty both towards God and towards man.”4 In this passage, Milton links 
good actions with good habits, which, in turn, he terms virtues. The link between these 
terms—actions, habits, and virtues—is also found in Aquinas’s discussion of virtue in 
the Summa Theologiæ. Both accounts have a common source in Aristotle’s discussion of 
the virtues. While there is a continuity of language between Aquinas and Milton, they 
arrive to very different conclusions about habit and virtue. It is this difference and its 
consequences that my dissertation explores. 
 My project starts by considering Milton’s early theatrical piece, A Maske. There, 
Milton stages an argument between the Lady and Comus on how Nature “means” her 
                                                     
3 MacIntyre’s account points to Protestantism and Jansenist Catholicism (and “their immediate late medieval 
predecessors”) as the new theologies that reject the Aristotelian conception of reason (After Virtue, 53-4). 
Recently, Brad S. Gregory has argued that MacIntyre’s diagnosis of the abandonment of the Aristotelian 
moral tradition does not pay sufficient attention to the religious and political violence of the Reformation 
period (The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 2012), 180-89). 
4 Complete Prose Works of John Milton, gen. ed. Don M. Wolfe (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953-
82), VI:647. Throughout the dissertation, all quotes from Milton’s prose works will be from this edition and 
cited parenthetically as CPW followed by volume and then page. 
 4 
“full blessings” to be used. Comus, in a seductive carpe diem poem, claims that the 
abundance of nature signifies that extravagant consumption is justified; it is just to use 
nature’s bounty as nature means it to be used, abundantly. The Lady, the virtuous 
individual around whom the masque is centered, argues against this claim. Nature does 
not mean that “her children should be riotous with her abundance” (763-4); her laws are 
“sober” and her dictates advise “spare Temperance” (766, 767). As the Lady goes on to 
argue: 
If every just man that now pines with want 
Had but a moderate and beseeming share 
Of that which lewdly-pampered Luxury 
Now heaps upon some few with vast excess, 
Nature’s full blessings would be well dispensed. (768-72) 
 
The Lady’s stirring speech presents an impassioned defense of some of the obligations 
that each member of a community owes to all others. The significance of our own 
consumption of Nature’s gifts can only be understood when taken into consideration 
within the context of the needs of others. In turn, as the Lady’s speech proceeds, this 
duty towards others—our temperate consumption—is inextricably linked to our duty 
towards God. By following the sober rules of Nature, “the Giver would be better 
thanked,/ His praise due paid” than by following Comus’s advice of “riotous” 
consumption (775-6).  
 5 
 At the same time, the setting of this speech raises a question: what resources does 
the Lady have to withstand temptation and how has she acquired them? She is alone in 
Comus’s palace in the woods, separated from her brothers and family, and immobilized 
by Comus’s spell. In her wanderings through the dark woods, her feet are 
“unacquainted” with the mazy paths they traverse. In representing her trial, Milton 
attempts to isolate an atom of action, her virtuous resistance against Comus’s seduction. 
I place this crucial moment in A Maske side-by-side with MacIntyre’s characterization of 
human action to draw out some of the central concerns of my project. By focusing on the 
setting of the Lady’s actions, I wish to invoke not only the theatrical place of action in 
which the Lady’s speech occurs, but also a broader notion. As MacIntyre points out in 
After Virtue, actions become intelligible in different ways when considered within 
different settings: “it is central to the notion of a setting as I am going to understand it 
that a setting has a history, a history within which the histories of individual agents not 
only are, but have to be, situated, just because without the setting and its changes 
through time the history of the individual agent and his changes through time will be 
unintelligible.”5 The setting, with its history, makes actions intelligible. More precisely, 
an agent’s actions can become intelligible only in relation to two contexts: first, the 
agent’s own history, and, second, the history of the settings of his actions. First, my 
                                                     
5 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 206-7. 
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action of typing a quote from After Virtue on this page, for instance, becomes intelligible 
within the context of my writing a dissertation and pursuing graduate studies.6 That is, 
an action becomes intelligible by identifying an agent’s intention in terms of her own 
history. However, identifying this context is not enough. Second, my action of typing 
this quote may be made intelligible by also accounting for its role within the history of 
graduate education at Duke University. That is, my intentions, and therefore my action, 
could not be intelligible without reference to the history of their setting. 
 MacIntyre’s definition of a setting fights against the idea that we can 
meaningfully talk about the notion of an individual human action, isolated from all 
context (After Virtue, 209). Human actions, as opposed to simple natural phenomena, are 
intelligible only when part of a narrative, of a history. It is, moreover, crucial that these 
narratives are teleological in nature:  
We live out our lives, both individually and in our relationship with each other, 
in the light of certain conceptions of a possible shared future, a future in which 
certain possibilities beckon us forward and others repel us, some seem already 
foreclosed and others perhaps inevitable. There is no present which is not 
informed by some image of some future and an image of the future which 
always presents itself in the form of a telos—or of a variety of ends and goals—
towards which we are either moving or failing to move in the present. (After 
Virtue, 215-6)  
 
                                                     
6 It is worth clarifying that my action may be intelligible even though my explication of MacIntyre’s quote 
may be, unfortunately, not understandable. On this, see After Virtue, 210-211.  
 7 
In this account, the concept of an action is that of an episode abstracted from a history 
with a beginning and moving towards a possible end. Since ends and goals are created 
in common with others, my actions become intelligible only within a shared narrative. 
With this understanding of action in mind, the virtues are to be understood as those 
habits that aid us in the attempt to live the good life. More precisely, the concept of the 
virtues shared by Aristotle, Aquinas, and MacIntyre presupposes a notion of human 
flourishing and proposes that the virtues are exactly those habits that allow us to learn 
what the good life is and to pursue it. However, what is good for me has to be learned in 
the context of not only my narrative, but the role of my narrative in those of others as 
well as in our shared teleological narrative in our search to learn what the good is. 
Consequently, the notion of the virtues is only coherent with an understanding of a 
person as someone who inhabits a certain narrative and who plays specific roles in the 
narratives of others. These roles and narratives have a history into which we are born. 
The virtues, by sustaining the pursuit of the good as an inhabitant of my own and 
others’ narratives, sustain “relationships to the past—and to the future—as well as in the 
present” (After Virtue, 221). Virtue ethics, then, presuppose a notion of human action 
which takes into account how actions are only intelligible in the context of a shared past 
and, at the same time, of a narrative that project into the future in terms of our ends and 
goals. 
 8 
 MacIntyre’s rich account of action and the virtues uncovers the complex and 
historical character of the virtue tradition shared by Aristotle and Aquinas. This is a 
tradition which Milton explicitly singles out in Areopagitica as part of the ethical 
resources he both draws on and challenges in his conception of virtuous reading: he 
insists that “our sage and serious Poet Spencer” is “a better teacher then Scotus or 
Aquinas” (CPW II:516). MacIntyre’s work furnishes my dissertation with both a history 
of Aristotelianism and a penetrative theoretical account of the relationship between the 
virtues and the past, an account that illuminates often-overlooked incoherences and 
tensions in Milton’s thought. Milton’s writings, taken together, present a puzzle when 
read in this light: Milton praises good habits in De Doctrina, but repeatedly rejects 
tradition and custom throughout his polemical prose works. By rejecting tradition, 
Milton attempts to separate the individual narrative from shared history. When viewed 
in the light of MacIntyre’s account of Aristotelian virtues, such an attempt renders the 
notions of action and habituation in the virtues incoherent. In other words, my 
dissertation asks: what are the consequences of understanding the virtues as 
dispositions of human beings viewed as individuals? In turn, how does this conception 
of the virtues reorient the role of a person in a political and social community? 
 Concern for the conception of the individual in society is certainly not new to 
Milton studies or the scholarship of seventeenth-century literature. The tendency in both 
 9 
historical and literary studies of the period, however, is to accept, in broad terms, 
Milton’s own formulation of this relationship. While scholars have criticized Hobbes’s 
thin conception of the contracting individual, the men and women that spring forth 
from Milton’s pages are often embraced as virtuous exemplars of political animals. On 
this issue, Milton’s prose is as dangerously seductive as Satan’s poetry: it shows us a 
version of the individual as capable of developing in the virtues while radically 
independent of others and of tradition. In the prose works of the Civil Wars and 
Interregnum, Milton’s conception of political association is tested as he forays into the 
spirited print debates over the reshaping of England’s domestic, religious, and political 
institutions. In these writings, the depiction of the virtues in A Maske is brought out of 
Comus’s enchanted woods to face a nation in political and social turmoil. After the first 
chapter on A Maske, my project turns to—and does not leave—Milton’s polemical prose. 
This decision was deliberate, but perhaps needs explaining. 
 This dissertation begun as a project on Milton and Milton remains central to my 
analysis. However, over the course of its writing, a methodological concern became 
increasingly clear. My questions about Milton’s notion of the virtues required me to 
carefully trace the development of his thought. While I repeatedly speak of “Milton’s 
conception of the individual and the virtues,” these terms are not meant to represent 
monolithic constants that remain unchanged throughout Milton’s life. Responding in 
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part to the events of the Civil Wars and the Interregnum, Milton’s representation of the 
role of individuals in political association changes from pamphlet to pamphlet. These 
changes, however, do not mirror a consistent development. Even within the same text, 
Milton will produce an often-conflicting depiction of the people of England. In 
attempting to account for these variations and contradictions in the course of writing the 
dissertation, I became interested in tracing what underpinning assumptions of political 
association Milton shared with his contemporaries. In the chapters that follow, I 
endeavor to investigate these contexts with the same care and through the same 
Aristotelian lens that I apply to Milton’s writings. By paying attention to the 
consequences of the rejection of Christian Aristotelianism by not only Milton but also by 
some of his contemporaries, my dissertation brings to light inconsistencies in the mid-
seventeenth-century language of social and political association. In other words, my 
original question about Milton’s conception of the virtues led me to inquire more widely 
about the role that accounts of the virtues played in the political thought of the English 
revolution. 
 Starting with chapter three, my dissertation enters the debate over the language 
of citizenship in the mid-seventeenth-century. Both historians and literary critics 
primarily place Milton’s anti-monarchical and political writings in the context of English 
republicanism. The Civil War—pitting Parliament against king—led Englishmen to re-
 11 
examine the relationship between forms of government, tradition, and customary law. 
Following J. G.A. Pocock’s magisterial account of classical republicanism in The 
Machiavellian Moment, scholars have located in the regicide a turning in how Englishmen 
conceptualized their role in the political life of the nation. Pocock argues that classical 
republicanism, drawing primarily on Aristotle’s Politics, furnishes a new political 
language which allows Englishmen to see themselves as “citizens” participating 
rationally in the political life of the nation. In this account, the regicide presented a stark 
break from traditional modes of social life and provided an opening for the 
development of a truly political form of association. Pocock’s influential model contrasts, 
on the one hand, traditional modes of social life supported by non-rational custom and, 
on the other, rational political association fostered by the balancing of individual 
interests. It is one of the central concerns of this dissertation to question this contrast. In 
Pocock’s account, Aristotle’s conception of the virtues provides the core to the early 
modern language of republican citizenship. Aristotle’s moral and political philosophy, 
reinterpreted by civic humanists, furnished a framework for theories of citizenship.7 
Informed by MacIntyre’s account of Aristotelian ethics and by Aquinas’s own Christian 
version of the virtues, I argue against Pocock’s stark distinction between customary and 
                                                     
7 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 64-75. 
 12 
republican versions of association. Pocock underestimates the account of rational 
political participation essential to Aquinas’s Aristotelian natural law theory. 
 The Machiavellian Moment has proved particularly important in the context of 
Milton criticism. By and large, studies of the literature of the mid-seventeenth-century 
have uncritically assimilated Pocock’s conceptual framework. Prominent among these 
are David Norbrook’s Writing the English Republic, Sharon Achinstein’s Milton and the 
Revolutionary Reader, as well as the collection of essays edited by David Armitage, 
Armand Himy, and Quentin Skinner, Milton and Republicanism.8 These, as well as other, 
studies of Milton place his writings in the context of English republicanism. By accepting 
Pocock’s account of the sharp distinction between the rational nature of republican 
citizenship and the unthinking reliance on custom of juristic thought, literary scholars 
tend to adopt Milton’s own account of English men and women as blinded by an 
idolatrous reliance on tradition. Even those scholars who are critical of some aspects of 
Pocock’s discussion of the emergence of republican thought in England share a 
fundamental agreement about the nature of political rationality. For instance, Norbrook 
accepts the characterization put forth in The Machiavellian Moment by maintaining that 
                                                     
8 David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), Sharon Achinstein, Milton and the Revolutionary Reader (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), and Milton and Republicanism, ed. David Armitage, Armand Himy, and 
Quentin Sinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For a fuller account of the influence of 
Pocock’s history of classical republicanism on Milton studies, see chapter five, section three. 
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focus on civic virtue, rational political participation, and a concern for the “freedom” of 
“the people” is distinctive of republicanism.9 Norbrook’s study meticulously traces the 
development of republican language in England from Thomas May’s translation of 
Lucan’s Pharsalia in 1627 to Milton’s publishing of Paradise Lost in the 1660s and 1670s. 
However, at the same time, Writing the English Republic reduces medieval political theory 
to a precursor of Robert Filmer’s “absolutist thought.” In Norbrook’s account, medieval 
thinkers collapsed the classical distinction between state and family: in “the medieval 
world, with rule in the hands of personal lord, public and private realms became 
inextricably mingled. The polis came under the hegemony of a super-oikos, the household 
of the emperor or monarch.”10 Milton’s republican achievement in, for instance, the 
divorce tracts is to turn each household into a miniature classical polis.11As I argue in 
                                                     
9 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, 18. 
10 Ibid., 115. 
11 Ibid., 117-8. More strikingly, Norbrook maintains that Milton envisions a form of female political 
participation, albeit limited, in his elevation of intellectual and spiritual over physical conversation in the 
divorce tracts (117-8). Here too, Norbrook seems to have unquestioningly assimilated Pocock’s categories of 
thought. In the context of the Putney Debates, Pocock argues that the “radicals” at Putney begun to 
articulate “a new level of civic consciousness” by perceiving themselves in a moment “of freedom 
triumphing over necessity.” In Pocock’s account, Ireton, on the other hand, denied this claim of far-reaching 
“natural liberty” and insisted that Englishmen were still bound by “necessity” and had to be anchored by a 
system of customary law (The Machiavellian Moment, 374-6). Echoing Pocock’s language, Norbrook falls in 
line with Milton’s privileging of the spiritual over the physical: “Sexuality is presented [in the divorce tracts] 
in terms of meeting a bodily need, indentified with the realm of necessity, so that the role of conversation as 
nurturing freedom can be brought out by contrast; the oikos becomes a little polis. […] a good marriage could 
potentially produce an enabling relationship for the male citizen between the household and the private 
sphere” (Writing the English Republic, 118; emphasis mine). Norbrook relegates a brief discussion of Milton’s 
misogynist language in the pamphlets to paragraph, where he mildly comments: “Yet Milton’s divorce 
tracts are riven with contradictions” (118). On my take on this vast understatement, see chapter two below.   
 14 
chapter five, the assimilation of Pocock’s misreading of Aristotelianism as well as of 
medieval Aristotelian thought has distorted our understanding of Milton’s political 
thought.  
 Informed by MacIntyre’s conception of rationality as tradition-bound and by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, my dissertation maintains both that 
Milton’s attack on custom presents a sharp break with the tradition of Aristotelian 
ethical and political thought and that this break has catastrophic consequences for his 
conception of political life. In bringing Aquinas’s account of social life to bear on 
Pocock’s representation of Aristotelian political theory, I aim to address my original 
puzzlement about Milton’s rejection of custom. In the late prose works, Milton argues 
that he writes in order to urge the institution a form of government that will turn 
custom-bound English subjects into rational and virtuous citizens. I suggest that this 
claim can be illuminatingly scrutinized in light of MacIntyre’s account of the 
intelligibility of human action and the narrative unity of human life. As MacIntyre 
explains, Aquinas’s formulation of the virtues affords a view of human life as having the 
potential for unity and directedness. Custom, rather than hinder rational deliberation 
about political association, forms part of the shared narrative that helps us to make our 
actions intelligible.
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1. Milton’s “freedom of the mind”: The Virtues in “A 
Maske” 
 
The sports began each day in manner and such sorte, as well nigh persuaded me of 
Mahomets paradise. We had women, and indeed wine too, of such plenty, as would have 
astonished each sober beholder. […] I do often say (but not aloud) that the Danes have again 
conquered the Britains, for I see no man, or woman either, that can now command himself or 
herself.1 
 
Diis etenim sacer est vates, divumque sacerdos, 
Spirat et occultum pectus, et ora Iovem. 
At tu siquid agam scitabere […] 
Paciferum canimus caelesti semine regem 
Faustaque sacritis saecula pacta libris, 
Vagitumque Dei, et stabulantem pauper tecto 
Qui suprema suo cum patre regna colit.2 
 
In his 1629 verse letter to Diodati, Milton distinguishes between two types of 
poet: the writer of light love verses, who may be often drunk with old wine, and the 
writer of serious poetry, who should only drink “the clearest water.” The latter kind of 
poet not only must follow an austere diet, but must also demonstrate “scelerisque 
                                                     
1 The Letters and Epigrams of Sir John Harington: Together with the Prayse of Private Life, ed. Norman Egbert 
McClure (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1930), 119-21. 
2 “For a bard is sacred to the gods, and a priest to the gods, and both his hidden heart and mouth breathe 
forth Jove. But if you would know what I am doing […], we are singing the peace-brining king of heavenly 
seed, and the happy ages promised in the sacred books, and the baby cries of God, and the stabling under a 
poor roof of him who inhabits the highest kingdom with his father” (Elegy VI. To Charles Diodati, staying in 
the country, ll 77-84). All quotes from Milton’s poetry are from: The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose of John 
Milton, ed. Kerrigan, William, John Rumrich, and Stephen M. Fallon (New York: Random House, 2007).  
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vacans et casta iuventus,/ Et rigidi mores, et sine labe manus” (“a youth free of crime 
and chaste, and strict moral, and a hand free from stain,” 63-4).  The young Milton of 
course chooses the sobriety of the poet of Jove and sends to Diodati a portrait of holiday 
pastimes that are consonant with that “casta iuventus” necessary for the formation of a 
“hand free from stain” and capable of writing a divine poem. The poet’s self-
representation as a chaste bard is reiterated in An Apology Against a Pamphlet (1642), 
where, against accusations of being a frequenter of brothels, he reminds the reader of his 
vocation as a writer of divine verse: “he who would not be frustrate of his hope to write 
well hereafter in laudable things, ought himself to be a true Poem; that is, a composition, 
and patterne of the best and most honourablest things.”3 The idea of virtuous abstention 
from temptation, of rejection of the intoxicating wine of the frivolous poet, is a recurring 
trope in Milton’s self-representations, a trope that is central to A Maske Presented at 
Ludlow Castle (1634). In this early theatrical work, falling from virtue is symbolized by 
tasting the “sweet poison” of Bacchus (47).4 Whoever tastes Comus’s “orient liquor” is 
instantly transformed into a grotesque icon of sin: 
                                                     
3 Complete Prose Works of John Milton, gen. ed. Don M. Wolfe (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953-
82), I:890. Throughout the dissertation, all quotes from Milton’s prose works will be from this edition and 
cited parenthetically as CPW followed by volume and then page.  
4 Milton’s A Maske Presented at Ludlow exists in five versions: the Bridgewater MS; the Trinity MS (written in 
Milton’s hand); a 1637 version printed by Henry Lawes, who wrote the songs for the Maske; and two version 
printed with Milton’s Poems in 1645 and 1673 (S. E. Sprott, ed., John Milton: A Maske, The Earlier Versions 
(Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1973), 3). I use the 1645 version of the masque since we can 
assume Milton’s full control of the text. For Milton’s reaction to Henry Lawes’ publication of the acting 
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 Soon as the potion works, their human count’nance, 
Th’express resemblance of the gods, is changed 
Into some brutish form of wolf, or bear, 
Or ounce, or tiger, or hog, or bearded goat, 
All other parts remaining as they were; 
And they, so perfect is their misery, 
Not once perceive their foul disfigurement. 
But boast themselves more comely than before, 
And all their friends and native home forget 
To roll with pleasure in a sensual sty. (68-77) 
 
Through the “intemperate thirst” that leads them to partake of Comus’s cup, the 
revelers lose “their human count’nance” and become bestial figures incapable of 
distinguishing between mere sensual pleasures and what is truly good. 
Seventeenth-century masques were primarily private entertainments; their aim 
was to celebrate and include their audience.5 Milton’s masque is written to be performed 
by three children of the Earl of Bridgewater and, in her leading role as the Lady, the 
fifteen years old Alice Egerton celebrated the virtue of chastity.6 A Maske explores the 
problem of discernment when dangerous temptations are disguised and presented as 
                                                     
 
manuscript of A Maske, see Barbara Lewalski, “Milton’s Comus and the Politics of Masquing,” in The Politics 
of the Stuart Court Masque, ed. David Bevington and Peter Holbrook (Cambridge, 1998), 307. 
5 With this aim in mind, court masques usually ended with the masquers selecting partners from the 
audience and including them in a final dance (Stephen Orgel, “The Case for Comus,” Representations 81 
(2003): 31). 
6 While the virtue of chastity was well suited to the age and gender of the Lady, the topic was particularly 
sensitive for the Bridgewater family. The sister of the Early of Bridgewater was married to the Earl of 
Castlehaven who, three years prior to the writing of A Maske, was found guilty of and executed for a series 
of cruel sexual crimes against his wife and her daughter (Barbara K. Lewalski, The Life of John Milton 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 58-9). 
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licit pleasures. Unlike the “fugitive and cloister’d” virtue that Milton would denigrate in 
Areopagitica (CPW II:515), the Lady’s chastity must face temptation and temperately and 
correctly discern the true nature of Comus’ offerings. The link between temperance, 
chastity, and right reason that drives much of the rhetorical sparring between the Lady 
and Comus in A Maske finds its immediate ancestor in the episode of Acrasia in Book II 
of the Faerie Queene: 
  Said [the Palmer], these seeming beasts are men indeed, 
  Whom this Enchauntresse hath transformed thus, 
  Whylome her louers, which her lusts did feed, 
  Now turned into figures hideous, 
  According to their minds like monstruous. 
  Sad end (quoth he [Guyon]) of life intemperate, 
  And mournefull meed of ioyes delicious. (II.xii.85)7 
 
Guyon, upon hearing the Palmer’s explanation of the brutish transformation of Acrasia’s 
lovers, links their lust to intemperance. Similarly, in Milton’s masque, Comus reproaches 
the Lady’s refusal of the proffered cup by accusing her of unnecessary temperance and 
“lean and sallow Abstinence” (709). With a logic similar to Guyon’s linking of lust with 
intemperance, Comus moves from a negatively depicted form of temperance to that 
“vaunted name Virginity” (738). What then is the connection between “the serious 
                                                     
7 All quotes from The Faerie Queene are from: Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, ed. Thomas P. Roche, Jr. 
and C. Patrick O’Donnell, Jr. (New York: Penguin, 1987). In writing the figure of Comus, Milton could have 
relied on Ovid, Homer, or, more immediately, on the figure of Circe in Tempe Restored. However, 
throughout A Maske there are multiple echoes of Spenser’s Faerie Queene. For a discussion of the influence of 
Spenser’s representation of chastity in Book III of the Faerie Queene in A Maske, see David Norbrook, Poetry 
and Politics in the English Renaissance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 238-42. 
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doctrine of Virginity” (787) and the “holy dictate of spare Temperance” (767)? Why does 
a work dedicated to the praise of chastity base its affirmation of virtue on the “freedom 
of the mind”? In A Maske, Milton begins to limn the connection between reason and 
virtue that will be developed in his later writing. As I will argue, Milton transforms 
Spenser’s representation of intemperance to reinterpret an Aristotelian concept of right 
reason. At the same time, Milton’s reworking of Aristotle’s model of rational action 
produces a version of human agency and reason that is at odds with the processes of 
virtuous education put forward in the masque. 
Much of the critical debate surrounding A Maske produced since the New 
Historicist studies of the 1970s and 1980s has focused on interpreting Milton’s politics 
and ecclesiology as expressed by his engagement with the genre of the masque. 
Beginning with Stephen Orgel’s The Illusion of Power (1975), the aesthetics of the court 
masque have been linked with Stuart politics, and Milton’s A Maske has been read as an 
attempt at reforming the genre.8 More recently, the understanding of Milton’s 
                                                     
8 For influential discussions of A Maske as a reformed (and even “radical”) example of the genre, see 
Maryann Cale McGuire, Milton’s Puritan Masque (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1983); David 
Norbrook, “The Reformation of the Masque,” in ed. David Lindley, The Court Masque (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984), 94-110; Cedric C. Brown, John Milton’s Aristocratic Entertainments 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); David Loewenstein, ‘“Fair Offspring Nurs’t in Princely 
Lore:” On the Question of Milton’s Early Radicalism,’ Milton Studies 28 (1992): 37-48; and Barbara Lewalski, 
“Milton’s Comus and the Politics of Masquing,” in ed. David Bevington and Peter Holbrook, The Politics of 
the Stuart Court Masque (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 296-320. Lewlaski, in particular, 
sees Milton as striking a balance between court and Puritan values to recreate the genre of the masque as an 
educational form: “Arcades and A Maske develop a stance toward art and recreation that repudiates both 
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entertainments as in line with his later radical politics has come under attack, most 
notably by Gordon Campbell and Thomas Corns. In their biography of Milton, John 
Milton: Life, Work, and Thought (2008), they argue the young poet is far from being the 
radical pamphleteer of the 1640s. In their reading, “[t]he Attendant Spirit has some of 
the characteristics of grace, as conceptualized in Arminian soteriology.”9 More precisely, 
they argue that, differing from Milton’s later Arminianism, as delineated in Paradise Lost, 
the soteriology of the early masque is Laudian: “[I]n the masque, as in Laudian 
Arminianism, external agencies function as vital catalysts. This is the role that the clergy 
and the ceremonies they promote have within the church. In part, that role is discharged 
by some aspects of the Attendant Spirit, in part also by the Brothers, but most 
significantly by Sabrina.”10 This type of analysis tries to categorize Milton’s political, 
ecclesiological, and social thinking by selecting a given aspect of A Maske—be it his 
transformation of the Jonsonian masque or his alleged allusion to Laudian ritual—and 
                                                     
 
court aesthetics and the Puritan wholesale prohibitions. Associating better aesthetics with the values of a 
virtuous Protestant aristocracy, Milton’s entertainments seek both to confirm and to educate these noble 
families in these good values” (297). Similarly, Leah S. Marcus, in The Politics of Mirth (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1986), sees A Maske as a symbolic annihilation of royal power (a power to be replaced, at 
least at Ludlow, by the Earl of Bridgewater’s virtuous rule) by arousing and then subverting generic 
expectations (169-212). 
9 Gordon Campbell and Thomas N. Corns, John Milton: Life, Work, and Thought (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 83. 
10 Loc. Cit. The relatively brief argument for Milton’s early Laudianism presented in the biography is based 
on a more detailed and focused study by Thomas Corns, “Milton before ‘Lycidas’” in ed. Graham Parry and 
Joad Raymond, Milton and the Terms of Liberty (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2002); 23-36. 
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using it as the critical key that will decode the poet’s thinking. For Corns and Campell, 
Sabrina’s sprinkling of water is a clear echo of the sacraments. On the other hand, for 
Leah S. Marcus, Henry Lawes’ performance as the Attendant Spirit, when read in 
connection to his participation in the production of Coelum Britannicum at Whitehall, can 
yield the opposite conclusion, that is, A Maske engages in anti-Laudian and anti-court 
poetics. 
While the studies mentioned above have helped to clarify the context and the 
web of allusions of Milton’s masque, their symmetrically opposed conclusions warn us 
that the search for independent elements that serve as interpretive keys inserted, 
consciously or otherwise, by the author to flag his political and religious allegiances can 
prove frustrating and inconclusive if detached from a clear understanding of the 
intellectual framework that underpins the deployment of any given factor in his poetry 
or prose.11 More precisely, if we want to understand Milton’s conception of grace, 
human free will, and reason, we need to grasp the categories of thought employed by 
the poet: How does his understanding of the role of grace play into the Lady’s reliance 
on virtue in her encounter with Comus? And how does Milton’s concept of virtue itself 
                                                     
11 In a move characteristic of much of this debate, Thomas Corns,  in an otherwise rich and moderate essay, 
claims that “The Passion” exhibits an “idiom that Laud could have relished” when the incarnate Christ is 
described as “a “sovran priest, stooping his regal head/ That dropped with odorous oil down his fair eyes” 
(“Milton before ‘Lycidas’”  29, quoting lines 15-6). By the same logic, Laud, had he been alive to read it, 
would have applauded the passage in Paradise Lost where we find Adam and Eve offering “prayers, which 
in this golden censer, mixed/ With incense, I thy priest before thee bring” (XI.24-5; emphasis mine). 
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differ from Aristotle’s? These questions need to be answered if we want to understand 
where Milton’s early poetry fits theologically, ecclesiastically, and politically in the 
development of his thought. Indeed, if in 1645, Milton still included in the middle of his 
collected poems a decisively Laudian text where “external agencies function as vital 
catalysts,” how are we to reconcile this to the language of Areopagitica (1644) and his 
growing disenchantment with Presbyterian, as well as Laudian, ecclesiology? What 
exactly is the freedom of the mind envisioned by Milton? 
1.1 Brutish Slavery and Aristotelian Liberty 
In the second book of Of Reformation (1641), Milton describes the telos of a 
Christian monarchy in clearly Aristotelian terms: 
They teach not that to govern well is to train up a Nation in true wisdom and 
virtue, and that which springs from thence magnanimity, (take heed of that) and 
that which is our beginning, regeneration, and happiest end, likeness to God, 
which in one word we call godlines, & that this is the true flourishing of a Land, 
other things follow as the shadow does the substance: to teach thus were meer 
pulpitry to them. This is the masterpiece of a modern politician, how to qualifie, 
and mould the sufferance and subjection of the people to the length of that foot 
that it to tread their necks […] To make men governable in this manner their 
precepts mainly tend to break a nationall spirit, and courage by count’nancing 
upon riot, luxury, and ignorance, till having thus disfigur’d and made men 
beneath men, as Juno in the Fable of Iö, they deliver up the poor transformed 
heifer of the Commonwealth to be stung and vext with the breese, and goad of 
oppression under the custody of some Argus with a hundred eyes of jealousie. 
[…] Alas Sir! a Commonwelth ought to be but as one huge Christian personage, 
one mighty growth, and stature of an honest man, as big, and compact in vertue 
as in body; for looke what the grounds, and causes are of single happiness to one 
man, the same yee shall find them to a whole state, as Aristotle both in his ethicks, 
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and politiks, from the principles of reason layes down. (CPW I:571-2; underlining 
mine) 
 
In his first anti-prelatical tract, Milton alludes to The Nicomachean Ethics and The Politics 
to remind his readers of the connection between private and public virtue; virtuous 
citizens are needed to form a healthy commonwealth. The passage compares the 
“modern politician’s” Machiavellian molding of citizens for subjection, to Aristotle’s 
stated goal of politics in the Ethics: “political science is concerned most of all with 
producing citizens of a certain kind, namely, those who are both good and the sort to 
perform noble actions” (1099b).12 To follow this main precept of political science, the 
legislator ought to urge virtue through his laws and punish those who behave viciously. 
More importantly, for Aristotle, the legislation of a good polis is meant to make possible 
the right form of education and thus allow its citizens to become habituated in the 
virtues: “[I]f one has not been reared under the right laws it is difficult to obtain from 
one’s earliest years the correct upbringing for virtue, because the masses, especially the 
young, do not find it pleasant to live temperately and with endurance. For this reason, 
their upbringing and pursuits should be regulated by laws, because they will not find 
them painful once they have become accustomed to them” (1179b). This is the model of a 
                                                     
12 All quotes from the Ethics are from Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and ed. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). Citations from this work will be given parenthetically in the text 
throughout the dissertation. 
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good legislator that Milton wants his readers to remember as he develops his argument 
for a Presbyterian Church polity in Of Reformation.  
Moreover, to drive home the importance of good politicians, Milton uses the 
description of the commonwealth as transformed-Io to recall the language of slavery in 
The Politics. In Book I, Aristotle addresses the question of whether slavery is right or 
against nature (1254a-1255a).13 In answering that slavery is indeed natural—that in fact 
“from their hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule” 
(1254a)—Aristotle creates a parallel between soul and body, man and animal, and master 
and slave:  
Where there is such a difference as between soul and body, or between men and 
animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can 
do nothing better), the lower sorts are by nature slaves, and it is better for them 
as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. […] And indeed 
the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with 
their bodies minister to the needs of life. (1254b) 
 
The connection between the body, animals, and those who “are by nature slaves” recalls 
the discussion in book ten of The Nicomachean Ethics on happiness and sensual pleasures. 
There, Aristotle begins by considering whether a life of amusements can be called 
happy: 
                                                     
13 All quotes are from Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Jonathan Barnes, ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). Citations from this work will be given parenthetically in the text 
throughout the dissertation. 
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pleasurable amusements also seem [worthy of choice in themselves]; for people 
do not choose them for the sake of other things, since they are more harmed than 
benefited by them, through failing to take care of their bodies and their property. 
And most of those called happy have recourse to pastimes like this, which is why 
those who are adroit in them are highly esteemed at the courts of tyrants; they 
offer themselves as pleasant purveyors of what the tyrants are after, and the 
tyrants want people like this. And so these amusements seem to be connected 
with happiness, because those in positions of power spend their leisure time on 
them. (1176b) 
 
While these sorts of amusements may at first seem desirable for their own sakes, that is, 
they may seem to be true goods, Aristotle quickly dismisses them as not capable of 
giving real happiness. Sensual enjoyments can be had by anyone, even slaves, and 
therefore they cannot possibly lead a citizen to happiness: “absolutely anyone, a slave no 
less than the best people, can enjoy the bodily pleasures; but no one attributes a share in 
happiness to a slave, unless he also attributes to him a share in the life we live” (1177a). 
Just as a free citizen of the polis could not possibly learn how to live happily by imitating 
an ox, neither could he achieve happiness by indulging in the kind of entertainments 
that would please a slave. Virtue is a necessary component in a full human life. 
A Maske also highlights the Aristotelian connection between freedom and virtue 
that is found in Of Reformation. The issue of freedom is raised most urgently in Comus’s 
palace. The description of the setting is telling and recalls Aristotle’s palace of tyrants as 
much as the court of Charles I: “The scene changes to a stately palace, set out with all 
manner of deliciousness: soft music, tables spread with all dainties” (Milton’s stage 
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directions, after line 658). It is in this “stately palace” that Comus tries to tempt the Lady 
with his magic cup: “Comus appears with his rabble, and the Lady set in an enchanted 
chair, to whom he offers his glass, which she puts by, and goes about to rise” (stage 
directions, ibid.). As she attempts to leave the chair, the Lady is prevented by Comus 
who threatens her with his occult powers: “Nay, Lady, sit; if I but wave this wand/ Your 
nerves are all chained up in alabaster” (659-60). The Lady’s response to Comus’s threat 
opposes her inner strength and freedom to his binding of her body: “Thou canst not 
touch the freedom of my mind/ With all thy charms, although this corporeal rind/ Thou 
hast immanacled” (663-5). The freedom of the mind is, to use Stanley Fish’s words, 
“everything that matters” to Milton, and this becomes evident when the Lady has been 
stripped of every other support.14 But how exactly is her freedom of the mind related to 
her unshakable virtue?  
Milton’s praise of freedom has often been taken as a sign of a form of 
antinomianism. Notably, Stanley Fish argues that, in the masque and thus as early as the 
1630s, the poet does not construct rigid categories of virtuous versus vicious actions, but 
rather assigns ethical values based on moral status of the agent: “The Lady is not good 
because she does X; rather, X is good because she does it. And exactly the reverse is true 
of the actions and offers of Comus, which are intended (by Milton) less to persuade than 
                                                     
14 Stanley Fish, How Milton Works (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2001), 151-2. 
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to supply the other pole of the two worldviews the mask is always contrasting.”15 In this 
view, the work of the masque is to stage for its audience a representation of free virtue 
in action. Even the intervention of Sabrina at the behest of the brothers is meant “to 
underline the freedom of virtue, which is as independent (in its own sphere) of heavenly 
intervention as it is immovable before the lure of earthly temptations.”16 The masque’s 
fit audience can learn from its performance by understanding and recognizing that 
virtue does not consist in doing a set of specific actions, but rather in having internalized 
a certain “hierarchy of loyalties.”17 It is this ordering of values that allows the Lady to 
correctly reason about and interpret the dark woods, Comus’s offer, and the proper use 
of Nature’s bounty. In Reviving Liberty, Joan Bennett refines this understanding of the 
antinomian Milton and argues that, at least by the time of the writing of the late poems, 
the role of Miltonic right reason is “to balance all applicable laws in a noncontradictory 
hierarchy consistent with the unified divine purpose, with ‘natural law,’ ultimate truth. 
This rational balancing is a normal activity of the divine spirit within us,” akin to the 
Aristotelian notion of striving for the mean.18 Thus, while any particular commandment 
may be broken, this can only be done “in deference to a rationally understood higher 
                                                     
15 Ibid., 157. 
16 Ibid., 159. 
17 Ibid., 156. 
18 Joan S. Bennett, Reviving Liberty: Radical Christian Humanism in Milton’s Great Poems (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), 110. 
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purpose of the whole law.”19 This balancing act is the proper use of human reason and 
free will as created in the image of divine rationality.20 It is this view of Miltonic reason 
and freedom as Aristotelian that I would like to question. 
At the beginning of A Maske, Milton illustrates the consequences of having lost 
the freedom of one’s mind. To the audience of the masque, the dangers of drinking from 
the charmed cup would have been apparent even before Comus’s entrance on the stage. 
The Attendant Spirit, in his first speech, describes the dangers of the “sweet poison of 
misused wine” (47) and warns that all those who drink of it “through fond intemperate 
thirst” (67) are turned into “brutish form” (70). The Spirit’s depiction of the rioters is 
confirmed by the physical appearance of the revelers once they do step onto the stage. 
Comus’s first speech begins by sounding benign enough, if unruly: “welcome joy, and 
feast,/ Midnight shout, and revelry,/ Tipsy dance, and jollity” (102-4). His speech only 
turns ominous once Comus invokes Cotytto: “Hail goddess of nocturnal sport,/ Dark-
veiled Cotytto” (128-9). However, while the beginning of Comus’s speech may have 
sounded innocuous to the audience, the appearance of the cast of rioters would have 
contradicted these words and anticipated the invocation of Cotytto. His company is 
                                                     
19 Loc. Cit. 
20 Ibid., 9-11. For Bennett, Milton is the heir of Hooker and a tradition of Christian humanism that values 
reason not as a limited instrument that can only be applied to the material world, but as right reason. She 
argues that the Anglican support of the Stuart doctrine of divine right is a repudiation of Hooker’s 
understanding of human free will as based on the rational nature of God (Reviving Liberty, 6-32). 
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described as “a rout of monsters headed like sundry sorts of wild beasts” (Milton’s stage 
directions; after line 92). The effects of intemperance are thus made clear to the audience 
twice: once by the introductory speech of the Attendant Spirit, and the second time by 
the actual appearance of Comus and his followers. The audience has a privileged view 
and therefore should not be deceived by the enchanter’s “dazzling spells” (154) and 
“glozing courtesy” (161). The Lady, on the other hand, will be denied exactly this visual 
revelation of the effects of “intemperate thirst” (64) on Comus’s followers.  
Milton, however, does not always give the audience a privileged view in A 
Maske. While in her first encounter with Comus, the Lady is fooled by his disguise and 
spells, in her first appearance in the masque, she is granted a vision denied to the 
audience. Approaching the place of Comus’s revels, the Lady begins to fear that the 
sounds of “riot and ill-managed merriment” (172) heard in the woods are signs of 
danger. Imagining a “thousand fantasies” (205), she is afraid, but her fear lasts only a 
moment: 
  These thoughts may startle well, but not astound 
  The virtuous mind, that ever walks attended 
  By a strong siding champion Conscience.— 
  O welcome pure-eyed Faith, white handed Hope, 
  Thou hovering angel girt with golden wings, 
  And thou unblemished form of Chastity, 
  I see ye visibly, and now believe 
  That he, the Supreme Good, t’whom all things ill 
  Are but as slavish officers of vengeance, 
  Would send a glist’ring guarding if need were 
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  To keep my life and honor unassailed. (210-20; emphasis mine) 
 
While the spectator of the masque has been given a privileged view into the true nature 
of Comus and the rioters, the audience does not see the virtues invoked by the Lady in 
this passage. What the masque does not explicitly present is an allegorical embodiment 
of the Faith, Hope, and Chastity. Their personifications are called to mind by the Lady’s 
speech, but they are not physically present on the stage.  
By way of contrast we need only recall one of the many entertainments offered to 
King James earlier in the century. Among the “sports” alluded to by Sir John Harington 
in the letter quoted in the epigraph to this chapter, we find a performance in which 
Faith, Hope, and Charity address James I in a (misfired) compliment: 
Now did appear, in rich dress, Hope, Faith, and Charity: Hope did assay to 
speak, but wine renderd her endeavours so feeble that she withdrew, and hope 
the King would excuse her brevity: Faith was then all alone, for I am certain she 
was not joined with good works, and left the court in a staggering condition: 
Charity came to the King’s feet, and seemed to cover the multitude of sins her 
sisters had committed; in some sorte she made obeisance and brought giftes, but 
said she would return home again, as there was no gift which heaven had not 
already given his Majesty. She then returned to Hope and Faith, who were both 
sick and spewing in the lower hall.21 
 
                                                     
21The Letters and Epigrams of Sir John Harington, 119. My attention was first drawn to this letter by Leah S. 
Marcus’s quoting this passage in The Politics of Mirth (10). The use of allegorical figures was of course 
common in masques and their roles were at times acted, at least during the reign of Charles I, by the King 
and Queen themselves (see, for instance, Lewalski, Barbara, “Milton’s Comus and the Politics of Masquing,” 
296-7). 
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There is no such allegory in A Maske. Strikingly, while sin is made evident in the visage 
of the rioters who, almost like Dante’s sinful souls, embody their own debauchery, there 
are no personifications of the virtues in A Maske. The three virtues are shown only to the 
Lady, who is given the ability to see what no spectator can. The virtues’ presence, 
however, is evidenced by the effects that they bring about in the Lady. For her, Faith, 
Hope, and Chastity appear “visibly” (216), and, immediately, evoke a belief in the active 
agency of providence: “I see ye visibly, and now believe” (216; emphasis mine). Having 
“seen” the virtues once, the Lady never swerves from her steady faith in providence.  
She is not afraid of following Comus disguised as a shepherd because she believes that 
her moral strength will not be tested beyond its abilities: “Eye me blest Providence, and 
square my trial/ To my proportioned strength. Shepherd lead on” (329-30). Having been 
given the pattern of the virtues “visibly,” the Lady knows herself capable of correctly 
measuring all temptations against them. 
 Is she right? The Lady of course resists temptation. At no point do we believe 
that she will give in to Comus’s offers and taste his “cordial julep” (672). It is clear that 
she is capable of matching the enchanter’s eloquence; she can supply Virtue with the 
“tongue to check [Vice’s] pride” (761). At the same time, her encounter with Comus 
indicates a tension between her first belief that a “glist’ring guardian” would appear to 
keep her “life and honor unassailed” (219-20) and her subsequent trust in Providence to 
 32 
only send trials “proportioned to her strength” (330). In her second statement, she no 
longer claims that her virtue is not “unassailed.” What resources does she have to 
withstand Comus’s temptations? And does the masque tell us how she has acquired 
such resources? A Maske is an example of a genre particularly concerned with 
instructing its audience, but, according to Stanley Fish, Milton gives a very limited 
answer to the question of what we can learn from the Lady. In How Milton Works, Fish 
argues that the Lady’s trial is an illusion. She does not actually do anything. Her only 
duty is to bear witness to virtue: “Her moment of trial (or, more properly, of self-
explification) requires an affirmation, and we are required to comprehend it; the text for 
both is the same: ‘Thou canst not touch the freedom of my mind.’”22 Indeed, according to 
Fish, in all of Milton’s early works, there is no real growth towards virtue:  
In the early poetry and prose, we meet the members of these two categories 
[regenerate and unregenerate] already fully formed and forever alien to one 
another […]. There is no sense of possible movement in either direction, and 
consequently there is no genuine role for time, which is imagined not as the 
vehicle for change but as a succession of spaces in which agents already 
constituted (either in truth or in its opposite) testify to what they are and what 
they are not.23 
In this reading then, the Lady’s transition from fear at hearing the noise from Comus’s 
revels to belief at her vision of Faith, Hope, and Chastity is simply a self-recognition of 
her own “freedom of the mind.” That is, whatever carries her through her trial is already 
                                                     
22 Stanley Fish, How Milton Works, 153. 
23 Ibid., 215-6. 
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present in her at the start of the masque. Moreover, the reader who is not already 
regenerate cannot learn how to become so from the Lady’s defense of virtue. In How 
Milton Works, A Maske is viewed as a spectacular example of what is celebrated by the 
Chorus of Marvell’s “A Dialogue, Between the Resolved Soul, and Created Pleasure”:  
  Earth cannot show so brave a sight 
  As when a single soul does fence 
  The batt’ries of alluring sense, 
  And Heaven views it with delight.24 
 
In Marvell’s poem, the reader is presented with a disembodied Soul refusing the 
temptations offered by Pleasure while the Chorus exhorts the Soul to remain virtuous. 
Like the Lady, the “single soul” remains firms against a series of temptations offered her 
by Pleasure. Presented with “Nature’s banquet” (14), the Soul rejects it and tersely 
replies: “I sup above, and cannot stay/ To bait so long upon the way” (17-8). 
While Marvell’s “A Dialogue” draws heavily on Paradise Lost, pairing Marvell’s 
poem with A Maske helps to highlight the importance of the Lady’s isolation.25  Her 
external guides have been stripped away and she is left alone in the woods. For Fish, 
this is the central point of the masque: “Friends, light, vision, hearing, direction—one by 
one they are taken from her, until in Comus’s lair she is deprived even of her mobility 
and is left with nothing at all. Yet, as it turns out, she is left with everything—everything 
                                                     
24 The Poems of Andrew Marvell, ed. Nigel Smith (London: Pearson Longman, 2007), ll. 45-8; emphasis mine. 
25 The tentative dating of Marvell’s poem to 1667 is based on the publication of the first edition of Milton’s 
epic (The Poems of Andrew Marvell, 33). 
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that matters,” that is the freedom of the mind. 26 What is the difference between the Soul 
in “A Dialogue” and the Lady paralyzed on the chair? On one level, nothing. Through 
the device of Comus’s enchantment, Milton has brought the Lady to a situation that is 
very similar to that of Marvell’s disembodied Soul. Both are presented with worldly and 
sensual temptations. Both resist by remembering that they must strive for a higher 
purpose than physical enjoyment. On another level, however, everything in the masque 
fights against the model of temptation represented in Marvell’s poem. In “A Dialogue,” 
Pleasure tries to allure the Soul with physical and material enticements, but many of 
these baits are strangely incorporeal. In his poem, Marvell does not present a hungering 
individual lured by appetizing food, but rather a soul tempted with “the souls of fruits 
and flowers” (15). In Milton’s masque, instead, the Lady is alone and vulnerable because 
her brothers notice that she is “wearied out/ With this long way” (182-3). Her physical 
weakness is what exposes her to Comus’s temptations. It is to alleviate her hunger and 
thirst that they step “to the next thicket” to bring her “berries, or such fruit/ As the kind 
hospitable wood provide” (185-7). Similarly, the Younger Brother is worried about the 
physical discomfort that their lost sister might be suffering. He worries about the “chill 
dew” and the “rude burs and thistles” (352), and imagines that “[p]erhaps some cold 
bank is her bolster now/ Or’gainst the rugged bark of some broad elm/ Leans her 
                                                     
26 Stanley Fish, How Milton Works, 152. 
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unpillowed head frought with sad fears” (353-5). The Lady’s physical body is an 
essential part of A Maske.  
Thus, while she resists temptation by declaration that she only needs the 
freedom of the mind, the Lady is not Marvell’s disembodied soul. Indeed, one of the 
central questions of her debate with Comus is how to interpret physical reality. Unlike 
the revelers, the Lady does not succumb to their bestial slavery of the flesh. Nonetheless, 
the enchanter realizes that cold, thirst, and hunger can be a powerful aid in his attempt 
to seduce her.  He describes his drink as “[t]o life so friendly” and “cool to thirst” (678). 
It is by reminding the Lady of her need for the gifts of all-giving Nature that Comus 
begins to tempt her: 
  Why should you be so cruel to yourself, 
  And to those dainty limbs which Nature lent 
  For gentle usage and soft delicacy? 
  But you invert the cov’nants of her trust, 
  And harshly deal like an ill borrower 
  With that which you received on other terms, 
  Scorning the unexempt condition 
  By which all mortal frailty must subsist, 
  Refreshment after toil, ease after pain, 
  That have been tired all day without repast, 
  And timely rest have wanted. (679-89) 
 
Comus’s language echoes that of Despair in Book I of the Faerie Queene. In Canto 9, the 
Redcrosse Knight comes upon a “drearie corse” and threatens revenge against Despair, 
whom he accuses of being the “author of this fact” (I.ix.36). Despair answers that it is not 
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“vniust to each his due to give” (I.ix.38) and that in death, one finally finds “Sleepe after 
toyle, port after stormie seas,/ Ease after warre” (I.ix.40). Redcrosse has been travelling 
through dangerous and tempting woods and the words of Despair remind him that he 
has sinned repeatedly: “The knight was much enmoued with his speech/ […]/ And to his 
fresh remembrance did reuerse/ The vgly view of his deformed crimes” (I.ix.48). The 
knight takes the knife that Despair hands to him and “At last resolu’d to worke his finall 
smart,/ He lifted vp his hand” (I.ix.51). He is, however, saved by Una’s intervention, 
who “snatch the cursed knife” (I.ix.52) from his hands and takes him to the House of 
Holiness. There, he is taught by Fidelia from her “sacred Booke” (I.x.19), comforted by 
Speranza, and instructed in “loue, and righteousnesse, and well to donne” by Charissa 
(I.x.33). It is through his progress in the House of Holiness and through the 
ministrations of Faith, Hope, and Charity that the Redcrosse Knight is prepared for the 
vision of the covenant of Grace that he receives by climbing “the hightest Mount” with 
Contemplation  (I.x.53). 
As we have seen above, the Lady, however, has already received a vision of faith, 
hope, and chastity. She is steadfast in her faith and Comus tempts her with 
“refreshment,” rather than “sleepe,” after toil. Spenser’s Redcrosse is restored to the 
covenant of Grace after his encounter with Despair by the figure of Contemplation. 
Comus, instead, scolds the Lady for betraying the “cov’nants” of Nature. He attempts to 
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lead the Lady to understand her own body as the rule by which to judge what is good 
for her. Since her limbs are “dainty,” she is meant for “gentle usage and soft delicacy,” 
or so goes the enchanter’s reasoning. In Comus’s view, an individual’s purpose can be 
deduced from her apparent nature. Comus returns to this argument after the Lady’s first 
refusal of the cup. In his alluring carpe diem poem in lines 737-755, he reiterates his 
argument that we can deduce our proper end from our appearance: “coarse 
complexïons/ And cheeks of sorry grain will serve to ply/ The sampler, and to tease the 
housewife’s wool” (749-51). The Lady’s beauty, instead, has another use and meaning: 
“What need a vermeil-tinctured lip for that,/ Love-darting eyes, or tresses like the 
morn?/ There was another meaning in these gifts” (752-4; emphasis mine). Meaning is 
evident in the thing itself with no need of external interpretive rules. The Lady’s reply to 
this line of reasoning turns against Comus his own language: “Impostor, do not charge 
most innocent Nature,/ […] she good cateress/ Means her provisions only to the good” 
(762, 764-5; emphasis mine). While both interlocutors are using the language of 
“meaning/to mean,” the logic behind their respective arguments is markedly different. 
For the Lady, meaning can only be known by understanding the intentions of Nature, 
“she good cateress/ means her provisions.” This play on grammar, the change from noun 
to verb, allows Milton gently to alert the reader (even more so than the original 
spectators) that to understand the meaning of Nature’s gifts, we need to know how she 
 38 
means them to be used; that is, we need to know their extrinsic end and their proper 
use.27 Moreover, we will not be able to discover how to correctly use Nature’s bounty, if 
we do not know our own telos. For the Lady, the worth of things is not intrinsic in their 
own properties, but can be understood from their uses and from the moral status of 
those using them: only those who “are good men can give good things,/ And that which 
is not good, is not delicious/ To a well-governed and wise appetite” (703-5). The 
difference between each object’s surface properties and the ends to which it is used is 
highlighted by the distinction between a drink being good and being delicious. Taste, 
being delicious, should be inherent in the object itself, but, for the Lady, it is dependent 
on the agent dispensing the drink.  
1.2 Misinterpreting Temperance as “sallow Abstinence”: The 
Lady’s Reply to Comus 
To fully comprehend the difference between the Lady’s and Comus’s conception 
of meaning and interpretation, we need to lay out more explicitly the connections 
between proper ends of objects and the moral status of an agent. However, before 
turning to this task, I would like to bring in for comparison a blunter version of the 
                                                     
27 John Donne, in his Paradoxes and Problems xii, seems to create a similar tension between both ideas of 
meaning by making a virtue of temporary virginity as long as it is relinquished in a timely and appropriate 
manner: “For surely nothing is more unprofitable in the commonwealth of Nature, than they that dy old 
maids, because they refuse to be used to that end for which they were only made” (The Complete Poetry and 
Selected Prose of John Donne, ed. Charles M. Coffin (New York: Random House, 2001), 304). The meaning of 
one condition, virginity, is deduced from its future end, rather than from its current state. Thus, virginity 
can be both either a virtue or a vice based on whether Nature’s intention is correctly interpreted. 
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position stated by the Lady as found in the sermons of John Preston.28 Preston, a 
reluctant convert to the study of Divinity, enjoyed a surprising career after gaining the 
favor of King James in 1615 during a public disputation on whether dogs can reason.29 In 
1621, he became chaplain to Prince Charles and, in 1622, he was appointed to the pulpit 
at Lincoln’s Inn after John Donne became Dean of St. Paul’s.30 Preston enjoyed the 
Court’s favor through most of the 1620s and lost his privileged position only after the 
Duke of Buckingham turned against him. In his sermon, “The Doctrine of Selfe-deniall,” 
Preston praises what Comus would have labeled “lean and sallow Abstinence.” 31 The 
sermon urges self-denial as a remedy against what Preston calls “idolatry of the flesh,” 
that is, the worshiping of creation instead of the Creator.32 Keeping this kind of idolatry 
                                                     
28 I choose John Preston to stand in comparison with Milton because of his wide influence and acceptance 
both at court and in the “Puritan party.” For a discussion of the problematic term “Puritan” and of the 
interpenetration of Puritans at court, see Lake, Peter, “Defining Puritanism—Again?” in ed. F. J. Bremer,  
Puritanism: Transatlantic Perspectives on a Seventeenth-Century Anglo-American Faith (Boston: Northeastern UP, 
1993), 3-29. 
29 All biographical details on Preston are from Christopher Hill, Puritanism and Revolution: The English 
Revolution of the 17th Century  (London: Secker and Warburg, 1958), 239-74. For a more detailed life of John 
Preston, see Irvonwy Morgan, Prince Charles’s Puritan Chaplain (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957). 
30 Christopher Hill gives an impressive roll call of Puritan notables who probably listened to Preston’s 
sermons at Lincoln’s Inn, including William Prynne (Puritanism and Revolution, 240). 
31 Published in 1633 as part of a collection of sermons, Fovre Godly and Learned Treatises. All quotes are from 
Preston’s sermons are from: John Preston, Fovre Godly and Learned Treatises (London, 1633). Early English 
Books Online. Union Theological Seminary Library (New York, N. Y.). 17 January 2010. 
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:9985025
9. 
32 Milton may have a similar idea in mind when he has both the Lady and Comus defend their answer to the 
question of how to correctly praise the “All-giver.” While Comus claims that “if all the world/ Should in a 
pet of temperance” give up all luxury, “Th’ All-giver would be unthanked, would be unpraised” (720-3), the 
Lady replies that if all “Had but a moderate and beseeming share/ […] then the Giver would be better 
thanked/ His praise due paid” (769-76). 
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at bay requires constant denial of the desires of the flesh: “[c]onsider what your morning 
thoughts are, consider that the flesh is lusting and running; thinke therefore every 
morning how to crosse it the day following, you must dayly deny your selves.” Not 
surprisingly, the preacher imagines an interlocutor protesting that “this is a hard saying, 
who can beare it?” Preston insists that happiness cannot be found in what has been 
created, but only in the Creator.  
This is a theme to which he returns frequently. For instance, in “A Remedy 
Against Covetousnesse,” he urges those who claim that they rejoice in the goods of 
creation as blessings from God to carefully examine their motives: “If yee thinke this 
with your selves, wee have Wives, Children, Friends and Riches, ‘tis true we have them, 
but yet they shall not continue with us an houre or minute longer than God will: If ye 
thinke so in good earnest, then yee rejoice in them as blessings.” For Preston, the truly 
godly may be thankful for the bounty of providence, but they must not put their trust in 
its gifts. He urges his listener to remember to:  
looke on them onely as the Vehiculaes or Conduit pipes, to convay comfort. The 
aire yeelds light as an Instrument, though it hath no light of its owne: the water 
may heat, but not of its selfe, but by that heate which is infused into it by the fire: 
So if a man drinke a Potion in beere, the beere of itselfe doth not worke but the 
Potion worketh by the beere: So it is with all outward blessings, they of 
themselves can yield you no comfort at all, but if they yeeld you any, it is by 
reason of that comfort which God puts into them.33 
                                                     
33 Preston, Fovre Godly and Learned Treatises, 18; emphasis mine. 
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Comfort and hope cannot be found in creation, but only in the Creator. Thus, “Wives, 
Children, Friends and Riches” can only be counted as blessings as long as we keep 
vividly before our eyes the giver of those gifts; none but such as are good can enjoy good 
things. The distinction between loving creation for its own sake and loving it for the sake 
of the Creator is not of course new to Preston. But in reading the passage above, one has 
to ask whether one “conduit pipe” would work as well as another. Are all material 
conditions and personal relations truly equivalent to the godly? More precisely, is loving 
creation for the sake of the Creator fundamentally independent of the particularity of the 
gifts of providence even when those gifts are “Wives” and “Children”? In “The Doctrine 
of Selfe-deniall” and “A Remedy Against Covetousnesse,” not only are riches and 
physical pleasures suspect, but so are all human relationships, including the most 
intimate. Reading the sermons, one is left with the bewildering sense that the best course 
of action for an individual might be to create as few attachments and supports as 
possible. Friends, who sustain us in our attempts at virtue today, may turn out to be 
luring us into idolatry tomorrow. 
To better understand what other form could be given to the idea of loving 
creation for the Creator, I would like to compare Preston’s sermons with Augustine’s 
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Confessions.34 In Book IV, Augustine utters his famous cry of self-doubt and opacity, “I 
had become to myself a vast problem,” while narrating his grief over the death of an 
unnamed childhood friend. 35 This death is a moment of tremendous pain and loneliness 
in the Confessions: “all that I had shared with him was without him transformed into a 
cruel torment. My eyes looked for him everywhere, and he was not there.”36 It is the 
passing of time that dulls Augustine’s grief: “[t]ime is not inert. It does not roll on 
through our senses without affecting us. […] by its coming and going it implanted in me 
new hopes.”37 But these hopes too are transient; they cannot be a solid foundation for 
permanent joy since they also die: “Things rise and set: in their emerging they begin as it 
were to be, and grow to perfection; having reached perfection, they grow old and die.”38 
The successive passing away of all that is created leads those who love only creation to 
constantly feel longing and suffering. Transient things “rend the soul with pestilential 
desires; for the soul loves to be in them and take its repose among the objects of its love. 
But in these things there is no point of rest: they lack permanence.”39 In a striking simile, 
Augustine likens the constant passing away of creatures to the formation and 
                                                     
34 For a discussion of the influence of Augustine’s Confessions on Puritan diaries of the sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-centuries, see Margo Todd, “Puritan Self-Fashioning” in Puritanism: Transatlantic Perspectives on 
a Seventeenth-Century Anglo-American Faith, 57-87. 
35 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 57. 
36 Ibid., 57. 
37 Ibid., 60. 
38 Ibid., 61. 
39 Ibid., 62. 
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understanding of speech: “That is the way our speech is constructed by sounds which 
are insignificant. What we say would not be complete if one word did not cease to exist 
when it has sounded its constituent parts, so that it can be succeeded by another.”40 In a 
drawn-out lament for the suffering caused by loving only what is created and thus 
impermanent, Augustine creates a parallel between the successive passing away of all 
the frail objects we love and the creation of meaning through consecutive sounds. The 
image presents completeness as achieved by understanding how to transcend the frailty 
of temporality by correctly fitting each sound, each life, in a fabric of meaning. For 
though each creature, taken separately, is just like a short sound, yet all of creation seen 
in its succession becomes meaningful as speech. It is speech that makes order out of the 
instants of Augustine’s life through the constant calling and praising of God that 
permeates the Confessions; the text itself becomes an example of how to read creation.  
At this moment, Augustine attempts to show how to love creation without 
resting his hopes on it. This kind of love can only be known through the incarnation: 
He who for us is life itself descended here and endured our death and slew it by 
the abundance of his life. In a thunderous voice he called us to him, at that secret 
place where he came forth to us. […] He did not delay, but ran crying out loud 
by his words, deeds, death, life, descent, and ascent—calling us to return to him. 
And he was gone from our sight that we should ‘return to our heart’ (Isa. 46:8) 
and find him there. He went away and behold, here he is.41 
 
                                                     
40 Ibid., 62. 
41 Augustine, Confessions, 64. 
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In this passage, the incarnation itself is presented with a syntax that mimics the quick 
passing away of instants of time and bits of language.42 The life of Christ then becomes a 
pattern for human life not only as an example to be followed, each life to be lived as 
imitatio Christi, but also as the interpretive key to life.43 As Jennifer Herdt points out, the 
rhetorical strategy of the Confessions is to teach through a series of examples: 
“Augustine’s Confessions is not a static record of his own experience but a cascade of 
exemplary conversions serving as the occasion for other conversions, which can in turn 
serve as exemplary. These exemplars can serve as such inasmuch as they point back 
beyond themselves to scripture and ultimately to Jesus as the original exemplar.”44 This 
is not to say that, for Augustine, justification can be achieved without divine grace. 
Rather, it is through examples, and most importantly the example of Christ, that the 
individual can move from conversion to growth in the virtues: “Augustine’s language 
                                                     
42 The original Latin, if anything, is even more emphatically fast-paced with its quick succession of dentals: 
“et descendit huc ipsa vita nostra, et tulit mortem nostram, et occidit eam de abundantia vitae suae: et tonuit 
clamans, ut redeamus hinc ad eum in illud secretum unde processit ad nos […]. non enim tardavit, sed 
cucurrit; clamans dictis, factis, morte, vita, descensu, ascensu; clamans ut redeamus ad eum. et discessit ab 
oculis, ut redeamus ad cor, et inveniamus eum. abscessit enim, et ecce hic est” (Augustine, Confessions, ed. 
James J. O’Donnell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 1:40) 
43 It is then not surprising that the Confessions end with a discussion of hermeneutics and allegory. The 
whole narration of the Confessions can be viewed as an attempt at interpreting Augustine’s life in terms of 
Christ’s. 
44 Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 67. 
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leaves ample room for gradual process and transformation, for spiritual exercise that 
habituate one slowly in Christian virtue.”45 
It is as part of this interpretive effort that the distinction between loving a 
creature for its own sake and loving it for the sake of the Creator can be understood. For 
Augustine, to love creation for its own sake is to rely on transient things as if they were 
permanent: “The reason why that grief had penetrated me so easily and deeply was that 
I had poured out my soul on to the sand by loving a person sure to die as if he would 
never die.”46 To love them for the sake of the Creator is to correctly interpret them and to 
understand their true end as well as our own. If we compare this view of creation with 
Preston’s, the difference becomes clear. In the “The Doctrine of Selfe-deniall,” imitatio 
Christi becomes renunciation: “learne to know CHRIST aright, that will make you deny 
your selves.”47 There is no concern for others, but rather a relentless returning to the self 
as what needs to be controlled, while the rest of creation is seen as a potential trap to 
lure the individual into idolatry. The focus is on the sinfulness of the flesh: “The flesh is 
to the Soule, as a disease is to the body; If ye give one that is sicke of a Dropsie, drinke; 
or one sicke of a Feaver, Wine; you will please the humour well, but ye kill the man; so it 
                                                     
45 Ibid., 70. 
46 Augustine, Confessions, 60. 
47 Preston, Fovre Godly and Learned Treatises, 211. 
 46 
is here.”48 While the language of sinfulness and of the works of the flesh is from Paul—
Preston quotes Rom. 7.20, “It is no longer I that doe it; but sinne that dwels in mee”—
nowhere in the sermon can we find a mitigating understanding of corruption of the flesh 
as a punishment for original sin rather than the source of sin itself.49 Preston’s sermons 
relentlessly ask us to view “the flesh,” a category that seems to include our attachments 
to friends and family, only as a possible source of sin. In Preston’s account, one must be 
ready to relinquish all human relationships, even those that have hitherto helped in the 
development of the virtues. Indeed, the very support we might receive from others is a 
potential source of sin. The fundamental position advocated in his sermons is that we 
must strip away anything external that might stand in the way of relying on God. 
Anything else risks breaking the first commandment.50 With such a focus on self-control 
and renunciation, Preston’s discussion of the duty to follow the example of Christ is 
given only five lines, where the reader is reminded of His “love, which he shewed in his 
                                                     
48 Preston, Fovre Godly and Learned Treatises, 190. 
49 This second view is the one found in Chapter 3 of Book XIV of The City of God: “For the corruption of the 
body, which weighs down the soul, is not the cause of the first sin, but its punishment. And it was not the 
corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful: it was the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible” 
(Augustine, The City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (New York: Penguin, 2003), 551).  
50 A clear example of this is found in “A Remedy Against Covetousness,” Preston’s sermon on the text of 
Col. 3.5: “to seeke helpe and comfort from any creature and not from God alone, is vaine and sinfull: It must 
needs bee so, because it is Idolatry” (Preston, Fovre Godly and Learned Treatises, 27). 
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readinesse both to give and forgive.”51 Charity—exemplified by Christ’s love—is 
reduced to self-denial and moderation.  
While Preston’s sermons give voice to concerns about the misuses of natural 
bounty that parallel those voiced by the Lady, her rejection of “lewdly-pampered 
Luxury” (770) moves beyond Preston’s fear of idolatry of the flesh. Although Comus 
accuses her of listening to “those budge doctors of the Stoic fur” (707), the Lady does not 
express a slavish obedience to temperance for its own sake or for fear of idolatry. In her 
speech, temperance becomes part of a form of justice (giving to others what is due to 
them) and piety (the proper worship due to God). It is through temperance, rather than 
gluttony, that natural bounty can be properly distributed. Nature   
  Means her provisions only to the good 
  That live according to her sober law, 
  And holy dictate of spare Temperance: 
  If every just man that now pines with want 
  Had but a moderate and beseeming share 
  Of that which lewdly-pampered Luxury 
  Now heaps upon some few with vast excess, 
  Nature’s full blessings would be well dispensed 
  In unsuperfluous even proportion. (765-73) 
 
The material gifts of Nature are meant for those who are good and follow “her sober 
law.” This vision of “moderate and beseeming share” is meant to bring into relief the 
suffering hidden by Comus’s praise of unending consumption. Want and deprivation 
                                                     
51 Preston, Fovre Godly and Learned Treatises, 249. 
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are unimaginable in the world described by the enchanter. There, “odors, fruits, and 
flocks” are put forth by Nature “to please and sate the curious taste” (712-4). Creation 
offers itself freely and commands that “millions of spinning worms […] weave the 
smooth-haired silk/ To deck her sons” (715-7).52 It is in reply to this attempt to deceive 
with “false rules pranked in reason’s garb” (759) that the Lady feels compelled to speak. 
As we have seen, her answer bypasses the seductive carpe diem poem which concludes 
Comus’s speech and becomes instead a vehement defense of what Nature means by her 
gifts. The Lady seems to have no concern for her own safety, but rather she is angered 
by his insult to “most innocent Nature,/ As if she would her children should be riotous/ 
With her abundance” (762-4; emphasis mine). Just as Comus creates a parallel between 
consumption and free enjoyment of beauty and sexuality, so does the Lady repel his 
sexual advances by refuting his rationalization of luxurious waste. In Preston, we have 
seen a reduction of imitatio Christi to self-denial with little focus on the role of charity or 
justice. A Maske does not go so far, but Milton does imply that “spare Temperance” 
could reform the misuse of creation, “Nature’s full blessings would be well dispensed” 
                                                     
52 In God Speed the Plow, Andrew McRae points to Thomas Moffett’s use of the image of the hardworking 
silkworm in The Silkewormes, and their Flies (1599) to justify the production of a luxury item, silk, by 
transforming its producer, the silkworm, into an example of honest industry (Andrew McRae, God Speed the 
Plough: The Representation of Agrarian England, 1500-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
210-11). In this passage, Comus attempts a similar representation of luxury. 
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(772), by leading us to partake only of “a moderate and beseeming share” (769; emphasis 
mine).53  
However, while the masque displays an awareness of the social repercussions 
that follow the sort of conspicuous consumption praised by Comus, the Lady must 
defend this conception of justice while removed from all social contexts. More precisely, 
Milton verbally gestures at the social consequences of individual behavior and at the 
dependence of the individual on society.54 At the same time, the Lady, representing a 
mature moral agent, not only must be able to stand alone, but must do so independently 
of her own history and education. Each ethical act is an atomic unit, disjoined from the 
foregoing narrative. To be dependent on others, on tradition, or on habit would “starch 
us all into” conformity and slavish obedience: “How goodly, and how to be wisht were 
such an obedient unanimity as this, what a fine conformity would it starch us all into? 
doubtles a stanch and solid peece of frame-work, as any January could freeze 
together.”55 
                                                     
53 I would like to clarify why I have labeled what the Lady defends in this speech justice rather than charity, 
the missing third from her reformulation of Paul’s triad of virtues. Indeed, Maryann MacGuire, in Milton’s 
Puritan Masque, uses “Puritan” texts’ association of charity with the image of the marriage of the soul to 
Christ to claim that “chastity is Milton’s version of charity” (138). However, at this point in the masque, the 
Lady does not seem to be concerned with loving one’s neighbor and God as much as with just distribution 
of Nature’s bounty based on the merit of the recipient, that is, to give what is due to “every just man that 
now pines with want.” 
54 This interdependence of justice is seen in the passage from Of Reformation quoted earlier. 
55 Areopagitica, CPW II:545. However, in the divorce tracts and in Adam’s love for Eve, this understanding 
seems to come under strain. 
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1.3 The Lady as Spenser’s Artegall: Milton’s Conception of 
Education in Temperance and Justice 
The argument between Comus and the Lady focuses on their diverging 
conceptions of the relationship between nature, the virtues, and the proper end of 
human life. As we have seen in Of Reformation, Milton’s understanding of the virtues 
and their political ramifications relies on his reading of Aristotle. However, while Milton 
relies on the Aristotelian language of the virtues and their connection to the proper 
human telos, the moral framework deployed in A Mask differs from that of the Ethics by 
incorporating an understanding of human reason that is alien to Aristotle. To bring out 
this difference, I will begin by reviewing Aristotle’s ethical model and then compare it 
with the picture proposed by A Maske. In my reading of Aristotle, I follow MacIntyre’s 
discussion of the Aristotelian virtues and their development in Christian thought. As 
MacIntyre argues in After Virtue, the Nicomachean Ethics sets up a teleological moral 
scheme in which “man-as-he-happens-to-be” is essentially different from “man-as-he-
could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.”56 It is the role of ethics to discover the 
means of how to progress from the first to the second state. In this view, ethics must be 
based on an account of human nature (including passions, desires, and reason—the 
characteristic human activity) and of the proper end of man.57 The role of the virtues is 
                                                     
56 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1981), 52. 
57 Loc. cit. 
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to enable us to reach our telos. To accomplish this, the “desires and emotions which we 
possess are to be put in order and educated by the use of such precepts and by the 
cultivation of those habits of action which the study of ethics prescribes; reason instruct 
us both as to what our true end is and as to how to reach it.”58 For Aristotle, “the exercise 
of the virtues is not […] a means to the end of the good for man. For what constitutes the 
good for man is a complete human life lived at its best, and the exercise of the virtues is 
a necessary and central part of such a life, not a mere preparatory exercise to secure such 
a life.”59 So the virtues are not an end in themselves, but they are rather an integral part 
of the happy life. 
As we have seen, in her debate with Comus, the Lady defends temperance as 
necessary for both piety and justice. Behind the idea of dividing “Nature’s full 
blessings” in “even proportion” lies Milton’s reading of the Aristotelian notion of 
proportional justice. In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle begins by discussing 
justice in terms of greed: “Since the unjust person is greedy, he will be concerned with 
goods—not all goods, but those with which good and bad fortune are concerned; these 
are always good without qualification, but not always for a particular individual” 
(1129b). Material goods—those dependent on fortune—are, when spoken of in general, 
“always good without qualification,” they are true goods. However, if we are concerned 
                                                     
58 Ibid., 52-3. 
59 Ibid., 149. 
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with particular individuals, material goods can be detrimental. When speaking of 
pleasure, Aristotle further clarifies that good fortune “in excess can be an impediment, 
and presumably should by rights no longer be called good fortune, its limits of 
application being defined in relation to happiness” (1153b). That is, while pleasure is a 
good, it is a good only in so far that it promotes a happy life. Pleasure pursued beyond 
reason cannot be counted as good, and for the vicious individual, material goods will 
not lead to happiness: “In the case of bodily goods, there can be an excess, and it is the 
pursuit of this excess, not the necessary pleasures, that makes a person bad; for everyone 
enjoys fine food and wine and sexual intercourse in some way, but not everyone in the 
way he ought” (1154a). Nonetheless, the unjust person will, against his own interest, 
attempt to obtain an unfair share of goods and so injure others. Similarly, in Milton’s 
masque, not only do the rioters injure themselves by their intemperance, but, as it is 
revealed by the Lady’s speech, their overindulgent reveling is a form of injustice 
towards others. 
How closely does Milton’s idea of justice follow Aristotle’s? In the Faerie Queene, 
we find a more immediate source for Milton’s understanding of the Aristotelian virtues. 
At the beginning of Book V, Spenser introduces Artegall, the knight of justice. After 
lamenting the decay of justice in the proem, Spenser recounts the education of its knight: 
“For Artegall in iustice was vpbrought/ Euen from the cradle of his infancie” (V.i.5). 
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When only a child, he is found by Astraea, who immediately understands that he is 
“with no crime defilde” (V.i.6). She then lures him away from his games to raise him in 
the wilderness in service of justice: 
  Of all the which, for want there of mankind, 
  She caused him to make experience 
  Vpon wyld beasts, which she in woods did find, 
  With wrongfull powre oppressing others of their kind. (V.i.7) 
 
The young knight learns how to “weigh both right and wrong” (V.i.7) outside of a 
human community. At this point in the poem, Artegall’s virtue is in some sense not 
complete, he still needs Britomart. There is no attempt to hide the violent and implacable 
nature of Artegall’s “iustice”: “euen the wilde beasts did feare his awfull sight,/ And 
men admyr’d his oueruling might” (V.i.8). As Spenser makes clear by allowing Artegall 
to fall prey to Radigund in Canto v, the knight of justice, without Britomart’s help, is 
under the sway of intemperate emotions.60 The question arises of whether Artegall’s 
education in the virtue is deficient: how can the virtue of justice be developed without 
temperance? At the same time, the narrative insists that Artegall’s education in the forest 
has given him all the skills he needs to dispense at least some form of justice: “Thus she 
him trained, and thus she him taught,/ In all the skill of deeming wrong from right” 
                                                     
60 The Amazons are described as a “troupe incontinent” (V.iv.26) and “a sort of Bees in clusters” (V.iv.36). 
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(V.i.8; emphasis mine).61 Canto i of Book V gives an image of education in justice that is 
removed from all human society and yet capable of giving the essential knowledge of 
the virtue. However, in an Aristotelian sense, Artegall could not possess justice even in 
the restricted sense that Spenser grants him before his union with Britomart. Indeed, the 
knight would barely be considered human in any meaningful sense: “That is why, if 
[man] has not excellence, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the 
most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states; for the 
administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of 
order in political society” (Politics 1253a36-40). For Aristotle, justice cannot be learned 
outside of the polis. 
More broadly, Spenser, by depicting Artegall as learning how to reason correctly 
about justice outside of society, puts forward a model of rationality that is, for all 
practical purposes, independent of human education and relationships. Similarly, in A 
                                                     
61 The figure of Astraea as a teacher is of particular interest in a reading of A Maske because we find echoes 
of her in the figure of the Attendant Spirit. Astraea, after completing Artegall’s education, leaves the world 
to return to her proper place in the heavens: 
 
  Now when the world with sinne gan to abound, 
  Astræa loathing lenger here to space 
  Mongst wicked men, in whom no truth she found 
  Return’d to heauen, whence she deriu’d her race; 
  Where she hath now an euerlasting place. (V.i.11) 
 
The Attendant Spirit is almost a returned Astraea, willing to “soil these pure ambrosial weeds/ With the 
rank vapors of this sin-worn mold” (A Maske, 16-7) in order to help the Lady. 
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Maske, we find the Lady sitting alone in Comus’s chair. Milton has carefully stripped her 
of all support. While her predicament is different from Artegall’s—she is after all “the 
fair offspring” (34) of a “noble peer of mickle trust and power” (31) and she has been 
“nursed in princely lore” (34)—her moment of trial is staged at a remove from all social 
connections. In this early work, we see the first instance of a recurring Miltonic trope: to 
resist against or to fall to temptation is the defining task of the individual capable of 
reasoning independently of all others.  
In Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle spells out the concept of the mean 
and how it relates to the virtues of character: “[F]ear, confidence, appetite, anger, pity 
and in general pleasure and pain can be experienced too much or too little, and in both 
ways not well. But to have them at the right time, about the right things, towards the 
right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the mean and the best; and this is 
the business of virtue” (1106b). The good person not only acts in accordance to the 
virtues, but he has also trained his passions so that virtuous action is a source of 
pleasure for him. Thus the difference between temperance (a true virtue) and continence 
(a step towards virtue) is that only the temperate person knows what is good and he acts 
upon it without interference from the passions. Part of our education in the virtues will 
then consist in training our emotions so that they will neither be too strong nor too 
weak, i.e., they will achieve the mean. But it will also consist in learning how to have 
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these emotions in the appropriate circumstances and toward the appropriate goals. 
Moreover, training in the virtues will also involve learning how to reason correctly: 
“Virtue, then, is a state involving rational choice, consisting in a mean relative to us and 
determined by reason—the reason, that is, by reference to which the practically wise 
person would determine it” (1107a). Thus, only the good person can reason correctly, 
and right reason and the virtues must develop together (1144a).  For Aristotle, right 
reason is not simply an instrument for achieving any end; it is oriented toward the 
good.62 
In A Maske, we see two stages in the training in wisdom. On the one hand, the 
Lady represents, for Milton, the already-virtuous individual who uses right reason to 
withstand temptation. On the other, the two brothers enact in their argument an attempt 
at learning how to feel and reason correctly. Indeed, after the Second Brother 
enumerates the possible dangers that may await a young woman alone in the woods, the 
Elder Brother tries to calm his fears by reminding him of their sister’s fortitude. The 
darkness of the woods will not disturb “the constant mood of her calm thoughts” (371). 
Lacking external light, she is guided by her virtue: “Virtue could see to do what Virtue 
would/ By her own radiant light, though sun and moon/ Were in the flat sea sunk. And 
                                                     
62 On the other hand, in the Ethics, Aristotle defines “cleverness” as the instrumental ability to achieve any 
goals we might set for ourselves, be they good or evil. Practical wisdom is different from cleverness since 
“virtue is involved in this eye of the soul’s reaching its developed state” (1144a). 
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Wisdom’ self/ Oft seeks to sweet retired solitude” (373-6). The lines link virtue to 
wisdom; just as the sun and the moon sink in “the flat sea,” wisdom completes the line 
to replace their light. The Elder Brother attempts to reassure the Second Brother that the 
Lady can correctly discern what to do because she is guided by the light of her virtue. 
However, this passionate defense of virtue’s ability to find its way is humorously 
deflated by the Elder Brother’s earlier speech lamenting the darkness of the woods. 
Indeed, the Second Brother seems to find the Elder’s philosophizing out of place and 
does not hesitate to make a joke of it. While no one would dare to rob a hermit in his cell, 
“beauty like the fair Hesperian tree/ Laden with blooming gold, had need the guard/ Of 
dragon watch” (393-5). But by its end, his speech leaves all bantering allusions to 
mythical creatures and focuses on the very real dangers that may lurk in the forest: “Lest 
some ill-greeting touch attempt the person/ Of our unownèd sister” (406-7). In reply to 
this last worry, the Elder Brother insists that the Lady is nonetheless safe: “my sister is 
not so defenseless left/ As you imagine; she has hidden strength/ Which you remember 
not” (414-6). The Second Brother, trying to understand this strength, unwittingly 
stumbles on the right answer: 
  Second brother.  What hidden strength, 
  Unless the strength of Heav’n, if you mean that? 
  Elder brother. I mean that too, but yet a hidden strength 
  Which if Heav’n gave it, may be termed her own: 
  ‘Tis chastity, my brother, chastity: 
  She that has that, is clad in complete steel. (417-21) 
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Here, the Elder Brother, following the Second Brother’s guess, makes a clear connection 
between chastity and divine aid. While “the constant mood of her calm thoughts” help 
the Lady keep fear at bay, the heavenly gift of chastity will protect her. For the next 
thirty-five lines, the Elder Brother depicts the virtue as a shield against whatever 
dangers may lurk in the forest. 63 
However, starting on line 454, there is a shift in the description of the powers of 
the Lady’s virtue. Chastity, rather than keep “goblin, or swart fairy” (436) at bay, 
becomes the passive recipient of providence’s aid. This virtue is so loved by heaven  
  That when a soul is found sincerely so, 
  A thousand liveried angels lacky her, 
  Driving far off each thing of sin and guilt, 
  And in clear dreams and solemn vision 
  Tell her of things that no gross ear can hear. (454-8) 
 
The lines convey the Elder Brother’s faith in his sister’s chastity, but they are difficult to 
accurately parse. In particular, line 456 is ambiguous: Is “each thing of sin and guilt” an 
exterior or an interior threat? As we move from the first part of the speech into this line, 
“each thing” appears to belong to the same world as the mythological creatures conjured 
                                                     
63 In these moments, Milton’s depiction of chastity recalls Fletcher’s in The Faithfull Shepherdess (originally 
staged in 1608, but revived in 1633). In the Jacobean play, we find that true chastity can heal the shepherdess 
Amoret from the stab-wounds inflicted by her beloved (and deceived) Perigot. In a scene that Milton echoes 
in Sabrina’s sprinkling of the Lady, Fletcher’s God of the River tests Amoret’s virtue with a drop of water 
and then heals her with a magic flower. It is because she is found truly chaste, that he can heal her. His 
magic would not have worked on a less pure shepherdess. 
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earlier by the Elder Brother. However, as we follow the sentence into the next two lines, 
it seems that “sin and guilt” are being banished, paradoxically, from the mind of the 
chaste soul by the angels. The change is startling; after all, the angels only come to those 
who are “found sincerely” virtuous (454). The rest of the speech, rather than clarifying 
the earlier lines, adds another layer of confusion. In a moment that seems to anticipate 
Milton’s later monism, we find the body, the “unpolluted temple of the mind” (461), 
being transformed by the conversation of angels to “the soul’s essence” (462).64  
How exactly does this process of purification come about? And what are the 
respective roles of grace, human agency, and education in the virtues in this 
transformation? It is not chastity itself that refines the body. “Saintly chastity” is “so 
dear” to heaven that a “thousand liveried angels lacky her.” In conversation with these 
“Heav’nly habitants” (459), the “outward shape” of those who are chaste is transformed 
and turned “by degrees to the soul’s essence,/ Till all be made immortal” (462-3). It is at 
this point of the process that the ambiguous nature of “each thing of sin and guilt” 
becomes crucial. On the one hand, once the Attending Spirit informs the boys that the 
                                                     
64 The passage seems to play with a Neoplatonic idea of harmony between body and soul that is similar to 
that expressed by Donne in The Second Anniversary: “her pure, and eloquent blood/ Spoke in her cheeks, and 
so distinctly wrought,/ That one might almost say, her body thought” (Complete Poetry and Selected Prose, 
244-6). Virtue can be recognized by its exterior. Similarly vice, like Comus’s, would eventually be found out, 
as is demonstrated by the bestial heads of the rioters. For Milton’s monism, see Stephen Fallon, Milton among 
the Philosophers: Poetry and Materialism in Seventeenth-Century England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1991).  
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Lady has been lured into Comus’s palace, the Elder Brother insists that no external 
violence can defile a virtuous individual: “Virtue may be assailed, but never hurt,/ 
Surprised by unjust force, but not enthralled” (589-90). On the other, at this point in the 
masque, it is difficult to avoid the implication that outside pollution may contaminate 
the soul. While the process of purification is one of gradual divine inspiration through 
dreams and visions (457), the process of defilement seems to occur without any 
supernatural intervention: 
      but when lust, 
  By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk, 
  But most by lewd and lavish act of sin, 
  Lets in defilement to the inward parts, 
  The soul grows clotted by contagion. (463-7) 
 
These lines present a process of habituation into vice. Repeated lustful actions, 
“unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk,” progressively corrupt the individual. 
Lust proceeds from the body and actions to defile “the inward parts.” This is drastically 
different from the discussion of chastity that immediately precedes these lines. While he 
explains how chastity and conversation with angels “cast a beam on th’ outward shape,” 
until “all be made immortal,” the Elder Brother does not describe a process of 
habituation in the virtues. 
Then, what does education in virtue consist of and how does it help the Lady 
withstand Comus’s temptation? The Elder Brother has a clear answer to this question: “I 
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do not think my sister […] so unprincipled in virtue’s book” as to give in to temptation 
(366-7; emphasis mine). The Elder Brother’s use of the metaphor of “virtue’s book” for 
education in the virtues appears in his first speech defending his sister’s ability to 
withstand temptation. Only after the Second Brother’s humorously chides him, does he 
correct this first description and includes the aid of angelic conversation. While the 
terminology of “virtue’s book” may be simply a conventional metaphor for education, it 
is a significant one in light of the discrepancy in the models of education in the virtues 
and vices.65 The understanding that virtue can be acquired through a book and verbal 
instruction belongs to the same tradition of religious pedagogy that places a strong 
emphasis on catechism.66 In a standard description of catechizing, Thomas Walkington 
insists that it is the foundation of faith: “in the spiritual building up of mens consciences 
to God, the doctrine of Catechisme is first to be laid as a foundation, and afterward the 
                                                     
65 This is an image that Milton often returns to. Besides the all-important role of books found in Areopagitica, 
we see young students being led to virtue by a book in, for instance, Of Education (1644), where to “win 
[students] early to the love of vertue and true labour, ere any flattering seducement, ere vain principle seise 
them wandering, some easie and delightfull book of Education would be read to them” (CPW II: 384). 
66 For a discussion of the importance of catechizing both children and adults in the seventeenth century, see 
Stanley Fish, The Living Temple: George Herbert and Catechizing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978), chapter one. In particular, for the common, but incorrect, derivation of the term “catechism” from the 
Greek for echo, see pages 17-19. Moreover, Jennifer Herdt, in Putting on Virtue, discusses the central role of 
repetition of doctrine and Scriptural places in Lutheran pedagogy: “To impress the Word of God on the 
young meant above all to repeat it over and over” (191). This focus on rote learning is carried into Reformed 
attitudes towards education. See, for instance, how Prudence catechizes Christiana’s children in the second 
part of Pilgrim’s Progress. For a detailed study of the large number of printed catechisms in circulation in the 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries, see: Ian Green, The Christian’s ABC: Catechisms and Catechizing in 
England c. 1530-1740 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). According to Green, one of the distinguishing 
features of Protestant, as opposed to Catholic, catechisms is their focus on transmitting knowledge of 
doctrine rather than functioning as practical manuals (15-6). 
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misterie of Christ is more highly and deeply to bee handled, as it were the rearing of the 
walles, roofe, and loover.”67 We see this same focus in The Faerie Queene, when, in Book I, 
the Redcrosse Knight is taken to the House of Holiness to be healed from the wounds of 
Despair. As we have seen earlier, Una requests that Redcrosse be allowed to go to the 
schoolhouse to “heare the wisedome of [Fidelia’s] words diuine” (I.x.18; emphasis 
mine). In the schoolhouse, Fidelia instructs all her pupils with “her sacred Booke, with 
bloud ywrit” (I.x.19). The message of the allegory is clear: Faith instructs the believer 
with Scripture and her speech is so powerful that “she was able, with her words to kill,/ 
And raise againe to life the hart, that she did thrill” (I.x.19).  
The allegory in this canto of the Faerie Queene is concerned with didactic clarity. It 
resembles what Elizabeth Salter, in the context of Piers Plowman, calls diagrammatic 
allegory. In Langland, it is a form that is closely connected with the visual arts and with 
the use of allegorical buildings by medieval preachers.68 Each element in the allegory is 
clearly and accurately labeled and, “like the maps and diagrams of medieval religious 
art, it is not meant to be visualized in depth […]. Such allegory, in which nothing is left to 
chance, or to the reader’s imagination, must be seen as the verbal equivalent of the 
                                                     
67 An exposition, quoted in Stanley Fish, The Living Temple, 79. 
68 Elizabeth Salter, English and International: Studies in the Literature, Art and Patronage of Medieval England, ed. 
Derek Pearsall and Nicolette Zeeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 120-2. 
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elaborately inscribed and glossed art of medieval tract illustrations.”69 Spenser’s allegory 
of the House of Holiness is less static than the passages of diagrammatic allegory that 
Slater considers in Piers Plowman: the Redcrosse Knight meets and interacts with the 
personifications of Faith, Hope, and Charity as he progresses through his education. At 
the same time, in this canto of The Faerie Queene, the relationship between message and 
imagery is spelled out with the same concern for precision and clarity that is typical of 
diagrammatic allegories. For instance, rather than seeing how Faith acts, presumably a 
central part of the work of the book of holiness, we are told that Fidelia can “comaund 
the hastie Sunne to stay,/ Or backward turne his course from heauens hight” (I.x.20). 
That is, the passage gives a paraphrase of Joshua’s feat of faith. This stanza carefully and 
precisely recalls notable places in Scripture where the power of faith is described.70 As 
we have seen earlier, Milton echoes the encounter of the Redcrosse Knight with Despair 
in Comus’s speech to the Lady; The Faerie Queene is a model for encounters with 
temptation and a type of “virtue’s book” for A Maske.71 In Comus’s palace, the Lady is 
                                                     
69 Salter, English and International, 121-2. 
70 In the 1590 and 1596 editions, the eight lines of stanza 20 point to Joshua 10.12, 2 Kings 20.10, Judges 7, 
and Matthew 21.22. The 1609 edition also included Exodus 14.21-31 (The Faerie Queene, n. 20 to p. 1103). 
71 It is in The Faerie Queene that we find the startling idea that Charity must not be confused with lust. 
Spenser clarifies that Charissa is no wanton, but a chaste matron: 
 
  She was a woman in her freshest age, 
  Of wondrous beauty, and of bountie rare, 
  With goodly grace and comely personage, 
  That was on earth not easie to compare; 
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left only with the freedom of her mind and her voice. A Maske is emphatically clear that 
speech and words play a central role in both instructing in and defending virtue. Indeed, 
it is the “gross ear” (458) that cannot be educated even by angels’ words.72 Moreover, the 
Lady feels the need to speak in defense of a virtue that is at risk of being rendered 
inaudible by the eloquence of vice: “I hate when Vice can bolt her arguments,/ And 
Virtue has no tongue to check her pride” (760-1). While she knows that Comus cannot be 
converted to chastity, he has no ear for it, she is compelled to argue against vice. For 
Milton, education in virtue is fundamentally verbal.  
Clearly, Milton’s understanding of the virtues cannot be Aristotelian. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, we see that direct teaching can only play a secondary part in the 
formation of a virtuous individual. One cannot be persuaded into virtue: 
Some think we become good by nature, some by habit, and others by teaching. 
[…] Argument and teaching, presumably, are not powerful in every case, but the 
soul of the student must be prepared beforehand in its habits, with a view to its 
enjoying and hating in a noble way, like soil that is to nourish seed. For if 
someone were to live by his feelings he would not listen to an argument to 
                                                     
 
  Full of great loue, but Cupids wanton snare 
  As hell she hated, chast in worke and will; 
  Her necke and breasts were euer open bare, 
  That ay therof her babes might sucke their fill. (I.x.30) 
 
The image of the mother of the virtues as bare-breasted seems to have alarmed Spenser and led him to 
clarify that her partial nudity represents generosity and nurture rather than erotic display. 
72 Milton includes a similar line in his earlier entertainment, the Arcades, where Genius sings that about “the 
heavenly tune, which none can hear/ Of human mold with gross unpurgèd ear” (72-3). 
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dissuade him, nor could he even understand it. How can we persuade a person 
in a state like this to change his ways? And, in general, feelings seem to yield not 
to argument but to force. There must, therefore, somehow be a pre-existing 
character with some affinity for virtue through its fondness for what is noble and 
dislike of what is disgraceful. (1179b; emphasis mine) 
 
For Aristotle, it is clear that “argument and teaching” are insufficient. Fidelia’s 
schoolhouse and the Elder Brother’s “virtue’s book” could not produce a virtuous 
individual. Indeed, someone whose soul had not been “prepared beforehand in its 
habits” would be incapable of understanding their teaching. But it is exactly this element 
of habituation that is missing in both Spenser and Milton. This is not surprising since a 
distrust of habit is expressed in protestant discussions of education. This is evident, for 
instance, in Luther’s thought. Herdt, extending the argument of Gerald Strauss’ Luther’s 
House of Learning, clearly lays out the tension apparent in Luther’s moral pedagogy. On 
the one hand, rote learning, instruction from one’s parents, and rewards for good 
performance are necessary to lead children to a genuine encounter with the sacraments 
and the Scriptures, virtue’s book. On the other hand, by these methods, we “may well 
succeed only in miring our children in the most dangerous—because the most hidden—
vices of all [and] habituate our children in the worst semblances of virtue.”73 In his later 
writings, Milton becomes increasingly vocal against tradition and habits, but already in 
                                                     
73 Herdt, Putting on Virtue, 191. 
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the 1630s, there is little room in his poetry for an Aristotelian idea of habituation. For 
Aristotle, habits are part of the happy life; for Milton, they are obstacles to true virtue. 74 
1.4 Bringing Light into the Woods: The Lady’s Encounter with 
Hypocrisy 
 
When the two brothers first appear in A Maske, the Elder Brother addresses the 
elements and asks for some light to guide him through the forest and find his lost sister: 
“Unmuffle ye faint stars, and thou fair moon/ That wont’st to love the traveler’s 
benison,/ Stoop thy pale visage through an amber cloud” (331-3). The language of his 
request parallels his sister’s exclamation at seeing “a sable cloud/ Turn forth her silver 
lining on the night” (221-2) after her vision of “pure-eyed Faith, white-handed Hope, 
[and the] unblemished form of Chastity” (213-15). Both the Lady and her brothers need 
physical, intellectual, and spiritual light to help them navigate the woods. However, no 
light from either the stars or the moon shows itself to the two boys, and the Elder 
Brother asks for “some gentle taper,/ Though a rush candle from the wicker hole/ Of 
some clay habitation” (337-9). The allegorical value of the “gentle taper” shining through 
“some clay habitation” is gently reinforced by Comus’s own description of the Lady as a 
“mortal mixture of earth’s mold” animated by “something holy” (244-6). The image is 
                                                     
74 This places Milton well in line with Preston’s thought. As we see in Preston we are persuaded to a life of 
faith: “But after what manner is this effectuall perswasion wrought? I answer, when as God gives an eare, 
and speakes a voice for it to heare: He that hath an eare to heare, saith Christ, let him hear. Wee then heare when 
as there is a listning and yielding disposition wrought within us” (Fovre Godly and Learned Treatises, 144). 
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not new to A Maske. It calls us back to Milton’s earlier poem, On the Morning of Christ’s 
Nativity, where we find Christ putting aside “That glorious form, that light 
unsufferable” to put on “with us a darksome house of mortal clay” (8, 14). In the Nativity 
Ode, as the poem is often referred to, Milton undertakes an early representation of the 
agency of grace removing the stain of original sin through the incarnation. The “Heav’n-
born-child” (30) finds a world corrupted by sin. Even Nature 
  woos the gentle air 
  To hide her guilty front with innocent snow, 
  And on her naked shame, 
  Pollute with sinful blame, 
  The saintly veil of maiden white to throw, 
  Confounded that her maker’s eyes 
  Should look so near upon her foul deformities. (38-44) 
 
In an image that recalls Genesis 3.7, and which will be repeated in Paradise Lost, Milton 
depicts a shameful nature attempting to hide her guilt from the Creator. The 
intervention of divine grace anticipates Nature’s shame and provides a remedy: “But he 
her fears to cease,/ Sent down the meek-eyed Peace” (45-6). With these lines, the Nativity 
Ode creates the same movement as Herbert’s Love (3). In Herbert’s poem, the soul is 
afraid to accept the body of Christ at the altar, but is reassured by the always-present 
divine love: “Love bade me welcome; yet my soul drew back,/ Guilty of dust and sin/ 
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[…] And know you not, says Love, who bore the blame?” (1-2, 15).75 Similarly, Milton’s 
poem imagines grace as rescuing the unworthy soul from its own sins even before the 
soul attempts to shamefully hide. Thus, in a pattern of complex temporal games and 
personifications, the Nativity Ode leads the reader to move between its literal and 
allegorical meaning. 
To deal with the incarnation and the Fall, the Nativity Ode eschews the 
Neoplatonism found in A Maske, where sin “embodies and imbrutes” the soul (468), and 
introduces instead the language of choice. Indeed, the second stanza of the induction 
represents the birth of Christ as the moment when He left the “trinal unity” (11) and 
“chose with us a darksome house of mortal clay” (14; emphasis mine). The lines recall 
the question of choice and free will implicated in the idea of the Fall, and ask us to 
puzzle over the respective roles of human agency and divine providence in both sinful 
choice and redemption. By having Christ choose with us, the line gently reminds the 
reader of the difficulty of separating the concept of the incarnation (and thus of 
redemption) from the idea of original sin and free will. The effects of the Fall on the 
human soul are seen in the personification of Nature, who is “[c]onfounded that her 
maker’s eyes/ Should look so near upon her foul deformities.” As we move through the 
next hundred lines of the poem, this allegorical reading is strengthened by the heavenly 
                                                     
75 George Herbert, The Complete English Poems, ed. John Tobin (New York: Penguin, 2004). 
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music that celebrates the birth of Christ and announces what seems an ever-lasting 
peace through the world: 
  Such music (as ‘tis said) 
  Before was never made, 
  But when of old the sons of morning sung, 
  While the Creator great 
  His constellations set, 
  And the well-balanced world on hinges hung. (117-21) 
 
The music that accompanied the making of the universe is ushering in a new creation, 
the customary image for spiritual rebirth. For a few stanzas we are allowed to imagine 
that “lep’rous Sin will melt from earthly mold,/ And Hell itself will pass away” (138-9). 
Justification is immediate sanctification. However, this interpretation is abruptly 
forestalled: “But wisest Fate says no,/ This must not yet be so” (149-50). Christ is still an 
infant and the crucifixion has yet to happen: “The babe lies yet in smiling infancy,/ That 
on the bitter cross/ Must redeem our loss” (151-3). Nature has not been purged of its sin, 
and, as the poem reminds us in a few lines, it won’t be until the second coming. The 
birth of Christ is just the first step: “But now begins; for from this happy day/ Th’old 
Dragon under ground/ In straiter limits bound” (168-9). It is at this moment of the poem 
that we might expect to find room for human agency and for the formation of virtue. But 
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all that is required for human, as well as angelic, service is to wait for a command: 
“Bright-harnessed angles sit in order serviceable” (244).76 
Given this understanding of grace in the Nativity Ode, what is the role of human 
agency in A Maske? At the beginning of the masque, the direct intervention of 
providence is manifested in the arrival of the Attendant Spirit. It is through his 
explanatory speech that the audience is made aware of the existence of danger in the 
forest. Figures with long didactic speeches are of course a standard part of most 
masques and Milton effectively uses this feature of the genre to create an interpretive 
frame for the “anti-masque” of Comus and his revelers. From the very first lines, the 
audience is made aware of the distance between the riotous world of the dark woods 
and the “regions mild of calm and serene air” that Attendant Spirit left to help those 
who “by due step aspire/ To lay their just hands on that golden key/ That opes the 
palace of eternity” (4, 12-14). But as the masque proceeds, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to image what due steps may be taken in order to earn that golden key. The 
                                                     
76 Milton returns to a very similar formulation in the 1650s in Sonnet XVI: 
 
“Doth God exact day labor, light denied?” 
I fondly ask; But patience to prevent  
That murmur, soon replies, “God doth not need 
Either man's work or his own gifts, who best 
Bear his mild yoke, they serve him best; his state  
Is kingly. Thousands at his bidding speed 
And post o're Land and Ocean without rest: 
They also serve who only stand and wait.” (7-14; emphasis mine) 
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only steps represented in Milton’s work lead to wandering in the dark woods. The Lady 
is lost because her brothers “stepped as they said to the next thicket side/ To bring [her] 
berries” (185-6). That is, though presumably virtuous and intent on performing a good 
action, the brothers’ steps place their sister in danger. Similarly, the Lady finds herself 
wandering through an unknown forest with “unacquainted feet.” Thus, in the 
“perplexed paths of this drear wood” (37), she has to search for the noise of “riot and ill-
managed merriment” (172) because she can find no other guide: “yet O where else/ Shall 
I inform my unacquainted feet/ In the blind mazes of this tangled wood?” (179-81).  
Both Rosemond Tuve and Stanley Fish point out that hypocrisy is the vice that 
even a virtuous eye cannot discern.77 However, the Lady did judge the sounds of revels 
correctly. While she cannot penetrate Comus’s disguise, she meets him where she 
expects to find those who “thank the gods amiss” (177). Indeed, the Dantean image of 
being lost in the dark woods is given a strange re-interpretation in A Maske. For Milton, 
the “selva oscura” is not an allegory of the moral decay of the pilgrim as it is in Dante. It 
is rather a representation of the outside world and how it is to be interpreted. As Fish 
argues, the moral status of the wood itself is neutral; in the Lady’s first speech, it is a 
“tangled wood” when she is thinking about being lost and a “hospitable” forest when 
she remembers that it might offer “cooling fruit” to a traveler. Similarly, the forest is 
                                                     
77 Rosemond Tuve, Images and Themes in Five Poems by Milton (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1957), 128; Stanley Fish, How Milton Works, 146-7.  
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simply a stage for Comus’s enchantments and illusions, and it is his magic that compels 
the “spongy air” to participate in his deception. The wood becomes dangerous for the 
Lady only once Comus and the revelers make it so. Then, what can the Lady do to 
correctly interpret and move through “the blind mazes of this tangled wood”? Since she 
does not belong in the forest, she moves through it with “unacquainted feet” trying to 
reach her father’s (and ultimately Jove’s) court, she has to follow guides, such as Comus, 
who are at home in this world of darkness and confusion. 
In the Lady’s predicament, we encounter a problem that becomes a constant part 
of Milton’s thought. On the one hand, the virtuous individual is not soiled by the 
outside world. While the Lady can be violently forced to partake in sin, as long as she 
does not waver from her firm obedience to divine commandment, she remains sinless: 
“To the pure all things are pure” (Areopagitica, CPW II:512) and “Evil into the mind of 
god or man/ May come and go, so unapproved, and leave/ No spot or blame behind” 
(Paradise Lost, V.117-9). Indeed, as Milton makes clear in Areopagitica, to truly learn 
virtue, we must come into contact with and learn from evil.78 Thus, the Lady seeks out 
those who produced “the sound of riot” so as to find her way through the woods. On 
                                                     
78 In Areopagitica, Milton begins by saying that to wise men “such [idle] books are not temptations, nor 
vanities; but usefull drugs and materials wherewith to temper and compose effective and strong med’cins” 
(CPW II:521). That is, those who are virtuous know how to make good use of even the worst materials. But 
then moves on claim that knowing evil is actually necessary to know good: “And perhaps this is that doom 
which Adam fell into of knowing good and evill, that is to say of knowing good by evill” (CPW II:514). 
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the other hand, though she has no knowledge of the sinful and mazy world of Comus, 
the Lady has to be able to recognize evil and reject it. The enchanter, in a sense, makes 
her job easy for her. While he is at first disguised as a lowly shepherd, he soon reveals 
himself for what he truly is. However, how would the Lady fare if presented with a 
concealed evil that does not so brazenly reveal itself as Comus does? Milton’s answer 
would be that she should test it, with the aid of divine guidance, and compare it with 
known good. This is indeed what the Lady seems to be doing when resisting Comus’s 
temptation. She sees that the enchanter has lied to her about his identity and that he led 
her to a palace rather than to “the cottage and the safe abode” he promised her (693-4). 
From this first lie, and from the revealed appearance of the rioters (695), she knows that 
the “cordial julep” would be a similar trap. However, in Milton’s later works, 
temptation is not so easily rejected. 79  As becomes fully evident in Samson Agonistes, the 
commands of grace may require diametrically opposed actions at different times. While 
                                                     
79In A Maske, Milton is confronting the problem of the eloquence of vice, to which he will return in Paradise 
Lost. What is striking about the Lady’s (correct) answer to Comus’s speech is that it is an emotional and 
passionate response to the enchanter’s alluring language. While she speaks of the fear that he would “charm 
[her] judgment” (758), it is her hate at hearing “Vice […] bolt her arguments” (760) that prompts her to 
defend virtue. By way of comparison, we see that Preston identifies five possible signs that a “desire be from 
the Spirit [rather than] from the Flesh”: First, the godly desires are “gentle and quiet,” while those from the 
Flesh are “turbulent and violent.” Secondly, “the desires of the Spirit doe not easily rise; we must take 
paines with our hearts for good desires; fleshly desires are hasty.” Thirdly, a good desire makes one “more 
heavenly minded,” while a bad desire tends to make one “more earthly minded, and indisposed to holy 
duties.” Fourthly, if prayer strengthens it, the desire is probably godly. And finally, “if there be some selfe-
respect that doth carry you, so farre yee goe and no farther: that respect being taken away, ye end” (The 
Doctrine of Self-deniall, 202-3). The Lady’s enthusiasm against Comus’s speech would fit well in this scheme 
once we remember that she forced back the “thousand fantasies” that at first perturbed her mind by relying 
on conscience, faith, hope, and chastity. 
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marrying the “daughter of an infidel” when “divinely called” (Samson Agonistes 221, 
226), may be allowed, a second such marriage can prove unlawful if not prompted by a 
new dispensation from God. What is required of a virtuous individual is to be willing, in 
Preston’s language, to deny all goods, friendships, and loves, as soon as they interfere 
with his obedience to unpredictable divine commands. This understanding of human 
response to divine will leaves very little room for freedom in the Aristotelian sense, 
where a virtuous individual acts freely towards his own good by developing habits that 
form the basis of rationality. For Milton, the role of human reason is restricted to an 
ever-diligent attending to and interpreting of the promptings of grace. 
How is this achieved? The foundation for salvation is of course found in the 
plain commandments of Scripture. It is by correctly understanding the Bible that we 
learn to rightly follow God’s will. In Of Reformation, for instance, Milton insists on the 
clarity of Scripture in all essential matters, including church government: “But it will be 
reply’d, the Scriptures are difficult to be understood, and therfore require the 
explanation of the Fathers, ‘tis true there be some Books […] that remain clouded; yet 
ever that which is most necessary to be known is most easie” (CPW I:566; emphasis 
mine). Indeed, all who approach the Bible have been furnished with enough reason and 
understanding to gather what is necessary for salvation from its text: 
The very essence of Truth is plainnesse, and brightness; the darknes and 
crookednesse is our own. The Wisdome of God created understanding, firm and 
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proportionable to Truth the object, and end of it, as the eye to the thing visible. If 
our understanding have a film of ignorance over it, or be blear with gazing on 
other false glistering, what is that to Truth? If we will but purge with sovrain 
eyesalve that intellectual ray which God hath planted in us, then we would 
believe the Scriptures protesting their own plainness, and perspicuity, calling to 
them to be instructed, not only the wise, and learned, but the simple, the poor, the 
babes, foretelling an extraordinary effusion of Gods Spirit upon every age, and 
sexe, attributing to all men, and requiring from them the ability of searching, 
trying, examining all things, and by the Spirit discerning that which is good. 
(CPW I:566; emphasis original) 
 
Unlike the image of dismembered body of Christ depicted in Areopagitica, the Scriptural 
truth presented in Of Reformation is a plain and bright object. Truth, if we had a clear 
enough eye, would be so easily perceived that it would seem to be “protesting [its] own 
plainness, and perspicuity.”80 Indeed, the “Wisdome of God created understanding, firm 
and proportionable to Truth the object” and it is only ignorance, something we can 
remedy, that keeps us from correctly perceiving what is good. In the logic of the 
passage, once this film is removed and Truth apprehended in Scripture, all will be able, 
with the aid of the Spirit, to distinguish between what is good and what is “false 
                                                     
80 Milton’s view of the clearness and integrity of Scripture undergoes extensive revision over time. In the 
divorce tracts, for instance, the written word of God seems less plain and bright than in the anti-prelatical 
pamphlets. There, even passages that seem to clearly prohibit divorce must be understood within a larger 
context and correctly interpreted: “Christ meant not to be tak’n word for word, but like a wise Physician, 
administering one excesse against another to reduce us to a perfect mean” (The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce, CPW II:282-3). Similarly, in Christian Doctrine, even the textual integrity of the New Testament is 
doubted: “I do not know why God’s providence should have committed the contents of the New Testament 
to such wayward and uncertain guardians, unless it was so that this very fact might convince us that the 
Spirit which is given to us is a more certain guide than scripture, and that we ought to follow it” (CPW VI: 589; 
emphasis mine). For Milton’s evolving sense of Scriptural interpretation, see Dayton Haskin, Milton’s Burden 
of Interpretation (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), in particular, see p. 46 for 
Colasterion and Milton’s claim that such a “pork” cannot interpret Scripture. 
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glistering.” But while truth may be plain and bright, while “the darknes and 
crookednesse is our own,” the moral dilemmas we encounter outside Scripture are not 
so clear. The Lady certainly did not bring darkness to the wood, she brought light 
rather, but Comus’s disguise was nonetheless impenetrable to her understanding. 
Milton uses Aristotelian language and categories to talk about virtue, reason, and 
liberty, while, at the same time, radically reconstructing the way they function through a 
specific model of the respective roles of human agency and divine grace. For Milton, 
grace fundamentally changes the scope of human reason: the virtues are anything but 
habits. We become virtuous by attending to divine truth and commandments. Christian 
readings of Aristotle, however, need not come to this conclusion. In the writings of 
Aquinas, there is a medieval solution to the problem of reconciling Aristotle and 
Christianity. Thomistic thought on the virtues can be seen as a synthesis of Aristotelian 
philosophy with the understanding of the will developed by Augustine.81 In contrast 
with the Puritan line of thinking exemplified by Preston, for both Aquinas and Aristotle, 
one’s family, friends, and city are not simple externals to the life of a virtuous individual 
that can be discarded at the perceived whims of an inscrutable divine will. As MacIntyre 
argues, Aquinas, in the Commentary upon the Ethics, proposes a model of education in the 
virtues that is fundamentally dependent on others: “[w]hat the person deprived hitherto 
                                                     
81 In this reading of Aquinas, I am following MacIntyre’s discussion in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
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of adequate moral education has to discover is that what he or she needs is a friend who 
will also be a teacher in the approach to the virtues.”82 That is, it is impossible to fully 
come to virtue on our own. And, more importantly, it is clear that not any human 
relationship will help us begin our moral education. Rather, only those friendships that 
are “defined in practice as well as in theory by the standards set by the natural law” can 
help us understand our telos.83 Why do we need this kind of relationship? An individual 
can find the precepts of divine law in revelation and in natural law as perceived by 
human reason, but for Aquinas as well as for Aristotle, one may not become virtuous 
simply by reasoning or argumentation.84 One must act virtuously in order to become 
virtuous. It is thus in human relationships that we practice the virtues (which can only be 
made sense of within a social context) and learn to become virtuous.  
What is important for our discussion is that for Aquinas, except in a few 
fundamental cases, we can understand natural law correctly and yet act sinfully: “our 
apprehension of basic true practical judgments as true does not involve that we 
understand what is involved in the living out of those judgments in the specifications 
                                                     
82 Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 180. This is not to deny a role for grace, as we see in Aquinas’ discussion 
of how certain habits, namely the theological virtues, can be infused: “The fact that God works in all things 
in a way appropriate to their nature does not prevent His doing what nature cannot do; but it follows from 
this that He does nothing adverse to what is fitting to nature” (Ia-IIae, q. 51, art. 4). All quotes from Ia-IIae, 
questions 49-67 of the Summa are from: Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on the Virtues, trans. John A. Oesterle 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). 
83 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 180. 
84 Indeed, right reason cannot exist prior to and disjoined from virtue, hence the distinction between reason 
and cleverness noted earlier in Aristotle. 
 78 
and particularities of practical life.”85 Moreover, Aquinas in following Augustine as well 
as Aristotle has to confront the Augustinian understanding that our perverted will—
mala voluntas—leads us to disobey even those precepts of divine law that we do 
understand fully.86 Thus, for Aquinas, it is not just an akratic individual who may 
rationally know what he must do and yet not do it, as it would be for Aristotle.87 Rather, 
an individual’s rational thought can sufficiently apprehend what ought to be done and 
yet fail to do it. This is because the will is free to choose not to follow the promptings of 
reason.88 We see a clear example of this when Aquinas, distinguishing between moral 
and intellectual virtues, points out the failings of rationality:  
the Philosopher says that ‘reason commands the appetitive principle by political 
rule,’ namely, that by which one rules over free men that have certain right of 
opposition.89 Thus Augustine says that ‘sometimes the intellect leads the way, 
and the desire follows belatedly or not at all,’ inasmuch as sometimes the 
passions or habits of the appetitive powers act in such a way that they impede 
the use of reason in a particular act. […] Therefore, in order that man’s actions be 
                                                     
85 Ibid., 185. 
86 Ibid., 181. 
87 For Aristotle, the problem with incontinence is a form of faulty knowledge: “In the case of having 
knowledge without using it we see a different kind of having, so that one can in a sense both have and not 
have it—for example, if one is asleep, mad or drunk. Now this is the condition of people under the influence 
of the ways they are affected; for spirited feelings, sexual appetites, and some other such things clearly alter 
our bodily condition as well, and in some people even produce attacks of madness. It is obvious, then, that 
we should say that incontinent people have knowledge in a similar way to these people” (Nicomachean Ethics 
124). 
88 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 189-91. 
89 This is opposed to the rule of reason over the body: “Hence the Philosopher says that ‘the soul rules the 
body despotically,’ that is, like a master rules a servant who does not have the right to oppose his master” 
(Aquinas, Ia-IIae, q. 58, art. 2). 
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good, not only must his reason be well disposed by a habit of intellectual virtue 
but also his appetitive power by a habit of moral virtue.90 
 
The only solution to our repeated disobedience of the law, the only way that we can act 
and reason well, is to develop the habits of moral and intellectual virtue, which cannot 
be done without the gift of charity given to us by grace; the virtue supplanted by chastity 
in A Maske.91 Indeed, for Aquinas, our growth in moral virtue would be limited without 
the infused virtue of charity: “insomuch as they are productive of good works in relation 
to a supernatural last end, and thus truly and perfectly attain the nature of virtue, they 
cannot be acquired by human acts but are infused by God.”92 That is, to learn how to act 
virtuously and how to reason correctly, we need both human and divine help. 
While Milton does not call friends and family conduits and pipes they way 
Preston does, it is telling that in his work we find virtues and right reason considered 
only in abstract terms rather than in a full social and practical context. Looking back to 
the passage on the clarity of Scripture from Of Reformation quoted earlier, we can see a 
move typical of Milton’s prose works: the subject of the key sentence is an abstraction 
and it is used to hide the (implied) agent. The tract asks us to purge our eyes from our 
                                                     
90 Ia-IIae, q. 58, art. 3. 
91MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 205. See also, Aquinas: “Charity is called the end of the other 
virtues because it directs them all to its own end. And since a mother is one who conceives in herself from 
another, charity is called the mother of the other virtues, because from desire of the ultimate end it conceives 
their acts by charging them with life” (IIa-IIae, q. 23, art. 3, Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, translated by Fathers 
of the English Dominican Province and re-issued by Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
92 Ia-IIae, q. 65, art. 2. 
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own ignorance and see “the Scriptures protesting their own plainness, and perspicuity” 
(CPW I:566). That is, the Scriptures themselves call all readers to learn from them. The 
choice of the grammatical subject is not accidental. Milton is arguing that his readers can 
stop relying on the Church Fathers to understand the Bible; it is plain to those with clear 
sight. Thus, the structure of the passage allows Milton to avoid the problem of the role 
of human agency in scriptural interpretation. All that is needed is for “every age, and 
sexe” to have the “ability of searching, trying, and examining all things” (emphasis 
mine).93 At no point does the tract come to terms with what would be involved in 
applying this ability.  
Milton’s picture of reason in his early works is thus clearly at odds with both 
Aquinas’ and Aristotle’s understanding of reason and virtue. For Aquinas, as we have 
just seen, we cannot begin our moral education until we have formed human 
relationships that are based on natural law. The virtues are not abstract entities that are 
applied to an abstracted conception of others. Charity, most crucially, is not only an 
infused virtue, but is a form of friendship, and it is learned through specific 
                                                     
93 For a similar move in another anti-prelatical tract, see Animadversions: “Wee shall adhere close to the 
Scriptures of God which hee hath left us as the just and adequate measure of truth, fitted and proportion’d 
to the diligent study, memory, and use of every faithfull man, whose every part consenting and making up 
the harmonious Symmetry of compleat instruction, is able to set out to us a perfect man of God or Bishop” 
(CPW I:700). Again, it is each part of Scripture that consents and makes up “harmonious Symmetry of 
compleat instruction,” and there is no need for a reader to add anything in order to understand what makes 
a good Bishop. 
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relationships. In Aquinas’ formulation, we find a role for divine grace that does not 
negate the possibility for human agency. Virtues can be both infused and habitual, 
“some habits are infused in man by God” and, moreover, the “fact that God works in all 
things in a way appropriate to their nature does not prevent His doing what nature 
cannot do; but it follows from this that He does nothing adverse to what is fitting to 
nature” (I-II:51.4). Divine grace does not work arbitrarily, but rather in concert with 
human nature, habits, and practices. While Milton neglects the virtue in A Maske, the 
rule of charity becomes his central hermeneutic tool in the Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce and in Christian Doctrine. However, any interpretation of Milton’s hermeneutics 
must take into account his reformulation of the virtue and his rejection of habit and 
tradition. 
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2. Justice and the Rule of Charity: Milton’s Divorce 
Tracts and Puritan Marriage 
And for the love of virtue, this said Philosopher Socrates would not expel his wife of the 
house. Yea, some say that he did therefore marry his wife to learn this virtue by that occasion.1 
 
“First comes the man, then a quarter of an houre after, his wife.” So begins 
Robert Cleaver’s and Jon Dod’s complaint in A godly forme of houshold government against 
“household-governors” who allow their family members to come to Church separately. 
The husband goes first, but allows his wife to leave later. She, in turn, causes the 
servants to delay even further: “and after her, we cannot tel how long, especially the 
maid-seruants, who must needs be as long as after her, as the men-seruants are after 
him. Whereby it commeth to passe, that either half the seruice of God is done before all 
be met: or else if the Minister tarry till there be a sufficient congregation, the first comers 
may be weary, and sometimes cold with tarrying, before the other shalbe warme in their 
seates.”2 One delay causes another and disrupts the devotions of the entire congregation. 
Those who are late miss part of the service, while those who arrived on time cannot 
                                                     
1 “Homily of the State of Matrimony” in Certain Sermons or Homilies Appointed to Be Read in Churches (1623), 
in Sexuality and Gender in the English Renaissance: An Annotated Edition of Contemporary Documents, ed. Lloyd 
Davis (New York: Garland, 1998), 33.   
2 All quotes are from Robert Cleaver and Jon Dod, A godly forme of houshold government for the ordering of 
priuate familes, (London, 1621), image 17. Early English Books Online. Folger Shakespeare Library 
(Washington, DC). April 8, 2010. 
http://proxy.lib.duke.edu:2212/search/fulltext?ACTION=ByID&ID=D00000243274680000&SOURCE=var_spe
ll.cfg&WARN=N&FILE=../session/1282307580_15461 . Cleaver’s first edition of the text dates from 1598. The 
manual went through nine editions, including, in 1610, an edition “newly perused, amended and 
augmented” in collaboration with Jon Dod. 
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attend with the proper state of mind. Cleaver and Dod place the fault of the delays 
squarely on the shoulders of the master of the household:  
Now, if it be demanded of the maisters, why they alone make such hast, and 
leaue all the rest behind them; & they answer truly, because the time is come, 
wherin vsually public prayer beginneth: can they be perswaded that it is time for 
themselues to come (as it is indeed) and yet not time for the rest to come with 
them? Hath the maister no longer time to tarry, and haue his seruants time to 
tarry so long after him? As though there were one law for him, and another for 
them: or rather, that the same law of the Sabbath, which moueth him of 
conscience to do that which he doth, did not as forciblie bind them all as himself: 
nay, did not binde him to looke to them, that they should keep holy the day as 
well as himself, which if he graunt to be true, & yet is not able to bring it to passe, 
(where the Lord hath giuen him so great authoritie for his owne sake) partly 
through the frowardnesse of his wife, and partly through the obstinacy of the 
rest of his familie: his case is to be pittied, and he is rather to be gouerned, then to 
gouerne: and he might do well to set vp one of them in his stead: seeing he doth 
suffer himselfe wilfully so to be abused, and is contented to be ouer-ruled by 
them in the chiefest thing.3 
 
In this passage, the authors remind the master of the household of his religious duties to 
his family—that is, to his wife, children, and servants—as well as to God. If it is time for 
him to pray, so it is for his family. If his conscience bids him to observe the Sabbath 
punctually, it should equally spur him to bring his family with him. After all, it is chiefly 
for the edification of his family that God has granted him natural authority over them. If 
he is incapable of fulfilling this duty, “he is rather to be gouerned, then to gouerne.” 
That is, a husband who cannot order the little commonwealth of his family so as to 
                                                     
3 Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 17; emphasis original. 
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promote true godliness is not truly the governor of his household, but deserves rather to 
be guided by others.  
I have quoted this passage at length because it gives a first sketch of the kind of 
language that forms part of the context for Milton’s divorce tracts. In particular, it 
indicates something of the complex web of relationships that surround marriage in 
Puritan writings. Milton’s divorce tracts enter a developing seventeenth-century 
discussion of the need to reform marriage with a proposal for divorce for 
incompatibility. While his conception of lawful causes for divorce goes further than that 
of most writers of the time, his framework for marriage is indebted to the language of 
marriage found in Puritan manuals. Milton is, however, a selective borrower. His 
argument for divorce hinges on a drastic reconfiguration of the definition of marriage. 
This redefinition has been quite successful in guiding critical analysis of the divorce 
tracts. Marriage for Milton, and for Milton critics, is primarily about husband and wife.4 
                                                     
4An influential strand of Milton criticism, though aware of alternative formulations in the seventeenth 
century, has adopted the poet’s own categorization of marriage. James Grantham Turner’s One Flesh: 
Paradisal Marriage and Sexual Relations in the Age of Milton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) traces the 
use of the imagery of Edenic marriage and sexual relations from Augustine to Puritan divines to recreate the 
context for Paradise Lost. In his reading, Milton liberates the mind from the subordination to the flesh in 
which it was placed by canon law and the writers of marriage manuals. Puritan divines “regard sexual 
satisfaction as the chief means ‘(next to an awfull feare of God)’ of a achieving ‘a kinde of Heaven upon 
Earth’” (75; see also 203-4), but Milton grasps the misery of an unequal marriage. Stephen M. Fallon, in “The 
Metaphysics of Milton’s Divorce Tracts” in Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose, ed. David 
Lowenstein and James Grantham Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 69-83, also argues 
that Milton upends the hierarchy of flesh over soul promoted by orthodox thinkers. Fallon’s main argument 
in this essay is that the divorce tracts document Milton’s nascent monism and that his privileging of the soul 
over the body is a rhetorical tactic. Moreover, Fallon is quite sensitive to the increasingly chauvinistic 
language of the successive divorce tracts: “his humane plea for no-fault divorce for incompatibility is yoked 
by violence to violence, with the rage of the injured male against the wife who will not be a wife” (78-9). 
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As I will argue in this chapter, this is a narrower view than found in marriage manuals 
such as Cleaver’s and Dod’s and it risks distorting our picture of the language used to 
discuss marriage in the seventeenth century. In the first part of this chapter, I turn to 
some overlooked strands of the seventeenth-century understanding of marriage. I begin 
                                                     
 
Nonetheless, his argument is also predicated on Milton’s definition of marriage. Tracing a different 
genealogy for the poet’s view of marriage from either Turner or Fallon, Thomas H. Luxon, in Single 
Imperfection Milton, Marriage and Friendship (Pittsburgh: Dusquene Universtiy Press, 2005), argues that in the 
divorce tracts Milton attempts to reform marriage in terms of classical notions of friendship (23-93). Luxon 
sees a tension between the humanist revival of classical homosocial friendship and the Protestant focus on 
marriage as the foundation of society (28-32). In this treatment, unhappy marriage for Milton is a defective 
friendship with an unequal partner. Here too, the focus is on the couple to the exclusion of all others. For 
similar treatment, see also: John Halkett, Milton and the Idea of Matrimony: A study of the Divorce Tracts and 
Paradise Lost (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Mark Fortier, “Milton, Equity and Divorce” in 
Milton, Rights, and Liberties, ed. Christophe Tournu and Neil Forsyth (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007), 143-153; and 
Catherine Gimelli Martin, “Dalila, Misogyny, and Milton’s Christian Liberty of Divorce” in Milton and 
Gender, ed. Catherine Gimelli Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 53-74; as well as her 
fuller treatment in Milton among the Puritans, where she argues that the relevant difference between Milton 
and the authors of marriage manuals is over the emphasis of obedience: “Milton’s theory of marriage is 
obviously the opposite of Bunyan’s, who like the authors of most Puritan marriage manuals, emphasized 
wifely obedience, made no allowance for separation even from a “Mr. Badman,” and largely restricted 
mutuality to the marriage bed—for Milton, and utterly joyless ‘blessing’ without the ‘spirit’ of mental and 
emotianl compatibility” (Catherine Gimelli Martin, Milton Among the Puritans: The Case for Historical 
Revisionism (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 73). There are of course readings of Milton’s divorce tracts that 
take into account a larger social context. For an analysis of Milton’s engagement with the Puritan ideology of 
gender relations and marriage and the development of his thinking from the divorce tracts to Paradise Lost, 
see David Aers and Bob Hodge, “‘Rational Burning’: Milton on Sex and Marriage,” in David Aers, Bob 
Hodge, and Gunther Kress, Literature, Language and Society in England 1580-1680 (Dublin: Gill and 
Macmillan, 1981), 122-51. I am indebted to this essay as well as to Diane Purkiss’ more recent essay, “Whose 
Liberty? The Rhetoric of Milton’s Divorce Tracts,” in The Oxford Handbook of Milton, ed. Nicholas McDowell 
and Nigel Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 186-199, for their discussions of Milton’s ideal of 
companionate marriage rescued by divorce in the context of gender relations and women’s roles in marriage 
in the seventeenth-century. Barbara Lewalski in The Life of John Milton (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000) 
acknowledges in her discussion of An Answer and Colasterion that Milton’s divorce tracts do not sufficiently 
consider the problems encountered by divorced women and their children (180). Nonetheless, Lewalski 
reads Milton’s desire for a “fit conversing soul” in his wife as a challenge to contemporary gender 
stereotypes (172). Gordon Campbell and Thomas N. Corns in John Milton: Life, Work and Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) briefly mention that the anonymous author of An Answer is most convincing 
in his argument against Milton when he considers the social consequences of divorce (166). 
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this chapter by reviewing five popular household manuals in order to flesh out the 
context for marriage in Puritan writings. The manuals provide a rich language for the 
discussion of marriage. Then, to better understand the metaphorical uses of this 
language, I turn to Preston’s breast-plate and John Donne’s marriage sermons. With this 
background, I look at Milton’s redefinition of marriage and at his claim for Scriptural 
support for divorce based on the rule of charity and Christian liberty. In the final section 
of the chapter, I argue that Milton’s developing understanding of liberty and charity 
grows out of a devaluing of the social bonds and human relationships necessary for 
education in the virtues, including charity itself. By comparing the only sustained reply 
to Milton’s first divorce tract, the anonymous An Answer to A Book intituled The Doctrine 
and Discipline of Divorce with Colasterion, we can unpack the ways in which Milton’s 
insistence on isolating the conversation of two souls as the fundamental requirement for 
marriage leads to a dehumanized version of both an unfit spouse and an unfit opponent 
in debate. 
As the passage opening this chapter begins to illustrate, to talk about marriage in 
the seventeenth-century requires talking about the whole family, not just the married 
couple. A household, Cleaver and Dod remind their readers, is formed of those who 
govern, namely a husband and wife, and those who are governed, that is to say, children 
and servants. The governors are however not equal. They are “first the chiefe gouernour, 
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which is the Husband, secondly, a fellow-helper, which is the Wife.”5 Having named the 
roles of all family members, the body of the manual is devoted to describing the duties 
that each member owes to all the others. The goal of the tract is to bring about a godly 
management of each family and, in turn, of the entire commonwealth which is formed 
by, and mirrored in, these households: “An Household is as it were a little 
Commonwealth, by the good gouernment whereof, Gods glorie may be aduanced, ands 
the commonwealth which standeth of seuerall families benefited; and all that lieu in that 
familie receiue much comfort and commoditie.”6 Thus, it becomes clear that the proper 
relationship between husband and wife cannot be discussed without considering the 
repercussions to the entire family and the commonwealth. Cleaver’s and Dod’s tract is of 
course not the only one to adopt such a stance. Perkins’s Christian Oeconomie (1609), as 
the title suggests, is also concerned with marriage in the context of household 
management. Much of his text is devoted to the education and rearing of children, the 
training of servants, and the management of finances as well as the proper relationship 
between husband and wife. Similarly, William Whately’s bride-bush, Thomas Gataker’s 
Marriage duties, and William Gouge’s Domesticall duties place the union of a man and a 
                                                     
5 Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 9; emphasis original. 
6 Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 6; emphasis original. 
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woman within the context of a large household using language nearly identical to 
Cleaver’s and Dod’s or Perkins’.7  
2.1 The Couple and the Community in Puritan Marriage Manuals 
In A godly forme of houshold government, Cleaver and Dod describe the goal of 
household management as twofold: “The gouernment of a Familie tendeth vnto two 
things specially. First Christian holinesse. And secondly, the things of this life. By the 
first, God is glorified, by the second, this present life is sustained, in such sort, as God 
seeth good for vs.”8 The exhortation to each father to bring his family to church seen in 
the opening quote is placed under the first heading, “Christian holinesse.” A master of 
                                                     
7 To this list, we could also Thomas Paget in A religious scrutiny concerning unequall marriage (1650). 
Interestingly, Paget advocates divorce in cases of religious difference. In his argument, he also considers the 
problem of the legal status of the children of such marriages as a fundamental part of the question under 
discussion. 
All quotations from these marriage manuals are from the following editions: 
William Perkins, Christian Oeconomie, trans. Thomas Pickering. London, 1609. Early English Books Online. 
British Library (London). April 8, 2010. 
http://proxy.lib.duke.edu:2212/search/full_rec?SOURCE=pgthumbs.cfg&ACTION=ByID&ID=99838344&FIL
E=../session/1282309554_21653&SEARCHSCREEN=CITATIONS&SEARCHCONFIG=var_spell.cfg&DISPLA
Y=AUTHOR. 
William Whately,  A bride-bush. Or, A direction for married persons Plainely describing the duties common to both, 
and peculiar to each of them. London, 1623. Early English Books Online. Union Theological Seminary Library 
(New York, N. Y.). April 8, 2010. 
http://proxy.lib.duke.edu:2212/search/full_rec?SOURCE=pgthumbs.cfg&ACTION=ByID&ID=99854638&FIL
E=../session/1281640062_10329&SEARCHSCREEN=CITATIONS&SEARCHCONFIG=var_spell.cfg&DISPLA
Y=AUTHOR. 
Thomas Gataker, Marriage duties briefely couched together out of Colossians, 3.18, 19. London, 1620. Early 
English Books Online. Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery (San Marino, CA). June 18, 2010. 
http://proxy.lib.duke.edu:2212/search/fulltext?SOURCE=var_spell.cfg&ACTION=ByID&ID=D0000099838734
0000&WARN=N&SIZE=134&FILE=../session/1282309926_22812&SEARCHSCREEN=CITATIONS&DISPLAY
=AUTHOR&ECCO=N. 
William Gouge, Of domestical duties eight treatises, (London, 1622). Early English Books Online. Folger 
Shakespeare Library (Washington, DC). April 8, 2010. 
http://proxy.lib.duke.edu:2212/search/fulltext?ACTION=ByID&ID=D00000998390470000&SOURCE=var_spe
ll.cfg&WARN=N&FILE=../session/1282310358_23904.  
8 Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 8; emphasis original. 
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the household who fails to promote the edification of those under his government not 
only deprives his family of necessary religious instruction, but also imperils the 
wellbeing of the entire community. His family misses part of the service and the 
devotions of the rest of the congregation are interrupted. However, he is not the only 
one who is reproached by Cleaver and Dod for this problem. The relationship between 
each family and the larger community is reciprocal. As the father of the family ought to 
urge all his household to attend church services for the benefit of the congregation as 
well as of the family, so is the rest of the congregation under the obligation to question 
the father about the lateness of his family: “the dispersed and broken comming of 
housholdes to the Church, is a thing greatly observed of the Lord God, and of his 
Angels, which are present at their assemblies: and it is that which griueth the rest of the 
Church, and as soon as they see one come in alone, they are ready with grief to ask, 
Where are the rest? What meaneth this partie to come alone?”9 The family’s delay is an 
offense to God, angels, and the congregation. Their absence ought to grieve the entire 
Church and make each member of the community ask what could have caused them to 
come separately. Cleaver and Dod connect this exhortation to communal edification to 
Psalm 42.4, “When I remembred these things, I powred out my very heart, because I had 
gone with the multitude, and led them into the house of God, with the voice of singing, 
                                                     
9 Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 18; emphasis original. 
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and praises, as a multitude that keepeth a feast.”10 The Psalm recalls the gathering of a 
joyous multitude at the temple, where collective singing and praying become central to 
the act of worship. The master of a household is reminded not to go alone to church, but 
to lead his entire family as the Psalmist led the multitude. In the manual, each 
individual’s edification is placed squarely within a network of obligations that extends 
beyond the individual’s conscience or even the family circle. 
Cleaver and Dod make the connection between marriage and commonwealth 
explicit in the section on the education of children. The manual presents the dire 
consequences that follow from parents’ reluctance to discipline and educate their sons 
and daughters from a tender age. Not only will their children grow up devoid of any 
virtue, but the entire commonwealth and Church will suffer. Indeed, it is useless to wish 
for Church reformation when unwilling to reform one’s own family:  
[H]ow needfull houshold gouernment is towards children, may appeare by the 
slender thriuing, and small profiting either of religion or vertue, either in the 
Church or Common-wealth. Speake men of discipline neuer so much, complaine 
                                                     
10 Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 17. “When I remember these things, I pour 
out my soul in me: for I had gone with the multitude, I went with them to the house of God, with the voice 
of joy and praise, with a multitude that kept holyday” (All quotes from the Bible are from: The Bible: 
Authorized King James Version, ed. Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996).) Note: the marginal note in the manual incorrectly identifies the passage as Psalms 24.4. Cleaver and 
Dod give a second Scriptural reference in the margin next to the question “Where are the rest?”, 1 Cor. 11.10:  
“For this cause ought the woman to have power on her head because of the angels.” In marriage manuals 
this Scriptural passage is often used as a proof-text in discussions of wives’ duty to submit to their husband 
or in the expositions of the husband’s duties to love and guide his wife. For the first type of use, see, for 
instance, Perkins, Christian Oeconomie (Chapters 5 and 12), Thomas Gataker, Marriage duties, and William 
Whately, bride-bush, (Chapter 14). Both Gataker and Whately insist that the proper affection of a wife for her 
husband is one of “loving-fear” and obedience. For the second use, see, in particular, Perkins’ use of 1 Cor. 
11 to argue that wife-beating is a form of sacrilege (Christian Oeconomie, Chapter 11). 
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they of the want of Church gouernment neuer so lowd, preach they, teach they 
neuer so much abroad, vnlesse they will begin discipline in reforming their 
houses, & guie religion some roome at home, they shall trauell much and profit 
little. […] and of all meanes that now may be hoped for, this seemth best: for of 
particular persons, come families: of families, townes: of townes, prouinces: of 
prouinces, realms: so that conueying discipline thus from one to another, in time, 
and that shortly, it would come into the Church.11 
 
The individual and the family are the foundation blocks of towns, provinces, and 
realms.12 Reformation of Church government, in this model, is best achieved bottom-up, 
by reforming the constituting members first. Once this is achieved, godliness will spread 
from private families to the entire commonwealth.13 Paired with the earlier passage 
drawn from Psalm 42, this model of reformation presents a symmetry between the 
whole and its constituent parts. Godly families are necessary for the reformation of the 
Church, and, in turn, a godly congregation will reinforce household discipline. For 
Cleaver and Dod, and for the readers hungry for the nine editions A godly forme of 
                                                     
11 Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 150. 
12 The idea of the commonwealth as constructed by families can be traced back to Book I of Aristotle’s 
Politics and his view of man as a social animal. Margo Todd, in Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social 
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), argues that the Puritan conception of the family as 
the building block of society is based in the reforming ideals of sixteenth century Christian humanists. In 
particular, she singles out Erasmus, More, and Vives for their influence in England (see, especially, pages 96-
117). Todd’s analysis is helpful in tracing humanist sources in Puritan marriage manuals even though she 
downplays the influence of continental Reformed thinkers. 
13 Sylvia Brown reads Cleaver’s injunction to reform each household as a coded message to moderate 
Puritans to work towards a reformation of the Church of England (Godly Household Government from Perkins 
to Milton: The Rhetoric and Politics of Oeconomia, 1600-45 (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1994), 60-1). In the 
first chapter of her dissertation, Brown argues that, between 1600 and 1640, the language of household 
manuals sustained a godly identity and promoted reformation in an inimical political environment (9-67). In 
the 1640s, when the establishment of a Presbyterian Church policy in England became a possibility, a 
generation of Puritans accustomed to reading household manuals took their language of reform from those 
same manuals (177). 
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houshold government went through, the concept of marriage and family cannot be 
extricated from the language of community and congregation. 
The link between the wellbeing of each family and that of the commonwealth at 
large is reflected in all details of everyday life. A man’s ability to govern his affairs 
outside of the house will be judged on his ability to manage his own family: “he is 
reckoned worthy to rule a common-wealth, that with such wisedome, discretion, and 
iudgement, doth rule and gouerne his owne house.”14 In turn, such skill in household 
management is developed first in the hierarchical relationship between husband and 
wife. The husband will never be able to run his household well, if he does not develop a 
harmonious relationship with his subordinate co-governor:  
For the houshold, when their maister and their mistresse, or dame, are at debate, 
can no otherwise be in quiet and at rest, then a Citie whose rulers agree not, but 
when it seeth them in concord and quietnesse, then it reioyceth, trusting that 
they will be euen so vnto them, as it perceiueth them to be among themselues. 
[…] And the seruants are not onely merrie therefore, but also they do their 
seruice the more obediently and cheerefully, shewing reuerence vnto the 
authority that proceedeth and increaseth of quietnesse and concord. For the 
husband defend his wiues estimation, with loue and beneuolence: and the wife 
her husband with loue and obedience. So that vnitie and concord, causeth them 
to be accounted wise, honest, and virtuous; and they must needs be good, seeing 
they haue loued so long together.15 
 
The twin images of household-as-commonwealth and the commonwealth-built-of-
households form an all-encompassing view of social relations in A godly forme of houshold 
                                                     
14 Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 87. 
15 Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 86. 
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government. On the one hand, since the household is a miniature commonwealth, we can 
learn how a family ought to be managed by learning from the analogy to political 
organization. Thus, husband and wife can be seen as governors of the family while 
servants and children as those governed. If the governors agree with each other, the 
subjects will be able to expect orderly and fair government. But if the governors 
disagree, the subjects can only expect discord. On the other hand, because the 
commonwealth is constituted of households which, in turn, mirror its structure, we can 
judge the abilities of an individual as citizens by his abilities as the governor of a 
household. The governors of the household will only be accounted “wise, honest, and 
virtuous” if their marriage is harmonious. The commonwealth, then, is dependent on 
godly families and godly families are dependent on good marriages. In turn, the 
relationships between husband and wife, parents and children, masters and servants, 
ought to reflect the order of a well-governed commonwealth.16 
Cleaver and Dod are not the only writers who presents such an ideal. Thomas 
Gataker, in Marriage duties, begins his account of marriage with a similar picture. The 
relationship between husband and wife is the foundation of all society and thus must be 
                                                     
16 In the manual, Claver and Dod repeatedly use examples from civil government in their advice. To 
husbands who wish to strictly rule their wives, they issue the following warning: “Some husbands are wont 
to say, that they will rule their wiues whatsoeuer they be, or howsoeuer they came by them, and that it is in 
the hand and power of the husband, what, and of what qualities and conditions she shall be. True it is, that a 
great part of this doth rest and lie in the husband, so that he vnderstand as he ought to do, that marriage is 
the supreme and most excellent part of all amitie and friendship: and that it farre differeth from tyranny, the 
which doth compel men to obey” (Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 105-6). 
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properly ordered: “[B]ecause this is the fountain from whence the rest flow: and the 
streames can not flow pure and cleare vnlesse the fountain be first clensed and kept 
cleane.”17 Gataker’s argument follows Cleaver’s and Dod’s closely. Marriage is the 
original source of all social relationships, a fact highlighted by Adam’s being given 
Eve—a wife and not another man—as a helpmeet to remedy his loneliness. In particular, 
if the relationship between husband and wife is not harmonious, there is little hope that 
the rest of the household affairs will run smoothly. The reason of “much neglect of dutie 
in many families, in children towards parents, in seruants toward Master and Mistres” 
can be found in the lack of agreement between husband and wife: “neglect of dutie and 
difference betweene them is a meanes to breed a contempt of one or both in those that 
should be guided by them: making seruants and children to take occasion of libertie and 
faile in their duty to them, as they faile in dutie either to other.”18 Gataker warns that 
lack of harmony in the relationship between husband and wife creates an unruly 
household. And such disorder potentially leads to a break-down in religious discipline: 
“where dutie faileth betweene man and w[i]fe it causes a neglect of […] dutie oft euen to 
God himself.”19  
Similarly, William Whately’s A bride-bush couches all admonitions against 
breaking any marriage duty in warnings about possible social repercussions. In the 
                                                     
17 Gataker, Marriage duties, 3. 
18 Gataker, Marriage duties, 4. 
19 Gataker, Marriage duties, 5. 
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second chapter of the manual, on due benevolence, Whately chastises married couples 
who are “carried forward with the heat and tide of their vnruly appetites” and who 
“come together in marriage, forgetting or neglecting to receive the Lords good will and 
blessing.”20 The consequences of failing to do so go well beyond the couple. 
Approaching sex without the proper orientation towards God can hurt the family, the 
commonwealth, and the Church: 
Doth not euery mans priuate wel-fare, and the publike also for the most part, 
depend in a manner altogether vpon the successe of this societie? The hope of 
posterity, the stay of old age, the comfort of weaknesse, the support of euery 
mans house and name, together with the flourishing and populous estate of 
euery church and common-weale, doth even  hang upon the fruit of matrimony. 
[…] and if many families (as it were seminaries) bee either empty of plants 
altogether, or vp pestered with crooked and crab-tree plants, how shall the 
Orchyards of the Church and Commonweale, be stored with good wholesome 
trees?21 
 
The metaphor is no longer that of a fountain from which all the streams of society flow, 
as in Gataker, but rather that of a seminary.22 The different image, however, does not 
have different import. From each married couple, the commonwealth and the Church 
derive their constituent members. Indeed, Whately warns each husband and wife that 
though they may have discharged all the duties towards each other, they will still be 
remiss in the duties of marriage if they do not regard the well-being of the other members 
                                                     
20 Whately, A bride-bush, 16. 
21 Whately, A bride-bush, 17. 
22 The image of the seminary could be meant to recall Malachi 2.15: “And did not he make one? Yet had he 
the residue of the spirit. And wherefore one? That he might seek a godly seed. Therefore take heed to your 
spirit, and let none deal treacherously against the wife of his youth.” 
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of the household. That is, even the duty of due benevolence must be undertaken with a 
clear sense of the possible consequences to their children. Moreover, as in the other 
manuals, the government of the household is depicted in A bride-bush as a miniature 
state: “The man must be taken for Gods immediate officer of the house, and as it were 
the King of the family; the woman must account her self his deputy, an officer 
substituted to him, not as equal, but as subordinate: and in this order they must 
governe.”23 Having established that the household is a little commonwealth with two 
governors of different rank, as well as the nursery of the English commonwealth, 
Whately proceeds to give the same advice proffered by Cleaver and Dod, and Gataker. 
Discord among the governors of the family will produce rebellion in those governed: 
“They must therefore so joyne hands in these workes, that their dissention may not blast 
the fruit of all their endeauours. It is harmfull to nourish as it were a domestick faction 
in this little common-weale. […] so shall their discreet concord in government preserue 
their authority among their people, encrease their loue each to other, and procure 
amendment in their inferiors.”24 
As a final example, I turn to William Gouge’s manual. Domesticall Duties is more 
extensive than any of the marriage tracts considered up to this point.25 The manual is 
                                                     
23 Whately, A bride-bush, 89. 
24 Whately, A bride-bush, 96-7. 
25 Gouge’s view of marriage is particularly interesting given his presence at the Westminster Assembly. 
Unfortunately, the minutes of the Assembly do not record any participation from Gouge in the debate on 
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divided into eight treatises, with each successive treatise building upon the previous 
one. The first section of the first treatise introduces and explains the Scriptural places 
from which the author will take his precepts. Gouge begins by giving an example of 
how Paul’s syntax teaches the best method to read Scripture and, presumably, Gouge’s 
own text. The very first verse adduced is Ephesians 5.21, “Submitting your selues one to 
another in the feare of God.”26 This verse illustrates how Paul moves from instructing 
the faithful on their general duties, that is, duties common to all regardless of calling, to 
teaching them their particular duties as married people. The form of the verb 
“submitting,” a gerund, creates a link between the general and particular, and thus 
demonstrates that one depends on the other. Gouge sees this construction as a particular 
mark of Paul’s style of writing and instruction. By creating a link between two verses, 
the apostle teaches us to understand each precept within the context of the preceding 
one: 
This manner of passing from one point to another, by a perfect transition which 
looketh both wayes, both to that which is past, and to that which commeth on, as 
it is very elegant, so is it frequent with this our Apostle. Whereby he teacheth vs, 
so to giue heed to that which followeth, as we forget not that which is past: as we 
must giue diligent attention to that which remaineth, so we must well retaine 
that which we haue heard, and not let it slip: otherwise, if (as one nail driveth out 
                                                     
 
the directory for marriage. See, Minutes of the Sessions of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, ed. Alex F. 
Mitchell and John Struthers (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1897), 7-14. 
26 Gouge, Of domestical duties, 2. 
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another) one precept maketh another to be forgotten, it will be altogether vain to 
add line unto line, or precept onto precept.27 
 
By this example, Gouge emphasizes that the duties of marriage must be understood 
within the context of the general duties of each member of the couple as a Christian man 
or woman. Moreover, each lesson in the marriage manual is meant to be read as 
building upon the previous one and pointing to the next. 
Gouge, like most writers of marriage manuals, returns to Ephesians 5 repeatedly. 
Indeed, as the entire First Treatise of Domesticall Duties details, the perfect pattern for the 
correct relationship between husband and wife can be found in the relationship between 
Christ and the Church: “All things requisite to ioyne man and wife together, doe fitly 
concurre betwixt Christ and the Church.”28 The parallel between Christ and the Church, 
on one hand, and husband and wife, on the other, runs through and saturates the First 
Treatise so thoroughly that admonitions against divorce based on the example of 
Christ’s unshakable love for the Church—“He is not like the hard hearted Iewes, who 
vpon euerie sleight occasion would put away their wiues. The Lord hateth putting away. 
Though therefore the Church, through her weaknesse, doe depart from him, and play 
the harlot, yet returne againe to me, saith the  Lord”—become occasions to remind his 
                                                     
27 Gouge, Of domestical duties, 2; emphasis original. 
28 Gouge, Of domestical duties, 117. The language used by writers like Gouge to emphasize that a good 
Christian marriage is to be understood by the model of the love of Christ for the Church is also used by John 
Preston and John Donne to argue that the relationship of the soul to Christ (and the Church to Christ) can be 
understood in terms of the love between a wife and a husband. I will turn to this metaphorical use of the 
language of marriage in the next section. 
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readers to love God. Gouge urges his readers to “Learne we by this patterne to cleaue 
close vnto the Lord, which is a dutie most due to Christ who cleaueth so close to vs, and 
therefore oft expressed in the Scripture.”29 For Gouge the language of marriage is 
inescapably linked with the language of faith in and love for Christ.30 It is in this context 
that Gouge begins to develop the attributes of marital love including, with an emphasis 
similar to Whately’s, due benevolence: “Loue is the glue and soader which maketh vs 
one with Christ: for it is the propertie of loue to vnite those that loue one another in one. 
[…] He that loueth is well pleased with him whom he loueth, and seeketh also to please 
him, that they may mutually delight one in another.” In the Second Treatise, this model 
of marital relationships allows Gouge to condemn adultery as a sin against charity. In 
the first place, adultery offends the trinity: “Against each person in the holy Trinitie: the 
Father (whose couenant is broken) the Sonne (whose members are made the members of 
an harlot) and the Holy Ghost (whose Temple is polluted).”31 Moreover, adultery offends 
the entire commonwealth, starting with one’s accomplice in sin and one’s spouse, 
moving on to the possible children of the adulterous relationship, and ending with one’s 
town, nation, and Church: 
                                                     
29 Gouge, Of domestical duties, 121; emphasis original. Gouge references Malachi 2.16, a particularly crucial 
passage in Milton’s argument for divorce. While Gouge, along with the King James translation, renders it as: 
“The Lord hateth putting away.” Milton, following the Vulgate and Calvin, translates it as: “he who hates 
let him divorce” (The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, CPW II:257; see also the editor’s note, n.16). Milton 
returns to this point of translation in Tetrachordon (CPW II:615) and Colasterion (CPW II:749). 
30 There is a similar tendency in other Puritan divine’s writings about marriage. However, the sheer length 
of Gouge’s manual allows him to develop this line of thinking in greater detail than in most other tracts. 
31 Gouge, Of domestical duties, 220; emphasis original. 
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Against ones neighbour, as the partie with whom the sinne is committed (for this 
sinne cannot be committed singly by one alone) the husband and wife of each 
partie (who cannot rest contented with any satisfaction) the children borne in 
adulterie (whom they brand with an indelible character of infamie, and depriue 
of many priuiledges that otherwise they might enioy) the alliance and friends of 
each partie (to whom the griefe and disgrace of this foule sinne reacheth) the 
whole family appertaining to either of them (for this is as a fire in an house) the 
towne, citie, and nation where such vncleane birds roost (for all they lie open to 
the vengeance of God for this sinne) and the very Church of God (the holy seed 
whereof is by this sinne hindred).32 
 
For Gouge, adultery does not simply offend the injured spouse, but hurts the entire 
community and destroys the covenant between man and God. It is thus a sin against 
charity and perverts the bond of neighborly love that holds commonwealth and Church 
together. It is a sin that perpetuates itself beyond the lives of those who commit it. Their 
children have “an indelible character of infamie” and the Church is deprived of “the 
holy seed” to replenish its numbers. 
I have quoted the passage above at length in order to highlight the context swept 
aside by Milton in his discussion of just causes for divorce. As we will see, in Reformed 
churches, the legal discussions of divorce did indeed focus on allowing divorce only for 
adultery and thus to seemingly privilege, as Milton complained, the body over the soul, 
sexual commingling over spiritual conversation. Nonetheless, as we have begun to see, 
popular discussions of marriage paint a very different picture. For instance, while in the 
Second Treatise of his manual Gouge recommends due benevolence between spouses as 
                                                     
32 Gouge, Of domestical duties, 220; emphasis original. 
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one of the best remedies against the sin of adultery, this advice comes only after having 
established a rich context for marital sexuality. Rather than being a simple privileging of 
the carnal over the spiritual, as Milton would have us believe, the discussion of adultery 
is inevitably linked to the problem of children—that almost unavoidable consequence of 
sex that is so quickly swept aside in the divorce tracts—as well as to the wider 
repercussions that follow upon such sin. Indeed, the Puritan bedchamber seemed to 
have rarely have been inhabited by only husband and wife, at least in the imagination of 
the writers of marriage manuals. Moreover, when Gouge reminds his readers that 
marital sex is a powerful remedy against adultery, “[o]ne of the best remedies that can 
be prescribed to maried persons […] is, that husband and wife mutually delight each in 
other, and maintaine a pure and feruent loue betwixt themselues, yeelding due 
beneuolence one to another which is warranted & sanctified by Gods word, and ordained 
of God for this particular end,” the mutual delight afforded by a loving marriage cannot 
be detached from the mutual delight between Christ and the Church.33 
This is not to say that there are not moments in Puritan marriage manuals that 
focus only on the couple, or at least the family, to the apparent exclusion of all larger 
concerns. In Perkins’ Christian Oeconomy, for instance, the family is not only a little 
Commonwealth, it is, quoting Philem. 1.2, a little Church and Paradise. It recreates a 
whole world within itself and does not seem to need any connection with the rest of 
                                                     
33 Gouge, Of domestical duties, 221; emphasis original. 
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society: “those families wherein this seruice of God is performed, are, as it were, little 
Churches, yea euen a kind of paradise vpon the earth.”34 Placing an even stronger 
emphasis on the couple in the beginning of chapter three of A bride-bush, Whately 
describes a marriage where love reigns to be “a pleasing combination of two persons 
into one home, one purse, one heart, and one flesh.”35 For a brief moment in the text, 
concerns about children, commonwealth, and Church are nowhere to be seen. Indeed, in 
the same page, a marriage without love is described using language that could well be 
taken from Milton: “Love is the life and soul of mariage, without which, it differs as 
much from itself, as a rotten apple from a sound, as a carcasse from a liuing body: yea 
verily, it is a most vncomfortable society, and no better than a very liuing death.”36 
Similarly, Gataker, when praising love between husband and wife, describes the 
relationship formed by marriage as the most intimate known to human beings: “behold 
a neerer coniunction between married persons man and wife, then between children and 
parents.”37 These moments, as well as the emphasis on due benevolence in these tracts, 
seem to warrant James G. Turner’s claim in One Flesh that “[t]hese [Gataker, Whately, 
and Gouge] and other ‘Puritan’ writers, though intensely aware of the horrors of a bad 
marriage, still write about matrimony as if it is an achievable Paradise […]. And they 
still regard sexual satisfaction as the chief means […] of achieving ‘a kinde of Heaven 
                                                     
34 Perkins, Christian Oeconomy, 8. 
35 Whately, A bride-bush, 31; emphasis mine. 
36 Whately, A bride-bush, 31. 
37 Gataker, Marriage duties, 32. 
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upon Earth.’”38 Given this reading of these marriage manuals, Milton’s own divorce tracts 
can be seen as overturning the primacy that copulation is given by Puritan writers. He 
reclassifies it as “an ‘inferior’ subdivision of the lower category of ‘conversation.’”39 Thus 
Milton, in this view, can be read as sharing with these writers a clear sense of what are 
the constituting elements of marriage, but as choosing to advocate a shift in focus from 
the physical to the spiritual. But this picture of the discussion over marriage is skewed 
and dominated by Milton’s own reformulation of what is essential to marriage. As can 
be seen from the discussion of marriage manuals above, passages that focus on the 
couple alone are accompanied by, and indeed in authors such as Cleaver and Perkins 
overwhelmed by, passages that emphasize the interconnection between family, 
commonwealth, and Church. In contrast to this contextualization of husband and wife 
found in the marriage manuals, Milton’s divorce tracts, as we will see, focus on the 
couple alone.  
2.2 The Soul’s Love for Christ: John Preston’s Language of 
Marriage 
Before turning to Milton, I want to look at one more Puritan writer’s discussion 
of marriage. In this case, however, I will be focusing on a figurative use of the language 
of marriage and love. The manuals we have looked at up to this point have adopted the 
language of Ephesians 5 to describe the proper relationship between husband and wife 
                                                     
38 Turner, One Flesh, 75. 
39 Loc cit. 
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as that between Christ and the Church. Through this Scriptural imagery, they describe 
each family as a miniature Church as well as a miniature commonwealth. Conversely, 
this scriptural passage could be used to illustrate individual spiritual development in 
terms of conjugal imagery. John Preston applies the framework of marriage and love to 
explain the proper orienting of the soul to Christ. Faith and charity are understood by 
means of the relationship between husband and wife. The breast-plate of faith and love is a 
collection of eighteen sermons on the two topics named in the title: faith, which is given 
ten sermons, and love, which is given eight sermons. In the first set of sermons of The 
breast-plate, John Preston uses the language of marital love and of marriage contracts to 
explain what faith in Christ is. The first sermon in the collection uses Rom. 1.17 for its 
text.40 The Scriptural affirmation that “the just shall live by faith” causes an anxious 
voice to exclaim: “but I haue not so strong a faith, I cannot beleeue as I would, and as I 
should.”41 The rest of the sermon, and indeed the entire collection, develops around this 
fear. The goal of The breast-plate is to explain what it means to have effectual faith in 
Christ and how those who “are ingrafted into, and borne of” Christ are saved. Faith is all 
                                                     
40 Rom. 1.17: “For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith: as it is written, 
The just shall live by faith.” While Preston does not explicitly mention Luther, the choice of text 
links the questions in the sermons on faith to a key Scriptural place in the history of the 
Reformation. See, Heiko Oberman, Luther: Man between God and the Devil, trans. Eileen Walliser-
Schwarzbart (New Haven, CT: Ylae UP, 1989), 164-6. 
41 John Preston, The breast-plate of faith and love, (London, 1630), 2. Early English Books Online. Dr. Williams’s 
Library and the Bodleian Library (Oxford). February 24, 2010. 
http://proxy.lib.duke.edu:2212/search/fulltext?ACTION=ByID&ID=D00000449203960000&SOURCE=var_spe
ll.cfg&WARN=N&FILE=../session/1282334366_29696. The sermons were first preached in 1625 and printed 
as a collection in 1630. 
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that is required for salvation: “it is onely required of thee to come with the hand of faith, 
and receiue it in the middest of all thy vnworthinesse, whatsoeuer it be, lay hold on the 
pardon, and embrace it, and it shall be thine.”42 This image of the unworthy recipient 
accepting and embracing the pardon for all his sins evolves into the governing trope of 
The breast-plate, the image of the marriage between Christ and the soul: “As the Husband 
wooes his Spouse, and says thus, I require nothing at thy hands, no condition at all, I 
doe not examine whether thou art wealthy, or no; whether thou be faire, or no; whether 
thou be out of debt, or well conditioned, it is no matter what thou art, I require thee 
simply to take me for thy Husband.”43 Over and over again, in answering questions 
about the nature of saving faith, Preston returns to this trope of marriage.44  
Indeed, the language Preston uses to describe the love between a soul and Christ 
is the same as that used by the marriage manuals. For instance, if one were to ask, how 
should I serve Christ? Preston would answer that he do so by keeping His 
                                                     
42 Preston, The breast-plate, 14. 
43 Preston, The breast-plate, 15. 
44 The imagery of marriage is even used in answering such seemingly dry points as whether “Fides est actus 
intellectus, [Faith] is an act of vnderstanding.” On this particular issue, Preston explains that it involves both 
intellect and the will: “As in a matter of marriage, If one come and tell a Woman, there is such a man in the 
world that is willing to bestow himself on you, if you will take him, and accept him for your husband: Now 
(marke what it is that makes vp the marriage on her part:) first she must beleeue that there is such a man, 
and that that man is willing to haue her, that this message is true, that it is brought from the man himself, 
and that it is nothing else but a true declaration of the mans minde. This is an act of her minde or 
vnderstanding: But will you take him, and accept him for your Husband? now comes the will, and 
concurrence of these two makes vp the match. […] If you beleeue that we deliuer the message from Christ, 
and doe consequently embrace and take him, you are iustified.” The fluid transition between the example of 
the woman contemplating marriage and the state of the soul moved to belief is typical of The breast-plate. The 
difference between effectual faith and faith as an act of the will is further clarified in the sixth sermon in the 
collection. There, Preston explains that even devils have a sort of faith, but it is not effectual because it 
consists only in fear and not love of God. 
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commandments sincerely and with the proper affection. One must, however, strive to be 
truthful in his service to God because even “an hypocrite may goe faree in 
performances, and yet though he doth much, hee may not love much.” Indeed, a truly 
godly individual will love Christ in the same way a wife loves her husband: “It is true, a 
man may doe much for Christ, and yet not love him […]. You know, the wife and the 
servant, they both serve the husband, and doe much for him, both are alike diligent, yet 
notwithstandi[n]g there is this difference, the wife doth it out of love.”45 If one of 
Preston’s parishioners were to turn to marriage manuals to better understand this model 
of love, he would find the same language and examples. Cleaver, following Paul, 
reminds us that marriage is a sign pointing to the union of Christ with the Church. This 
should be kept vividly before the eyes of both husband and wife: “therefore thou 
oughtest so much as shall lie in thee, to lift vp thy mind, and to remember how great and 
worthy an image thou doest represent; and that thy wife shall be vnto thee as the 
Church, and thou vnto her as Christ; herefore thou shouldest shew thy selfe vnto her, as 
Christ shewed himselfe vnto his Church.”46 Moreover, a husband should always 
remember that his wife’s obedience is unlike that of a servant: “By the helper, is signified 
the vtilitie and profit of the seruice, and by the similitude and likenesse are signified 
loue and helpefulnesse. For a seruant and he that is hired are insufficient to supply that 
                                                     
45 Preston, The breast-plate, 79. 
46 Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 75. 
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place; there can neither be so much loue, and ability to minister helpe and comfort to a 
man, as will be found in a faithfull wife.”47 Gataker, rather than focusing of the 
difference between the love of wife and the outward obedience of a servant, explains the 
wife’s proper relationship to her husband by contrasting true love and subjection with 
the mere show of a hypocrite. While “hypocrites place religion onely in ceremoniall 
obseruances,” a godly wife will be “faithfull and carefull, in a constant and conscionable 
performance of such duties as issue and flow from the inward acknowledgement of that 
superioritie of power and place, that God hath giuen to the husband in regard of the 
wife.”48 Indeed, her fear of her husband is “like that feare that the godly beare vnto God.” 
It is “not a seruile or slauish dread, but a liberall, free and ingenuous feare.”49 The 
parallel between religious and conjugal love is meant to help illustrate both marriage 
and a soul’s relationship with God. 
There is however a difference in emphasis between Preston’s use of the imagery 
of marriage and that in the marriage manuals. While in the Puritan tracts the focus is 
mainly on the larger context for each marriage with a few passages that concentrate 
primarily on the married couple itself, in Preston, the emphasis is on the relationship 
between the individual soul and Christ.50 The same relentless requirement that each 
                                                     
47 Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 76. 
48 Gataker, Marriage duties, 11. 
49 Gataker, Marriage duties, 12. 
50 Furthermore, while Preston and the writers of marriage manuals use the same, standard Scriptural places 
to draw the parallels between civil and mystical marriage (especially, Eph. 5.23-27, 1 Cor.10), their respective 
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individual be willing to suffer for God that we have seen in Foure Godly and Learned 
Treatises is also to be found in The breast-plate. In the latter collection of sermons, 
however, it is recast in the image of a loving marriage:  
A husband that loves his spouse, is exceeding readie to suffer any thing to enjoy 
her love, he is willing to suffer any displeasure of parents, of friends, to suffer the 
losse of his estate, he cares not for discredit in the world, hee is ready to breake 
through thicke and thinne, and to doe any thing, so he may obtaine her love at 
the last: So if you love the Lord Iesus, you will suffer any thing for his sake.51 
 
The passage recalls Ephesians 5.25, “Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also 
loved the church.” In the Scriptural passage, the love of the husband for his wife is 
likened to that of Christ for the Church. Preston, however, emphasizes the love of the 
individual for Christ. Just as the loving husband is willing to undergo privation in order 
to obtain the love of his wife, each individual must be willing to “suffer any displeasure 
of parents, of friends, to suffer the losse of his estate” to win the love of Christ. To do 
otherwise, to put any other love above God would be to display an adulterous love: 
“You may know whether your love to any creature, to any sport or recreation be 
adulterous or no. A chast wife may love many men besides her husband; but if it once 
begin to lessen her love to her husband, that is an adulterous love: Therefore if you 
would love the Lord aright, be sure to cut off this, for it breedes a distance betweene 
                                                     
 
readings of these passages also shows a different focus. For Preston, the main focus is a moral reading of the 
relationship between the individual soul and Christ. For Cleaver and Dod, Perkins, Gouge, and Gataker, the 
emphasis is on the relationship between the Church as a whole and Christ. 
51 Preston, The breast-plate, 77.  
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God and you.”52  For Preston, any love and concern that one may feel for any creature 
must be tested to determine whether it diminishes the affection that the soul owes to the 
Creator. As we will see, the remedies presented in The breast-plate to heal any possible 
estrangement between the soul and God mirror the solutions proposed in the marriage 
manuals to foster a stronger bond between husband and wife. 
There are, however, passages in The breast-plate that do show concern for the 
larger social and political connections between faith and the commonwealth.53 A striking 
example of Preston’s engagement with a larger ecclesiastical context is found in the 
fourth sermon of love. The Scriptural text is Gal. 5.6.54 This sermon continues the 
discussion on the properties of true love begun in the third sermon, and describes the 
two affections that depend on love: anger, which in the context of religion is also called 
zeal, and fear.55 The first affection dependent on love, anger, is manifested whenever the 
object of love is taken away from us or dishonored. Indeed, anger can be used to gauge 
the strength of our love. Thus, Preston urges his listeners to judge their pious zeal by 
                                                     
52 Preston, The breast-plate, 107. 
53 For the political aspects of Preston’s sermons, see Christopher Hill’s “The Political Sermons of John 
Preston,” in Puritanism and Revolution, 239-74. 
54 Gal. 5.6: “For in Jesus Christ neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision; but faith which 
worketh by love.” 
55 In the first sermon on love (sermon eleven), Preston specifies that love is an affection, that is one of the 
“diverse motions and turnings of the will.” More precisely, “Love is nothing else but a disposition of the 
will, whereby it cleaves or makes forward to some good that is agreeable to it selfe.” While this first 
definition of love is ambiguous on the meaning of “some good,” it becomes clear in the subsequent 
discussion that Preston means that we only love what we perceive as good. Thus we have to be taught to 
love Christ by learning “to looke on him as upon that which is sutable and agreeable to us” (Preston, “Of 
Love. First Sermon,” in The breast-plate, 6; pagination for the sermons of love begins with “The First 
Sermon”). 
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measuring their anger at the decay of true religion: “This is a thing that will try your 
love to the Lord. If you finde that you can heare of the desolation of the Churches, and 
of the increase and growing of Poperie, and yet you doe not take it to heart to be affected 
with it, you doe not grieve for it, it is a signe that you want love to the Lord.”56 The 
second affection, fear, can also be used as a measure of the strength of our love. As well 
as being angry towards anything that might corrupt true religion, those who love God 
will also be fearful of his displeasure, “Now when the Lord shall shew some tokens of 
his wrath, those that love him, and esteeme him, those that prize him, cannot but be 
affected.”57 If we truly love God, we will fear displeasing and angering him.  
How are anger and fear connected? Preston brings the two affections together in 
two steps. First, he blurs the lines between two types of fear. One the one hand, there is 
the fear felt by those who love God that the “token of his wrath” represent His 
displeasure. On the other, there is fear of His wrath. While fear of God is first defined as 
the fear we feel at God’s displeasure at our coolness in love, as the sermon develops, the 
focus shift to the fear of the consequences of God’s wrath towards the sins of the whole 
community. That is, Preston changes the emphasis from each individual’s relationship 
with the Creator to the repercussions derived from living in a commonwealth with those 
who transgress God’s commandments. Thus, his readers are warned that the plague 
                                                     
56 Preston, “Of Love. Sermon Four,” in The breast-plate, 89. 
57 Preston, “Of Love. Sermon Four,” in The breast-plate, 90. 
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raging in London in 1625 is the probable results of sins, in particular, idolatry, 
fornication, and “unworthy receiving of the Sacrament.”58 Indeed, even the godly are 
punished for the sins of the other members of the community: “It is not likely that all the 
people fell into that sinne of Idolatry, or into the sinne of Fornication, but yet the Lord was 
offended with the whole Congregation for those that did it.”59 What can the godly do to 
stop the anger of God? Here Preston brings together fear and anger. Indeed, the plague 
rages because the godly have failed to love God strongly enough. The coolness of their 
anger against idolatry and fornication is as much a cause of God’s punishment as the 
sins themselves. Recalling Num. 25, Preston reminds his audience how Phinehas’ zeal, 
his just religious anger, stopped the plague: “Because his love was hot, and his anger 
was kindled in a holy manner […]. If the zeale of Phineas was the cause of staying that 
plague, and of withholding the Lords hands, then surely the coldnes of those from 
whom the Lord lookes for much heate, for much fervency of spirit, whom God expects 
should stand in the gappe, I say, that is the cause that the Lord goes on in punishing.”60 
Preston thus asks those who have “some fire in them” or “have had some worke of grace 
                                                     
58 Preston, “Of Love. Sermon Four,” in The breast-plate, 92. 
59 Preston, “Of Love. Sermon Four,” in The breast-plate, 92; emphasis original. The proof-text for this part of 
the sermon is Num. 25, with particular emphasis on verse 11: “Phinehas, the son of Eleazar, the son of 
Aaron the priest, hath turned my wrath away from the children of Israel, while he was zealous for my sake 
among them, that I consumed not the children of Israel in my jealousy.” But see also verses 7 and 8: “And 
when Phinehas, the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron the priest, saw it, he rose up from among the 
congregation, and took a javelin in his hand;/ And he went after the man of Israel into the tent, and thrust 
both of them through, the man of Israel, and the woman through her belly. So the plague was stayed from 
the children of Israel.” 
60 Preston, “Of Love. Sermon Four,” in The breast-plate, 93. 
 112 
in their hearts wrought by the Spirit of God, that have some sparkes if they were blowne 
up” to “doe something that the Lord may stay his hand.” These godly people can stop 
the plague by loving God with proper fear and anger: “shew your love to the Lord in 
trembling at his judgements, in being zealous for his Names sake.”61 
But what is this love and how is it achieved? In the first sermon on love, Preston 
details five kinds of love: first, a love of pity (where we want to protect and preserve that 
which we love, like a father might pity a sick or vicious son); second, a love of 
concupiscence (that is, when we desire something merely for the use we make of it); 
third, what Preston terms love of complacency (that is, when we are pleased with 
something that appeals to the will and the understanding, like a teacher may love a 
good student or a father may love a good son); fourth, there is the kind of love found in 
friendship, which goes beyond the previous three (this is the reciprocal love that friends 
feel for each other); and finally, the fifth kind of love is the love of dependence. This last 
kind of love, in particular, is the love we give to God: “when one loues one upon whom 
all his good depends, so we are said to loue God, wee loue him as one upon whom all 
our good and happinesse, all our comfort and hope depends.”62 To love God properly, 
we have to learn to see all our happiness as dependent on Him. This is not an easy task. 
                                                     
61 Preston, “Of Love. Sermon Four,” in The breast-plate, 94. 
62 Preston, “Of Love. The First Sermon,” in The breast-plate, 9. The first sermon specifies that we love God 
with the last three loves, complacency, friendship, and dependence, but it is only in describing the very last 
type of love that Preston gives no other example in the definition other than the love of God. All other four 
types of loves are defined in terms of relationships between creatures and creation. 
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God has implanted a natural love in us for those things we perceive as good, for 
instance, our children or our wealth. Preston subdivides this natural love into two types: 
vicious and spiritual. Vicious love is sinful love for creation used for our own ends. 
Spiritual love, on the other hand, raises any natural love we feel towards God and 
makes it holy. While we may have a natural affection for what we perceive as good, 
such as our wealth, we need to learn to reorient this affection towards a spiritual love of 
God and Christ. However, fallen humans are such that they naturally tend toward 
vicious loves, so much so, that they naturally hate God: “every man by nature hates 
God, by reason of that opposition and contrariety which is betweene God and every 
man by nature, for all loue comes from similitude and agreeablenesse: And therefore 
where there are two of a contrary disposition, there must needs be hatred. Now the pure 
nature of God is contrary to us, and therefore every man by nature hates God.”63 Since 
like is attracted to like, our vitiated nature leads us to love sin and hate God. Therefore, 
our natures must be broken by the Law and rebuilt by faith and the Gospel before we 
can begin to feel true spiritual love. 
Preston is quite clear that the Gospel itself is not enough for us to learn to love 
God. Most individuals, when they first hear the Gospel read and explained to them, 
listen without being sufficiently moved. It is first necessary to prepare men’s hearts by 
humbling and impressing on them the enormity of their sins. It is only through an 
                                                     
63 Preston, “Of Love. The First Sermon,” in The breast-plate, 11; emphasis mine. 
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encounter with the Law, Preston explains, that the heart can be prepared to receive the 
Gospel: “then a man begins to looke toward Christ, to looke on him […], as a widdow 
that is miserable and poore, indebted and undone, lookes upon her husband that will 
make her rich and honourable, that will pay all her debts, I say, when a mans heart is 
thus humbled and broken by the law, by sound humiliation, then he begins to looke 
towards Iesus Christ.”64 Once we are made aware of our need for a Redeemer, for a rich 
husband who will pay our debts, the Gospel can bring us to love God. When the Gospel 
is preached to someone who has been humbled, then: “hee is willing to take Christ as a 
Lord, as a husband: when that is done, that Christ hath discovered his will to take them, 
and they resolve to take him, then there ariseth a holy, a constant conjugall loue wherein 
they are rooted and grounded.”65 We thus learn to love what we hate by becoming fully 
aware of our own sinfulness and of Christ’s unique role as Redeemer. As Preston sums it 
up: “When these two things are joyned, that a man is humbled, and lookes on Christ as 
one that is now fit for him: And secondly hee is perswaded that Christ is willing to take 
him, when this is done, a man receiues Christ by faith: And from this faith this loue 
issues.”66 The term conjugal love is not accidental to this description of saving faith and 
love. Not only must an individual be persuaded that Christ is “fit for him,” but also that 
He will receive him. That is, the love between soul and Redeemer must be reciprocal as 
                                                     
64 Preston, “Of Love. First Sermon,” in The breast-plate, 12. 
65 Preston, “Of Love. First Sermon,” in The breast-plate, 14. 
66 Preston, “Of Love. First Sermon,” in The breast-plate, 14-5. 
 115 
that between wife and husband. This love is necessary for salvation, “hee that hath it not 
is in a cursed and damnable condition; he is not in Christ, if he doe not love, that as the 
Apostle saith, hee that beleeves not shall be damned: we may say as well of love, for 
there is a tye betweene all these, faith, repentance and love,” but it is difficult to attain 
and sustain, being against our nature.67 
It is because of this difficulty that in the fourth sermon on love the question on 
how to strengthen this newly-gained love for God becomes urgent. Preston reminds his 
listeners that frequent prayers have already been recommended in his earlier sermons as 
appropriate methods to increase one’s love for God. Such prayers should consist of 
supplications that God show himself to their souls. In addition, Preston now urges that 
all of those who would strengthen their faith should remove two impediments to their 
love for God, “strangenes, and uncircumcision of heart, or worldly mindednesse.”68 
Strangeness, that is, distance and lack of conversation and companionship, is known to 
destroy human friendships. Similarly, warns Preston, it can wither the love and 
friendship we have with God. We must avoid it because “when there growes a 
strangenesse betweene God and us, wee begin not to know the Lord, there growes an 
ignorance, and so there is an intermission of those reciprocall offices of love betweene 
us; that even as it is among the Saints, the forsaking of their fellowship looseneth their 
                                                     
67 Preston, “Of Love. First Sermon,” in The breast-plate, 18. 
68 Preston, “Of Love. Sermon Four,” in The breast-plate, 104. 
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love, and so stoppeth the intercourse of good duties that should be among them: so it is 
with the Lord.”69 Strangeness divides us from God and hinders the “reciprocall offices of 
love” between the soul and God. We must thus speak to God, that is, pray to Him, as 
much as possible. Conversation with God “maintaines and increaseth this communion 
and familiarite betweene the Lord and thee.”70 Moreover, we must avoid increasing 
strangeness by preventing any other object of love to come between us and God, that is, 
we must avoid worldly-mindedness. This is not to say that we may not love anything 
but God. As we have seen earlier, in the example of the chaste wife who may love other 
men besides her husband, love of creation is not necessarily worldly-mindedness. But 
whatever else we may love must never distract us from our friendship with God or 
prevent us from turning to Him in frequent conversation. 
This advice echoes the language of marriage manuals. Whately, to take one 
example, begins the first chapter of A bride-bush by defining the two duties of marriage: 
“Chastity and due Benevolence. The restraining of themselves from all other persons, 
and the communicating of themselves to each other.”71 The bond of marriage is broken 
only when these two duties are not kept. But while only these are essential to marriage, 
they are not sufficient to make married life pleasant. Love is also necessary: “their 
hearts, must be united as well as their Bodies, else their union will prove more 
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troublesome than can be imagined.”72 If a married man finds that he does not love his 
wife, in chapter four, Whately provides a discussion of the means, both natural and 
spiritual, to promote conjugal love.73 The chief natural means is cohabitation: “Let them 
have one house, one table, one chamber, one bed; so shall they with most ease, have also 
one heart and one soul.”74 The proof-text for this advice is Deuteronomy 24.5.75 Having 
provided a paraphrase of the verse, Whately considers his case proved: “so long a time 
[one year] of nearness and familiarity, might make their loves for ever after firme and 
indissoluble.”76 That is, conjugal love is made firm by familiarity and weakened by 
absence. Similarly, Perkins, in Christian Oeconomie, draws on the same verse to admonish 
newly married men that they have a clear duty of cohabitation with their wives, 
especially during the first year of marriage. Such duty is enjoined in Scripture so as to 
create firm bond between the married couple: “that they might worke a setled affection 
one towards another, which afterward vpon no occasion might bee changed.”77 Preston’s 
                                                     
72 Whately, A bride-bush, 31. 
73 Under the heading of spiritual means for a loving marriage, Whately strongly recommends performing 
religious duties together. He also advises those who are still unmarried to turn to God in prayer for help in 
choosing a suitable spouse. 
74 Whately, A bride-bush, 42. 
75 Deut. 24.5: “When a man hath taken a new wife, he shall not go out to war, neither shall he be charged 
with any business: but he shall be free at home one year, and shall cheer up his wife which he hath taken.” 
76 Whately, A bride-bush, 43. 
77 Perkins, Christian Oeconomie, 99. Cleaver and Dod, on the other hand, are less sanguine about 
cohabitation’s effectiveness in fostering a peaceful and loving marriage. While it is necessary, it is far from 
being sufficient: “And therefore the diuell, the enemie of all vnitie, concord and agreement, laboureth by all 
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watch, by feruent and earnest prayer to God, that the diuel preuaile not against them, by such too early 
disagreement. […] the husband and wife must be very carefull and diligent, that their first cohabitation and 
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advice in The breast-plate to avoid strangeness from God and to shun adulterous loves 
translates the language of marriage manuals into that of the union of the soul to God. 
This is not to say that Preston is consciously patterning his collection of sermons on 
marriage manuals, but rather to indicate that the blueprint for fostering affection is the 
same in the religious and in the domestic settings.  
Having learned how to strengthen our bond with God, how do we know 
whether we sincerely love Him in the first place? Preston turns to this question in the 
first sermon of love in The breast-plate. Given the importance of this love for salvation, it 
is crucial to learn how to examine one’s affections and faith to determine whether the 
soul is properly oriented towards God. With due introspection, this is an easy task. For 
Preston, while we may deceive others, that is, while we may be hypocrites,78 we are 
transparent to ourselves: 
                                                     
 
dwelling together be louing, delectable, and friendly, and not separated through any spitefull contention or 
discord, so shall the whole estate of their marriage be more comfortable, and prosper the better so long as 
they shall liue” (Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 102). 
78 In The breast-plate, the use of the term “hypocrite” is restricted to those who perform good acts for God, 
but do not mean them. There is, however, another use for this term in Puritan writing which denotes those 
who are mistaken or deluded about their status as one of the elect. For this use and the anxiety associated 
with the possibility of self-deception, see John Stachniewski, The Persecutory Imagination: English Puritanism 
and the Literature of Religious Despair (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 40-1. In particular, on the issue of 
saving faith, Stachniewski’s account paints a very different picture from Preston’s. While Preston insists on 
the one’s love for God is felt clearly and powerfully, Stachniewski shows the difficulties encountered by 
seventeenth-century individuals attempting to determine whether their calling is effectual. For instance, the 
conversion narrative of Richard Norwood vividly illustrates the constant fear of its author of being a 
hypocrite, that is, of deceiving himself. Even in the rare occasions when he might have felt signs of grace, 
Norwood doubted his ability of distinguishing true faith from self-deception (107-126). Given 
Stachniewski’s evidence, The breast-plate stands out for its surprising optimism on the individual’s ability to 
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it is true, thou maist deceive me or another man when thou professest love to 
God, but in this thou canst not deceive thy selfe; for a man knowes what he 
loves, love is a very sensible and quick affection. When a man loves any thing, 
when hee loves his wife, loves his friend, loves his sonne, loves his sport, his 
recreation, he knowes he loves it, he hath the sense of that love in himselfe. 
Therefore consider with thy selfe whether thou hast any such stirring affection 
towards the Lord Iesus or no; doest thou feele thy heart so possessed with him? 
art thou sicke of love, as the Spouse saith in the Canticles, I am sicke of love? That 
is, are you grieved when he is absent? are you glad when you have him? when 
you can get into his presence? for there is a kinde of painfulnesse in love: and all 
painfulnesse is of a quicke sense. When it is said, the Church was sicke of love, 
sicknesse is painfull: And therefore when you want the Lord, when there is a 
distance betweenne him and you, when he doth not looke on you as he was 
wont, there will be painfulnesse in it and griefe.79 
 
This passage is worth quoting in length because it gives a clear insight into Preston’s 
anatomy of love and faith that is not otherwise evident in his explicit classifications. 
While earlier in this same sermon, Preston had differentiated between five kinds of love, 
it now seems that we can test whether we do posses any or all of these kinds of love in 
the same way. One knows that he loves a spouse or a child in the same way that he 
knows that he loves sport or recreation; he feels it it within himself: “he knowes he loves 
it, he hath the sense of that love in himself.”80 Just as a bride feels the sting of her 
husband’s absence or indifference, so does the soul feel pain if Christ is absent. In this 
                                                     
 
recognize his or her effectual faith. By linking faith with love, an apparently transparent emotion for 
Preston, the collection of sermons down-plays the possibility of self-deception. This seems to go hand-in-
hand with the figural language we find in the marriage linking love in marriage with religious love. That the 
love between creatures may prove different than the love between creation and Creator, especially after the 
Fall, did not seem worth discussing to Puritan writers we have examined. 
79 Preston, “Of Love. First Sermon,” in The breast-plate, 24. 
80 Preston, “Of Love. First Sermon,” in The breast-plate, 24. 
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passage, Preston returns to his earlier focus on the importance of avoiding strangeness 
with God. Frequently seeking His presence by means of prayer strengthens our love for 
Him. Conversely, the strength of our love can be gauged by the pain we feel when we 
allow a distance to grow between us and Christ. Indeed, if we do not desire to converse 
with God through prayer, we give clear proof that we are hypocrites: “Sh[a]ll a wife 
professe love to her husband, and never come where he is, never be within dores, and 
never be in his companie? So, will you say you love Christ, and not be frequent in 
prayer, or neglect and slight that duty, seldome converse with him, and seldome speake 
of him?”81 For Preston, both kinds of love, that of a wife to her husband and that of the 
soul to God, are immediately and transparently sensible to the self. Moreover, there is 
no concern in his text that the conversation between soul and Christ might be different 
from the conversation between spouses. There is no reflection on whether and how the 
practices mediating one type of love may differ from those mediating the other. 
We find then in The breast-plate an insistence that love, both between creatures 
and between creature and Creator, is a transparent affection which can be fostered with 
simple and clear remedies. What are the consequences of this assumption? Preston’s 
discussion of hypocrisy is telling. In his sermons, he rehearses words similar to those of 
Augustine’s meditation on the difficulty of conversion from Book VIII of the Confessions. 
But, for the Puritan writer, any hesitation in whole-hearted conversion is a sign of 
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hypocrisy and bad faith. In detailing how true love longs for speedy fulfillment, Preston 
chides those who delay serving God as deficient in effectual faith. Paraphrasing 
Augustine, he warns that “when a man professeth he loves the Lord, and yet will 
deferre to come in, saying, I wil serve the Lord perfectly, but not yet, not till my youth be 
a little more over, not till things be thus and thus with me, then I will; it is certain thou 
lovest him not: for it is true of every affection, that which is a true and right affection, 
that which is an hearty affection, it is present.”82 As he further explains in the next 
sermon, if we love Christ, we feel constrained to serve him just as “the weight of a stone 
compelleth it to goe to the center, as the lightnesse of the fire compels it to ascend up.”83 
True love for God leads to immediate and zealous service. Although Preston describes 
the un-regenerated heart of man as hating God and tending towards sin, he seems 
unconcerned with the possibility that what fallen individuals love naturally, sin, may 
prove to have a habitual hold on the soul moving towards faith. Love for God is an all-
or-nothing proposition. 
What would a description of growth in faith that does not dismiss habitual sin 
look like? Preston’s text points directly to Augustine’s Confessions. In Book VIII, as the 
narrative approaches the moment of conversion in the garden in Milan, Augustine 
returns to the difficulty experienced in attempting to free a weak will from sinful habits. 
                                                     
82 Preston, “Of Love. First Sermon,” in The breast-plate, 27. Preston paraphrases Augustine’s prayer in chapter 
seven, book eight of the Confessions: “Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet” (Augustine, Confessions, 
trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 145). 
83 Preston, “Of Love. Second Sermon,” in The breast-plate, 32. 
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Augustine is guided towards conversion by listening to and reading other conversion 
narratives. After hearing about Victorinus’ conversion from Simplicianus, Augustine 
strongly desires to follow his example, but finds his will too weak to do so: “I sighed 
after such freedom, but was bound not by an iron imposed by anyone else but by the 
iron of my own choice.”84 The irons that enslave him are the habits formed by a life 
spent in pursuit of temporal goods. Even though Augustine fully realizes the sinfulness 
of his past life and recognizes the truth he found in Christianity, he does not have the 
freedom from sin he yearns for. He realizes that he must break the bonds imposed by 
passions oriented towards sin and strengthened into seemingly necessary habits by 
time: “The consequences of a distorted will is passion. By servitude to passion, habit is 
formed, and habit to which there is no resistance becomes necessity. By these links, as it 
were, connected one to another (hence my term chain), a harsh bondage held me under 
restraint.”85 There is no question here of hypocritical love for God.86 At this point in Book 
VIII, Augustine sincerely desires to dedicate his life to the Church, but he is nonetheless 
incapable of doing so. But if his desire is sincere, why can he not whole-heartedly turn to 
                                                     
84 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford UP 1992), 140. 
85 Ibid., 140; emphasis mine. 
86 As Jennifer Herdt points out in Putting on Virtue, Augustine emphasizes that single minded love of God is 
impossible to achieve in this life (45-7). In our education in the virtues, we strive to become “enough like 
God to be capable of this loving relationship with God. My final end is not just external; even though I 
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God? The bondage to sinful habit is part of the just punishment to which we are all 
subject for willingly following our disordered passions. Augustine sees the chains that 
hold him back from conversion as due to the existence of two (incomplete) wills fighting 
each other in his soul. One will desires conversion, the other is attached to the old 
passions. The mind is thus held back: “We are dealing with a morbid condition of the 
mind, which, when it is lifted up by the truth, does not unreservedly rise to it but is 
weighed down by habit. So there are two wills. Neither of them is complete, and what is 
present in the one is lacking in the other.”87 There is no simple rising of the soul to God 
even when confronted with truth and moved to love Christ. We are held down by the 
chains of sinful habit. Even though Preston closely paraphrases Book VIII of the 
Confessions, the spontaneous motion he depicts, where the soul acts to serve God under 
the impetus of faith and love “as the lightnesse of the fire compels it to ascend,” presents 
a fundamentally different picture from that described by Augustine. 
Moreover, as we have seen, Preston’s use of Ephesians 5 sets his parallel between 
conjugal and spiritual love apart from that of the writers of marriage manuals. Preston 
explains the marriage of Christ with the Church as the union of each individual soul 
with Christ. This is typical of his writings. In The breast-plate, growth in love and faith is 
the proper activity of each individual heart alone. The Church and its ministers are 
described as messengers who bring to each soul word of the groom’s love. Once this 
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message has been delivered and accepted, the sermons shift away from any discussion 
of the role of the community of the Church. For instance, Preston, as Milton, rejects 
memorized prayers. He insists that the only true prayers are those created by the Holy 
Spirit in the soul: “prayer is not a worke of the memory, or a worke of the wit. A man 
that hath a good wit, or a ready invention, or a voluble tongue, may make an excellent 
praier, in his owne esteeme, and in the esteeme of others, but this is not to pray. Prayer 
is the worke of a sanctified heart, it is the worke of GODS Spirit.”88 Reciting set prayers 
is not sufficient. Given that frequent prayer is recommended as a way to kindle true love 
for God, Preston’s parishioners find themselves tasked to relentlessly examine their 
prayers for sincerity: “But canst thou come to GOD as to a friend? Canst thou come to 
him as to one whose fauour thou art assured of? Canst thou come to him as to a Father? 
Except thou canst doe this, know that he regardeth not thy prayers.”89 Not only must we 
pray, we must do so with the proper state of mind and, for Preston, the appropriate 
mental disposition cannot be achieved when reciting memorized prayers. To illustrate 
the point, Preston draws a clear distinction between the actions of sincere Protestants 
and the formal deeds of Catholics. Papists’ prayers do not help them to love God 
because they are but empty motions: “but here is the difference, wee deriue it all from 
Christ by faith, we say that faith doth all.”90 For Preston, we do not converse with God 
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through our words and actions; we do so with our faith and love. In this conception, set 
prayers cannot be an expression of sincere faith and love. 
2.3 Knowledge of the Self: Donne’s Sermon Preached at the 
Marriage of Lady Mary 
The distrust of the possibility for a transparent self seen in Augustine can also be 
found in John Donne’s marriage sermons. In the sermon preached at the marriage of 
Lady Mary, daughter of the Earl of Bridgewater (November 19, 1627), we find a picture 
of knowledge of the self which is closer to Augustine’s than Preston’s. The sermon 
begins with a prayer drawing a set of parallels between a number of unions: Lady Mary 
and Lord Herbert, the soul and God, then Mercy and Justice in God Himself, and finally 
the divine and the human in the incarnation.91 In this opening prayer, we are reminded 
that God gives marriage a place of honor in Scripture. Indeed, it is the crowning act of 
creation and the occasion for the first miracle of Christ. However, the body of the 
sermon itself turns from this positive emphasis to a seemingly negative description of 
the attributes of marriage. The text for the sermon is Matt. 22.30, “For in the resurrection 
they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like angels of God in heaven.” 
Using this verse, Donne describes marriage as a remedy for defects that will no longer 
plague us in the resurrection. Marriage is here linked with our fallen and mortal state. 
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The verse is then split at the comma and each half is expounded separately. Donne 
begins by reminding his hearers of the three ends of marriage. These are implied in the 
first half of the verse by way of the negative. That is, since in the resurrection the saints 
will have no need for marriage, we can deduce the ends of marriage by considering our 
imperfection in this life. In our final state, there will be no need for a remedy against 
lust, since each soul will be perfect in itself; there will be no need for mutual help, since 
each soul will be united with God; and there will be no need for the immortality of the 
species through children, since there will be true immortality for each soul (VIII:99). 
Nonetheless, while there will be no need for marriage, we will still retain our affection 
for those we loved while in this life: “But yet, though Christ exclude that, of which there 
is clearely no use in heaven, Mariage, […] yet he excludes not our knowing, or our loving 
of one another upon former knowledge in this world, in the next” (VIII:99; underlining 
mine). Again, Donne’s interpretation rests on a negative, Christ “excludes not.” This 
negative is all we have to reassure us that we will be allowed to know each other in the 
resurrection. The promise that the affections of this life will carry on to the next is based 
on the absence of a Scriptural verse excluding that hope, and supported by the dignity of 
marriage in this life. Indeed, even though we do not understand how we will be able to 
recognize each other, we can trust that we will, “Neither can we say, we shall not, 
because we know not how we should” (VIII:99).  
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At this point in the sermon, Donne pauses to explain why we must trust that we 
will be able to know something in the resurrection, even though we do not yet 
understand how. The proof of this can be found in the creation of Eve: “Adam, who as 
asleep when Eve was made, and neither saw, nor felt any thing that God had done, knew 
Eve upon the very first sight, to be the bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh. By what light 
knew he this?” (VIII:99; emphasis original). This question dominates the second half of 
the sermon. What does it mean for us to know others? How do we even know 
ourselves? Here, we are told to trust the promise. Even though we do not know how we 
will know, we must trust that we will know our loved ones in the resurrection. After all, 
death, like the marriage of Lady Mary and Lord Herbert, is a uniting of families: “to 
Moses, Iungeris populis tuis, Thou shalt dy and be gathered to thy people” (VIII:100). Both 
marriage and the resurrection gather and re-member what is broken by death. Marriage 
does not only unite two families into one, but it prevents the breaking apart of the 
bodies and minds of each spouse: “They that scatter themselves in various lusts, commit 
wast” (VIII:100). Following lusts, sinning, is to scatter and waste what should be wholly 
and singly devoted to a productive multiplication that replenishes what death takes 
away: “Every man is a naturall body, every congregation is a politik body; The whole 
world is a Catholik, an universal body […] for the sustentation, and reparation of the 
world, God hath given Mariage” (VIII:100; emphasis original). The language of the 
sermon see-saws between the scattering and corruption brought on by death and the 
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reuniting action of the resurrection, prefigured in the marriage being celebrated. On the 
one hand, we see that the “universal body,” constituted by viewing all the individual 
natural bodies together, can only be sustained by the union of marriage and the 
production of children. But this replenishing of the stock of humanity through the 
successive generations leads in turn to the proliferation of bodies that die and 
disintegrate. Menacingly, the possibility of bodies, be they natural or political, breaking 
apart and scattering seems to be always in the background of the sermon. Only the 
image of marriage contains this chaotic disintegration. The marriage of individuals in 
this life preserves the social bond in the temporal sphere; the marriage of the soul with 
God promises the re-membering of the bodies at the end of time.  
Thus, the sermon’s relentless focus on death, a seemingly inappropriate topic for 
a marriage, is presented as necessary to understand the true end of the union of two 
individuals. By bringing to life new generations, the couple will reconstitute the social 
body just as God will reconstitute each natural body. Donne, however, is more attentive 
to the tensions in his analogies than Preston. While in The breast-plate the union of soul 
and Christ was easily compared to that of husband and wife, in the Bridgewater 
wedding-sermon, the parallel between marriage and the resurrection proves harder to 
understand than it appears at first. The resurrection of the body can only be known 
through faith: 
Where be all the splinters of that Bone, which a shot hath shivered and scattered 
in the Ayre? Where be all the Atoms of that flesh, which a Corrasive hath eat 
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away, and other Limbs? In what wrinkle, in what furrow, in what bowel of the 
earth, ly all the grains of the ashes of a body burnt a thousand years since? In 
what corner, in what ventricle of the sea lies all the jelly of a Body drowned in 
the generall flood? (VIII:98; emphasis original) 
 
The language of scattering and dispersion gives the momentary illusion that a burnt or 
decayed body can never be reassembled. Just as we need to strain our mind’s eye to 
view that “universal body” that is dispersed throughout the nations of world, so we are 
led to imagine searching through each particle of air, each furrow on the ground, and 
each drop of water in the oceans to find just one natural body that perished long ago. 
But piecing together a natural body requires more than simply aggregating the 
molecules from all deceased bodies. How do we know one grain of ash from another, 
“what cohaerence, what sympathy, what dependence maintaines any relation, any 
correspondence, between that arm that was lost in Europe and that legge that was lost in 
Afrique or Asia, scores of years between?” (VIII:98). The answer is that there is no 
natural “sympathy” to gather the dust into a whole body, “all dies, and all dries, and 
molders into dust.” Only the vision of the Creator is capable of re-assembling each body: 
“still God knows in what […] part of the world every graine of every mans dust lies and 
[…] he whispers, he hisses, he beckens for the bodies of his Saints, and in the twinckling 
of an eye, that body that was scattered over all the elements, is sate down at the right 
hand of God, in a glorious resurrection” (VIII:98). By uniting in marriage, two 
individuals prefigure the “glorious resurrection” promised in Scripture; they give new 
members to the universal body and give evidence to the Providence of God.  
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It is because of this, Donne insists, that marriage is to be preferred to single life. 
Exceptions are only granted to those who are so unfitted for wedded life that marriage 
would imperil their ability to serve God: “If in a rectified Conscience he knows, that he 
should be the lesse disposed to religious Offices, for mariage, he does well to abstaine” 
(VIII:101). But immediately upon giving this exception to the calling of marriage, Donne 
issues a warning: “he must remember that the world is one Body, and Mariage the 
aliment” (VIII:101; emphasis original). To deny the body of the world its aliment is to 
condemn it to the moldering away so minutely described in the preceding passages of 
the sermon. Indeed, for most men and women, marriage is not only permitted, but 
commanded: “for the reparation of the world, which is one Building, and Mariage the 
supply thereof, to maintaine a second eternity, in the succession of children, and to 
illustrate this union of our soules to Christ; we may, and in some Cases, must marry” 
(VIII:104; emphasis original). The permission to marry, implied only by way of a 
negative in Matt. 22.30, has now become an imperative; we must marry. How did Donne 
transition from a permission to a command to marry? The sermon begun by looking at 
the perfection, both physical and spiritual, promised to the Saints in the resurrection. By 
comparing our mortal condition to this future perfection, we can find in marriage a 
mechanism to approach our ideal end. We thus know what the end of marriage is 
because we know what perfection we will attain once we no longer need it. Knowledge 
of the ends of marriage is attained through the recognition of our need for marriage. 
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As the sermon moves to the second half of Matt. 22.30, “but are like angels of 
God in heaven,” Donne turns to the question of what we can know from this 
comparison. Having established that in this life “we must not looke for Angelicall 
perfections” (VIII:105) in ourselves, and that only marriage can alleviate our deficiencies, 
the sermon turns to the question of what exactly are the perfections of the resurrection. 
That is, what is the state that we wish to imitate in marriage? We cannot know what 
angelical perfections are like: “Now, when we would tell you, what those Angels of God 
in heaven, to which we are compared, are, we can come no nearer telling you that, then 
by telling you, we cannot tell” (VIII:105). This construction, affirming what we can know 
and then reminding us the limitation of that knowledge dominates the rest of the 
sermon. In Matt. 22.30, we are compared with angels. What does this comparison tell us? 
“We know they are Spirits in Nature, but what the nature of a spirit is, we know not” 
(VIII:105; underlining mine). In a similar way, we know their office, that they are 
creatures, and that they are capable of knowledge themselves: 
we know they are Angels in office, appointed to execute Gods will upon us; but, 
How a spirit should execute those bodily actions, that Angels doe, in their owne 
motion, and in the transportation of things, we know not: we know they are 
Creatures; but whether created with this world, (as all our later men incline to 
think) or long before, (as all the Greeke, and some of the Latin Fathers though) we 
know not: […] we know the Angels know, they understand, but whether by that 
way, which we call in the Schoole, Cognitionem Mutatinam, by seeing all in God, 
or that which we call Vespertinam, by a clearer manifestation of the species of 
things to them, then to use, we know not. (VIII:105; underlining mine) 
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But we do not know how they execute their office or how they were created or how they 
have knowledge. The passage is a reminder of the limitation of our knowledge, “we are 
content to say with S. Augustine, Esse firmissime credo, quaenam sint nescio” (VIII:105-6). 
While understanding angelic perfection will have to wait until the resurrection, 
“Then we shall be like them, and know them by that assimilation” (VIII:106), the sermon 
gives us hope that knowledge can be attained. Like can know like. But this can only be 
true once we attain a perfected state. In our current sinful imperfection, however, our 
knowledge of ourselves has limitations: “If by being like the Angels, we shall know the 
Angels, we are more then like our selves, we are our selves, why doe we not know our 
selves?” (VIII:106). Donne, like Augustine and unlike Preston, finds the self opaque and 
dangerously so. It was by a lack of knowledge of the self, and a desire to attain what 
proved to be dangerous knowledge, that Adam fell:  
Why did not Adam know, that he had a Body, that might have been preserved in 
an immortality, and yet submitted his body, and mine, and thine, and theirs, 
who by this union are to be made one, and all, that by Gods goodnesse shall be 
derived from them, to certain, to inevitable Death? Why doe we not know our 
owne Immortality, that dwells in us still, for all Adams fall, and ours in him; that 
immortality which we cannot devest, but must live for ever, whether we will or 
no? To know this immortality, is to make this immortality, which otherwise is 
the heaviest part of our Curse, a Blessing onto us, by providing to live in 
Immortall happinesse: whereas now, we doe so little know ourselves, as that if my 
soule could aske one of those Wormes which my dead body shall produce, Will 
you change with me? that worme would say, No. (VIII:106) 
 
The passage brings together the problem of knowledge derived from the discussion on 
the second half of the Matt. 22.30 with the images of union, disintegration, and death 
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derived from the analysis of the first half of the verse. The paragraph begins with the 
idea of not knowing what is truly immediate to us. As we read the passage, we are 
temporarily presented with the idea that Adam did not know his very own physicality, 
“Why did not Adam know, that he had a Body.” For a moment, it seems that while 
Adam could recognize Eve as flesh of his own flesh, he did not know his body. But this 
perception is immediately corrected by shifting the focus on the initial potential 
immortality of that body. It is then again further corrected by aggregating to that first 
body the bodies of all the following generations, “his body, and mine, and thine, and 
theirs, […] and all.” The sentence gradually unfolds to reveal enclosed in Adam’s lack of 
knowledge the unfolding generations that have supplied the second immortality that 
replaces the original immortality forsaken by Adam. We are now mortal because Adam 
did not know the meaning of his own potential immortality. However, our mortality 
turns out to be only an apparent mortality. But in this apparent mortality, we risk re-
enacting the first sin through our ignorance of our own true immortality: “Why doe we 
not know our owne Immortality.” Our immortality, like Adam’s, can prove dangerous if 
not known. It is only by knowing it, that we can turn it into a blessing. Donne does not 
resolve the terrifying image of our condition. Even a worm would not exchange his fate 
for ours. The universal body, formed by the descendants of Adam, mirrored in the 
union of this marriage which will produce new limbs for it, is composed by natural 
bodies that will die and be consumed by worms. These bodies themselves, because 
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Adam could not know the immortality of his body and we cannot truly know the 
immortality of our souls, will make our eternity, our immortality, worse than the 
Devil’s: “the Devill is a Spirit, and a condemned soule a spirit, yet that soule shall have a 
Body too, to be tormented with it, which the Devill shall not” (VIII:107). The self-
knowledge that seems so easily attainable to fallen minds in The breast-plate is nowhere 
to be found in Donne’s wedding sermon. 
2.4 Knowing Others: Milton’s Divorce Tracts. 
Nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity.92 
Milton’s divorce tracts were received with ridicule, scorn, and indignation. They 
left few marks in the discussions on marriage in the 1640s besides a convenient target for 
those who opposed the idea of divorce for causes other than adultery.93 The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce, his first tract on the issue, was attacked in both Parliament and the 
Westminster assembly.94 For instance, William Prynne, in Twelve considerable serious 
questions touching church government (1644), lumps Milton with such unsavory company 
as those who embrace “Anabaptistiall, Antinomial, Hereticall, Atheisticall opinions, as 
                                                     
92 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1958), remark 693. 
93 While the tracts failed to persuade either the Westminster Assembly or Parliament of the need to grant 
divorce for causes other than adultery, they nonetheless sold faster than Milton’s earlier political pamphlets. 
See, Gordon Campbell and Thomas N. Corns, John Milton: Life, Work, and Thought (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008), 
164. 
94 Milton published four divorce tracts. These are: two editions of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643 
and 1644), The Judgement of Martin Bucer (1644), Tetrachordon (1645), and Colasterion (1645). I will be focusing 
on the first edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce and Colasterion. 
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of the souls mortality [and] divorce at pleasure.”95 The circulation in print of an open 
argument for divorce is for Prynne one of the sure signs that Independency is a ruse to 
open “a floud-Gate to let in an inundation of all manner of Heresies, Errors, Sects, 
Religions, distructive opinions, Libertinisme and lawlesnesse among us.” “Divorce at 
pleasure” is just one of the many symptoms of social and moral erosion, and thus it 
must be opposed by all who have “any remainder of right reason residing in their 
braines,” clearly implying that Milton had forsaken any claim of belonging to this better 
group. Prynne’s invectives are typical of the response to the divorce tracts. Most of those 
who mention Milton’s arguments for divorce do so briefly and group him with other 
sectaries. 96 This is not to say that the question of marriage and how it should be 
reformed was of no importance in the 1640s. The minutes of the Westminster assembly 
show a lively discussion on the issue.97 Moreover, in the matter of divorce, England was 
                                                     
95 William Prynne, Twelve considerable serious questions touching church government sadly propounded (out of a 
reall desire of unitie and tranquility in church and state) to all sober-minded Christians. London, 1644. Early 
English Books Online. Union Theological Seminary Library (New York). May 10. 2010. 
http://proxy.lib.duke.edu:2212/search/fulltext?SOURCE=var_spell.cfg&ACTION=ByID&ID=D0000012354053
0000&WARN=N&SIZE=37&FILE=../session/1282595571_2588&SEARCHSCREEN=CITATIONS&DISPLAY=
AUTHOR&ECCO=N.  
Milton replies to Prynne’s attack in the first pages of Colasterion (CPW II: 722).  
96 We find negative allusions to Milton’s divorce tracts in Herbert Palmer’s The Glass of Gods Providence 
(preached to Parliament on August 13, 1644), Palmer had agreed with Milton in the antiprelatical debate, 
Daniel Featley, The Dippers Dipt (1645), and Thomas Edwards’ Gangraena (1646), error number 154, page 29. 
For Ephraim Pagitt’s and Robert Baillie’s comments on Milton’s arguments for divorce, see Lewalski, The 
Life of John Milton, 202-3. I will discuss the only extended answer to Milton’s tracts later in this section. 
97 See, Minutes of the Sessions of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, ed. Alex F. Mitchell and John Struthers 
(Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1897), 7-14. For a discussion of Milton’s divorce tracts in the context of the 
Westminster Assembly, see Sharon Achinstein, “‘A Law in This Matter to Himself’: Contextualizing 
Milton’s Divorce Tracts,” in The Oxford Handbook of Milton, ed. Nicholas McDowell and Nigel Smith (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 174-85. Achinstein sees Milton’s divorce tracts as playing into the hands of 
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in a unique situation. When Milton entered the debate on marriage and divorce, English 
law on the subject had remained virtually unchanged since the end of Elizabeth’s reign. 
Divorce with right to remarry (divorce a vinculo) was not allowed for any cause.98 It was 
however possible to be granted a separation (divorce a mensa e thoro) without the right to 
remarry. The legal status-quo made the English church stand out from its continental 
counterparts. There, a number of Reformed thinkers had argued for divorce with right 
to remarry for cases of desertion as well as adultery. The unusual severity of English law 
on the matter of divorce and the fact that practice, as well as lay and ecclesiastical 
opinion, diverged strongly from legal theory in cases of adultery and desertion would 
have made Milton’s argument in favor of divorce a vinculo potentially successful if he 
had restricted himself to these two cases.99  
This is not however how he chooses to argue. In The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce, Milton takes for granted an agreement on divorce for adultery. Given this 
starting point, the task of the tract is to show that divorce for simple incompatibility also 
                                                     
 
the Presbyterian faction at the Assembly, who could use his argument for individual freedom to emphasize 
the dangers posed by sectarians.  
98 This was of course in theory. In some cases of adultery, the innocent husband would remarry. I follow 
Lawrence Stone, Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990), on the history of 
divorce. See, in particular, pages 304-8. 
99 A law allowing divorce with right to remarry in line with continental Reformed Churches had a broad 
base of support. Notably, William Laud, in 1605, married Charles Blount Earl of Devonshire to Lady Rich, 
the guilty party in a case of separation a mensa e thoro for adultery (Stone, Road to Divorce, 307). 
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has a Scriptural foundation.100 The key biblical passages to overcome are Matthew 5.32 
and Matthew 19.6-9, whose surface meaning clearly forbids divorce for causes other 
than adultery.101 In particular, Matthew 19 seems to revoke the Old Testament allowance 
for divorce found in Deuteronomy 24.1.102 According to the passage from Matthew, 
Moses allowed divorce not because it is inherently just, but as an imperfect remedy for 
worse sins. Milton argues that to read these key New Testament verses as forbidding 
divorce in cases other than adultery is to read carnally. Those who do so see only the 
surface meaning while remaining blind to the spiritual teachings. To correctly interpret 
these passages, we need to understand the intention behind Jesus’ admonition and be 
guided by the rule of charity. In forbidding divorce, “the Canon Law and her adherents, 
not consulting with charitie, the interpreter and guide of our faith, but resting in the 
meere element of the Text” are consorting with the devil so that “all inordinate licence 
might abound” (CPW II: 236). How does reading by the rule of charity differ from the 
                                                     
100 The exact statement of what Milton means by incompatibility is found in the first chapter of the tract: 
“That indisposition, unfitnes, or contrariety of mind, arising from a cause in nature unchangeable, hindering 
and ever likely to hinder the main benefits of conjugall society, which are solace and peace, is greater reason 
of divorce then naturall frigidity, especially if there be no children, and that ther be mutuall consent” (CPW 
II:242). 
101 Matthew 5.32: “But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of 
fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth 
adultery.” 
Matthew 19.6-9: “Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined 
together, let not man put asunder. He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts 
suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so. And I say unto you, Whosoever 
shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and 
whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.” 
102 The relevant passage is Deuteronomy is: “When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to 
pass that she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her: then let him write 
her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house.” 
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standard interpretation of Jesus’ words in Matthew 19? 103 Milton argues that if we 
follow charity, we will see that Jesus could not have meant to forbid divorce. After all, 
he promised to fulfill rather than repeal the Law. Moreover, “hee hath taught us to love 
and extoll his Lawes, not onely as they are his, but as they are just and good to every 
wise and sober understanding” (CPW II:297-8). That is, there is no Scriptural law that is 
inexplicable to right reason or harmful to faithful Christians. Since the Deuteronomy 
divorce law provides a reasonable relief to those stuck in an unhappy marriage, it would 
be against right reason to have this remedy taken away. More importantly, since all the 
commandments in Scripture were written by divine charity, “as without charity God 
hath given no commandment to men, so without it, neither can men rightly beleeve any 
commandment giv’n [and] wee cannot safely assent to any precept writt’n in the Bible, 
but as charity commends it to us” (CPW II:340), we must rely on charity for their correct 
interpretation. Any reading of Scripture that offends charity and right reason cannot be 
correct. Faced with a clear commandment against divorce, Milton argues that since the 
surface meaning of the prohibition seems to run counter to the expression of divine 
charity embodied in the gift of marriage, we need to understand the intent behind the 
institution of marriage in order to correctly interpret Christ’s words. The task of the 
                                                     
103 Theodore L. Huguelet, in “The Rule of Charity in Milton’s Divorce Tracts,” Milton Studies 6 (1974): 199-
214, argues that Milton could have derived his reliance on the rule of charity from the analogy of charity 
proposed by Augustine, Erasmus, and Reformed theologians, including Calvin. Nonetheless, Huguelet sees 
Milton’s own formulation of the rule as being ultimately based on his application of the Ramistic method to 
Scripture. I will return to Milton’s understanding of charity in comparison with Augustine’s later in the 
chapter. 
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interpreter is to return to the original institution of marriage in Genesis to help 
understand the prohibition stated in Matthew. Having refocused the question, Milton 
then reorders the ends of marriage to turn spiritual compatibility into the essential 
element of a valid union. Genesis 2.18, “And the LORD God said, It is not good that the 
man should be alone; I will make him an help meet for him,” becomes the defining 
scriptural passage in the divorce tracts’ understanding of marriage.  
How does focusing on Genesis 2.18 advance Milton’s argument? To an imagined 
interlocutor who insists that Jesus, in Matthew 19, warned clearly that what “God hath 
joined together, let no man put asunder,” Milton now asks, but “when is it that God may 
be said to joyn” (CPW II:328)? Is it “[w]hen the parties and their friends consent? Not 
surely; for that may concuree to leudest ends, or is it when Church-rites are finisht? 
Neither; for the efficacy of those depends upon the presupposed fitness of either party. 
Perhaps after carnal knowledge? Lest of all: for that may joyn persons whom neither law 
nor nature dares joyn” (CPW II:328). Temporarily leaving the word “fitness” 
unexplained, Milton argues that to hold that a marriage is not valid until after 
consummation would be to make mere carnal knowledge the fundamental essence of 
marriage. That would be indeed to read Jesus’ words carnally rather than spiritually. In 
the context of this passage, “presupposed fitness” points to the requirement that a 
marriage be consummated before it is considered valid. However, referring back to 
Genesis, Milton now turns to a different kind of “fitness.” A marriage is truly a marriage 
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only “when the minds are fitly disps’d and enabl’d to maintain a cherfull conversation, 
to the solace and love of each other, according as God intended and promis’d in the very 
first foundation of matrimony, I will make a help meet for him” (CPW II:328). That is, a true 
helpmeet is a wife who will join her husband in conversation that is spiritual as well as 
physical.104 Milton uses the narrative of the creation of Eve to argue that the divine intent 
in instituting marriage, and indeed in creating women, is to furnish men with a 
companion.105 Thus, only those couples who can “maintain a cherfull conversation” are 
truly joined in matrimony as defined by its foundation in Genesis, “[t]he rest whom 
either disproportion or deadnes of spirit, or something distastfull & avers in the 
immutable bent of nature renders unconjugal, error may have joyn’d; but God never 
joyn’d against the meaning of his own ordinance” (CPW II:328).106 The physical union of 
a husband and wife who are not joined by a compatibility of minds is a legal marriage, 
but a spiritual act of adultery. 
                                                     
104 Diane Purkiss argues that however, for Milton, conjugal conversation need not be among equals. A wife 
“is seen also as a holiday for the husband from the rigours of masculinity” (“The Rhetoric of Milton’s 
Divorce Tracts,” 191). 
105 Genesis 2.18 was of course a standard text for discussions of marriage. Milton’s conclusion is, however, 
sui generis in emphasizing companionship and in almost ignoring the importance of reproduction and child 
rearing. For a comparison between Milton’s emphasis on the temporal primacy of Scriptural 
commandments in establishing companionship as the essence of marriage and Puritan and Reformed 
writer’s focus on reproduction, see Halkett, Milton and the Idea of Matrimony, 16-17. 
106 The image of error joining such a couple in corrupted marriage takes on a stronger resonance in the 
second edition where, in the dedicatory letter to Parliament, Milton couples custom with error: “Custome 
being but a meer face, as Eccho is a mere voice, rests not in her unaccomplishment, until by secret 
inclination, shee accorporat her selfe with error, who being a blind and Serpentine body without a head, 
willingly accepts what he wants, and supplies what her incompleatnesse went seeking. […] And these two 
between them would persecute and chase away all truth and solid wisdom out of humane life” (CPW II: 
223). In this address, the image of Custom joining with Error to deprive human life of truth and wisdom 
stands as an allegorical precursor to the mismatched marriage of those whom “error may have joyn’d.” 
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Milton’s definition of what it means to join in matrimony deserves further 
attention. The strategy of the passage is to catch the reader in a set of questions, each of 
which is presented as logically related to the ones preceding and following. These 
questions aim at pin pointing the specific instant in which “God hath joyn’d” a man and 
woman in matrimony. If we agree to the premise of the first question, when has God 
joined in marriage, the others follow inexorably. Is it at the gathering of friends, at the 
Church service, or in the marriage bed that God can be said to have joined the two? Each 
of these options is discarded as soon as it is proposed. Each seemingly proper act of 
union, the bringing together of the families, the formal joining in a Church, and finally 
the physical union of the newlyweds, is shown to have potentially corrupt or ineffectual 
uses. For Milton, it is clear that in each of these cases, the apparent joining is merely a 
custom or a necessity, and therefore, it cannot be sufficient to create the spiritual union 
that God had intended for Adam when He gave him Eve as a helpmeet. What can create 
such a union? That happens “when the minds are fitly dispos’d and enabl’d to maintain 
a cherfull conversation” (CPW II:328; emphasis mine). There is of course a striking 
difference between the insufficient human unions discarded by Milton up to this point 
and the perfect spiritual union he proposes as the true end and only effectual seal of 
marriage. Each event in the first category is portrayed as occurring at once, in a single 
moment of time. On the other hand, “cherfull conversation” has to be maintained over 
the course of the couple’s entire wedded life. Why does this difference matter? In this 
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passage, Milton is able to discard each traditional marker of marriage by slicing it away 
from its social context. The meeting of family and friends to celebrate the union loses its 
meaning because it is considered as separate from its purpose, it could be any meeting 
and thus not indicative of a union blessed by God. Similarly, the marriage service is in 
itself devoid of the appropriate meaning because it is taken in isolation, rather than as 
the final step in an ongoing forming of a legal and religious bond between the two 
individuals being married. Finally, the newlyweds’ consummation of their marriage is 
again taken as a mere sexual encounter, and thus potentially sinful, rather than as a step 
in a sequence of acts and promises. In this paragraph, Milton transfers the making of a 
true marriage from the recognized acts that are usually understood to fulfill both a 
promise and a contract to the sustaining of an ongoing conversation. 
For Milton, it is this spiritual conversation which both defines a true union and 
fulfills the natural yearning of the soul. In describing the reasons why a marriage can 
survive adultery or permanent frigidity, but not spiritual and mental discord, Milton 
pleads that “all ingenuous men will see that the dignity & blessing of mariage is plac’t 
rather in the mutual enjoyment of that which the wanting soul needfully seeks, then of 
that which the plenteous body would jollily give away” (CPW II:252). This line of 
argument seems to be at the core of what critics have found to be unique and liberating 
in Milton’s treatment of marriage and divorce. Indeed, in this picture, Milton is hailed as 
attempting, but failing, to liberate marriage from the grips of slavery to the mere flesh. 
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Stephen Fallon’s discussion is a good example of this tendency: “While contemporary 
marriage-theorists write of the importance of companionship as well as of procreation 
and the marriage debt, Milton alone closely anatomizes the interrelationship of spirit 
and body, and alone argues that a union of minds is essential to the couple’s becoming 
one flesh, a process that others describe in purely physical and sexual terms.”107 While it 
is true that Milton is uniquely eloquent in detailing the unhappiness caused by mental 
incompatibility in a marriage, there has been an overly hasty dismissal of Puritan 
marriage manuals and a consequent misinterpretation of Milton’s argument vis-à-vis 
these works.108 While none of the manuals reviewed at the beginning of this chapter 
explicitly elevate spiritual compatibility over the sexual and procreation duties of 
marriage, they describe a marriage between disagreeing spouses in terms that resemble 
those found in the divorce tracts. Even Milton’s argument that ill-matched marriage 
could drive an individual to religious despair (CPW II: 247) does not stray far from the 
standard fare of marriage manuals. Manuals and sermons in the late sixteenth- and early 
                                                     
107 Stephen M. Fallon, “The Metaphysics of Milton’s Divorce Tracts,” 69. 
108 What is strikingly unique to Milton’s argument is the willingness to allow for a higher law in marriage 
than that of male domination: “Not but that particular exceptions may have place, if she exceed her husband 
in prudence and dexterity, and he contentedly yeeld, for then a superior and more naturall law comes in, 
that the wise should govern the lesse wise, whether male or female” (CPW II:589). Cleaver and Dod, for 
instance, explicitly argue that even though a wife may be wiser than her husband, she should nonetheless 
submit to him: “True it is that some women are wiser and more discreet then their husbands […]. Yet still a 
great part of the discretion of such women shall rest in acknowledging their husbands to be their heads” 
(Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of houshold government, image 101). John Donne expresses a sentiment 
similar to Cleaver’s in his sermon for the Nethersole marriage (II: 346).  For a reading of Milton’s “superior 
and natural law” and its implications for his political thought, see David Aers and Bob Hodge, “Milton on 
Sex and Marriage,” 129-32. 
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seventeenth-centuries created a close affinity between the language of sexual love in 
marriage and the language of religious experience and, as we have seen, dedicated 
considerable space to the question of how to nurture love between husband and wife.109  
I belabor this point not because I wish to imply that Puritan manuals offered a 
vision of marriage that is necessarily preferable to Milton’s, but rather because these 
manuals depict a rich social context for marriage. By connecting the language of 
conjugal relationships with a concern for children, household, commonwealth, and 
Church, Puritan divines come to sketch an outline of the interdependence between 
marriage and community. This language is missing in Milton’s tracts. As it is often noted 
in discussion of the divorce tracts, most writers of marriage manuals give the same list 
of the three ends of marriage that are found in the book of common prayer and that 
Milton includes in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, “Godly society, next civill, and 
thirdly, that of the mariage-bed” (CPW II:268). However the most notable difference 
between Milton and the other writers on the subject is not that he rearranges the list to 
                                                     
109 Cleaver’s and Dod’s A godly forme of houshold government gives a striking example of this in the chapter on 
the duties of the husband towards the wife. In advising men that they choose a “meet, fit, and honest mate,” 
Cleaver reminds them that much depends on their choice: “As he that will plant any thing, doth first 
consider the nature of the ground in the which he mindeth to plant: euen so much more ought a man to 
haue respect to the condition of the woman, out of whom he desireth to plant children, the fruites of 
honestie and welfare” (A godly forme, image 49). The language of reproduction describing the woman’s body 
as the ground in which her husband planted his children was of course commonplace. But Cleaver, two 
short paragraphs later, uses the same imagery in describing a wife’s mind. This time, the husband is 
planting spiritual seeds: “he that hath married a wife that is irreligious or forward, if he shall vse like 
diligence to instruct and order her minde, if he diligently and courteously apply himself to weede away by 
little and little the noisome weeds out of her mind, both by wholesome precepts, and by Christian 
conversation; it can not be but in time he shall feele the pleasant fruite thereof to both their comforts” (A 
godly forme, image 50). 
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place “the mariage-bed” last, but rather that he takes the list seriously.110 While the 
works of such writers as Perkins and Cleaver do include passages emphasizing the 
importance of due benevolence, the organization and focus of the overall manuals 
clearly indicate that their understanding of marriage cannot be reduced to the 
fulfillment of sexual and reproductive duties. For these writers, we cannot understand 
marriage if we only look at these three ends as they function within the union of two 
people alone, as if they were cut off from others. To talk about marriage is to talk about 
an entire web of social relations and therefore statements about what is good in 
marriage require a justification that takes into account these wider concerns. This 
difference in focus between Milton and these writers can help to bring into relief the 
assumptions behind the divorce tracts. The task of the rest of this chapter is to uncover 
these assumptions and to attempt to trace the consequences for Milton’s understanding 
of social relationships. 
As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, the writers of marriage 
manuals rarely discuss the respective duties of husband and wife without connecting 
marriage to the creation of a family, involving both children and servants, and the 
sustaining of the commonwealth and Church. For instance, Cleaver and Dod open their 
                                                     
110 John Donne, for instance, also deems controlling lust to be the least important, though placed first in his 
list, of the three ends of marriage: “Let him then that takes his wife in this first and lowest sense, In 
medicinam, but as his Physick, yet make her his cordiall Physick, take her to his heart, and fill his heart with 
her, let her dwell there, and dwell there alone” (wedding-sermon for Margaret Washington (May 30, 1621), 
The Sermons of John Donne, III:244). 
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manual not by considering husband and wife alone, but rather by seeing them as “[t]he 
gouernours of a family, be such as haue authoritie in the familie by Gods ordinance, as 
the father and the mother, maister and mistrisse” (emphasis mine). In The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce, on the other hand, Milton focuses on the relationship between 
husband and wife to the exclusion of all other concerns.111 This allows him to reshape 
what counts as an explanation of how and when a marriage is made. While English law 
on divorce may have focused on the marriage bed, most manuals focus on the social ties 
that were born of that physical union, ties that extend well beyond the daily 
conversation of husband and wife. Because of this, these writers would not answer 
Milton’s question of when two individuals are united by God just by looking at the 
wedding day. The explanation has to begin much earlier. Perkins, to take an extreme 
example, dedicates over a third of his manual to questions such as what is the marriage 
contract, what levels of affinity or consanguinity make marriage impossible, why 
polygamy is not allowed, why contagious diseases ruin the union, and to problems of 
consent and insanity.112 For Perkins and the other writers of marriage manuals, marriage 
                                                     
111 Milton does connect the reformation of marriage with the reformation of the commonwealth when it is 
rhetorically advantageous to do so (CPW II:431). Nonetheless, his principal line of argument deals only with 
the couple. 
112 In a passage that would dismay Milton, Perkins distinguishes between perpetual insanity and madness 
that only comes in fits. The first kind makes marriage impossible and the betrothal invalid as consent cannot 
be freely given. The second kind of madness does not hinder marriage as long as “it was manifestly 
knowne, that the said parties were both in their right wits, before they plight their troth each to the other” 
(Christian Oeconomie, 75). For Perkins, not only do husband and wife need not be of one mind to remain 
married, but as long as the marriage is contracted while both partners can give free consent it will stand 
even if one of them loses his or her mind. 
 147 
begins with a promise which cannot be separated from issues of consent, both of the 
man and woman but also of their parents, and is enmeshed in questions of 
consanguinity and familiar relations. Indeed, Perkins asks the same question that Milton 
sets out to exploit in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. In Chapter VIII of Christian 
Oeconomie, he imagines an interlocutor wondering: “How God that is in heauen, should 
bring and ioyne together man and wife vpon the earth?” The answer, contrary to 
Milton’s approach, is to remind his readers that we are neither in Heaven nor in Eden: “I 
answere, that he doth it not immediately by himselfe, as he brought Euah vnto Adam, but 
in & by some solemne and lawful meanes. And this meane, is that great and ancient 
power and prerogative of parents. And the law of God hath giuen them this power, not 
in ciuill contracts and compositions alone, but euen in the beginning and accomplishing 
of marriages.” Perkins’ answer is of course formulated to take into account the running 
disagreement between Reformed divines and the Catholic Church on whether the 
consent of parents is necessary for the marriage contract to be valid. But it is more than a 
pointed reply to papist arguments. In it, Perkins acknowledges that since the Fall, 
husband and wife are not brought together directly by God as Adam and Eve were, but 
rather that God effects the union through “some solemne and lawful meanes.”113 That is, 
                                                     
113 Arthur E. Barker reads the divorce tracts as forcing Milton to come to terms with and recognizing the 
limits imposed by the Fall on liberty. True Christian liberty can only be obtained by those few whose heart 
and reason, like Milton’s, have been regenerated by the Spirit. Positive law cannot impinge on the liberty of 
the righteous under the pretext of restraining license and sin (Milton and the Puritan Dilemma, 1641-1660 
(Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1942), 115-7). Following Barker, I would argue that the difference 
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“meanes” based on human laws and customs become the vehicle for divine agency in 
marriage. 
I will turn to my second point of comparison for Milton’s theory of marriage. The 
most sustained reply to Milton’s divorce tracts is the anonymous An Answer to A Book 
intituled The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1644).114 The Answer is a point-by-point 
reply to the first edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. In particular, it attacks 
Milton’s definition of the ideal foundation of marriage, spiritual conversation. In the 
divorce tracts, love is defined as the desire for spiritual conversation, “this pure and 
                                                     
 
between Perkins’ and Milton’s discussion of when the union of husband and wife can be said to have truly 
taken place is due to Milton’s insistence that laws be made for the elect few rather than for those whose 
reason has not been regenerated by the Spirit. Indeed, to do otherwise, is to drive the elect towards sects and 
schisms: “[S]eeing that sort of men who follow Anabaptism, Famelism, Antinomianism, and other fanatic 
dreams,  (if we understand them not amisse) [added in second edition]  be such most commonly as are 
by nature addicted to a zeal of Religion, of life also not debausht, and that their opinions having full swinge, 
do end in satisfaction of the flesh, it may come with reason into the thoughts of a wise man, whether all this 
proceed not partly, if not chiefly, from the restraint of some lawfull liberty, which ought to be giv’n men, 
and is deny’d them” (CPW II: 278). Of course, Milton is not above contradicting himself. While, as Barker 
argues, Milton claims the regenerate husband’s unhindered right to decide when to divorce regardless of 
the consequences for those who are not of the elect, he also insists that only a husband who is “a thing 
heroically virtuous” will be able to remain faithful to an unpleasing wife. In this vein of argument, Milton 
insists that laws ought to be made “for the common lump of men […], though not to their sins, yet to their 
unsinning weakness” (CPW II:253-4). I will return to Barker’s argument in greater detail later in the chapter. 
114 All quotes from An Answer are from: William Riley Parker, Milton’s Contemporary Reputation (New York: 
Haskell House Publishers, 1940), a collection of seventeenth century responses to Milton’s writings. Page 
number will be indicated in text and refer to original pagination. Sara J. van den Berg and W. Scott Howard 
identify the publisher of An Answer as the printer George Miller (“G. M. Revealed: Printer of the First 
Attacks on The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce,” in Milton Quarterly 38 (2004): 242-52). Van den Berg and 
Howard note that Miller is also the publisher of Palmer’s The Glass of Gods Providence. The licenser of An 
Answer was Joseph Caryl. He not only licensed the anonymous pamphlet, but also endorsed its message. 
Milton counter-attacked Caryl in Colasterion (see CPW II:727). For a discussion of this exchange and of the 
different exegetical approaches between Milton and Caryl, see Dayton Haskin, Milton’s Burden of 
Interpretation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 75-6. 
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more inbred desire of joining to it self in conjugall fellowship a fit conversing soul 
(which desire is properly call’d love) is stronger then death” (CPW II: 251). For Milton, the 
lack of conversation can drive the injured spouse to adultery or loss of faith, “it drives 
many to transgresse the conjugall bed, while the soule wanders after that satisfaction 
which it had hope to find at home, but hath mis’t. Or els it sits repining even to 
Atheism” (CPW II: 269). The reply in An Answer accuses Milton of confusing mental 
with physical conversation. The Answerer is willing to grant that if a wife does not 
prove a suitable conversational partner, the husband is welcome to “look abroad” for 
this form of companionship as long as “he meddles not with her bodie” (32). However, 
if Milton insists that lack of conversation at home causes him to “lust unlawfully after 
the bodies [instead of minds] of other mens Wives,” then he is making a mistake of 
categories. For the Answerer, the idea of spiritual conversation is simply nonsense: “We 
have heard that Angels converse with one another as they are Spirits; but for Husbands 
and Wives, though they ought not to love in word only, but in deed and in truth with 
the affections of the heart, yet we know no conversing with one another, but is by words 
and actions” (32). That is, Milton’s argument is best suited to Donne’s “Creatures, that 
have not so much a Body as flesh is, as froth is, as a vapor is, as a sigh is.”115  
Milton replies to An Answer in 1645 with Colasterion. His dismissal of the 
Answerer’s criticism that “we know no conversing with one another, but is by words 
                                                     
115 The Sermons of John Donne, VIII:106. 
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and actions” is typical of the rhetoric of the tract. Milton gives no answer to the 
argument itself, but rather dismisses the author as incapable of understanding what is 
meant by conversation of the mind and how it might affect marriage. The Answerer’s 
unfit “chopps” are not capable of savoring the true meaning of such a spiritual union, 
which affects him “like a generous Wine, only by overworking the settl’d mudd of his 
fancy, to make him drunk, and disgorge his vileness the more openly” (CPW II:747). The 
Answerer is simply the wrong kind of person to understand Milton’s ideal of marriage: 
“All persons of gentle breeding (I say gentle, though this Barrow grunt at the word) I 
know will apprehend and bee satisfy’d in what I spake, how unpleasing and 
discontenting the society of body must needs be between those whose minds cannot bee 
sociable” (CPW II:747).116 While Milton skirts the issue, the Answer’s objection does point 
to a central question in the divorce tracts. In his arguments, Milton focuses on 
descriptions of unfit marriage partners. What do these descriptions indicate about his 
understanding of human relationships? Why does Milton devalue the Answerer’s 
“words and actions”? 
I started this section with an epigraph taken from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations. It is remark 693: “Nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a 
mental activity.” Fergus Kerr, in chapter two of Theology after Wittgenstein, connects this 
                                                     
116 For Luxon, Colasterion dramatizes a conversation with an unfit partner. The tract is seen as a “kind of a 
rudely articulated bill of divorcement” (Single Imperfection, 59). 
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remark with Wittgenstein’s critique of the view of language that stems from a devaluing 
of the embodied nature of human beings.117 For Wittgenstein, this understanding of 
language is closely connected with the problem of other minds. This problem has two 
levels. On the first level, we have an image of a mind with thoughts, wants, and desires 
locked inside a body. Kerr begins his discussion of this view with the opening of the 
Philosophical Investigations and its recounting of Augustine’s reflections on language 
acquisition in the first book of the Confessions.118 Wittgenstein sees Augustine’s story of 
how he learnt how to speak as identical to a description of how one may learn a foreign 
language.119 This picture of language learning represents the infant as knowing his 
wants before, and independently of, knowing a language. The infant struggles to find 
ways to communicate these wants to the grown-ups around him and acquires language 
by observing how adults name objects that he desires. In other words, the child is 
effectively learning how to translate his mental language into a spoken language. The 
                                                     
117Theology after Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); see, in particular, page 42. Descartes’ Meditations 
are the main precursor to the modern version of this conception of language, but Kerr traces a similar 
understanding to writers prior to Descartes. In particular, he focuses on Augustine, Aquinas, and Gregory 
the great. Gregory provides the important image of the self as isolated behind the wall of the body (79-80). 
118“When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I 
grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention 
was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the 
face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses 
our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly 
used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; 
and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires” (Philosophical 
Investigations, remark 1, quoting Augustine’s Confessions; emphasis mine). 
119Theology after Wittgenstein, 39. Kerr points to remark 32: “And now, I think, we can say: Augustine 
describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand 
the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child 
could already think, only not yet speak. And ‘think’ would here mean something like ‘talk to itself.’” 
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fundamental act of this learning how to speak is that of learning to name, that is, 
learning to make connections between objects and the appropriate words in the spoken 
language. What Wittgenstein does with the passage from the Confessions and the 
example of the builders in the Investigations is to dispel the idea that naming is a simple 
activity that we do naturally, without initiation into a complex practice. In fact, to name 
something is not simple at all, it involves already knowing a number of things:  
[Naming] is natural in the sense that it depends on certain physical capacities to 
handle things, focus the eyes, repeat an action, distinguish one thing from 
another, and the like. Such biological desires and powers are cultivated and 
reinforced by practice, so they become ‘second nature’ to any creature with 
(more or less) our physical and psychological constitution; but it takes a great 
deal of education—rousing the infant’s interest, teaching it to discriminate 
among its perceptions etc.120 
 
In Augustine’s picture, as read by Wittgenstein, naming objects, i.e., giving ostensive 
definitions, in our own private mental language is an act that can be done by the 
individual alone prior to learning a shared language.121  
Wittgenstein reminds us that this cannot be right. Thoughts and meaning do not 
exist in our heads privately and independently of a shared language. By choosing 
Augustine as the text on which to base his remarks at the very beginning of the 
                                                     
120 Theology after Wittgenstein, 71. 
121 Ibid., 73. I want to pause to note that whether the reading of Augustine that Wittgenstein presents in the 
Investigations is correct or not is besides the point. As Kerr points out, Wittgenstein selects this passage and 
gives this reading of it because this picture of language learning, and the related picture of the self as 
existing independently of culture and community, comes to dominate Western thinking (42). For a reading 
of language learning in the Confessions that takes into account Augustine’s understanding of divine 
illumination, see Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and 
Tradition (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 84. 
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Investigations, Wittgenstein demonstrates the difficult-to-resist appeal of the conception 
of meaning as a mental activity, transparently known to the self, but hidden from others 
unless communicated via the medium of language. Kerr paraphrases and explains 
remark 693 as saying that “to think of meaning as some essentially occult state or act 
inside one’s consciousness, radically inaccessible to anyone else, is, residually, and all 
the more insiduously for that, to succumb to the appealing thought that the self is 
concealed inside the man.”122 In a 1930 lecture, Wittgenstein explains the idea in this 
way: 
This simile of ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the mind is pernicious. It is derived from ‘in 
the head’ when we think of ourselves as looking out from our head and of 
thinking as something going on ‘in our head’. But we then forget the picture and 
go on using the language derived from it. […] Would it be possible to 
communicate more directly by a process of ‘thought reading’? What would we 
mean by ‘reading thought’? Language is not an indirect method of 
communication, to be contrasted with ‘direct’ thought-reading. Thought-reading 
could only take place through the interpretation of symbols and so would be on 
the same level as language. It would not get rid of the symbolic process. The idea 
of reading a thought more directly is derived from the idea that thought is a 
hidden process which it is the aim of the philosopher to penetrate. But there is no 
more direct way of reading thought than through language. Thought is not 
something hidden; it lies open to us.123 
 
What Wittgenstein describes in this lecture is the idea that we know our thoughts and 
ourselves, but that the self is enclosed in a physical shell that shields and isolates us 
from others. Language is part of the shell, and thus, it is mere exterior. If we could 
                                                     
122 Theology After Wittgenstein, 42. 
123 Wittgenstein’s Lectures Cambridge 1930-1932, ed. Desmond Lee (Blackwell: Oxford, 1980). Quoted in 
Theology after Wittgenstein, 44. 
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somehow by-pass this verbal shell—words as approximating the meaning hidden inside 
our heads—we could then know others as we know ourselves, and so achieve true 
intimacy. We could know each other as spirits do, as one angel might know another: “In 
questioning the validity of this (often hidden) object of comparison, Wittgenstein invites 
us to remember ourselves as we really are. Once and for all, that is to say, we need to 
give up comparing ourselves with ethereal beings that enjoy unmediated communion 
with one another.”124 
The fundamental problem with this idea of “thought reading” is that it leads to, 
and reinforces, the second level of the problem of other minds. In moments of 
miscommunication, when we realize that we have misunderstood what someone said, 
their gestures, or the expression on their face, we might be led to believe that the normal, 
rather than exceptional, state of affairs is one in which the thoughts of others are hidden 
from view.125 This problem of occasional miscommunication tends to distract us from the 
fact that ordinarily, in most daily activities, we understand each other perfectly well. 
And this distraction, if allowed to dominate our conception of others, can be 
catastrophic. Other people then become puzzling objects whose intentions I must figure 
out from the clues found in their actions and expression: “It is as if I watched certain 
                                                     
124 Theology after Wittgenstein, 45. 
125 Ibid., 78. Here Kerr introduces Gregory’s image of human communication from his Morals on the Book of 
Job: “We stand, as it were, behind the wall of the body, sheltered from the eyes of others in the recesses of 
our mind; but when we wish to reveal ourselves we come forth, with speech as the gateway in order to 
show our inner selves” (quoted in Theology After Wittgenstein, 80). In this picture, the self is safely hidden 
inside the body and it reveals itself only when it wills to do so through speech. 
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privileged objects in my environment and had to infer or guess from their surfaces what 
was going on inside.”126 The only way I can hope to interpret the “surfaces” of people is 
to draw, by analogy with my own case, a connection between their behavior and the 
state of mind hidden inside their bodies: “I see many eyes but I cannot be certain that 
they are not all blind, never mind whether they are watching me. […] The solipsist is 
surrounded by creatures whose kinship with himself he has to deduce by interpreting 
the noises they emit.”127 While we know our own selves directly and transparently, we 
know others only by inference.128 But since we view ourselves as hidden inside our own 
minds and allowing ourselves to be known only when we willfully decide to do so, we 
are then led to suspect that what we see of others need not, in our ordinary, daily 
interactions, correspond with their true intentions. Their thoughts and the true meaning 
of their words are hidden from us by the walls of the body, spoken language, and 
custom. If we could only break down these walls and speak as one spirit to another, then 
we would really know each other. 
                                                     
126 Theology after Wittgenstein, 81. 
127 Ibid., 81. 
128 Marjorie Grene makes this point clearly in The Knower and the Known (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1974). In the Cartesian and empiricist traditions, “[t]hrough their actions, expressions, and statements, 
I know others. […] so I know [a friend] through the clues to his existence, to his mind, which his behaviour 
affords me” (86). That is, I can know others only by external clues, like a forensic detective. To this view 
Grene opposes one that seems to be deeply indebted to Wittgenstein, though she does not directly draw on 
his work until much later in the book. For Grene, I cannot know others by analogy with myself. Indeed, I am 
dependent on others for any self-knowledge that I might have. If I would attempt to know myself 
independently, “I should have to detach myself from myself, to be not myself but another. In fact, it is our 
self-knowledge which comes more often than not at second hand, from the reflected impact of ourselves on 
others. […] True, I am ‘within’ my own experiences and not someone else’s; but this ‘insideness’ in mere 
subjectivity, not knowledge” (86). 
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Milton’s divorce tracts display an understanding of communication similar to 
that critiqued by Wittgenstein. There, Milton argues that the terrible loneliness felt by 
the unhappy husband, who seems condemned to live the existence of reprobate, would 
disappear if he could only find a fit-conversing soul to share his thoughts. In 
Tetrachordon (1645), Milton points to the text of Genesis 2.18 to explain that the helpmeet 
created by God for Adam is “another self, a second self, a very self it self” (CPW II: 600). 
In The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, he describes the daily companionship with one 
who is not a fit “second self” as constant reminder of his unfulfilled hopes in marriage: 
“but here the continuall sight of his deluded thoughts without cure, must needs be to 
him, if especially his complexion incline him to melancholy, a daily trouble and paine of 
losse in some degree like that which Reprobates feel” (CPW II:247). In both cases, a wife 
is represented as a personification of the husband’s self. In her presence, he is forced to 
confront “the continuall sight of his deluded thoughts” materialized in his home. Milton 
portrays the ideal marriage as a spiritual conversation between spouses where the 
husband’s self is reflected in this second self.  But Donne, like Wittgenstein, reminds us, 
“If by being like the Angels, we shall know the Angels, we are more then like our selves, 
we are our selves, why doe we not know our selves?”129 Milton, by insisting that a good 
marriage consists in finding “another self, a second self, a very self it self” with whom to 
communicate soul to soul and not by the Answerer’s words and actions, is skirting the 
                                                     
129 The Sermons of John Donne, VIII:106. 
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problem that to communicate and create meaning at all, even within ourselves, we are 
ineluctably immersed in words, actions, and—that most unwelcome Miltonic horror—
custom. If we return to Milton’s question of “when is it that God may be said to joyn” 
two people in marriage (CPW II:328), we can now see that his discarding of all markers 
of marriage is fundamentally connected with his view of human and social relationships 
and the mediation of custom. Marriage ceremonies, promises of betrothal, and the 
coming together of families are seen as mere shells that have no real meaning unless 
accompanied by a fitting mental and spiritual state. Worse yet, to engage in such 
customary acts without the proper mental state is a form of idolatry and hypocrisy. 
Those who do rely on habit and custom cannot participate in the conversation of the 
souls. They take the walls and exterior shells for reality.  
What is problematic about this image in Milton’s tracts is that it tends to 
dehumanize others when their exterior does not match what we take to be the correct 
corresponding interior. More precisely, for Milton, a wife is a true help-meet only when 
her husband finds in her a sympathetic spiritual response. If that is missing, she 
becomes an empty cipher. We can see this emptying of others in the language used to 
describe an unfit wife in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, as well as the in other 
divorce tracts. In chapter three, Milton complains that canon law privileges physical 
incompatibility over spiritual and mental differences. There, he describes the law as 
being “more mov’d at the disappointing of an impetuous nerve, then at the ingenuous 
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grievance of a minde unreasonably yoakt” (CPW II:249). The husband’s mind, for Milton 
did not grant wives the right to obtain a divorce to remedy their grievances, is 
“unreasonably yoakt” to a nothing—there is no object to “yoakt.” The other presumably 
unhappy mind, the wife’s, disappears from the sentence. Only the unhappy husband’s 
mind is “yoakt” against reason, that is, unreasonably, but also against the very nature of 
the mind. Similarly, one who has “spent his youth unblamably” and hopes to find joy in 
marriage, but chooses the wrong partner, finds himself “bound fast to an uncomplying 
discord of nature, or, as it oft happens, to an image of earth and fleam” (CPW II:254). A 
wife who is not of the same nature as the husband, she is “an uncomplying discord,” is 
found to be no more than “an image of earth and fleam”; she is more like the body of 
Adam molded from dirt before God breathed life into his nostril than a real human 
being. In these moment, we see that a wife who is not capable of being Milton’s “second-
self” is doomed to be no self at all. She is only an empty surface, and a potentially 
deceiving one at that. Indeed, if those opposed to divorce were to argue that the 
unhappy husband should have taken the time to get to know his future wife better 
before committing to an unalterable step, Milton would reply that it is easy to mistake 
lack of conversation for modesty: “When as the sober man honouring the appearance of 
modestie, and hoping well of every sociall vertue under that veile, may easily chance to 
meet, if not with a body impenetrable, yet often with a minde to all other conversation 
inaccessible” (CPW II:250). In the sentence we see that even if the husband can penetrate 
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the body of his wife, she nonetheless may have a mind that cannot be reached by any 
means, it is “to all other conversation inaccessible.”130 While her body is available to her 
husband, she turns out to be nothing more than an image, a penetrable body whose 
mind may as well not exist since it is not to be reached. 
Milton’s plea for a spiritual companion in marriage is in line with the one of the 
strands of thinking in Puritan marriage manuals. In the address to Parliament added to 
the second edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Milton positions his argument 
for divorce within the understanding of Protestant marriage as a partnership aimed at 
reforming the commonwealth one family at the time. However, through the adversarial 
rhetoric of Colasterion and the language privileging mind over body throughout the 
divorce tracts, Milton strips of dignity the aspects of marriage that do not rise to the 
ideal of a spiritual conversation. Daily life, sex, the bearing and raising of children all 
become so much “cattell” (CPW II:251). Promises of betrothal, marriage contracts, and 
marriage services lose their ability to create a marriage bond. What is troubling about 
Milton’s view of marriage promises and contracts, as we will see below, is that if they 
are found to have been made to someone who does not fulfill the poet’s expectations, 
                                                     
130 Milton’s demand that a husband have access to both body and soul of his wife reflects the advice found 
in marriage manuals. Cleaver and Dod seem to propose a similar view of the proper relationship between 
husband and wife: “The husband ought not to be satisfied with the vse of his wiues body, but in that he 
hath also possession of her will and affections: for it sufficeth not that they be married, but that they be well 
married, and liue Christianly together, and be very well contented” (Cleaver and Dod, A godly forme of 
houshold government, image 82). For Cleaver and Dod, to live “Christianly” together as husband and wife 
presupposes a husband’s “possession of her will and affections.” 
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they are said to have never been valid. Such marriage becomes an empty husk, such 
wife a mere idol; they are erased from existence. The anonymous Answerer touches on a 
fundamental problem in Milton’s vision of marriage when he insists that wives and 
husbands converse by ordinary words and actions. While Milton insists that these words 
and actions are meaningless—or worse yet, a form of hypocrisy—if they are not 
validated by certain mental states, Wittgenstein reminds us that their meaning is 
independent of such interior confirmation. As Fergus Kerr explains in recapitulating 
Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea that meaning is a mental activity: “[t]he metaphysically 
dictated doctrine that everything that people do and say, if it is to be worthy of their 
dignity as self-conscious and autonomous intellectual entities, must issue from thought 
and will (supposed, to be sure, to be interior, invisible and private), is an illusion that 
has to be deflated once and for all.”131 Milton’s divorce tracts exemplify a possible 
outcome of such an illusion. Having stripped his unfit wife of selfhood, this hoped-for 
second self turns out to be but an image of earth and the disappointed husband finds 
himself in the condition of a reprobate, one who lives devoid of faith and hope, and 
barred from the bonds of charity. Being married to an image turns the husband’s daily 
life into a series of hypocritical acts, rote prayers with no meaning addressed to a dead 
idol. 
                                                     
131 Theology after Wittgenstein, 115. 
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These meaningless daily actions described in the divorce tracts resemble those 
denounced in Preston’s breast-plate.132 As we have seen, Preston defines hypocrisy as a 
lack of sincerity and love: “hypocrisy is to doe the outward act without inward sincerity. 
Now to doe a thing in love is to doe it in sincerity. And indeed there is no other 
definition of sincerity, that is the best way to know it by: A man that doeth much to God, 
and not out of love, all that he doth is out of hypocrisie.” Love must accompany each 
action if we want to avoid being hypocrites. Both Preston and the writers of marriage 
manuals prescribe closeness and conversation as means to foster this essential love. 
There is, however, a potential tension between the requirement for sincere love and the 
method recommended by Puritan divines for attaining such love. Conversation with 
someone we do not love—or whom we naturally hate, as Preston argues regarding 
man’s orientation towards God—can be seen as hypocritical in itself. The divorce tracts 
register this tension. In Colasterion, in particular, we can see Milton directly responding 
to the standard advice given to unhappy husbands. To the Milton’s complaint that an 
unfit wife makes marriage impossible, the Answerer replies that a husband ought to 
patiently bear the faults of his wife, and help her to correct her mistakes.133 Relying on 
                                                     
132 Milton makes the comparison between hypocrisy in marriage and in religion directly in Tetrachordon: 
“Therfore God who hates all feigning and formality, where there should be all faith and sincereness, and 
abhors the inevitable discord, where there should be greater concord, when thro' another's default, faith and 
concord cannot be, counts it neither just to punish the innocent with the Transgressor, nor holy, nor 
honourable for the sanctity of Marriage, that should be the union of peace and love to be made the 
commitment, and close fight of enmity and hate” (CPW II:631). 
133 What it means for a husband to bear the wife’s faults in practice seems to vary rather drastically from this 
ideal of Christian patience. Perkins is fairly typical in insisting that the husband’s power of the wife does not 
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Eph. 5.25, “Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave 
himself for it,” the Answerer argues that husbands are commanded by Paul to love their 
wives by “passing by and healing the faults and infirmities of their Wives, as Christ gave 
himself” (6). This is how we are meant to understand love in marriage: “such love as is 
there required ought to hide and passe by faults, disagreements of minde, contrariety of 
disposition, &c.” (6). Milton’s reply in Colasterion does not deny the parallel between 
Christ and a patient husband, but rather argues against the notion that Christ is willing 
to bear with the faults of the Church. Milton insists that the verse in Ephesians supports 
divorce: “For if the husband must bee as Christ to the Wife, then must the wife bee as 
the Church to her husband. If ther bee a perpetual contrariety of minde in the Church 
toward Christ, Christ himself threat’ns to divorce such a Spouse, and hath often don it. If 
they urge, this was no true Church, I urge again, that was no true Wife” (CPW II:732). 
Christ, having found the Church to display “a perpetual contrariety of minde,” divorces 
her. The argument in this passage is in exact parallel with the one The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce. Just as a wife who is perpetually at odds with her husband has 
                                                     
 
extend to physical punishment for her faults. If he is incapable of restraining a particularly stubborn wife 
with verbal admonitions, the husband ought to call on a magistrate to intervene. However, Perkins proceeds 
to note that while a husband who is married to “a wife so stubborne and peeuish, must beare it, if it may be 
borne, as the portion of his crosse laid vpon him by God,” nonetheless, “if he be impatient [i.e. if he strikes 
her], he may in some sort be pardoned and pitied, but he is not wholly excused.” Whately, perhaps 
acknowledging that the theory professed in other manuals does not seem to agree with what is condoned in 
practice, goes further and actually recommends wife-beating for particularly willful cases. 
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never been joined in matrimony as defined by Genesis, a faulty Church was never a true 
Church. 
What does Milton mean by the Church in this passage? As Cedric C. Brown 
argues in “Milton and the Idolatrous Consort,” by invoking the specter of idolatry and 
false religion in the divorce tracts, Milton strengthened his case by playing upon the 
widespread fear of Catholicism.134 In this reading, the divorced Church then recalls both 
the false Church of Rome and the Laudian Church of England. To an audience 
sympathetic with the familiar anti-Catholic arguments as well as with the Presbyterian 
and Independent claims against Episcopal church policy, Milton’s image of Christ 
divorcing the corrupted Church would have been a rhetorically powerful move. But 
what are the consequences of this ideal of separation? Such line of argument indicates 
the need for unrelenting reformation. By way of comparison, we can look at John 
Donne’s interpretation of the same verse. In his use of this Scriptural passage in two 
different sermons, Donne interprets the Spouse of Christ both generally, as the true 
Church in its entirety, and particularly, as each faithful soul. In both senses, the union 
between Christ and the Spouse is described as unbreakable. We find his use of the first 
sense in his first sermon at Saint Dunstans (April 11, 1624). Here, Donne reminds his 
listeners that “[t]he union of Christ to the whole Church is not expressed by any 
                                                     
134 Criticism, 35 (1993), 419-39. Brown points out that the Queen’s impeachment in 1643 made the issues of 
Catholicism and idolatry into a convenient foil for Milton’s argument. 
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metaphore, by any figure, so oft in the Scripture, as by this of Mariage” (IX:82). But the 
difference between civil marriage and this mystical marriage is that “there in that union 
with Christ to the whole Church, neither husband, nor wife can ever die; Christ is 
immortall [and] the Church is immortall too; for as a Prince is the same Prince, when he 
fights a battaile, and when hee triumphs after victory: so the militant, and the 
triumphant Church is the same Church” (IX:82). The image in Donne’s sermon is clearly 
one of continuity. The Church that Christ married has always been the same Church and 
will continue to be so, though perfected, in its triumph after the second coming. A 
similar interpretation is found in the wedding-sermon for Margaret Washington (May 
30, 1621). There, Donne considers the spiritual marriage between Christ and an 
individual soul. Again, he draws the parallel with civil marriage explicitly: “he hath 
maried it in aeternum, for ever; which is the third and last Circumstance in this spirituall, 
as it was in the secular marriage” (III:253). In both versions of the image, Donne insists 
that marriage between Christ and His Spouse is eternal. The Church of Eph. 5.25 is the 
true Church.135  For Milton, on the other hand, the language of the same verse is taken to 
refer to any particular Church that may turn out to be “no true Church.” His use of the 
verse calls for an endless evaluation and pruning of both the Church and of marriage.136 
                                                     
135 Similarly, the authors of marriage manuals read the Church married by Christ in Eph. 5 as representing 
the true congregation of the godly. Preston also reads the verse as indicating the true marriage between 
Christ and the regenerate soul. 
136 In the second edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, this need for constant vigilance and 
reformation is presented at the very beginning of the address to the Parliament and Assembly: “And 
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Once faults or differences between Christ and the Church or husband and wife become 
irreparable, the entire history and identity of either spouse or specific Church becomes 
suspect. As The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce argues, a wife whom a husband can no 
longer love was never a true wife, she was never joined to him God into one flesh. 
Similarly, a Church that has decayed from its apostolic purity was never a true Church. 
Constant reformation on these terms demands the obliteration of the past whenever a 
present fault is discovered.  
What are the consequences of this conception? Milton had already argued in 
print that the Church of England was no true Church. In Animadversions (July, 1641), he 
argues against Bishop Joseph Hall’s A Defence of the Humble Remonstrance (April, 1641). 
With this pamphlet, Milton joins the debate between Hall and the five proponents of 
Presbyterian Church polity who wrote under the pseudonym Smectymnuus.137 The 
structure of Animadversions is similar to that of Colasterion. In both tracts, Milton quotes 
his opponent and then replies to the quote, often insultingly. In answering Hall’s 
accusation that the five divines of Smectymnuus are “like ill bred sons” who “spit in the 
                                                     
 
[Custom and Error] betweene them would persecute and chase away all truth and solid wisdome out of 
humane life, were it not that God, rather then man, once in many ages, cals together the prudent and 
Religious counsels of Men, deputed to represse the encroachments, and to worke off the inveterate blots and 
obscurities wrought upon our mindes by the suttle insinuating of Error and Custome” (CPW II:234). The 
insidious infiltration of error into human life through custom is only held back by the reforming agency of 
God who inspires the calling together of “prudent and Religious counsels of Men.” 
137 The five authors of Smectymnuus are: Stephen Marshall, Edmund Calamy, Thomas Young, Matthew 
Newcomen, and William Spurstowe. For an overview of the controversy, see Barbara K. Lewalski, The Life of 
John Milton,128-34 . 
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face of your Mother the Church of England,” Milton distinguished between the true 
mother Church and the corrupt Church of England: “Wee acknowledge, and believe the 
Catholick reformed Church, and if any be dispos’d to use a trope or figure, as Saint Paul 
once did in calling her the common Mother of us all, let him doe as his owne rhetorick 
shall perswade him” (CPW II:727). Milton allows any who so desire to speak respectfully 
of the universal reformed Church by calling it their Mother, but he also reminds his 
readers that this is but a trope, a rhetorical style. Indeed, we should beware of being 
coaxed into an unthinking obedience by believing a turn of phrase: “but marke Readers, 
the crafty scope of these Prelates, they endeavour to impresse deeply into weak, and 
superstitious fancies the awefull notion of a mother, that hereby they might cheat them 
into a blind and implicite obedience to whatsoever they shall decree, or think fit” (CPW 
II:727-8). Milton here explicitly brings up the ghost of Catholicism by accusing Hall of 
trying to trick English Protestants into “implicite obedience” and believing 
“superstitious fancies.” To fall for this trick would be to give up the ground gained by 
the Reformation: 
So that we who by Gods speciall grace have shak’n off the servitude of a great 
male Tyrant, our pretended Father the Pope, should now, if we be not betimes 
aware of these wily teachers, sink under the slavery of a Female notion, the 
cloudy conception of a demy-Iland mother, and while we think to be obedient 
sonnes, should make ourselves rather the Bastards, or the Centarus of their 
spirituall fornications. (CPW II:728) 
 
The passage recalls the Pauline language of the son of the bondmaid and that of the free 
woman from Galatians 4.22-39. To accept the Church of England as our true mother 
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Church is to refuse the gift of freedom that divine grace has granted through the 
Reformation by giving up our Christian liberty. The rhetoric of the bishops is seen as 
attempting to convince us to “sinke under the slavery” of Episcopalian Church 
discipline by disguising that slavery under a mask of filial obedience. 
In the early 1640s, Milton’s argument against Episcopal Church government 
based on Christian liberty found a ready and sympathetic audience. However, using the 
same tactic in the divorce tracts forces Milton to argue that the liberty he demands is 
based on virtue and not license. In particular, we see the tracts mounting a defense of 
husbands who have made poor choices in marriage partners. One incorrect decision 
does not impute an otherwise virtuous life. For instance, in Tetrachordon, Milton 
describes the cause of a bad marriage as being rooted in one bad choice, made in one 
brief instant:  
if we do but erre in our choice the most unblamable error that can be, erre but 
one minute, one moment after those mighty syllables pronounc’t which take 
upon them to joyn heavn and hell together unpardonably till death pardon, this 
divine blessing that lookt but now with such a human smile upon us, and spoke 
such gentle reason, strait vanishes like a fair skie and brings on such a scene of 
cloud and tempest, as turns all to shipwrack without havn or shoar but to 
ransomles captivity. (CPW II: 600-1) 
 
The blameless husband’s error is located in one precise instant and unrelated to his 
otherwise virtuous life. Indeed, the more virtuous, the more likely to be deceived: “The 
sobrest and best govern'd men are least practiz'd in these affairs; and who knowes not 
that the bashfull mutenes of a virgin may oft-times hide all the unlivelines and naturall 
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sloth which is really unfit for conversation” (The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, CPW 
II:249). Poor choice in marriage partner is not a symptom of poor judgment or of 
unwillingness to reflect properly upon the state of matrimony, the usual diagnosis 
proposed in Puritan marriage manuals. Rather, Milton views such a mistake as the error 
of “but one minute” which leads to a lifetime of torment, “till death pardon.”138 Like the 
Lady in A Maske, who blamelessly follows Comus to his palace while hoping to find her 
brothers, the sinless husband stumbles on a “scene of cloud and tempest” while 
searching for a “divine blessing.” But unlike the Lady, the husband who does discover 
the unfitness of the wife is not granted a way out of his imprisonment. 
Given this predicament, to deny the regenerate husband the possibility of 
divorce based on a literal reading of Matthew 5 and 19 is to pervert the principle of 
charity that underlies all of Scripture. Indeed, in the Address to Parliament, Milton 
insists that a prohibition against divorce has Satanic origins: “What greater weakening, 
what more suttle stratagem against our Christian warfare, when besides the grosse body 
of real transgressions to encounter; wee shall bee terrify'd by a vain and shadowy 
meanacing of faults that are not: When things indifferent shall be set to over-front us, 
                                                     
138 Annabel Patterson argues that, in the divorce tracts, Milton is forced to contemplate his own error in 
judgment in selecting an ill-suited spouse (“No Meer Amatorious Novel,” in Politics, Poetics, and 
Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose, ed. David Loewenstein and James Grantham Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 85-101, see esp. 91-5). Similarly, Stephen Fallon reads Milton’s self-representation as 
a blameless Christian in the divorce tracts as always on the verge of disintegrating under the pressure of 
demonstrating the (theological) despair-inducing quality of a bad marriage (Milton’s Peculiar Grace: Self-
Representation and Authority (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 110-32).  
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under the banners of sin, what wonder if wee bee routed, and by this art of our 
Adversary, fall into the subjection of worst and deadliest offences” (CPW II:228; 
emphasis mine). Christian liberty should not be restricted in “things indifferent.” The 
frustration of the hope for wedded happiness risks leading those who are unhappily 
yoked to seek solace elsewhere. Moreover, marriage with an unfit partner can prove 
dangerous in and of itself. To demonstrate this, Milton appeals to the case most likely to 
receive support from his readers by arguing that marriage between spouses of different 
religion can warrant divorce if the unbelieving spouse offends the conscience of the 
Christian one: 
Another caution was put in this supposed command, of not bringing the beleever 
into bondage heerby, which doubtles might prove extreme, if Christian liberty and 
conscience were left to the humor of a pagan staying at pleasure to play with, or 
to vex and wound with a thousand scandals and burdens, above strength to bear: 
If therefore the conceived hope of gaining a soul, come to nothing, then charity 
commands that the beleever be not wearied out with endlesse waiting under 
many grievances sore to his spirit; but that respect be had rather to the present 
suffering of a true Christian, then the uncertain winning of an obdur'd heretick. 
The counsell we have from S. Paul to hope, cannot countermand the moral and 
Evangelick charge we have from God to feare seducement, to separate from the 
misbeleever, the unclean, the obdurate. (CPW II:267) 
 
Referring to 1 Cor. 7.12, Milton argues that Paul advises us to attempt to convert an 
unbelieving spouse for only as long as there is concrete hope of conversion and granting 
that the Christian spouse not be seduced from true religion.139 To suppose that Paul had 
                                                     
139 The King James version of the verse reads: “But to the rest speak I, not the Lord: If any brother hath a wife 
that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away.” Milton translates the 
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meant to enslave Christian liberty to the whims of an unbeliever even to the point of 
risking “that the believer be […] wearied out with endless waiting under many 
grievances sore to his spirit” is an outrage against charity.140 Since charity does not deny 
just remedies in indifferent matters, if we find ourselves in a marriage that might 
destroy our faith, we are allowed to “separate from the misbeleever, the unclean, the 
obdurate.” Milton insists that while a man of special calling and virtue may attempt to 
withstand inordinate temptations that may come his way in an unfortunate marriage, 
most men will do better to remove the temptation and divorce.141 More importantly, 
while one may freely and voluntarily attempt to pardon an adulteress or convert an 
unbelieving spouse, he should never be coerced to do so by law: “For God loves not to 
plow out the heart of our endeavours with over-hard and sad tasks. God delights not to 
make a drudge of vertue, whose actions must be all elective and unconstrain'd. Forc't 
vertue is as a bolt overshot it goes neither forward nor backward, and does no good as it 
stands” (CPW II: 342). Actions are only truly virtuous when they are not forced by law. 
                                                     
 
Greek as follows: “If a brother have an unbelieving wife, and she joyn in consent to dwell with him” (CPW 
II:267), thus emphasizing a mutual agreement in continuing the marriage. 
140 In a later passage in The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Milton cites Paul in support of the rule of 
charity. To rightly interpret any passage of Scripture, we must follow Paul’s “divine hymne” in 1 Cor. 13, 
“charity beleeveth all things,” which teaches us that “charity is the high governesse of our beleefe, and that 
we cannot safely assent to any precept writt'n in the Bible, but as charity commends it to us” (CPW II:340). 
141 At this juncture in the tract, Milton ropes in Perkins as an unlikely supporter. He uses the authority of the 
Puritan divine to differentiate between special and general calling. The editor of the Complete Prose Works 
cites the third chapter of Christian Oeconomie as Milton’s reference on this point. 
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For Milton, this voluntary virtue is the crucial difference between Christian liberty and 
servitude under the Law. 
How far does such virtuous freedom extend? In Milton and the Puritan Dilemma: 
1641-1660, Arthur E. Barker sees a widening scope for Milton’s application of Christian 
liberty in the 1640s. Barker argues that in the divorce tracts Milton moves towards an 
unorthodox interpretation of Christian liberty and expands it to apply beyond 
indifferent things.142 In the matter of marriage, both Moses and Christ “wished believers 
to be free from human authority.”143 Moreover, the rule of charity itself, which becomes 
Milton’s fundamental exegetical rule, dictates that “man’s good becomes the 
fundamental rule not merely for human but for divine law. […] the consequence is the 
freeing of the individual from external control.”144 Barker sees Tetrachordon as the key 
text for Milton’s developing understanding of liberty. There, Milton comes to believe 
that “no ordinance, human or from heaven, can bind against the good of man.”145 In 
particular, the explication of Gen. 1.27 in this tract signals a clear break from the more 
                                                     
142 Milton and the Puritan Dilemma, 106. To exemplify the orthodox understanding of Christian liberty, Barker 
summarizes Calvin’s view in the Institutes into three points. First, “the law of works is abrogated by the 
gospel of faith, […] though the moral part of the Law is still in force, and teaches, exhorts, and urges us to 
good.” Second, while mankind is incapable of fulfilling the Law, the elect “follow God’s guidance in the 
Law as the spontaneous result of grace.” Third, “[a]ll things concerning which there is no gospel prohibition 
[i.e., indifferent] are sanctified to the Christian’s use” (101). 
143 Ibid., 106. Barker here quotes Tetrachordon on Matt. 19.8: “Although they can know when they please, that 
Christ spake only to the Conscience, did not judge on the civil bench, but alwaies disavow'd it” (CPW II: 
661). 
144 Ibid., 110. 
145 Ibid., 111. 
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limited view proposed in the anti-prelatical pamphlets. The passage from Tetrachordon is 
worth quoting in full:  
For albeit our first parent had lordship over sea, and land, and aire, yet there was 
a law without him, as a guard set over him. But Christ having cancell'd the hand 
writing of ordinances which was against us, Coloss. 2.14. and interpreted the 
fulfilling of all through charity, hath in that respect set us over law, in the free 
custody of his love, and left us victorious under the guidance of his living Spirit, 
not under the dead letter; to follow that which most edifies, most aides and 
furders a religious life, makes us holiest and likest to his immortall Image, not 
that which makes us most conformable and captive to civill and subordinat 
precepts; whereof the strictest observance may oftimes prove the destruction not 
only of many innocent persons and families, but of whole Nations. Although 
indeed no ordinance human or from heav'n can binde against the good of man; 
so that to keep them strictly against that end, is all one with to breake them. 
(CPW II:587-8) 
 
In this passage, Christian liberty is presented as superior to pre-lapsarian liberty. The 
guidance of the Holy Spirit and the fulfilling of the Law through charity have given us 
the freedom “to follow that which most edifies, most aides and furders a religious life, 
makes us holiest and likest to his immortall Image.” Thus, whenever following laws 
would prove “against the good of man,” there is no commandment against breaking 
them. As Barker argues, the move from the understanding of the good of man in the 
anti-prelatical tracts to that found in this passage is telling. In the earlier pamphlets, “[i]t 
could reasonably be assumed (since even Bodin had admitted it) that the reformed 
government would conduce to civil good; but since God had prescribed one right 
discipline, moderating arguments from considerations human and civil could be thrown 
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out.”146 In the divorce tracts, however, what God has prescribed has to be deduced 
against the letter of the Gospel itself. To do so, Milton has to place Christian liberty 
“over law, in the free custody of his love, […] not under the dead letter.”   
What is important about the divorce tracts is not the specific conclusions that 
Milton comes to regarding the dissolution of unhappy marriages. Rather, it is his 
working through his understanding of reason, charity, and Christian liberty through the 
kind of systematic exegesis that is not found anywhere else in his writings until De 
Doctrina Christiana. We need to ask then, what are the consequences of subordinating 
civil law and Scriptural interpretation to Milton’s understanding of the good of man? As 
we have seen in the previous chapter, for Milton, thanks to divine grace, the regenerate 
individual need not rely on habit to develop phronēsis. Indeed, habit and custom are 
dangers to be avoided as they dull reason and enslave us to actions and modes of life 
that are hypocritical.147 To rely on custom is to rely on others, on institutions, and on 
historically developed modes of life. For Milton, virtuous acts are made by each 
independent individual who discovers for himself what rule is given by Scripture on 
how to behave in a given situation. Moreover, as we have seen in Colasterion and in 
                                                     
146 Milton and the Puritan Dilemma, 110. 
147 For a reading of the divorce tracts as not opposed to habit, see Paul Cefalu, Moral Identity in Early Modern 
English Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 166-7. Cefalu reads Milton as explicitly 
distinguishing between custom, which “puffs up unhealthily a certain big face of pretended learning” and 
“the wholesome habit of soundness and good constitution” (quoting from The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce, CPW II: 223). I agree that Milton uses the language of Aristotelian habituation, but what a good habit 
would look like is nowhere to be found in his writings. 
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Animadversions, we cannot rely on the Church—be it the Church of England or the 
proposed Presbyterian Church—to guide our growth in virtue. In these pamphlets, any 
given Church may turn out to be a false bride of Christ, whom He will divorce. How 
then do we learn what we ought to do in any given situation? The divorce tracts present 
one solution in the example of Christ’s teaching. There, Milton interprets Jesus’ mode of 
instruction to the Pharisees as a doctrine akin to the Aristotelian mean: “Wherin we may 
plainly discover how Christ meant not to be tak'n word for word, but like a wise 
Physician, administring one excesse against another to reduce us to a perfect mean” 
(CPW II: 282-3). Christ, as a wise physician, discerns whether someone errs in defect or 
excess with respect to a given virtue (exercises right judgment, phronēsis), and 
administers a correction in the opposite direction. 
How are we then to follow His example and properly exercise right reason? How 
do we know how far we are from the mean and how to approach it? After all, Aristotle 
warns that “how far and to what extent someone must deviate [from the mean] before 
becoming blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reason, because nothing perceived 
by our sense is easily determined; such things are particulars, and judgement about 
them lies in perception” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1109b).148 Learning how to exercise phronēsis 
                                                     
148 Aristotle clarifies why we do not deliberate about particulars, i.e. “matters of perception,” in Book III, 
Chapter iii. See, in particular, 1113a. MacIntyre, in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, shows that there are two 
ways in which, according to Aristotle, we can fail to apply right reason correctly: “we may fail to indentify 
the characteristics of a particular which are relevant to the actions what we should be about to perform 
either for lack of experience or from inadequate epistēmē [scientific knowledge], so that we do not 
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requires learning how to be virtuous, and, conversely, growing in virtue requires the 
exercise of right reason. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Aristotle 
argues that growth in the virtues and in right reasoning imply a certain kind of polity. It 
is only in human relations that embody the virtues that we can begin and complete our 
education and learn how to deliberate correctly. This is not to say that the polis we live in 
has to be perfect. However, its constitution, as MacIntyre points out in Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality?, has to provide a sufficiently developed framework of justice so that 
we can begin our ethical education.149 An individual disconnected from the polis is more 
like a wild animal than a human being. He cannot hope to learn how to employ right 
reason and become a virtuous person. In turn, virtuous individuals are the kind of 
citizens necessary for a just polis. As we have seen, the language of the Aristotelian 
connection between individual and society is found in Puritan marriage manuals. But 
there, it is intermixed with an ideal of the family as the isolated locus for reformation 
that is alien to Aristotelian thinking.150 Milton echoes this language in his address to 
Parliament in the second edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce: 
                                                     
 
understand the universal, the concept of the form which this particular exemplifies” (92). Here MacIntyre 
refers to Nicomachean Ethics 1131a11-25. 
149 Here, I am following MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, chapter six, esp. 90-99. In this chapter, 
MacIntyre argues that for Aristotle, a fundamental lack of justice in a polis would impede the growth of the 
kinds of human relationships that are essential for the development of virtuous citizens. 
150 For this reading of the marriage manuals, I am indebted to MacIntyre’s reading of Aristotle. 
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Advise yee well, supreme Senat, if charity be thus excluded and expulst, how yee 
will defend the untainted honour of your own actions and proceedings: He who 
marries intends as little to conspire his own ruine, as he that swears Allegiance: 
and as a whole people is in proportion to an ill Government, so is one man to an 
ill mariage. […] For no effect of tyranny can sit more heavy on the Common-
wealth, then this houshold unhappines on the family. And farewell all hope of 
true Reformation in the state, while such an evill as this lies undiscern'd or 
unregarded in the house. On the redresse whereof depends, not only the 
spiritfull and orderly life of our grown men, but the willing, and carefull 
education of our children. (CPW II 229-30) 
 
Milton here explicitly draws a parallel between family and commonwealth. The 
dissolution of a marriage contract is no different than rebelling against a tyrant. 
Moreover, the cause of the Reformation is dependent on the reformation of each family. 
As long as “such evill as this lies undiscern’d or unregarded in the house” the entire 
commonwealth will suffer since the spiritual life of men as well as the education of 
children is dependent on a well-ordered household. As we have seen in Barker’s 
discussion of the development of Milton’s though, in the anti-prelatical pamphlets, the 
spiritual life of citizens is dependent not only on their private judgment exercised in line 
with Christian liberty, but also on the implementation of the correct form of Church 
polity. In the early tracts, Milton argues that we can find such polity clearly described in 
the Bible and exemplified in the Scottish Presbyterian Church.151 However, when 
arguing for divorce, Milton can neither rely on the plain sense of Scripture nor in the 
                                                     
151 In Chapter II of The Reason of Church Government, Milton points to epistles of Paul to Timothy and Titus. 
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practice of any other Church. As Barker argues, Milton emphasizes the good of man and 
the rule of charity as the ultimate criteria for biblical interpretation. 
Here we see a clear break with Aristotle. Milton perceives the good of man as the 
good of the individual detached from society. The divorce tracts insist that promoting 
the good of the individual will naturally lead to the good of the commonwealth. But this 
is quite different from Aristotle’s understanding of the connection between citizens and 
society. In the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, what is truly, rather than just 
apparently, good for the citizen of the polis cannot be discovered by considering the 
citizen as an individual independently of his social context. Man as a rational creature is 
social. Milton, when arguing that covenants do not hold when they do not fulfill their 
end, insists that it is against charity to forbid divorce when the sought-for “solace” is not 
found in marriage: “neither can it be of force to ingage a blameles creature to his own 
perpetuall sorrow, mistak'n for his expected solace, without suffering charity to step in 
and doe a confest good work of parting those whom nothing holds together, but this of 
Gods joyning, falsly suppos'd against the expresse end of his own ordinance” (CPW 
II:245). To forbid divorce is to condemn a “blamles creature” to “perpetuall sorrow.” The 
concern for the commonwealth and children found in the Address to Parliament is no 
longer emphasized. Charity steps in to aid the blameless individual and the benefits to 
wife, children, and commonwealth are assumed to automatically follow. Therefore, for 
Milton, the good of the individual considered in isolation from society is the primary 
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concern of civil laws. It is not surprising then that the Answerer asks about the fate of 
the children left in the “bellies” of divorced wives (9). Milton’s rule of charity applies to 
them only as a secondary consequence. Charity is of course not a virtue that Aristotle 
would have recognized.152 Nonetheless the formation of any such virtue could not be 
envisioned in either the Nicomachean Ethics nor in the Politics independently of the polis. 
To say that man is a social animal means that we simply cannot regard the social web as 
external to our understanding of the individual; the polis is not built of individual men, it 
is built of citizens.  
I have brought Aristotle’s understanding of the necessity of the polis for the 
development of virtue and right reason to begin to sketch the consequences of elevating 
Milton’s understanding of the good of man as an individual to the role of key 
hermeneutical tool. The rule of charity that guides the divorce tracts insists on the 
sufficiency of the regenerate individual’s encounter with Scripture for the discernment 
of virtuous action. What does a fuller account of charity than Milton’s look like? To see 
how Milton is restricting the definition of charity in these tracts, we need to turn from an 
Aristotelian to a Christian understanding of the virtues. I will first look at Augustine’s 
understanding of that what it means for Christians to be part of the Church and then 
                                                     
152 In the Nicomachean Ethics, the virtue that comes closest to charity is friendliness: “Complete friendship is 
that of good people, those who are alike in their virtue: they each alike which good things to each other in so 
far as they are good, and they are good in themselves. […] Each of them is good without qualification and 
good for his friend, since good people are both good without qualification and beneficial to each other” 
(1156b). But, unlike charity, friendliness creates a bond only between similarly virtuous individuals. 
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turn to Aquinas’ account of charity. For my reading of Augustine, I follow David Aers’ 
Salvation and Sin.153 Like Aristotle, Augustine imagines the life of the wise man as social: 
“The philosophies [sic] hold that the life of the wise man should be social; and in this we 
support them much more heartily. [For] how could that City [of God] have made its 
start, how could it have advanced along its course, how could it attain its appointed 
goal, if the life of the saints were not social?”154 In the same chapter of The City of God, 
Augustine links the necessarily social nature of Christian life with the ills and misery 
which permeate any human relationship, especially family life: “who are, in general, 
more friendly, or at any rate ought to be, than those within the walls of the same house? 
And yet, is anyone perfectly serene in that situation, when such grievous ills have so 
often arisen from the secret treachery of people within these walls?”155 But a meaningful 
Christian life for Augustine cannot occur outside of a social setting with all its vexations 
and flaws. As Aers argues in Salvation and Sin, regardless of the flaws of the Church, 
Augustine reminds us that we cannot simply retreat into ourselves. The Church is a 
divine gift and the life of a Christian is lived in the Church.  
                                                     
153 Salvation and Sin: Augustine, Langland, and Fourteenth-Century Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2009). 
154 The City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (New York: Penguin, 2003), 858. 
155 Ibid., 858. As Aers points out, the Catholic Church into which Augustine converted is not without faults: 
“Against the Donatists’ fantasies of a pure Church, Augustine insisted that the Church in its pilgrimage has 
wrinkles and spots, unlike the bride of Christ in her final form (Eph. 5.25-27). Just as Augustine’s language 
resists dichotomization of visible and invisible Church, so it resists any simple, unqualified identification of 
the city of God and the Catholic Church” (Salvation and Sin, 7). 
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Indeed, Augustine repeatedly returns to the understanding of the Church as a 
vehicle of grace: “In his preface to On Christian Teaching Augustine insists that 
Christians, however replete with divine gifts, must accept that the Holy Spirit teaches 
through human mediations.”156 In particular, for Augustine, the approach to Scripture 
proposed by Milton in the divorce tracts would demonstrate a clear lack of charity. 
Indeed, to insist in believing that we do not need the mediation of the Church to 
interpret Scripture is to succumb to pride.157 In his preface to On Christian Teaching, 
Augustine replies to those critics who claim that there is no need for exegetical rules and 
that correctly interpreting Scripture is a gift from God. To dispel this belief, Augustine 
turns to language learning: 
My argument is with Christians who congratulate themselves on a knowledge of 
the holy scriptures gained without any human guidance and who—if their claim 
is valid—thus enjoy a real and substantial blessing. But they must admit that 
each one of us learnt our native language by habitually hearing it spoken from 
the very beginnings of childhood, and acquired others—Greek, Hebrew, or 
whatever—either by hearing them in the same way or by learning them from a 
human teacher.158 
 
Augustine reminds his critics that we do not despise this ordinary method of language-
learning even though the apostles learnt all languages instantaneously through the 
inspiration of the Holy Spirit (Acts 2.1-4). Similarly, we must accept that we need to 
learn from others in the Church without pride and, in turn, teach what we know without 
                                                     
156 Aers, Salvation and Sin, 11. 
157 Loc. cit. 
158 On Christian Teaching, trans. R.P.H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 4. 
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jealousy.159 To learn from and to teach others is a divine gift in itself: “the human 
condition would be wretched indeed if God appeared unwilling to minister his word to 
human beings through human agency.”160 This is a gift precisely because it builds the 
bonds of love necessary for human life in its full social sense. If we did not need to learn 
from one another, “there would be no way for love, which ties people together in bonds 
of unity, to make souls overflow and as it were intermingle with each other, if human 
beings learned nothing from other humans.”161 Augustine then, as Wittgenstein, reminds 
us that the conversation of the soul that Milton craves is found in the ordinary 
interactions with others. It is in the act of humans teaching one another that “souls 
overflow and as it were intermingle.” But a conception of charity that insists in locating 
the work of grace in the individual as separate from others leads Milton to ignore the 
importance of these bonds. 
Why are such bonds important? As we have seen earlier, Augustine in the 
Confessions describes the chains of carnal habits that arise from a distorted will. This is 
the consequence of original sin. As MacIntyre points out, for Augustine, before the Fall, 
the will was oriented towards God; after the Fall, only divine grace and our assent to it 
can overcome the chains of sin.162 Aquinas, as we have seen in the first chapter, finds in 
Augustine’s concept of the distorted will and the subsequent subversion of justice the 
                                                     
159 On Christian Teaching, 5. 
160 Ibid., 5. 
161 Ibid., 5-6. 
162 Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 157. 
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necessity for the work for the infused virtue of charity. Only when we recognize our 
defective will, can we receive faith, hope, and charity through grace: “It is only in the 
kind of knowledge which faith provides, the kind of expectation which hope provides, 
and the capacity for friendship with other human beings and with God which is the 
outcome of charity which can provide the other virtues with what they need to become 
genuine excellences, informing a way of life in and through which the good and the best 
can be achieved.”163 What is this way of life?164 It is first of all a life in a community 
which aims at a common good, much in the way of the Aristotelian polis. But, unlike the 
Aristotelian polis, Aquinas’ version of such a community allows for the possibility of 
forgiveness for the transgression of the rules of the community. What is crucial is that 
forgiveness is not a short-circuiting of justice, but rather it presupposes that the guilty 
party acknowledge his or her fault and be willing to accept the justice of the punishment 
meted out by law. Forgiveness only comes into play once the injured party agrees to 
forgive by exercising the virtue of charity.165 In this account, forgiveness presupposes 
justice and, conversely, charity is the form of justice.166 Thus, for Aquinas, adding charity 
to the Aristotelian virtues fundamentally changes their end: “Its inclusion alters the 
conception of the good for man in a radical way; for the community in which the good is 
achieved has to be one of reconciliation. It is a community with a history of a certain 
                                                     
163 Three Rival Versions, (140). 
164 In this reading of Aquinas, I am following MacIntyre, After Virtue, 174-5. 
165 After Virtue, 174. 
166 See, Summa IIa-IIae.23.8. 
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kind.”167 Forgiveness is thus dependent on a given conception of justice embodied in a 
given community with a certain kind of history. This account of charity and justice is 
fundamentally different from the one we find in Milton’s divorce tracts. For Milton, 
charity promotes Christian liberty above all. And, as Barker argues, it is a version of 
liberty that is independent of all forms of coercion and external control. The problem is 
that in his account, charity and forgiveness are separated from a shared understanding 
of justice. Indeed, in the divorce tracts, charity flows to the injured and blameless party. 
But what of the wife? She is left with the kind of forgiveness and charity that we grant 
enemies. To the Answerer’s fifth argument that one “Christian ought to bear the 
infirmities of another, but cheifly of his Wife,” Milton answers: “I grant, infirmities, but 
not outrages, nor perpetual defraudments of truest conjugal society, not injuries and 
vexations as importunat as fire. […] Charity indeed bids us forgive our enemies, yet 
doth not force us to continue freindship and familiarity with those freinds who have bin 
fals or unworthy towards us; but is contented in our peace with them, at a fair distance” 
(CPW II:731).
                                                     
167 After Virtue, 174. 
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3. Justice, Interpretation, and the Process of History in 
Milton’s Regicide Tracts 
 With the dissolution of royal government and the outbreak of the Civil War in 
1642,  a series of pamphlets were published arguing, on the one side, for the legitimacy 
of Parliamentarian resistance to the king and, on the other, for the king’s need to defend 
his prerogative against Parliament’s “unlawful” encroachment. The debate over whose 
actions, Parliament’s or the king’s, were “lawful” and “just” hinged in part on 
formulating the precise nature of the relationship between sovereign, Parliament, and 
the people. Is the king’s power derived directly from God or is it bestowed through the 
mediation of the people’s consent? If the latter, how is this consent communicated and 
can it be withdrawn? Finally, where does the ultimate sovereignty reside in England? 
Both Parliamentarian and royalist apologists proposed answers to these questions in 
pamphlets designed to address the argument between king and Parliament following 
the Militia Ordinance of 5 March 1642. Insisting that it was acting according to the 
central principle of natural law, that is, to preserve salus populi or the safety of the 
people, Parliament declared its right to raise a militia to defend the realm without the 
king in a Declaration or Remonstrance of the Lord and Commons in Parliament: “if his 
Majesty should refuse to joyne with us therein, the two Houses of Parliament being the 
supreame Court and highest councell of the Kingdome, were enabled by their owne 
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authority to provide for the repulsing of such imminent, and evident danger.”1 The 
Remonstrance does concede that the power to raise an army is not normally vested in the 
two Houses alone, it is in the king with Parliament. But by the “fundamentall Laws of 
this Kingdome,” whenever the Commonwealth is “deprived of the fruit of that trust 
which was in part reposed in” the king, the two Houses of Parliament may take over 
functions traditionally exercised by the sovereign to avert an imminent danger.2 The 
Remonstrance argued that if Parliament shirked its duty to raise a militia in times of 
grave danger, the kingdom would “returne to its first principle, and every man left to do 
what [is] aright in his own eye, without either guide or rule.”3 As we will see, in stating 
this principle, the Remonstrance states a claim used repeatedly by Parliamentarian 
apologists. Parliament is acting according to the “fundamental laws of the kingdom,” its 
actions are “lawful,” even though it illegally appropriates the king’s legal and 
customary power to raise and command military forces. Arguing over whether 
Parliament’s claims are “lawful,” the authors considered in this chapter come to 
                                                     
1 England and Wales, Parliament, The declaration or remonstrance of the Lord and Commons in Parliament 
assembled with divers depositions and letters thereunto annexed (London, 1642), 3. Early English Books Online. 
British Library (London). December 10, 2010. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:13459946. By warning about “imminent, and evident danger,” 
the Remonstrance taps into widespread fears of Catholic uprisings in England spurred by the newsbooks’ 
exaggerated reports of the violent rebellion in Ireland. For the wider context of the Irish rebellion and the 
Militia Ordinance, see Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution:1625-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 192-218. Ironically, by deploying the language of salus populi in 1642, Parliament was adopting the 
rhetoric that Charles I had used in the 1620s in order to raise revenue by royal prerogative alone. For the 
origins of the phrase salus populi suprema lex esto in Roman legal philosophy and its use by Parliamentarian 
writers, see Quentin Skinner, Vision of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), II:326. 
2 Remonstrance, 15. 
3 Loc. cit. 
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elucidate the relationship between natural law and the customary and “artificial” 
aspects of political association. In doing so, they wage a rhetorical battle over the 
interpretation of Scripture, history, and English laws. John Milton revives this battle in 
1649 to write in defense of the execution of Charles I. As I will argue in the last section of 
this chapter, the burden of his regicide tracts is to teach their readers how to interpret 
according to the kind of right reason that is developed by virtuous individuals. For 
Milton, such readers are not bound by traditional and historical frameworks and the 
violent rhetoric of a text such as Eikonoklastes is an expression of the tension between 
Milton’s persuasive and educative aims. 
3.1 Resistance, the Law, and the King: What Are the Bonds of 
Justice? 
 The royalist position was defended vocally by Henry Ferne, who joined the 
argument in 1642 with The Resolving of Conscience. Ferne was the royalist chaplain who 
would preach the last sermon the king would hear before his trial in 1649.4 In The 
                                                     
4 Ferne’s Resolving for Conscience as well as Dudley Digges’ An Answer to a Printed Book are two of the most 
important responses to the Parliamentarian Henry Parker’s Observations, perhaps the most important 
pamphlet of the period. I will turn to Parker’s writings below. I start with Ferne’s pamphlet before turning 
to Parker’s Observations because it clearly sets out the royalist position on the origin and extent of sovereign 
power. On Ferne’s contribution to royalist theories of power, and on his sermon to the king of November 29, 
1648, see John M. Wallace, Destiny His Choice: The Loyalism of Andrew Marvell (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1968), 12-4, 40-3. The title of Ferne’s work is meant to remind the readers that passive 
disobedience to a ruler is only allowed in cases when the king’s commands clearly contradict divine law. 
That is, a subject’s conscience has to firmly know that the king is ordering to act unlawfully. As J. P. 
Sommerville points out in Politics and Ideology in England, 1603-1640, there were three elements to the 
standard royalist position on the grounds for disobedience to a king. First, only in the case the royal 
command directly contradicted divine law, could a subject refuse to obey his sovereign. Second, there could 
be no room for doubt that the king’s command was against God’s law strictly interpreted. And, thirdly, a 
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Resolving of Conscience, Ferne articulates the argument against armed resistance to the 
king and warns that Parliament is attempting to draw “a poore people […] into Arms 
against the duty and allegiance they owe to their Prince by the Laws of God and man,” 
on the strength of its “high esteeme with all” and its “pretended defence of those things 
that are most deare unto us, Religion, Liberties, Laws.”5 The main thrust of the pamphlet 
is to expose the sophistry of the Parliamentarian position and to show that no subject 
can conscientiously support armed resistance against the king under any circumstances. 
Ferne’s central aim is to resolve the reader’s conscience on two main points. First, in 
general, he denies the possibility of lawful violent resistance to any ruler.6 Second, in the 
particular case of Charles, he argues that the king has not behaved as a tyrant who ought 
be resisted and that thus Parliamentarian resistance is founded on specious grounds. 
                                                     
 
subject could never resist actively, but only passively (Politics and Ideology in England, 1603-1640 (London: 
Longman, 1986), 34-5). This third point is a cornerstone of early Stuart political theory. For James I’s 
statements on this subject, see Basilicon Doron  and The Trew Law of Monarchies in King James VI and I, 
Political Writings, ed. J. P. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 21, 78. 
5 Henry Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience in Joyce Lee Malcolm, ed., The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth 
Century English Political Tracts (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), I:182. 
6 Throughout the pamphlet, Ferne demonstrate an awareness of the accusation, such as that voiced by 
Milton in Of Reformation touching Church Discipline in England (1641), that by forbidding all resistance to a 
monarch, he might encourage tyranny on the part of the king (Resolving, 183). He insists that this is a false 
imputation “laid upon the Divines of this Kingdom & upon all those that appear for the king in this cause, 
that they endeavour to defend an absolute power in him, and to raise him to an Arbirtray way of 
government” (Resolving, 183). While royalist writers do argue that it is unlawful to violently rebel against 
the king, Ferne insists that his argument does not encourage tyranny since he allows passive disobedience to 
commands that contradict divine law and established positive law: “we may & ought to deny obedience to 
such commands of the Prince, as are unlawfull by the law of God yea, by the established Laws of the Land” 
(Resolving, 183). 
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 Turning first to the general question of resistance, Ferne begins by arguing that a 
subject cannot violently attack his monarch even when directly threatened: “Personall 
defence is lawfull against the sudden and illegall assaults of […] the Prince himself thus 
far, to ward his blowes, to hold his hands, and the like: not to endanger his person, not 
to return his blows, no; for though it be naturall to defend a man’s self, yet the whole 
Common-wealth is concerned in his person [the king’s].”7 As we will see, 
Parliamentarian writers claimed a right of self-defense derived from natural law. To 
counter this argument, Ferne reiterates the point made by James I, amongst others, that 
private subjects never have the right to rebel against the sovereign. More specifically, 
since the safety of the entire kingdom is at stake when the king is under attack, Ferne 
argues that rebellion against the king is a strike against the “order which is the life of a 
Commonwealth.”8 Ferne turns to the analogy between the physical body and the body 
politic to defend this line of reasoning. For Parliament to violently rebel against the king 
is like one part of the body to be “set against the Head and another part of the same 
body”; the well-being of the entire body is put in danger by such violence.9 Here, Ferne 
uses one of the standards images for government to show that any argument for violent 
resistance based on the right of self-defense needs to be understood as against the 
subjects’ own interests since it dissolves the peace and stability of the commonwealth 
                                                     
7 Ferne, Resolving, 187; emphasis mine. 
8 Loc. cit. 
9 Loc. cit. 
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itself. While passive “Personall defence may be without all offence, and does not strike 
at the order and power that is over us,” armed rebellion “cannot be without many unjust 
violences, and does immediately strike at that order which is the life of a 
commonwealth.”10 That is, the right of individual violent self-defense is curtailed by the 
need to consider the good of the entire commonwealth. For Ferne, the interests of the 
commonwealth are concentrated in the person of the king just as the interests of a 
physical body are concentrated in its head. The image of the body politic with the king 
as its head was of course an old one by the time of the Stuart monarchy, but what I want 
to point out at this point is Ferne’s use of this image to identify the interests of each 
subject with those of the king via the interest of each member of the body politic with 
the good of the commonwealth. 
   In response to Ferne’s formulation of the good of the commonwealth, the 
Presbyterian minister Charles Herle produced two answers to the Resolving of Conscience. 
In his second and longer reply, A Fuller Answer to a Treaties Written by Doctor Ferne (29 
December 1642), Herle begins by explaining that England is not ruled by the king alone. 
The English monarchy is truly a mixed form of government comprised of king and two 
houses of Parliament.11 Herle presents a corporate view of English government: on the 
                                                     
10 Loc. cit. 
11 “England’s is not simply a subordinative and absolute, but a Coordinative, and mixt Monarchy. […] here the 
Monarchy, or highest power is itself compounded of 3 Coordinate Estates, a King, and two Houses of Parliament; 
unto this mixt power no subordinate authority may in any case make resistance” (Charles Herle, A Fuller 
Answer to a Treaties Written by Doctor Ferne in Joyce Lee Malcolm, ed., The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth 
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one hand, each member of Parliament, individually, is to be considered a subject of the 
king, and thus inferior to his sovereign, but, on the other hand, when all the members of 
Parliaments are considered collectively, as constituting the two Houses, they are not 
inferior to the monarch. Thus, according to Herle, Ferne’s arguments against the 
lawfulness of subjects rebelling against the king are not applicable to the situation in 
England. The Parliament is not a subject of the king, “because the King is a part, and so 
hee should be subject to himself: no, nor are the two Houses without him Subjects; every 
member seorsim, taken severally, is a Subject, but all collectim in their Houses are not.”12 
How is it possible for members of Parliament to be both subject to, when considered 
individually, and coordinate with, when considered collectively, the power of the king? 
Herle here draws a crucial distinction. It is not the king’s writ calling Parliament that 
“unsubjects” them, but rather it is by nature of the very constitution of the English 
commonwealth originally consented to by the people and the king: “it was the consent of 
both King and people, in the first coalition or constitution of the Government, that makes 
them in their severall Houses coordinate with his Majesty, not subordinate to him.”13 This 
original and fundamental consent is necessary to constitute a given form of government. 
                                                     
 
Century English Political Tracts (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), I:228). According to Tuck, in Philosophy and 
Government, Herle’s focus on the role of the mixed constitution of England is a feature common to 
Presbyterian writers (Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government: 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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12 Herle, A Fuller Answer, 228-9; emphasis original. 
13 Ibid., 229; emphasis original. 
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While that societies must be organized under a government to ensure their safety is 
“God’s institution and morall,” the specific form of government and the given 
distribution of power is agreed upon by each people to be governed.14 It is therefore not 
surprising that a member of Parliament may be, at once, both subject to and coordinate 
in power with the king. Herle, unlike the writers we will consider below, does not 
describe how governments were first formed by the people. The focus of his argument is 
to demonstrate how supreme power in a commonwealth can be coordinately shared by 
Parliament and the king and that this coordinate power of the houses is founded, as is 
the power of the king, on an original act of consent. 
 To make this claim, Herle has to counter the analogies used by royalist writers to 
formulate the relationship between subjects and ruler. In Ferne’s writing, we have 
briefly seen one of the standard images, the commonwealth represented as a body with 
the king as its head. Two other images were commonly used: the king as husband with 
the subjects, collectively, as his wife; and the king as father with the subjects as his 
children. Herle turns to this last analogy to counter Ferne’s use of the image of the body 
politic. To better explain the double nature of a member of Parliament, as both a subject 
and coordinate sovereign power, Herle likens the king and the Parliament to a father 
                                                     
14 Ibid., 231. Herle quotes Fortescue to support his claim that the specific arrangement of power in a given 
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before) the qualification of the power is an efflux of the people’s consent, as the power itself (as the Doctor 
tells us) an efflux of God’s Providence; and to say truth, he himself acknowledges as much, confessing, That no 
particular forme of government is, jure divino, it must be then humano sure, from the people’s consent” (231-2; 
emphasis original). 
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and son jointly holding lands in trust: “a Father and a Sonne are by a deed of enfoement 
jointly entrusted with certain Lands to uses, the Sonne is still subordinate to the Father as a 
Sonne; but as Foefee, in the trust, he is not subject but coordinate and joint with him.”15 The 
legal trust gives the son a new identity as foefee. And, crucially for Herle’s argument, 
this legal identity is not dependent on the father’s authority. This reinforces the claim 
that it is not king’s writ that “unsubjects” the members of Parliament, but rather the 
legal framework of the trust itself. Moreover, the example of a legal trust on “certain 
Lands” develops into a tirade addressed to the House of Lords, whose members should 
uphold their traditional role as co-sharers in the political power of England. The Lords 
are the “Conciliarii nati,” the born councilors of the State, and in them “their shares both 
of trust and interest in this Supremacy of power in Parliament, the very constitution itself 
of the government hath invested their very blood with.”16 For the members of the House 
of Lords, their “trust and interest” in government is hereditary, acquired and preserved 
by their “Fathers with so much of their care […] and so much of their bloud,” and to be 
passed on through their own blood.17 Herle counters the royalist claims of patriarchal 
monarchy with the claims of hereditary trust. By blindingly obeying the tyrannical rule 
of the king, the members of the Lords betray the trust vested in their own families and 
preserved by their fathers. Using the language of legal trusts, allows Herle to create a 
                                                     
15 Herle, A Fuller Answer, 230; emphasis original. 
16 Herle, A Fuller Answer, 230-1; underlining mine. 
17 Ibid., 231; emphasis original. 
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model not only for the relationship between Parliament and king, but also for that 
between Parliament and subjects. In the analogy of the lands held on trust, both the king 
and Parliament are in the same legal relationship with the subjects. 
 Moreover, the language of a legal trust allows Herle to redirect to his advantage 
a term used in Ferne’s own argument. In the title page of Resolving of Conscience, Ferne 
uses the language of trust to introduce the question of whether active resistance is ever 
lawful: “Whether upon such a Supposition or Case, as is now usually made (The King 
will not discharge his trust but is bent or seduced to subvert Religion, Laws, and 
Liberties) Subjects may take Arms and resist?”18 Here, the opposition is between a king 
who will “discharge his trust” and one who will act tyrannically to “subvert Religion, 
Laws, and Liberties.” But what exactly is the king’s trust according to Ferne? As Richard 
Tuck argues in Natural Rights Theories, the language of trust could prove dangerous for 
royalist writers. If the king held sovereign power in trust from the people, it could be 
argued that the people could reclaim such power whenever the trust was not fulfilled. 
That was, after all, the distinction between trust and alienation.19 In Resolving of 
Conscience, Ferne attempts to contain this dangerous implication. The king does indeed 
hold his power by trust, but not from the people: “Seeing some must be trusted in every 
State, ’tis reason the highest and final trust should be in the higher or supreme Power 
                                                     
18 Ferne, Resolving, 179; emphasis mine. 
19 Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), 146-7. 
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with whom next to himself God hath intrusted the whole Kingdom, all other have 
power and trust, having it under him as sent by him.”20 This passage uses the term 
“trust” in two distinct, but closely intertwined, senses. On the one hand, it establishes 
that the kingdom has been entrusted to the king directly from God. With this move, 
Ferne accounts for the revocability implicit in the concept of a trust by insisting that only 
God can hold the king accountable. Moreover, since all other power in the 
commonwealth derives from the king’s own trust, the king has the right to revoke it at 
will.  
 On the other hand, the passage registers the use of the language of trust made by 
the advocates of resistance by acknowledging that “some must be trusted in every 
State.” In doing so, Ferne relies on his description of the mutual trust between king and 
Parliament that precedes this passage. There, Ferne begins by arguing that the primary 
duty of the king is to ensure the safety of the Commonwealth.21 In England, safety is 
provided by the fundamental laws of the land and by the balance of the king’s negative 
voice with that of the two houses of Parliament.22 Each Estate (king, Lords, and 
                                                     
20 Ferne, Resolving, 205; emphasis mine. 
21 See: Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, 202. This much was agreed upon by writers on both sides of the 
debate. For Herle’s version of this argument, see A Fuller Answer, 232. 
22 Ferne, Resolving, 202. The language of the fundamental laws of England had been primarily used by 
Parliamentarian authors to justify action against the king’s authority. The term “fundamental law” was used 
to invoke the idea that there were fundamental liberties which the law of England existed to promote. In 
case of emergency, Parliament could act against the letter of the law in order to follow preserve these 
liberties. The seminal study of the ancient constitution and the fundamental law of England, the two terms 
sometimes used interchangeably, is J.G. A. Pocock, Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English 
Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century: A Reissue with a Retrospect (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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Commons) has a negative voice in the enacting of legislation and no two Estates can 
pass a law without the approval of the third.23 This balanced structure gives the English 
Parliament its “excellent temper” and prevents the “distractions and convulsions of the 
whole Commonwealth, as the distempers in a naturall body.”24 The safety of the 
commonwealth is preserved by keeping the three elements of the legislative power in 
balance. In particular, denying the king his negative voice in legislation would impair 
his ability to discharge his trust and safeguard the well-being of the commonwealth. 
Thus a question of royal prerogative, negative voice, is recast in terms of the safety of the 
kingdom. With this understanding of the balance of the three estates, Ferne turns to the 
question of trust between king and the two Houses. Here, the focus of the passage shifts 
from the question of how the king may discharge his trust to the question of the two 
                                                     
 
Press, 1957, 1987). See in particular, pages 48-9 for Parliament’s evolving use of the term “fundamental law.” 
For the appeal to the language of the fundamental law in times of emergency or “necessity,” see Glenn 
Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 222-5. 
23 Ferne, Resolving, 202. Here Ferne argues against the calls for denying the king his negative voice in 
Parliament. On the quick change in the Parliamentarian position on the king’s negative voice, see Quentin 
Skinner, Vision of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) II:326-32. That in England 
legislative power is in normal times placed in king and Parliament acting together is granted by 
Parliamentarian writers. Even in the Declaration of 19 May 1642, Parliament still officially accepted that 
“this Nation hath intrusted certain hands with a Power to provide in an orderly and regular way, for the 
good and safetie of the whole, which power, by the Constitution of this Kingdome, is in his Majestie and in 
his Parliament together” (Edward Husbands, T. Warrant T., and R. Best, An Exact Collection (London, 1643), 
207; quoted in Skinner, Vision of Politics II:329). Moreover, Skinner points out that the language of the Three 
Estates of Parliament was adjusted to indicated king, Lords, and Commons (rather than Commons, Lords 
Temporal, and Lord Secular) after the exclusion of the bishops in February 1642 (Vision of Politics II:329, n. 
129). 
24 Ferne, Resolving, 202. 
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Houses trusting the king and of the king trusting the two Houses. While the balance of 
the three “powers of denying” is for the security of the entire commonwealth, it is also 
“for the security of each State against other, of the Commons against the King and 
Lords, of the Lords against them: and must the King trust only, and not be trusted? Must 
not he also have his security against the other, which he cannot have but by Power of 
denying?”25 The Parliament’s arguments against the king’s prerogative are thus recast in 
terms of an unreasonable lack of trust. That is, Parliament is asking the king to surrender 
his right to a negative voice in the legislative process without any equivalent guarantee 
on the part of the other Estates. It is an abuse of the trust that the king has in them and it 
is reflected in their attempts to shake the trust that the people have in the king: “the 
principles now taught to render their Prince odious to his people under the hatefull 
notions of Tyrant, Subverter of Religion, and Laws, a Person not to be trusted.”26 Thus, 
while Ferne uses the language of (simple) trust between subjects and the sovereign as 
well as between Parliament and king, he subordinates it to the language of legal trust 
between God and king. In this use, Parliament’s power is dependent on the divinely 
sanctioned royal power. 
 Herle’s analogy between the relationship of king and Parliament and that of 
father and son holding a land trust jointly is meant to counter Ferne’s formulation of 
                                                     
25 Ferne, Resolving, 202; emphasis mine. 
26 Ibid., 214; emphasis mine. 
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sovereign power as a divine trust. Moreover, it also grounds the notion of sovereign 
power, and the possibility of rebelling against it, in terms of customary and historically 
informed structures. This allows Herle to accuse the royalist of giving a formulation of 
sovereign power which breaks the bonds of justice in the commonwealth. To flesh out 
the logic of Herle’s move, I briefly turn to Coke’s discussion of land trusts and to his use 
of the language of trust in defining the role of Parliament with respect to the king’s 
legislative power. In the first part of The Institutes of the Laws of England, Coke elucidates 
the term “use” of land by specifying that: “an use is a trust or confidence reposed in 
some other, which is not issuing out of the land, but as a thing collaterall, annexed in 
privities to the estate of the land, and to the person touching the land, scilicet, that cesty 
que use [the beneficiary] shall take the profit, and that the terre-tenant [the trustee] shall 
make an estate according to his direction.”27 That is, the property is transferred to the 
trustee, who then becomes the legal owner of the land in trust of the beneficiary (cesty 
que use).28 Originally, a trust was simply a formalized confidence devised to circumvent 
                                                     
27 Lib. 3, Cap. 8. Sect. 464. Edward Coke, The first part of the Institutes of the laws of England, or, A commentary 
upon Littleton, ed. Charles Butler (Philadelphia: Robert H. Small, 1853), vol. 2. The Making of Modern Law. 
Gale. 2011. Gale, Cengage Learning. December 15, 2010. 
http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/servlet/MOML?af=RN&ae=F100339225&srchtp=a&ste=14. 
On the issue of the adoption of the term “trust” after the Statute of Uses 1535 to denote what had previously 
been called a use, see J. H. Baker, “The Three Languages of the Common Law,” McGill Law Journal 43 (1998): 
10. 
28 The term is an abbreviation of cestui a qui oes le feffement fut fait, that is, “the person for whose benefit the 
feoffment was made.” The Old French “oes” degenerated to “use” in English law or, at times, the expression 
is changed to “cestui que trust” (The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, ed. H. A. L. Fisher, 3 vols. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), III:343, n. 1). 
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restrictions on the transfer of land.29 As Coke goes on to explain, the beneficiary would 
originally have no enforceable right, jus, to the land: “So as cesty que use had neither jus 
in re, nor jus ad rem, but only a confidence and trust, for which he had no remedie by the 
common law, but for breach of trust his remedie was only by subpoena in chancerie.”30 
The beneficiary was seen as having a right not in the land itself, but rather in the person 
of the trustee, in whom he reposed “confidence and trust.”31 But by the time Coke is 
writing, the “trust and confidence” of a beneficiary is a recognized claim upon the 
person of the trustee that can be defended in the court of Chancery.32  
 How does this compare to the language of trust used by Ferne and Herle in their 
discussion of sovereign power? Coke uses the formula “trust and confidence” in his 
                                                     
29 See, Stuart E. Prall, “The Development of Equity in Tudor England,” The American Journal of Legal History 8 
(1964):10. 
30 Lib. 3, Cap. 8. Sect. 464. Coke, The first part of the Institutes. The history and the development of uses is a 
complex subject outside the scope of the present argument. For a sketch of some of the pressures on the 
development of uses, see J. H. Baker, “English Law and the Renaissance,” The Cambridge Law Journal 44 
(1985): 48. 
31 More precisely, jus ad rem indicated a proper right to the land recognized by common law and therefore 
adjudicated, in case of a dispute, in common law courts. On the other hand, ad personam would indicate a 
claim on the person which could be enforced by recourse to a prerogative court, such as Chancery (Prall, 
“The Development of Equity in Tudor England,” 18). 
32 The question of jurisdiction of the court of Chancery, and other prerogative courts, with respect to the 
jurisdiction of common law courts had a long history of dispute by the time of Coke’s writing. Alan 
Cromartie points to Christopher St. Germain, in A Dialogue Betwixt a Doctor of Divinity and a Student of the 
Common Laws of England (1528), as insisting that the equity court of Chancery could not undo a finding of the 
common law court. Here, the meddling of Chancery is seen as inappropriate appeal to natural law: 
“[a]ppeals to natural law were out of place in questions that the judges [in common law courts] had 
decided, because decision by the bench had taken natural law into account” (“The Constitutional 
Revolution: The Transformation of Political Culture in Early Stuart England,” Past and Present 163 (May, 
1999): 82. For a history of the dispute, see Prall, “The Development of Equity in Tudor England,” 1-19. Of 
particular interest, is Henry VIII’s willingness to restrict the jurisdiction of the Chancery through the Statute 
of Uses in 1536 in order to “eliminate the Use entirely because it denied him his feudal rights of escheat, 
forfeiture, wardship, and marriage” (10). 
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discussion of Parliament in the fourth part of the Institutes. In a general discussion of 
what causes Parliaments to fail in fulfilling their function, Coke puts disagreement 
between monarch and either House as the first cause of failure. As an example of the 
importance of concord between king and Parliament, he cites the example of Edward III:  
So essentiall is the kings good will towards his commons that it was one of the 
petitions of the commons to the king, that he would require the archbish. and all 
others of the clergy to pray for his estate, for the peace and good government of 
the land, for the continuance of the kings good will towards his commons: 
whereunto the thrice noble king assented with these effectuall words, The same 
prayeth the king: and many times the like petitions for the lords. How the king in 
all his weighty affairs had used the advice of his lords and commons, (so great a 
trust and confidence he had in them.) Alwaies provided, that both lords and 
commons keep them within the circle of the law and custome of the parliament.33 
 
The king’s trust of the Commons is essential to the functioning of Parliament and to the 
good of the commonwealth. And indeed, in this excerpt, we find Edward III attesting to 
his “trust and confidence” in both Lords and Commons. The added clause, that the king 
extends his trust only so far as “both lords and commons keep [their advice] within the 
circle of the law and custome of the parliament,” is left without immediate comment in 
this section of the Institutes. However, the first chapter of the fourth part of the Institutes 
is in itself a setting in writing of what constitutes “the law and custome of the 
Parliament”—a setting down that both comments on and is supported by the historical 
                                                     
33 Edward Coke, The fourth part of the Institutes of the laws of England: concerning the jurisdiction of courts, 
(London: W. Clarke, 1817), 35. The Making of Modern Law. Gale. 2011. Gale, Cengage Learning. December 15, 
2010. 
http://galenet.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/servlet/MOML?af=RN&ae=F100535417&srchtp=a&ste=14; 
emphasis mine. 
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records of law and acts of Parliament. What is the role of this historical accumulation of 
law? J. G. A. Pocock had originally argued in The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law 
that Coke’s, and consequently most common lawyers’, conception of the law as 
immemorial focused on its unchanging nature.34 In Coke’s thought, “the identification of 
past and present was complete, and the possibility that the idea of custom might give 
rise to ideas of law being in continuous development was altogether suppressed.”35 This 
original statement is clarified and partially revised by Pocock in his 1986 Retrospect. 
Here, in response to criticism that his original description of the “common-law mind” 
over-emphasizes the myth of an immemorial constitution, Pocock clarifies the notion of 
custom as held by common lawyers: “the notion of custom, which could imply 
adaptation, was employed to imply preservation […]. Yet my intention seems to me 
now (and has long seemed) to have been to state less that the whole body of law was 
held to be immemorial that any element in it could be held immemorial at will.”36 This 
revision of Pocock’s original reading of Coke and the idea of the ancient constitution has 
been elaborated by both Glenn Burgess, in The Politics of the Ancient Constitution, and by 
Richard Helgerson, in Forms of Nationhood. Burgess emphasizes Pocock’s concession that 
                                                     
34 For Pocock, the idea of the an ancient constitution proved attractive to both common lawyers and 
Parliamentarian writers alike because a body of law in existence since time immemorial could not have been 
legislated by any king and therefore could not be changed by a king (J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient 
Constitution and the Feudal Law, 51). 
35 Ibid., 45. 
36 Pocock, The Ancient Constitution, 275. Here, Pocock is responding, in particular, to Richard Tuck’s criticism 
of his original view of the ancient constitution as not taking into account the influence of continental, and 
particularly French, legal theory (274). 
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custom could be viewed as evolving to argue that Coke’s view did allow for historical 
development of the law: “English law had been tested by several generation of fine 
minds, added to and altered, so that the end product was perfectly fitted to the needs of 
the nation. […] when Pocock says that the common lawyers view of law as evolving 
custom was paradoxical in that it implied both evolution and immutability he mistook 
the fact that Coke tried to graft Fortescue’s historical simplicities onto complex historical 
views that he espoused elsewhere for a more universal problem.”37 In Burgess’ view, 
Coke does not lack a picture of historical change. Finally, Richard Helgerson argues in 
Forms of Nationhood that the preponderance of precedents and the appeal to varied 
authorities in Coke’s Institutes is the embodiment of the idea that common law “dates 
back to time out of mind, but it has been revealed in many cases, many statues, and 
many books, of which Littleton is only one.”38 From this debate over common lawyers’ 
                                                     
37 Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution, 73. 
38 Richard Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 97. Chapter two of Forms of Nationhood presents a helpful treatment of Coke and common law 
with respect to the reception of Roman law on the continent. In particular, Helgerson picks up the argument 
over the status of English common law vis-à-vis civil law begun with Maitland’s claims about the reception 
of Roman civil law in the Rede Lecture for 1901, “English Law and the Renaissance,” and subsequently 
challenged by Baker in “English Law and the Renaissance” (see, especially, page 50). For Helgerson, the 
claim made by seventeenth-century common lawyers that English law was special and that it particularly 
protected the subject against tyranny, unlike Roman civil law, has its origins in John Fortescue’s De Laudibus 
Legum Angliae (1470) (Forms of Nationhood, 65-9). While England resisted the reception of Roman law, it did 
receive “a Roman idea of the form in which the law should present itself” (69). It is in response to this idea, 
and in opposition to Bacon’s claim that the writing of the law belongs to the monarch, that Coke writes the 
Reports (1600-15) and the Institutes (1628-44) (Forms of Nationhood, 69-77). While the first part of Coke’s 
Institutes presents itself as a commentary on Littleton’s Tenures (1482), Coke includes what is noticeably 
absent from Littleton, precedents and reports of cases as essential part of the commentary (Forms of 
Nationhood, 90-3). While common law may be traced back as the law of the land for “time immemorial” it 
has also “been tested by several generations of fine minds, added to and altered, so that the end product 
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understanding of historical development, what is clear is that in all of these formulations 
the crucial fact about common law is that it is not dependent on the legislative power of 
the sovereign. It is rather dependent on custom, either as an unchanging, unwritten, 
immemorial constitution revealed through court cases or as a historically developing 
body of law produced by the judgments of the courts over time. Crucially, to return to 
the passage from Coke quoted above, the relationship of trust between king and 
Parliament was adjudicated by a body of laws that had reference outside the will of the 
sovereign and an unverifiable divine trust. 
 While in Coke’s formulation, the relationship between king and Parliament can 
only be understood by studying the cumulative framework of legal precedent, in Ferne’s 
version, the appeal to a trust from God to the sovereign excludes the possibility of an 
appeal to established custom or law.39And indeed, Herle is quick to point out the 
                                                     
 
was perfectly fitted to the needs of the nation. In addition the laws themselves embodied a wisdom [to be 
understood by lawyers through the acquisition of the “artificial reason” of the law] superior to the natural 
reason of any individual mind” (Forms of Nationhood, 73). On the issue of the reception, see also Baker, in 
“English Law and the Renaissance,” who, on the other hand, argues against the distinction between 
continent and England in terms of the reception of Roman law in “English Law and the Renaissance.” Baker 
sees a shift in the mode of law writing—in which precedents are increasingly recorded—in both the 
continent and England in the sixteenth century: “On the Continent the change is marked by the increasing 
publication of decisions, and in England—where law reporting had passed through an earlier stage—by the 
greater decisiveness of reports such as Plowden’s and Coke’s. It is also reflected in the English textbooks. 
Littleton relied on reason and common learning, and disdained to cite precedents. Sir William Staundford 
(1509-58), holding the same judicial office as Littleton less than a century later, wrote books so crammed 
with references and quotations that he seemed incapable of venturing an opinion unless it could be derived 
from someone else” (59). 
39 Ferne, as typical of royalist writers, relies heavily on Romans 13, and especially Romans 13.1 (“Let every 
soul be subjects unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained 
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absolutist consequences of this understanding of royal power: “It was but a while since 
good Pulpit stuff with Court-Doctors, That safety being the end of Government, and the King 
the only by God solely entrusted with it, he was not bound by or to any human Lawes in the 
managing it to that it’s end; he was to use whatever the result of his owne judgement concluded 
fit and conducing thereunto.”40 That is, the king fulfills his divine trust as long as he acts to 
guard the safety of the kingdom. In Herle’s hostile formulation, this understanding of 
                                                     
 
by God”), for his argument against rebellion (see, for instance, pp. 185, 189, 193, 195, 197, 199, and 203). His 
reading of the verse is summed up in a clear passage in the first section of The Resolving of Conscience: “[I]f 
Conscience be perswaded he [the Prince] does not hold himselfe within those bounds so fixed [by Law], can 
it be perswaded that the people may re-assume that power they never had [Ferne denies that sovereign 
power originally resided in the people]? Or take that sword out of his hand that God hath put into it? No, 
Conscience will look at that Power as the Ordinance of God, and that abuse of that Power as a judgment and 
scourge of God upon the people, and will use not Arms to resist the Ordinance under pretence of resisting 
the abuse, but cut cries and prayers to God, petitions to the Prince, denials of obedience to his unjust 
commands, denials of Subsidies, aids, and all fair means that are fit for Subjects to use, and when done all, if 
not succeed, will rather suffer than resist” (206). Here, Ferne is rehearsing Lutheran arguments for 
obedience to sovereign powers which found its way into England in the sixteenth-century especially 
through the works of Tyndale, Barnes, and Melanchthon (see, Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern 
Political Thought, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), II:65-108). In particular, Tyndale, in 
The Obedience of a Christian Man, uses Paul’s language (Foundations, II:66-7). All of these writers follow 
Luther’s idea that while a subject should not obey a ruler’s commands if they contradict divine law, the 
subjects cannot actively resist their lawful prince (Foundations, II:70). In opposition to Lutheran strictures 
against rebellion, Calvinist resistance theory, broadly speaking, came to argue that in case even a legitimate 
ruler proved tyrannical, inferior magistrates could resist the tyrant (this is the thrust of Skinner’s argument 
in The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. II, especially part 3). As we will see, this position will be 
advocated by Presbyterian writers during the Civil Wars and Milton will have to contend with it in his 
regicide tracts when justifying the execution of the king in the face of wide-spread opposition in the House 
of Commons. The 1640 Constitution and canon ecclesiasticall gave official church sanction to Ferne’s view 
“THE most High and Sacred order of Kings is of Divine right, being the ordinance of God himself, founded 
in the prime Laws of nature, and clearly established by expresse texts both of the old and new Testaments” 
(Constitutions and canons ecclesiasticall; treated upon by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, presidents of the 
convocations for the respective provinces of Canterbury and York, and the rest of the bishops and clergie of those 
provinces; and agreed upon with the Kings Majesties licence in their severall synods begun at London and York. 
(London, 1640), page 12. Early English Books Online. December 10, 2010. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99835843).   
40 Herle A Fuller Answer, 232; italics original. 
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the role of the king as a trustee for the commonwealth allows any royalist theorist who 
embraces it to claim that the trust between sovereign and God supersedes all other legal 
or promissory commitments on the part of the king: 
he was not bound to keepe any Oath he took to the people to be ruled therein by Law; 
there could be no commutative justice between him and them, only distributive from 
him to them, so that all they had was his, to the very parings of their nails, his Oath 
was but a peece of his Coronation show, he might take it today and breake it tomorrow 
without perjury, because he was under a former and higher obligation to God (by whom 
only he was trusted, and to whom only accountable) to use whatever means he should 
thinke conducing to the end for which he had it only from God: that the Salus populi 
committed only by God, and solely to Him, was a Law between God and him only.41 
 
In this passage, Herle depicts a breakdown of justice. By claiming to be accountable only 
to God, the king places himself outside of the confines of commutative justice that bind 
each of his subjects to one another.42 While the king is to be trusted by his subjects, he 
cannot be held accountable through the system of justice because sovereign power is 
directly entrusted from God. According to Herle, the royalist position removes all 
reciprocal relationships between subjects and king. The absolutist tyrant described by 
the version of royalist propaganda in Herle’s argument divides society into two 
                                                     
41 Herle, A Fuller Answer, 232. Henry Parker, in The case of shipmony briefly discoursed (published on Nov. 3, 
1640, the opening of the Long Parliament), leveled the same accusation to royalist writers (Henry Parker, The 
case of shipmony briefly discoursed, according to the grounds of law, policie, and conscience and most humbly 
presented to the censure and correction of the High Court of Parliament, Nov. 3. 1640, 33-4. Early English Books 
Online. Huntington Library and Art Gallery (San Marino, CA). December 10, 2010. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99849230). 
42 Aristotle’s definition of commutative justice clarifies Herle’s accusation: “When people associate with one 
another for the purpose of exchange, however, this kind of justice [commutative]—reciprocity in accordance 
with proportion, not equality—is what binds them together, since a city is kept together by proportionate 
reciprocation. For people seek to return either evil for evil—otherwise they feel like slaves—or good for 
good—otherwise no exchange takes place, and it is exchange that holds them together” (1133a). 
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incommensurable segments. On one hand, we find the king, capable of dealing 
distributive justice to his subjects, and on the other hand, we find all the subjects, who 
can enter reciprocal contracts and promises with each other, and are thus governed by 
commutative justice, but who cannot expect to be in a relationship of commutative 
justice with the king. Herle is left asking whether the king “owes no duty to man at 
all?”43 What disappears from view in this version of the royalist stance is the framework 
of justice based on the accrual of custom and law as presented by Coke. 
 Clearly, Herle’s portrayal of the royalist position is deeply hostile; those who 
wrote in defense of Charles’ policies did not argue that the king was free to act in 
opposition of established law as a matter of course. The king was bound to follow the 
law unless the safety of the state, salus populi, required him to do otherwise. This can be 
seen throughout The Resolving of Conscience. For Ferne, the coronation oath places “a 
great obligation” upon the king; it is not “but a peece of his Coronation show, he might take 
it today and breake it tomorrow without perjury.”44 Nonetheless, Ferne gives no remedy, 
other than passive resistance, to the subjects of a ruler who tyrannically breaks his 
promises. Moreover, some royalist formulations of the king’s power did, as Herle 
                                                     
43 Herle, A Fuller Answer, 233. 
44 Ferne, Resolving, 199. In his 21 March 1610 speech, James I makes a similar point by asserting that in a 
settled kingdom, “the King becomes to be Lex loquens, after a sort, binding himselfe by a double oath to the 
observation of the fundamentall Lawes of his Kingdome” (Political Writings, 183). Here, James is both 
conceding that a king is bound, “after a sort,” by his oaths, but, at the same time, he quotes a maxim of 
Justinian’s Institutes to claim that the king is lex loquens (for James I’s and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s use of 
this saying, see Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood, 84, especially note 34). 
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accuses, exclude the possibility of delimiting the king’s power by law, as seen in 
Attorney-General Heath’s statement in the Five Knights’ case that the king 
is the head of the same fountain of justice, which your Lordship administers to 
all his subjects. All justice is derived from him, and what he doth, he doth not as 
a private person, but as the head of the commonwealth, as justicarius regni, yea, 
the very essence of justice under God upon earth is in him. And shall we 
generally, not as subjects only, but as lawyers, who govern themselves by the 
rule of the law, not submit to his command, but make enquires whether they be 
lawful, and say that the King doth this or that in course of justice? […] who shall 
call in question the actions or the justice of the king, who is not to give any 
account of them?45 
 
In this statement, no subject, including lawyers, may question the legality of the king’s 
actions. Indeed, the only way for subjects to “govern themselves by the rule of the law” 
is to obey the king without question. This line of argument, describing the king as the 
“fountain of justice” and thus not to be questioned, is for Herle and, as we will see, for 
Henry Parker, a dangerous excuse for tyranny. A king who is not bound by laws cannot 
be a just ruler. 
 
                                                     
45 Samuel Rawson Gardiner, ed., The constitutional documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1889), 60; underlining mine. This passage is partially quoted in Glenn Burgess in The 
Politics of the Ancient Constitution. Here, Burgess argues that under James I there was a “Jacobean consensus” 
in which kings were seen as “having an ordinary, legal prerogative—this they exercised through the 
common law because it was part of that law. But they also had an absolute prerogative, they were also 
God’s lieutenants on earth, and in these capacities they could act outside the common law” (89; see also 140 
and 144-5). This consensus fell apart when Charles I and his Attorney-General Heath extended royal 
prerogative to legal territory previously considered protected by common law. For an opposing view, see J. 
P. Sommerville, “The Ancient Constitution Reassessed” in R. Malcolm Smuts, ed., The Stuart Court and 
Europe: Essays in Politics and Political Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 64. 
Sommerville does not see evidence for a “Jacobean consensus” on the issue of royal prerogative and traces 
the debates that became prominent during Charles reign to the reign of James I. 
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3.2 Henry Parker and the Origins of Government 
 Ferne’s Resolving of Conscience is written in reaction to Henry Parker’s 
Observations and it is in Parker’s highly influential pamphlet that we find the 
connections between law, justice, and the right to rebel against a tyrant worked out in 
detail.46 Parker’s Observations is, in turn, a reply to His Majesties answer to […] The 
declaration, or remonstrance of the Lords and Commons, the 19 of May, 1642. The immediate 
issue behind both the king’s Answer and Parker’s Observations was the Militia Ordinance 
of 5 March 1642.47 Insisting that it was acting according to the central principle of natural 
law, that of salus populi or the safety of the people, Parliament declared its right to raise a 
militia to defend the realm without the king, “if his Majesty should refuse to joyne with 
us therein, the two Houses of Parliament being the supreame Court and highest councell 
of the Kingdome, were enabled by their owne authority to provide for the repulsing of 
such imminent, and evident danger.”48 The Remonstrance does concede that the power to 
                                                     
46 Austin Woolrych sums up the accepted view of the importance of the Observations: “It was the most 
influential and widely discussed statement of radical parliamentarian theory in all the proliferating 
pamphlet war of 1642” (Britain in Revolution, 223)). On Henry Parker’s role in shaping the Parliamentarian 
position, see, for instance, Michael Mendle, Henry Parker and the English Civil War: The Political Thought of the 
Public’s “privado” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 100-1; Victoria Kahn, Wayward Contracts: 
The Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640-1674 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 174-5; 
Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution, 187, 229-30; and Richard Tuck, Philosophy and 
Government, 226-3. 
47 For a discussion of the two editions of the Observations—the shorter Some Few Observations, printed in June 
1642, and the fuller, Observations upon some of his majesties late answers and expresses, printed in July 1642, both 
anonymous—and their attribution to Henry Parker, see Mendle, Henry Parker and the English Civil War, 70-
89. For the importance of the Militia Ordinance in the development of Parliamentary rhetoric, see Tuck, 
Philosophy and Government, 224-32. 
48 The declaration or remonstrance of the Lord and Commons in Parliament assembled with divers depositions and 
letters thereunto annexed (London, 1642), 3. Early English Books Online. British Library (London). December 
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raise an army is not normally vested in the two Houses alone, it is in the king in 
Parliament. But by the “fundamentall Laws of this Kingdome,” whenever the 
Commonwealth is “deprived of the fruit of that trust which was in part reposed in” the 
king, the two Houses of Parliament may take over the executive power to avert an 
imminent danger.49 Indeed, as the Remonstrance goes on to argue, if Parliament shirked 
its duty to raise a militia in times of grave danger, the kingdom would “returne to its 
first principle, and every man left to do what [is] aright in his own eye, without either 
guide or rule.”50 That is, the actions of Parliament are not against the law because they 
are the necessary steps to prevent the dissolution of government in England. Countering 
these arguments, the king’s Answer to the Remonstrance is an attempt to reject both the 
immediate as well as the legal grounds for Parliament’s actions. It begins by denying the 
existence of any urgent threat to the realm and proceeds to remind Parliament that it 
                                                     
 
10, 2010. http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:13459946. The warning against imminent danger is repeated 
throughout the Remonstrance of May 19th. Indeed, in its third section, Parliament goes on to argue that it has 
to raise a militia without the king’s approval in order to guarantee the safety of the king himself: “the 
Kingdome hath bin of late, and still is in so eminent danger both from enemies abroad, and a Popish and 
discontented partie at home, that there is an urgent and inevitable necessity of putting his Maiesties subiects 
into a posture of defence, for the safeguard both of his Maiesty, and his people” (14). For the origins of the 
phrase salus populi suprema lex esto in Roman legal philosophy and its use by Parliamentarian writers, see 
Skinner, Vision of Politics, II:326. 
49 Remonstrance, 15. 
50 Loc. cit. 
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cannot enact legislation without the king.51 Crucially, the Answer denies Parliament’s 
legislative authority. While Parliament is indeed the highest court in the realm and it can 
thus decide any case brought before it, it does not have power to make laws without the 
king’s assent.52 
 Parker’s rejoinder to the king’s Answer steps back from the immediate argument 
over the militia and focuses on the constitutional challenge posed to Parliament by the 
royalist position. The opening of the Observations is, therefore, a general discussion of 
Royal and Parliamentary power.53 Parker begins by asking what the origin of political 
power is. While all power ultimately originates from God, the choice of a particular form 
of government is left to each nation, “God is no more the author of Regall, then of 
Aristocraticall power, nor of supreame, then of subordinate command,” and the laws 
that organize all modes of government are not divine ordinances, but “the Pactions and 
agreements of such and such politique corporations.” 54  Thus, Parker argues, both 
                                                     
51  His Majesties answer to a book, intituled, The declaration, or remonstrance of the Lords and Commons, the 19 of 
May, 1642 (Cambridge, 1642), 5-8. Early English Books Online. Trinity College Library (Cambridge). 
December 10, 2010. http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:12229709. 
52 His Majesties answer to a book, 19-20. 
53 Parker had given a more direct rejoinder to the royalists accusations in the king’s answer to the 
declaration of May 19, 1642 with his Some Few Observations. For the differences between this earlier tract and 
the Observations, see Mendle, Henry Parker and the English Civil War, 82-5. 
54 Henry Parker, Observations upon some of His Majesties late answers and expresses (London, 1642), 1. Early 
English Books Online. (British Library, London). December 10, 2010. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:12684134.  
Richard Tuck draws a clear distinction between the view of “natural rights theorists” and Presbyterian Civil 
War writers on the origin of sovereign power: “While the natural rights theorists form Grotius onwards 
believed that any form of dominium was constituted by a transfer by humans of their own natural rights of 
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Parliament and the king derive their power from the people. This move allows Parker to 
claim that, when properly considered, Parliament’s political and legislative power has 
the same origin as the king’s: “Parliaments have the same efficient cause as monarchies, 
if not higher, for in the truth, the whole Kingdome is not so properly the Author as the 
essence it selfe of Parliaments.”55 Here Parker introduces a theme he will return to 
repeatedly: the power of Parliament is founded on its representative nature.56 It is not 
immediately clear from this first formulation of the idea of representation, the kingdom 
as the “essence” of Parliament, what is the exact nature of the relationship between 
                                                     
 
dominium over themselves and alien objects, the Presbyterians believed that the developed social forms of 
dominium were constituted by God as correlatives of his commandments, and in particular the 
commandments to punish evildoers and to honour parents” (Natural Rights Theories, 144). This kind of 
classification overly emphasizes the differences between writers who share much common ground. In 
general, Tuck’s account in Natural Rights Theories and in Philosophy and Government is intent in fitting Henry 
Parker in a line of thinkers, starting with Grotius, who make a clear break with medieval accounts of natural 
law and right. Focusing on this narrative, Tuck emphasizes Parker’s accounts of representation, the electoral 
nature of Parliament, and rights. Conversely, this leads Tuck to view Parker’s communitarian account of 
slavery, to which I will turn below, as an “unwillingness” to “accep[t] individual inalienable rights,” which 
in turn has to be explained away by a view of Parker as “theoretically and professionally committed to 
support the Army leaders” (Natural Rights Theories, 147). For an account of natural rights that stresses the 
debt that Grotius—the author whom Tuck identifies as forming a novel understanding of natural rights and 
natural law based on self-preservation—owed to medieval thinkers, see Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural 
Rights. In particular, Tierney argues that the idea of a duty of self-preservation and self-love can be traced 
back through Aquinas to Augustine in a way that bares a close resemblance to Grotius’ formulation, even 
though Grotius adapted this inherited tradition in a way appropriate to an early modern Protestant 
audience. Moreover, in Grotius’s writing, as in that of medieval writers, the duty of self-preservation does 
not exclude the duty to live in harmony with others (for Tierney’s engagement with Tuck’s reading of 
Grotius, see The Idea of Natural Rights (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1997), 319-324). 
My reading of Parker is indebted to Tierney’s account of this tradition. 
55 Parker, Observations, 5. 
56 For a discussion of the early modern concept of representation, see Christopher Hill, “Covenant Theology 
and the Concept of ‘A Public Person’” in The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill, 3 vols. (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), III:300-324. 
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Parliament and the people. As we will see below, Parker routinely hides the gap 
between the original source of political power (the members of the commonwealth) and 
the entity that wields it (either Parliament or the king). But, at this point, it suffices to 
note that Parker finds in representation and implied consent the bases for the authority 
of Parliament’s legislative and sovereign power.57 Finally, in this first sketch of the origin 
of power, Parker emphasizes that both king and Parliament must govern according to 
the law of salus populi, and, in particular, that the very institution of royal power is based 
on the original need to organize a government for the safety of the people: “his dignitie 
was erected to preserve the Commonaltie, the Commonaltie was not created for his 
service: and that which is the end is farre more honorable and valuable in nature and 
policy, then that which is the meanes.”58  
 Having established the origins of sovereign power in general terms, Parker turns 
to a narrative of the history of the first foundation of government. After the Fall, the 
nature of mankind grew so sinful that laws, and a sovereign to enforce those laws, 
became necessary for the establishment and preservation of society: “Man being 
depraved by the fall of Adam grew so untame and uncivill a creature, that the Law of 
                                                     
57 Parker, Observations, 12-4. 
58 Parker, Observations, 3. The language of salus populi was wielded by royalist and parliamentarian writers 
alike. Jonathan Scott points out that “the polemical contest between parliament and the king was not solely, 
or even principally, focused upon justifications of resistance. Rather it involved the competing claims of 
each to be that institution of state charged with taking action for the public peace and safety in a situation of 
extreme necessity” (Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in 
European Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 150). 
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God written in his brest was not sufficient to restrayne him from mischefe, or to make 
him sociable.”59 Because of original sin, the law of nature, present in each man’s heart, is 
no longer sufficient to guide man’s social behavior. Laws need to be codified, 
interpreted, and enforced. This requires the establishing of a form of government: 
therefore without some magistracy to provide new orders, and to judge of old, 
and to execute according to justice, no society could be upheld, without society 
men could not live, and without laws men could not be sociable, and without 
authority somewhere invested, to judge according to Law, and execute according 
to judgement, Law was a vaine and void thing, it was soon therefore provided 
that laws agreeable to the dictates of reason should be ratified by common 
consent, and that the execution and interpretation of those Lawes should be 
intrusted to some magistrate, for the prevention of common injuries betwixt 
Subject and Subject.60 
 
In this compact narrative, Parker depicts both the first appointing of magistrates and the 
duty of these magistrates to codify, interpret, and execute laws. The passage presents, by 
necessity, an imagined history of the origins of government. This means that, at each 
step of the narrative, Parker focuses on what must have happened by (what he sees as) 
logical necessity. But because this is an imagined history, this means that any given 
necessity, “without laws men could not be sociable,” can be answered in the narrative 
by a bare rational solution, divested of problems of agency or specific historical detail, 
“it was soon therefore provided that laws agreeable to the dictates of reason should be 
ratified by common consent.” In particular, Parker presents the need for laws and 
                                                     
59 Parker, Observations, 13. 
60 Ibid., 13; emphasis mine. 
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magistrates based on the idea that without them there can be no society. This leaves 
open the question: who does the “instrusting” to the magistrates if a society cannot be 
assembled before the existence of magistrates? In the passage, the use of passive verbs 
makes it difficult to pin-point the function of “common consent” in the formation of 
government. Is “common consent” the instigating force behind the very idea that laws 
and magistrates should be instituted or is it only necessary for the ratification of laws? 
More generally, how does consent, both original and ongoing, function in the 
Observations?  
 To see the answer these questions, we turn to Parker’s account of the formation 
of representative bodies. In the narrative of the first formation of government, a two-fold 
picture of Parker’s understanding of sovereign authority and representation emerges. 
First, his narrative shows that the source of all laws, justice, and political power within a 
commonwealth is the people as a whole, rather than the king, and that, at the same time, 
this very same people is an ever present threat to stability. Second, in his narrative 
Parker argues that the authority of justice fundamentally inherent in the people is most 
safely expressed through a representative body such as Parliament, which becomes 
identified with the community as a whole by virtue of representation. I say most safely 
because the threat to stability posed by the people themselves needs to be contained and 
representative assemblies can serve this purpose by acting as a counter-balance to the 
king’s sovereign power and thus providing an orderly process through which the 
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community’s grievances against the ruler can be addressed. Starting with the first facet 
of this view of government, we see that Parker argues that the original establishment of 
magistrates proves not to be sufficient to contain all the consequences of corrupted 
human nature. Kings and magistrates, wielding unchecked power, become tyrants. And 
tyrants are almost as dangerous to self-preservation as the original state of nature: “man 
was yet subject to unnaturall destruction, by the Tyranny of intrusted magistrates, a 
mischief almost as fatall as to be without all magistracie.”61 While it is easy to devise 
laws to curb the appetites of tyrannical rulers, these laws have little effect without any 
means to enforce them. Indeed, this problem proves more intractable than the initial 
establishing of laws: “long it was ere the world could extricate it selfe out of all these 
extremities, or finde out an orderly meanes whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded 
prerogative on this hand, and to excessive liberty on the other: and scarce has long 
experience yet fully satisfied the mindes of all men in it.”62 For Parker, the solution to the 
problem of tyranny proves so difficult to find that even long experience in it has not 
convinced everyone of its efficacy. Therefore, this solution, once hit upon, should not be 
lightly discarded. Moreover, in the Observations the problem of tyranny always lurks in 
the background of orderly society. The passage of time has only made rulers more adept 
and refined in their methods of oppression. But, strikingly, Parker’s conclusion is not 
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62 Ibid., 14. 
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that subjects are now more likely to be enslaved by their tyrannical rulers, but rather 
that few nations will allow absolute monarchy: “In the infancy of the world, […] man 
was not so actificiall [sic] and obdurate in cruelty as now […]. But since, Tyranny being 
growne more exquisite, and policy more perfect, […] few Nations will indure that 
thraldome which uses to accompany unbounded & unconditionate royalty.”63  
 By what means can a tyrant be stopped? At first, the only remedy was violent 
rebellion. These rebellions, causing turmoil and bloodshed, often only accomplished the 
exchange of one tyrant for another.64 In the final turn of Parker’s imagined history, we 
find the creation of representative bodies, such as the English Parliament. Here, Parker 
counters the royalist claim that monarchy is the most stable and safe form of 
government, by noting that while the earlier forms of popular representation, “Ephori, 
Tribuni, Curatores, &c,” may have been almost as bad as the tyrants they were supposed 
to control, peaceful representative assemblies such as the English Parliament are much 
more stable than simple monarchy: “till some way was invented to regulate the motions 
of the peoples moliminous body, I think arbitrary rule was most safe for the world, but 
now since most Countries have found out an Art and peaceable Order for Publique 
Assemblies, whereby the people may assume its owne power to do itself right without 
disturbance to it selfe, or injury to Princes, he is very unjust that will oppose this Art and 
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order.”65 Representative assemblies are seen as giving the people a way to “do itself 
right” without resorting to violence. Moreover, in this formulation of the function of 
Parliaments, we see that the prince’s power is also safeguarded. What is striking in this 
account is that we have a shift in focus from controlling the power of tyrants to 
controlling the people’s “moliminous”—massive and ponderous—body. That is the 
people, who in Parker’s account are the very source of justice and political authority, are 
represented as a cumbrous and menacing entity in need to be contained and controlled. 
The implied attack on the royalist position is clear. Any king attempting to curtail 
Parliament’s power risks his own overthrow. 
 The second aspect of Parker’s view of representation, the identification between 
a representative assembly and those who are represented, emerges in the narrative of 
the Observations as an inevitable consequence of the chaotic nature of direct democracy. 
In Parker’s account, Parliament is invested, “by vertue of election and representation,” 
with the very same power which originates in the people and, in earlier times, was 
wielded by assemblies of the entire community: “that Princes may not be now beyond 
all limits and Lawes, nor yet left to be tried upon those limits and laws by any private 
parties, the whole community in its underived Majesty shall convene to do justice.”66 
Representative bodies such as Parliament are made to stand in for “the whole body of 
                                                     
65 Ibid., 14-5; emphasis mine. 
66 Parker, Observations, 15. 
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the community.” The need for representation is due to the very practical concern that 
“the vastnesse of [the people’s] owne bulke may not breed confusion.”67 Here again, we 
see that the people as a whole are a cause of troublesome confusion. Almost each step in 
the formation of governments can be traced back to the need to control the unruly 
multitude. Finally, once the need for a representative body is established, the 
representative body is identified with the whole community and it holds its power with 
the same “underived Majesty” as the body politic at large.68 Indeed, the identification 
between the subjects and their representatives becomes so perfect by the end of the 
paragraph that discord between the two turns into form of blasphemy: “the people upon 
causelesse defamation and unproved accusations have beene so prone to withdraw 
themselves from their representations, and yet there can be nothing under Heaven, next 
to renouncing God, which can be more perfidious and more pernitious in the people 
than this.”69 The move is striking. On the on hand, it counters royalist arguments that, if 
rebellion against the king is lawful, then so is rebellion against Parliament. On the other 
hand, by firmly identifying the community as a whole with Parliament as its 
representative body, it turns any disagreement between “the people” and Parliament 
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68 Scott, following Mendle, argues that Parker is claiming for Parliament the kind of absolute power he 
denies to the king (England’s Troubles, 150) and that the Leveller response to this claim turns against 
Parliament the language used by Parker and other Parliamentarian writers against the king (269-74). See 
also, Mendle, Henry Parker and the English Civil War, 87. 
69 Parker, Observations, 15-6. 
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into the sinful result of listening to “causelesse defamation and unproved accusations.”70 
In Parker’s narrative, dissent between the people and Parliament cannot be justified. 
 What is the role of the king? After all, England is a monarchy, and Parker agrees 
that while in normal times, the power to enact laws is in the king and Parliament 
together, in times of emergency, “if the King will not joyne with the people [to act for 
their safety], the people may without disloyalty save themselves.”71 That is, Parliament, 
embodying the people’s inherent sovereignty, can act without the consent of the king in 
matters essential to the safety of the commonwealth. Bypassing the royalist claim that an 
individual may not resist a magistrate with force under the plea of self-defense, Parker 
insists that it is evident “to the clearest beames of humaine reason” that even a private 
person “may defende himself by force, if assaulted, though by the force of a Magistrate” 
and that thus it is not possible to claim that “whole nations being exposed to enmity and 
hazard, being utterly uncapable of flight, must yeeld their throats and submit to 
Assassinates, if their King will not allow, them defence.”72 Rather than argue whether 
any given individual may resist a sovereign, Parker places the act of self-defense in the 
nation as a whole, represented and personated in Parliament. That the king could deny 
                                                     
70 Parker’s use of the term “people” moves as easily between “the peoples moliminous body” which must be 
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we mention people we do not mean the confused promiscuous body of the people” (quoted in Christopher 
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71 Parker, Observations, 16. 
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this right is for Parker a sign that he has been under the influence of malignant 
counselors who have flattered him for their own gain by painting a picture of royal 
prerogative that is out of proportion with the light of reason.73 The rest of the pamphlet 
is dedicated to dismantling the similes used by courtiers to falsely flatter the king. That 
kings are “called Gods, Fathers, Husbands, Lords, Heads, &c.” is but a way to “illustrate 
some excellency in Princes by way of similitude, but must not in all things be applyed, 
and they are most truly applyed to Subjects, taken divisim, but no conjunctim.”74 Here 
again, as in the argument for self-defense, Parker distinguishes between the relationship 
between each subject, taken singularly, and the king, and the relationship between all the 
subjects, taken collectively, and the king. Each simile is analyzed in turn and found 
faulty when applied to the entire commonwealth. In particular, the marriage simile 
cannot work between king and subjects because “the wife is inferiour in nature, and was 
created for the assistance of man […], but it is otherwise in the State betwixt man and 
man, for that civill difference which is for civill ends, and those ends are, that wrong and 
violence may be repressed by one for the good of all not that servilitie and drudgerie 
may be imposed upon all, for the pomp of one.”75 Rather than being inherent in nature, 
like the difference between husband and wife, the difference between a magistrate and 
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any given subject is only an expedient to enforce the order necessary for the well-being 
of the entire community. 
 Thus, one of the main aims of the Observations is to demonstrate that, when 
understood properly, the natural relationship between subjects and king forbids 
arbitrary rule. More precisely, because kings derive their power from their subjects, 
Parker argues that the idea that subjects could bindingly contract themselves into 
slavery to their own king without any remedy is against both reason and the laws of 
Nature: 
[T]he safetie of the people is to bee valued above any right of his, as much as the 
end is to bee preferred to the meanes; it is not just nor possible for any nation so 
to inslave it selfe, and to resigne its owne interest to the will of one Lord, as that 
that Lord may destroy it without injury, and yet to have no right to preserve it 
selfe: For since all naturall power is in those which obay, they which contract to 
obay to their owne ruine, or having so contracted, they which esteeme such a 
contract before their owne preservation are felonious to themselves, and 
rebellious to nature.76 
 
The right of a people to “preserve itself” is inherent in the logic that the means (i.e., the 
king) is to be preserved only in so far at it promotes the well-being of the end (i.e., salus 
populi). For Parker, the right of rebellion is a law of logic. This is a theme that he returns 
to in his later writings. In Jus Populi (1644), Parker extends his analysis of power, the 
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origin of government, and the right of rebellion begun in the Observations.77 The tract 
begins with a summary of the three main points from the Observations: “1 Princes derive 
their power, and prerogatives from the people. Secondly, Princes have their investitures merely 
for the people benefit. Thirdly, In all well-formed States the Laws, by which Princes claim, do 
declare themselves more in favour of liberty then Prerogative.”78 Parker reasserts that these 
three claims are “fundamentals” of government and that he enters the fray only “for the 
weaker sort of peoples sake, lest multitudes of opponents should sway them, and effect 
that by number, which cannot be done by weight.”79 From the beginning of the tract 
then, Parker claims that the Parliamentary case is clear to “the judgement of wise men,” 
but that tyrannical arguments may seduce the multitude. Indeed, as in the Observations, 
one of the tasks of Jus Populi is to analyze and dismantle the similes for royal power 
found in marital and paternal rule as well as in the despotic rule of master over slaves. 
In particular, Parker begins his discussion of the proper relationship between the rights 
of the prince and those of the people by quoting 1 Corinthians 11.8-9, “for the man is not 
                                                     
77 As the full title indicates, Jus Populi, or, A discourse wherein clear satisfaction is given as well concerning the 
right of subiects as the right of princes, the tract delineates the extent of the rights of subjects along with those of 
the sovereign (Henry Parker, Jus Populi (London, 1644). Early English Books Online. (British Library, 
London). December 10, 2010. http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:11914448.  
For a discussion of Parker’s use of Bodin and Grotius, see Mendle (130-2). Mendle shows how Parker argues 
against Bodin’s notion of paternal power (130) while, at the same time, adopting Bodin’s views against 
slavery to counter Grotius’ arguments for voluntary enslavement to a sovereign power (132). 
78 Parker, Jus Populi, 1; emphasis original. Quentin Skinner traces the classical origins of Parker’s claims that 
royal prerogative means enslaving the members of the commonwealth and that a king’s greatness is directly 
proportional to his subjects’ greatness, and that this greatness, in turn, is depended on their freedom to 
Sallust and Tacitus (“John Milton and the Politics of Slavery,” 9). 
79 Parker, Jus Populi, 1. 
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of the woman; but the woman of the man. Neither was the man created for the woman; 
but the woman for the man.” Having recalled the language of marriage with this 
Scriptural passage, Parker does not reproduce the royalist simile in reverse—that is, he 
does not posit the king as wife and the people as husband, as he will do later in the 
pamphlet—but instead uses it to defend the structure of his own argument in opposition 
to the falsely seducing rhetoric of his opponents: “There cannot be therefore any to pick 
rules more properly pressed then these: nay without offering some contradiction to the 
Spirit of God, we cannot reject the same form of arguing in the case of a people, and 
their Prince.”80 What we must learn from 1 Corinthians 11 is a form of reasoning. Thus, 
Parker opens the tract by presenting his own method of biblical hermeneutics as 
conforming “to the Spirit of God” and as a corrective to the misleading language and 
scriptural interpretation of the royalist writers and divines.  
 In particular, one of Parker’s targets is Henry Ferne and his use of the marriage 
simile.81 In Conscience Satisfied (1643), Ferne replies to the various answers to his earlier 
Resolving of Conscience and centers the third part of his argument on the analogue of 
marriage:  
as if in Matrimony (for the King is also sponsus Regni, and wedded to the 
kingdom by a Ring at his Coronation) the parties should agree, upon such and 
such neglect of duties, to part asunder; or children (for the king is also a Father of 
the kingdom, and the body politique owes to him naturall obedience, 24. H.8. c. 12) 
                                                     
80 Parker, Jus Populi, 2; emphasis mine. 
81 Parker argues extensively against Ferne in Jus Populi, see page 55-7. 
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should condition with their Parents upon such and such usage to be acquitted of 
their duty and obedience; what our Saviour said of their light & unlawfull 
occasion of Divorce, non fuit sic ab initio, it was not so from the beginning, when 
God at first joined man and woman, may be said of such a reserved power of 
resistance, it was not from the beginning, when at first Rulers and Kings were 
Fathers, for so they are still called in the fift Commandment, not to be resisted or 
abdicated by their children, their subjects.82 
 
This passage combines the language of matrimonial bond with that of paternal rule. 
Jesus’ warning against Deuteronomic divorce that non fuit sic ab initio is extended to 
cover kingship via the original institution of fathers as kings.83 For Ferne, this Scriptural 
verse can be read as an injunction to look at the origin and first institution of marriage 
and, more generally, of all social relationships to understand their correct constitution. 
Indeed, the passage shifts from the marital to the paternal analogy for monarchy in 
order to avoid Jesus’ allowance for divorce in the case of adultery in Matthew 19. To 
Ferne’s ab initio, Parker opposes his own “origo or first production of Civill Authority.”84 
Parker’s origo includes both the history of sovereign power, through a review of classical 
histories alongside Scripture, as well as its cause, the people. As in the Observations, 
Parker does not deny the royalist claim that all power is originally from God, but he 
                                                     
82 Henry Ferne, Conscience satisfied. That there is no warrant for the armes now taken up by subjects. By way of reply 
unto severall answers made to a treatise formerly published for the resolving of conscience upon the case. Especially 
unto that which is entituled A fuller answer (Oxford, 1643), 12. Early English Books Online. (British Library, 
London). December 10, 2010. http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99871360.  
83 Ferne is using Matthew 19.8-9: “He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts 
suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so. And I say unto you, Whosoever 
shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and 
whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.” 
84 Parker, Jus Populi, 2. 
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insists that royalist writers are reading Scripture incorrectly, and fraudulently at that. 
This misinterpretation arises when the idea of the divine origin of power is taken to 
exclude human participation: “For tis not by us questioned whether powers are from 
God or no; but whether they are so extraordinarily from God, as that they have no 
dependence upon humane consent.”85 To prove that there is a need for human consent 
in the establishing of all sovereign power, Parker repeats the argument of the 
Observations that the origin of government is to be found in the Fall and the subsequent 
need for men to be restrained from their vicious tendencies if they are to live in society. 
In Jus Populi, Parker expands his earlier discussion of the consequences of sin on forms 
of government by comparing human society with those of angels and devils. Neither 
have real governments nor subjection. Where there is either no sin, or nothing but sin, 
government is not necessary. More precisely, Parker here distinguishes between the 
different angelic ranks, which indicated a difference in “excellence” and “honour,” and 
the ranks in human society, which are due to differences in political power.86 In human 
society fallen nature leads to the need of government. Thus, we see that “subjection, or 
rather servile subjection, such as attends humane policy amongst us, derives not it self 
from Nature, unless we mean corrupted nature.”87 Through these considerations, Parker 
arrives at a distinction between the order, such as that found amongst angels, which is 
                                                     
85 Ibid., 2. 
86 Parker, Jus Populi, 3. 
87 Ibid., 3. 
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naturally from God and political power and jurisdiction, which became necessary only 
after the Fall. 
 Indeed, for Parker, no specific form of government is commanded in Scripture. 
In fact, the example of Abraham, an example of the patriarch-king in royalist writings, is 
brought into the tract not to discuss the origins of monarchy, but rather to introduce the 
importance of choice and liberty in human government.88 While there might have been 
“in nature some majority or precedence due either from Lot to Abraham, or from Abraham 
to Lot,” upon the occasion of disagreement amongst their servants, rather than the one 
submitting to the other, “they rather resolved upon a dissociation.”89 Parker goes on 
insist that, even though the parting proved harmful to Lot, it was not sin to opt for 
liberty over continued union with Abraham: 
the question is not whether it was prejudiciall, or no, to esteeme the priviledge of 
an Independent liberty before the many other fruits and advantages of a well 
framed principalitie: but whether it was sin against God, or no, and a 
transgression against the constitution of power, to pursue that which was most 
pleasing, before that which was likely to prove more commodious. I conceive 
that freedome being in itself good, and acceptable to Nature, was preferred 
before Government, which was also good, and more especially commendable, 
but God had left the choice indifferent, and arbitrarie, and therefore there was no 
scandal or trespasse in the choice.90 
 
                                                     
88 Filmer is particularly fond of Abraham as an example of an early king. In Patriarcha, he mentions him as 
having the power to declare war and ratify peace agreements (Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, 
ed. Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 7). In The Orginall of Government, 
he uses Abraham to argue against Hobbes’ discussion of consent (192) as well as against Hobbes’ 
interpretation of the covenant between God and the people of Israel in Leviathan (196; 205). 
89 Parker, Jus Populi, 5. Parker here refers to Genesis 13.8-12. 
90 Parker, Jus Populi, 5; emphasis mine. 
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This passage provides an illustration of Parker’s principle that the choice of form of 
government is left up to each nation. There is no a priori Scriptural command towards 
one form of government over another. Both “freedome” and stricter “Government” are, 
in themselves, good. And since God has “left the choice indifferent, and arbitrarie,” no 
argument basing itself on the after-fact that Lot’s separation from Abraham proved 
injurious can negate that the two patriarchs could divide without sinning. How does 
Parker’s notion of the arbitrary nature of the form of government compare with other 
seventeenth century’s accounts of the same idea? 
 In the idea of “indifferent, and arbitrarie” choice in the foundation of 
government, Parker is echoing the theory of permissive natural law.91 This idea, 
medieval in origin, was part of a division of natural law into two kinds, immutable 
commands and permissive or suppositional laws. Two sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century uses of this idea help to clarify Parker’s account of government formation. First, 
in Francisco Suárez’s formulation, while commands, such as the Decalogue, are 
immutable, permissive laws cover those things, such as liberty and common property, 
that can be altered by human laws.92 In particular, in the important case of liberty, we 
can see that while by nature men are free, they can lose that liberty. That is, while the 
law of nature allows for liberty, there is no immutable right to it.93 The question, for 
                                                     
91 In the following discussion of Suárez and Grotius, I follow Brain Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 301-42. 
92 Ibid., 306. 
93 Ibid., 306. 
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Suárez, is under which circumstances can this right be alienated? For instance, can a 
conqueror enslave a population without breaking any laws of nature? To understand his 
answer to this question, Tierney turns to Suárez’s discussion of the origins of states. In 
the background of this formulation of the formation of government, Tierney finds the 
medieval concept of corporations: “[t]he subtext of much early modern writing on the 
origin of state was the doctrine of medieval corporation law asserting that a group of 
scattered individuals had no inherent jurisdiction but that such a power did inhere in 
the same persons united into a corporate body.”94 Thus, a group of people can come 
together and by an act of agreement form a political body. The problem remains of how 
the political body can have sovereign powers which do not inhere in the individual 
subjects, such as capital punishment. For Suárez such power is innate in human nature, 
but does not manifest itself until humans form societies.95 In this, we find a different 
type of suppositional law: “a law that came into play only as a result of some preceding 
human act.”96 Since sovereign power derives from a permissive law, the community can 
alienate it and yield it to a ruler. Once this power is grated to the ruler, the people 
cannot reclaim it.97 But this does not simply mean that a conqueror can tyrannically 
enslave a population. Suárez insists that while, for the good of the community, a ruler 
                                                     
94 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 309. 
95 Ibid., 309-10. 
96 Ibid., 311. 
97 Ibid., 312. 
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can deprive given citizens of liberty or property, he must have just cause.98 Indeed, if a 
ruler begins to behave tyrannically, the community as a whole, under the right to self-
defense, can licitly depose him.99 Hugo Grotius, also developing this medieval notion of 
double natural law, traces the idea of sovereign power a step further back than what we 
have just seen in Suárez. Political powers, such as capital punishment, which for Suárez 
exist only in the corporate body, are, for Grotius, inherent in the individual.100 Grotius’ 
view that no one can yield a power that he does not have leads him to conclude that for 
full sovereign power to be present in the community, it had to be first in the 
individuals.101 Tierney notes that while Grotius’ statement that all powers of the 
commonwealth are inherent in the individual before political association may seem very 
individualistic, his overall treatment of political association is more nuanced.102 A 
community is not a simple collection of independent individuals. In Grotius’ work, we 
find that “individual rights could flourish only in a well-ordered society; but a society 
could flourish only if the individual members cared, not only for their own well-being, 
but for that of their fellow members and of the whole community. Grotius does not 
confront us with isolated individuals facing an omnipotent state but with human 
                                                     
98 Ibid., 313. 
99 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 314. More precisely, in the case of a tyrant who comes to the throne 
without legal authority, each individual citizen can depose or kill him. But for a legal ruler who persistently 
acts tyrannically, the agreement of the community is necessary before he can be deposed (Tierney, 314). It is 
worth adding that Suárez’s condemnation of divine right and patriarchal theories of kingship led to the 
burning of his work in London in 1613 (Sommerville, Politics and Ideology, 63). 
100 Ibid., 333. 
101 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 334. 
102 Ibid., 334-5. 
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persons, sociable by nature, bound by ties of friendship and mutual support, each 
acknowledging a duty to respect the rights of others.”103 But ultimately, Grotius 
concludes that people can absolutely yield all their rights to a ruler and bind themselves 
into slavery.104 
 Thus, the idea of permissive laws and the indifference in choice of form of 
government could be used both to justify rebellion against a tyrant and to claim that a 
people could bind itself into slavery. As we have seen, Parker’s own solution is to deny 
that we can enslave ourselves to a tyrant. But we have also seen that he denies that 
private subjects can licitly rebel against Parliament.105 In the Observations, Parker arrived 
at this conclusion by focusing on the nature of Parliament as a representative body; in 
Jus Populi, he supports his discussion of representation with a more developed 
discussion of consent. The notion of consent emerges through Parker’s reading of the 
example of Abraham and Lot. This story demonstrates that the need for original consent 
and choice in establishing a form of government is supported by Scripture. This original 
                                                     
103 Ibid., 336. 
104 Ibid., 336. 
105 Michael Mendle and Jonathan Scott see Parker as transferring absolute power from the king to Parliament 
(Mendle, Henry Parker and the English Civil War, 86-8; and Scott, England’s Troubles, 150). Indeed Parker does 
deny that “private subjects” can licitly rebel against rulers, including Parliament. But, as we will see in the 
discussion on slavery below, Parker draws a distinction between being ruled by the arbitrary will of an 
unchecked monarch and being ruled by the laws made by a Parliament. Unsurprisingly, the royalist 
warnings that Parker’s arguments for rebellion against the king could be turned against Parliament itself 
proved to be correct. Cromwell, in a letter to Robert Hammond written on November 25, 1648, invoked the 
principle of salus populi suprema lex to argue against the treaty of Newport and to ask “whether this army be 
not a lawful power, called by God to oppose and fight against the king upon some stated grounds” (The 
Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, ed. W. C. Abbott, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1937), I: 677-9, quoted in Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 426). 
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freedom of choice does not, however, extend past the foundational moment in the 
history of a commonwealth. That there is an a freedom in choice of government when a 
people first organizes its form of rule is not in and of itself a justification of rebellion: “I 
speak not this to unsettle any form of Government already founded, and composed, nor 
against the constitution it self, or intention of framing associations: tis sufficient for my 
purpose, if it be proved, that before such foundation or composition every man be left 
free, and not abridged of his own consent, or forced by any Law of God to depart from 
his freedome.”106 Here, I want to draw attention to the difference between Parker and 
Milton on this particular point. As we will see, in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates 
(1649), Milton takes the argument that there is no Scripturally mandated form of 
government a step further than Parker does. In this pamphlet, he argues that “since the 
King or Magistrate holds his autoritie of the people, both originaly and naturally for 
their good in the first place, and not his own, then may the people as oft as they shall 
judge it for the best, either choose him or reject him, retaine him or depose him though 
no Tyrant, merely by the liberty and right of free born Men, to be govern’d as seems to 
them best” (CPW III:206). For Milton, unlike for Parker, “the liberty and right of free 
born Men” allows them to dismantle even established forms of Government at their 
pleasure. 
                                                     
106 Parker, Jus Populi, 5-6. 
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 On pages 7-10, Parker proceeds to quickly and decisively answer a series of 
absolutist arguments based on Scriptural reasoning. Early in this series of arguments 
and answers, Parker reiterates his point that he does not oppose monarchy under all 
conditions, but rather that since “God did not create so vast a distance betwixt man and 
man, as betwixt man and other irrationall creatures […] there was not at first the same 
reason of subjection amongst the one as the other,” and so while “we except nothing 
against order, or a milde subjection, amongst men: we only say that such servility as our 
Adversaries would now fain patronize in Gods name, was never introduced by God, 
Nature, or any good men.”107 This distinction between “milde subjection” and “servility” 
becomes crucial to Parker’s writing. In particular, the structure of the argument of Jus 
Populi makes it difficult to seriously entertain the possibility of a political arrangement in 
which a people binds itself into absolute servitude to a prince. This is not because Parker 
does not raise this possibility, “if a Nation by solemne oath, or otherwise has ingaged it 
self to submit to the will of a Prince absolutely, affirmatively reserving no priviledges, 
but tacitly renouncing all immunities except onely at discretion [of the ruler], I shall not 
seek to destroy such agreement,”108 but rather because this statement comes after a 
discussion of sovereign power as being fundamentally tied to the power and well-being 
                                                     
107 Parker, Jus Populi, 8; emphasis mine. The absolutist argument that Parker is responding to with these lines 
is one based on an analogy between Adam’s sovereignty of creatures and a King’s rule: “Man in his 
innocence received dominion over the creatures immediately from God; and shall we deny that the most 
noble, and excellent government over men [is] from God, or say that it is by humane constitution?” (8). 
108 Parker, Jus Populi, 17. 
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of the people. This is because political power flows directly from the people to the ruler 
and it is directly proportional to the strength of the subjects. To demonstrate this point, 
Parker starts with a distinction between natural and moral causes of sovereign power, 
and then uses this distinction in two ways: first to give an account of a monarch’s 
physical power and honor as naturally and directly proportionate to the power in the 
people he governs, and then to restrict the “moral principle” behind monarchy to “the 
Commission, or indeed that form of qualification by which one Prince differs from 
another in extent of Prerogative.”109 The ruler’s power is dependent on the ongoing 
consent of the people: 
The honour and splendor of Monarchs (two main ingredients of dominion) are 
after a physicall manner derived, the more glorious and noble the people is, the 
more glorious and noble the chief of the people is; and this honour and glory is 
such as flows from the people without wasting itself, in the act of flowing. In the 
like manner puissance, and force, it has a naturall production from the people 
(and this is another principall ingredient of Empire) the more strength there is in 
such or such a Nation, the more strong is he who commands that Nation: and yet 
that puissance which by perpertuall consent passes into the supreme 
Commander, does not so passe from the people, but that it retains its ancient site, 
and subject of inherence.110 
 
In his reading of the Scriptural example of Abraham and Lot, Parker had found the need 
for consent by each individual at the foundational moment of a form of government, 
                                                     
109 Parker, Jus Populi, 17. 
110 Ibid., 16-7. Indeed, even in the case of conquest, the eventual consent of the people is found to be 
necessary. In answering the argument for absolute monarchy by right of conquest, Parker argues that 
“[there] is no reason we should be now remedilessly opprest, because our Ancestors could not defend 
themselves against your oppression” (15). Moreover, conquest itself ultimately has to acquire legitimate 
power by consent of the conquered, “neither was any Conquest ever yet accomplisht without some 
subsequent consent in the party conquered” (13-4). 
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“every man [must] be left free, and not abridged of his own consent.” Here, in 
considering the source of political power, Parker argues that a “perpetuall consent” of 
the people is necessary in sustaining a prince’s sovereignty; a king’s power is supported 
by the ongoing consent of the people.  
 What is the nature of this ongoing consent? Parker clarifies how both honor and 
power are transferred by the people to the king with two similes. He first compares the 
relationship between subjects and ruler with that of husband and wife, and then in turn 
explains this marital relation in astronomical terms: “The woman is coruscant by the 
rayes of her husband, borrowing resplendence like the Moon from the Suns aspect, 
without losse or diminution to the fountain and cause of that coruscance. In the same 
manner Princes derive honour and power from their Subjects, yet drain not at all the 
source which derives it.”111 In this simile, Parker inverts the standard royalist image of 
the king as husband and the people as wife.112 As in the Observations, here too, Parker 
argues that if a king loses the consent of the people, he loses his power. However, in Jus 
Populi, the nature of this transfer of power is elaborated in more detail than in the earlier 
tract. In the parallels between political power, marriage, and the sun and the moon, we 
also see the dual form which transfer of power takes. It is both natural and customary. 
The king’s power is derived through consent from the power of his subjects both as the 
                                                     
111 Parker, Jus Populi, 17. 
112 This point is made by Victoria Kahn, who argues that Parker in Jus Populi first inverts the standard 
marital metaphor for the political contract and then rejects it altogether (Wayward Contracts, 102-3). 
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moon’s natural “borrowing” of light from the sun and as a wife’s customary 
“borrowing” of the “rayes of her husband.” At the same time, the astronomical model 
hides by which means political power is transferred. As in his description of the creation 
on laws in the Observations, in Jus Populi, Parker’s metaphor for political association is 
constructed around processes that obscure human agency. In the Observations, as we 
saw, Parker argues that when humans came to live together in societies, “laws agreeable 
to the dictates of reason” were “provided,” but does not specify by whom; in Jus Populi, 
Parker represents the ruler’s power as borrowed from the people just as the light of the 
moon is borrowed from the sun, but does not explain how a political transfer of power 
may differ from a celestial one. 
 Given the repeated insistence in both the Observations and in Jus Populi that 
marital power is not a useful model for sovereign power, it is surprising that Parker uses 
the image of marriage to explain the relationship between subjects and king. In her 
recent Wayward Contracts, Victoria Kahn turns to Parker’s marital imagery in Jus Populi 
to argue that it contradicts the account of political association developed in the 
Observations. For Kahn, Parker is acutely concerned with the “arbitrary” and “artificial” 
nature of the political contract. She argues that in the Observations Parker had come to 
understand political association as contractual and, therefore, artificial and arbitrary.113 
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In her account, by using the comparison of political association with marriage in Jus 
Populi, Parker betrays a resistance to his own insight: 
From an argument about the divine and natural subordination of wife to 
husband, Parker moves to a conception of marital relations as socially and 
politically constituted […] in Jus Populi Parker exposes the radical implications of 
his own contractual model of obligation. His diametrically opposed 
interpretations of the marriage analogy imply that marriage cannot be the 
natural term that grounds our understanding of political obligation. Rather, all 
contracts—including marriage—are civil artifacts, that is, a matter of negotiation 
and consent, with everything that that implies for political resistance and 
divorce. Parker’s resistance to this insight about marriage replicates the tension 
between will and legitimacy in other contemporary instances of the language of 
contract.114 
 
Kahn’s reading is sensitive to Parker’s focus on consent and custom. However, her 
depiction of the Parker’s eventual rejection of the marriage analogy is worded in starker 
terms than those used in Jus Populi. This, in turn, distorts her reading of the relationship 
between nature and custom depicted in the pamphlet. For Parker, marital power is 
somewhere between “mere order,” as found amongst angels and devils, and political 
“Jurisdiction.” Indeed, what Parker objects to is the use of marital power as a 
justification for arbitrary and absolute political power as natural. In Jus Populi, a wife’s 
inferiority to her husband is due to nature, but it is regulated by customs and laws. 
Thus, while the husband may naturally rule over his wife, his power is constrained by 
the laws of his nation: “in all nations the power of Husbands is regulated by the publick 
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civill power.”115 If a wife does not willingly obey her husband, the husband can turn to 
the arbitration of an external judge: “recourse must be had to an impartiall judicature, 
where either party may be indifferently heard.”116 As we have seen, Parker repeatedly 
downplays the power relationships implicated in the formation of crucial political 
institutions, such as laws, by representing them as the result of “natural” or inevitable 
processes. His discussion of marriage is no exception: a wife ought to willingly obey her 
husband because “Nature teaches wives to look upon their husbands interests, as their 
own.”117 At the same time, his comparison of political association with marriage 
demonstrates that for Parker a contract like marriage is not simply arbitrary. This can be 
seen in his conclusion that there is little in marital power to support the case for 
arbitrary monarchy: “so much concerning Maritall power, and to shew that nothing can 
be rightly extracted out of it, for the licensing of arbitrary rule in the State.”118 However, 
this is not because marriage itself is merely arbitrary, but rather because it is governed 
by custom and laws.119 The brief treatment of marriage in Jus Populi is in agreement with 
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119 A similarly nuanced understanding of custom and laws can be found in Samuel Rutherford discussion of 
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The tract begins by agreeing that, as Romans 13.1 attests, all power in general is from God (1). However, 
Rutherford’s answer to the question of how political power, in particular, is formed differs from both 
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the picture of marriage found in the Puritan household manuals discussed in chapter 
two. 
 Victoria Kahn’s reading of Henry Parker’s attack on absolute rule in chapter four 
of Wayward Contracts is part of a larger analysis of early modern conceptions of political 
obligation. Parker is read in the context of a new discourse of contract, and in particular 
of contracts binding the individual into voluntary servitude, arising in the seventeenth 
                                                     
 
Parker’s and the royalist position. “All civill power,” Rutherford explains, “is immediately from God in its 
root. In that, 1. God hath made man a sociall creature, and one who inclineth to be governed by man; then 
certainly, he must have put this power in mans nature […]. 2. God and nature intendeth the policie and 
peace of mankind, then must God and nature have given to mankinde, a power to compasse this end; and 
this must be a power of Government” (2). In this discussion, Rutherford is very close to Suárez’s formulation, 
whom he quotes: “Politick power of Government, agreeth not to man, singly, as one man, except in that root 
of reasonable nature; but supposing that men by combined in societies […], it is naturally, that they joyn in a 
civill societie, though the manner of Union in a politick body; [as] Suarez saith, That a power of making 
Laws, is given by God as a property flowing from nature” (2). Thus, for Rutherford, saying that all power is 
from God, does not deny that “the Communitie orderly conveened, as it includeth all the Estates civill, have 
hand, and are to act in choosing their Rulers” (59). Indeed, answering Maxwell’s argument in Sacro-sancta 
regum majestas that by analogy to nature, where the better creatures rule over the inferior, we should see that 
monarchy is a divinely mandated form of government, Rutherford rejects reasoning based on simple 
analogies to the animal world. Government is indeed natural, but the specific form is decided by each 
people: “We teach that Government is naturall, not voluntary; but the way and manner of Government is 
voluntarie: all societies should be quickly ruined, if there were no Government: but it followeth not 
therefore, God hath made some Kings, and that immediately, without the intervening consent of the people, 
and ergo, it is no arbitrary to the people to choose one supreme Ruler, and to erect a Monarchie, or to choose 
moe Rulers, and to erect and Aristocracie. It followeth no way. It is naturall to men to expresse their minde in 
human voices; Is not speaking of this or that language, Greeke rather than Latine, (as Aristotle saith) […] by 
humane institution? It is naturall for men to eat; ergo, election of this or that meat is not in their choise. What 
reason is in this consequence?” (66). Just as we need food to nourish us and language to express our 
thoughts, we also need a form of government for our own good, “God hath given to every societie a faculty 
of preserving themselves, and warding off violence and injuries” (66), but whether we speak Latin or Greek, 
whether we eat one food or another, whether we establish a monarchy or a democracy is not dictated by 
divine law. The comparison between language and government allows Rutherford to illustrate what it 
means for a natural power—given to humans by God—to only express itself once humans join in society. 
While every individual is naturally prone to learning a language, it is only by being in the society of other 
humans that he or she may actually learn to speak a given language. 
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century. This new discourse is part of a shift in both legal reality and in political theory. 
Starting with the legal framework, Kahn traces a shift in jurisdiction of economic 
contracts in late Tudor England from ecclesiastical courts to common law courts.120 This 
was first accomplished in cases dealing with sale and transfer of property. While cases 
involving debt used to be adjudicated in ecclesiastical courts, starting with St. German’s 
Doctor and Student, they become increasingly regarded as under the jurisdiction of 
common law courts as cases of breach of promise.121 In this shift, Kahn sees an increasing 
emphasis on intention in legal theory dealing with contracts and an accompanying 
“secularization of conscience.”122 Kahn posits that, in the seventeenth century, this 
secularization of conscience was reflected in the growing arguments over political 
obligation, subjections, and the legal status of loyalty oaths.123 How far can political 
obligation be taken? Can we bind ourselves into slavery? Kahn compares Parker to 
Grotius. Parker, unlike Grotius, “for whom slavery was the logical extreme of contract,” 
sees “slavery and contract as incompatible.”124 Grotius joins an Aristotelian “social view 
of human nature” with a “new psychology of political obligations,” in which fear and 
                                                     
120 Kahn, 42. 
121 Ibid., 44. This change in theoretical understanding of economical contracts was codified into legal reality 
by Slade’s Case in 1602 (Kahn, 45). 
122 Kahn, 43. The topic of “secularization of conscience” is a too large to be handled within the scope of this 
dissertation, but for a different analysis than Kahn’s, see Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007). 
123 Ibid., 7-8. 
124 Ibid., 103. 
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self-interest serve as motives for cooperation.125 In Kahn’s account, Grotius’ innovation is 
to take the logic of the right to self-preservation to its logical conclusion and to posit the 
possibility of voluntary servitude: “the slave contract followed from the notion that one 
has property in one’s person and that one may enter into a contract for reasons of self-
preservation.”126 For Parker, on the other hand, “it is a contradiction of our nature and 
our right of self preservation to bind the will absolutely—hence the right of resistance, a 
right based on both conscience and the calculation of self-interests.”127 In Kahn’s account, 
the passage in which Parker concedes that a people may irrevocably bind themselves, is 
a concession to irrational behavior in Jus Populi: “In making this concession, Parker once 
again exposed one of the dilemmas at the heart of contract: that of reconciling will and 
legitimacy, the free exercise of discretion with the constraints of reason—or unreason. 
This is the problem of voluntary servitude, a problem, Parker has vainly argued, that 
has no right to exist.”128 
 This reading of Parker’s unwilling encounter with “the problem of voluntary 
servitude” is dependent of a view of all contracts as “civil artifacts, that is, a matter of 
negotiation and consent.” Kahn’s analysis, however, avoids paying attention to such 
                                                     
125 Ibid., 60, 61. 
126 Ibid., 62. Kahn traces a further development in Grotius’ thought in which he comes to “feel that necessity 
and fear were servile and base motives, characteristics of comic lowlife rather than of rational political 
subjects. In this view, voluntary servitude was no longer the logical extension of the political contract but its 
irrational other” (63). 
127 Ibid., 103. 
128 Ibid., 104. 
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statements as those made by Parker when he says that he does not mean to upset settled 
forms of government. While contracts are indeed civil artifacts, they are not the kind of 
civil artifacts that can be taken apart without potentially catastrophic risk. Indeed, as we 
have seen earlier, the king’s refusal to call Parliament is in part problematic for Parker 
because it risks returning to the pre-representative times in his history of government 
when the abuses of a king would lead to violent rebellion. It is this risk of rebellion that 
makes the need for consent so important. If the people return to civil war, the king loses 
the fundamental power of protection, the power for which kingship was created in the 
first place: “To do the office of a Protector, is the most proper, and therefore the most 
excellent, and incommunicable prerogative of a King, yet, even that power by which he 
is made capable of protecting, issues solely from the adherence, consent, and unity of the 
people.”129 That is, there is no power or prerogative that a king has which does not flow 
from the ongoing consent of his people. It is thanks to these considerations that Parker 
can label the idea of a people biding themselves to servitude as most unlikely and 
unnatural: “I onely say such agreements are not the effects of Nature, and tis not easie to 
imagine how right reason should ever mingle with such a moral principle, as gave being 
to such an agreement, especially when it renders the Prince, who for honour and power 
has his perpetuall dependence upon the people, yet more honourable and powerfull in 
                                                     
129 Parker, Jus Populi, 17. 
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reputation of others then the people, and that by the expresse grant of the people.”130 For 
Parker, the ongoing consent of the people is both the foundation of and it is preserved 
by a just and peaceable form of social life. 
3.3 Slavery and Breaking the Bonds of Justice 
 Servility, for Parker, is not only unlikely and unnatural, it damages the 
commonwealth. Parker uses Aristotle’s distinction in the Politics between paternal, 
marital, and servile relationships to argue that the latter is inappropriate in the 
government of a commonwealth. Reminding the reader that the end of all government is 
the good of the people governed, Parker points out that “[s]ervile power is tolerated, 
because it tends to the safety and good of him that is subject to it; but as Aristotle holds, 
3. Pol. c. 4, the master in protecting his servant does not look upon his servants ends 
herein, but his own, because the losse of his servant, would be a losse to his family.”131 
While servile power may be for the good of the servant, it is only so incidentally and not 
essentially. Thus, this type of rule cannot be tolerated in a commonwealth “because it is 
incompetent with liberty, provided onely for slaves, and such as have no true direct 
interest in the State.”132 Parker’s move here is to take Aristotle’s exclusion of slaves, 
                                                     
130 Ibid., 17-8. 
131 Parker, Jus Populi, 28. Here, Parker seems to be referring to Book III, chapter 6 (rather than 4) of The 
Politics, in which Aristotle distinguished between the rule of the master over his slaves, in which “is 
exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but accidentally considers the slave,” and the 
rule of the head of the household over wife and children, which is “exercised in the first instance for the 
good of the governed or for the common good of both parties” (1278b-1279a). 
132 Parker, Jus Populi, 28. 
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laborers, and artisans from active participation in the polis—they could not be citizens—
and to deduce from it that a servile form of government cannot be the correct 
relationship between king and subjects in a commonwealth.133 The original, created 
human freedom inherent in each subject cannot be subsumed into serving an end that is 
against his own good: “Servility and slaverie (if it be rightly defined) is that odious and 
unnaturall condition, which subjects and necessitates a man to a false end, or to such an 
end, as God and Nature in his creation never did intend him for.”134 Moreover, not only 
does servile rule violate the true end of the subjects, but it also deviates from the king’s 
own “true excellence and perfection of that publick divine end, for which they were 
ordained.”135 To demonstrate this point, Parker first argues that slavery in private 
households is detrimental to the commonwealth (16-18) and then uses this groundwork 
to argue against arbitrary royal government.136 At the beginning of this argument, 
Parker again turns to Aristotle for his definition of a slave and uses this definition to 
argue against despotic rule in the household.137 This form of rule is, in a sense, no proper 
                                                     
133 Parker does, however, also make an appeal to the sovereign’s self interest by arguing that a Prince who 
governs for his subjects will never lack the means to be powerful, as demonstrated by the example of 
Elizabeth: “Therefore does Aristot. 8. Ethic. c. 10. Maintain, that Kings do not regard their own particulars, 
but the community of their Subjects; because there is a self-sufficiencie, and perfection in good Kings whilest 
they cannot be said to want that, which their subjects have. Queen Elizab. By her publick actions doubted 
not to win her Subjects hearts, and being possessed of her Subjects hearts, she doubted not but to command 
bother their hands and purses, and what else could she want to make her truly great and glorious?” (29). 
134 Parker, Jus Populi, 30. 
135 Ibid., 30. 
136 Ibid., 36-42. 
137 “A slave (according to Aristotle) is he, who is so wholly his Lords, as that he hath no propertie remaining 
in himself: he only lives, or hath a being to his Lord; but is as dead, nay nothing to himself” (36). Parker does 
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government at all: “This power gives the Lord an absolute, arbitrarie interest in the 
slave; and it cannot be called Jurisdiction, because it proposeth no ends of Justice in it 
selfe.”138 Like Herle, Parker sees arbitrary rule as violating the principles of justice in a 
commonwealth. But in using Aristotle, Parker has to contend with the philosopher’s 
assumption that certain people are natural slaves.139 On one level, this claim can be 
quickly answered in the negative: no man may be held in slavery to his own detriment. 
The question still remains, however, of whether in certain cases a master’s arbitrary rule 
may not in fact be in the best interest of the slave. That is, whether some men are so 
servile by nature as to need the direction of an absolute master. 
 In the subsequent pages, Parker systematically presents arguments answering 
this question in the negative. In the first place, a slave is left “utterly disinherited of 
himself, and subject to his masters sole ends: Now that which tends not to the 
preservation, is not naturall, but violent, and consequently, to be abhorred.”140 Here 
Parker re-affirms the idea that each creature seeks its own self-preservation. However, 
since a slave is but an instrument of the master, his or her own natural desire for self-
                                                     
 
not give a reference to the passage of Aristotle to which he is referring. However, his wording is reminiscent 
of The Politics, Book I, Chapter 4 (1253b-1254a). The context of this section of The Politics would be relevant to 
Parker’s argument. Just before this section, in Chapter 3, Aristotle introduces his discussion by considering 
how political rule differs from household management: “For some are of the opinion that the rule of a 
master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political 
and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same” (1253b17-20). 
138 Parker, Jus Populi, 36. 
139 Aristotle raises this question at the very end of Chapter 3 in Book I of The Politics. 
140 Parker, Jus Populi, 37. 
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preservation has to be subsumed into the ends and desires of the master, thus 
potentially going against the order of nature.141 Moreover, in slavery, not only is each 
servant’s interest in himself violated, but the entire’s commonwealth’s interest in each 
subject is usurped by the master’s claim, that is, “Servile Government does not onely 
shew it self iniurious and violent in devesting the propriety of those which are subjected 
to it, but also the more publike and sublime propriety; which the Common-wealth, the 
Society of Mankinde, nay God himself has in the parties enslaved.”142 In this section of 
Jus Populi, Parker supports his argument for the right to self-defense by using, without 
explicitly citing it, Aristotle’s argument against self-harm. In the final section of his 
discussion of justice in Book 5 of The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle considers the question 
of whether someone can voluntarily be treated unjustly and, in particular, whether it is 
possible to commit injustice towards oneself. To clarify the question, Aristotle considers 
the problem of suicide: “A person who cuts his throat in a fit of anger is doing this 
voluntarily, contrary to correct reason, and the law does not allow this; so he is acting 
unjustly. But towards whom?” (1138a10-13). For Aristotle, the answer is clear; the 
injustice is not towards the self, who has acted voluntarily, but towards the polis: “Surely 
                                                     
141 As Aristotle put it in Book I, Chapter 4 of The Politics, “a slave is a living possession, and property a 
number of such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument for instruments” (1253b31-5). 
142 Parker, Jus Populi, 37. In reading this part of Parker’s argument against natural slavery, I disagree with 
Victoria Kahn who sees Parker as arguing that a natural slave “is a contradiction in terms because slavery 
‘rob[s men] of that natural interest which they have in themselves’” (103; emphasis mine; emendation due to 
Kahn). Kahn’s focus agrees with Tuck’s reading of Parker as developing a primitive version of individual 
rights. But these readings tend to downplay Parker’s emphasis on the community’s interest in the 
individual. 
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towards the city, not himself, since he suffers voluntarily, and no one voluntarily suffers 
injustice? This is why the city imposes a penalty, and a kind of dishonor attaches to the 
person who has done away with himself, on the ground that he has perpetrated an 
injustice against the city” (1138a13-6).143 The logic of Aristotle’s argument against suicide 
is in the background of Parker’s demonstration that a master’s absolute rule over his 
slaves injures the entire community: “If the lord may destroy his slave at pleasure, then 
he may destroy that, which in part is belonging to another: then the condition of a slave 
is worse than of a beast, or any inanimate Cattels; and this is most unnaturall, and 
publikely detrimentall.”144 Moreover, while the concept that we may not destroy that 
which belongs to others can be read, as Aristotle does, to condemn suicide, the logic of 
slavery makes it so that nothing restrains a master from killing a slave since the slave 
becomes the exclusive property of the master, divesting the community of its stake in the 
                                                     
143 Terence Irwing, in his notes on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, clarifies this point: “The specific form of 
‘dishonor’ (atimia) that Aristotle has in mind is the loss of status of a free citizen […] and hence the 
withdrawal of civil rights” (238). Having injured the polis, the suicide loses his status as a member of the 
political community. Aristotle’s argument against suicide was followed by Aquinas in the Summa: “I answer 
that, It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, 
the result being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists corruptions so far as it can. 
Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love 
himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the natural law and to charity. Secondly, 
because every part, as such, belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so, as such, 
he belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he injures the community, as the Philosopher 
declares. Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to His power, Who kills and makes to live. 
Hence whoever takes his own life, sins against God, even as he who kills another's slave, sins against that 
slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to 
God alone to pronounce sentence of death and life, according to Deuteronomy 32:39, ‘I will kill and I will 
make to live’” (II-II:64.5, Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province and re-issued by Cambridge University Press, 2006). Calvin, on the other hand, rejected this line of 
reasoning (Jeffrey R. Watt, “Calvin on Suicide,” Church History 66 (September 1997): 470-1). 
144 Parker, Jus Populi, 37. 
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slave’s person: “by these Rules [do not destroy what belongs to others], no man may 
abuse himself: yet these restrain not from abusing slaves; these deny not, but a lord may 
have a more confined power over his slave, than he has over himself. Seneca would not 
admit, that the masters right in the slave should derogate from the right of himself in 
himself, much lesse of others.”145 This is a crucial move in Jus Populi. It explains why 
Parker sees arbitrary rule as being fundamentally incompatible with justice. By denying 
the interest that the community may have in the slave, the master removes the slave 
from the bonds of justice. 
 I want to pause here to point out what is at stake in this description of slavery 
and its relationship, or lack thereof, to justice. For Parker, justice is simply not possible 
when a certain class of humans, slaves, is under the arbitrary rule of a particular person, 
their master. It is not just that the master may rule violently and therefore unjustly, 
though Parker will address that case as well, it is that justice simply cannot be found in 
the master-slave relationship. By removing the slave from the rule of law, servitude 
renders the slave dead to justice. To a certain extent, Parker is following Aristotle by 
                                                     
145 Parker, Jus Populi, 37.The rules alluded to in this sentence are mentioned by Parker in the previous lines: 
“Sic utere tuo, ne noceas alieno: sic utere privato, ne noceas publico” (37). Here Parker seems to be 
paraphrasing the common maxim of property law: “Prohibetur ne quis faciat in suo quod nocere possit alieno: et 
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas” (quoted by Coke, “William Aldred’s Case” in The Reports of Sir Edward 
Coke, Knt. In Thirteen Parts (1826), 107. HeinOnline. December 10, 2010. 
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linking justice with life in the polis, under its laws.146 In Book I of The Politics, Aristotle 
describes a man who either cannot or does not need to live in a State as being “either a 
beast or a god” (1253a29). In the polis, a man can grow in virtue and then he “is the best 
of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all […]. But 
justice is the bond of men in states; for the administration of justice, which is the 
determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society” (1253a32-3, 37-
40). Aristotle also makes it clear that natural slaves are such because they cannot 
participate in the life of the polis directly, they are defective as humans and, to a certain 
extent, resemble animals more than freemen. A natural slave is someone who 
“participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have [it]” (1254b22-23).147 Such 
people cannot participate in the bond of justice because they do not participate in reason 
enough to be fully part of the polis.148 Why does this matter? In chapter two, I argued 
that Milton’s reasoning in the divorce tracts is symptomatic of an understanding of our 
relationships with others that is very similar to that of the skeptic as presented by 
                                                     
146 In this account of Aristotle’s conception of justice, I am a following MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality?, especially pages 95-99. 
147 Aristotle does distinguish between animals and natural slaves. In the sentences immediately following 
the one quoted in the text, he goes on to clarify: “Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend reason, 
they obey their passions” (1254b23-4; emphasis mine). But this difference does not seem to translate strongly 
in practice: “indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with their 
bodies minister to the needs of life” (1254b24-5). 
148 The connection between reason and justice is made clear Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. See also, page 
97 in MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, as well as: “For Aristotle, […] justice properly so-called is 
exercised between free and equal citizens of one and the same polis, and although justice may be at stake in 
certain limited ways in other relationships—in commercial or military treaties or in relationships to wives, 
children, and slaves—by and large the scope of justice is defined by the boundaries of this particular polis” 
(Whose Justice, 146; emphasis mine). 
 248 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s work is also illuminating in trying to understand the logic 
behind Parker’s argument on slavery and justice. To explain the connection, I will build 
on the discussion on skepticism from the previous chapter to include Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of the idea of a private language. 
 In Part 4 of The Claim of Reason, Cavell discusses Wittgenstein’s work on private 
language from the later remarks of The Philosophical Investigations. The strand of 
discussion that I want to focus on begins with Wittgenstein’s remarks on the idea that a 
sensation may be private.149 Remark 258 introduces Wittgenstein’s example of how a 
(rudimentary) private language might work. He describes a hypothetical situation in 
which “I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I 
associate it with the sign ‘S’ and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I 
have the sensation.”150 One of the goals of this remark is to show what a private 
language would have to be. That is, that a private language is not merely a secret 
language, like a made up one between children, but rather a language that no one other 
                                                     
149 Following Cavell, I will focus on the series of remarks beginning with the discussion of pain in §244. 
150 The remark is worth quoting in full as it unfolds the attempt to create an entry in a private vocabulary, 
including an attempt to formulate a private ostensive definition: “Let us imagine the following case. I want 
to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign ‘S’ and 
write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation.——I will remark first of all that a 
definition of the sign cannot be formulated.—But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition.—
How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the 
same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation—and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.—But what is 
this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a 
sign.—Well, that is done precisely by the concentration of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself 
the connexion between sign and the sensation.—But “I impress it on myself” can only mean: this process 
brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion 
of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means 
that here we can’t talk about ‘right’” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, remark 258). 
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than me could understand. Cavell calls this getting into the mood of the fantasy of a 
private language where “I could not, in principle, give [a] person the meaning (or the 
use) of the sign in such a way that he could use it.”151 If, on the other hand, another 
person could have a use for the private mark ‘S,’ the description given in §258 furnishes 
that person with all he or she may need to use the same mark in their own calendar. But 
how does someone else know what this private sensation is? Cavell puts it this way: 
“Whether you have really appreciated the quality of the sensation of mine which so 
interest me, or understand why I take such an interest in it, is a matter generally of who 
we are and what our relationship is. I may have great difficulty in describing it for you, 
but that itself may contribute to your appreciation of it.”152 Cavell’s claim that one’s 
difficulty in describing a sensation to another may be part of what helps the other 
understand it is dependent on Wittgenstein’s description of how we learn the meaning 
of sensation words, such as ‘pain,’ in the first place. In remark 244, Wittgenstein clarifies 
how words refer to sensations: “how does a human being learn the meaning of the 
names of sensations?—of the word ‘pain’ for example. Here is one possibility: words are 
connected with the primitive, the natural, expression of the sensation and used in their 
place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him 
exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour” (§244). The 
                                                     
151 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 347. 
152 Ibid., 348-9. 
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original writer of the mark ‘S’ can appreciate his own sensation marked by ‘S’ only in so 
far as he can work towards sharing it with others. That is, both Wittgenstein and Cavell 
depict our apprehending—rather than simply having—our own sensations as forming 
pari passus with our learning language and shared behavior.  
  How is the idea of a private language related to slavery? In these remarks, we 
are asked to distinguish between privacy and subjectivity. What matters about a 
sensation is not that it is private or unique: “The importance about my sensation is that I 
have it. The uniqueness in question points not to some necessary difference between my 
sensation and yours (for there may be no significant difference between them), but to the 
necessary difference between being you and being me, the fact that we are two.”153 The 
fantasy of a private language is presented by Cavell as a relentless focus on the idea that 
what matters about a sensation is that it is fundamentally mine and no one else can have 
it. But this is exactly what Wittgenstein denies in what Cavell calls one of the morals of 
the Investigations: “The fact, and the state, of your (inner) life cannot take its importance 
from anything special in it. However far you have gone with it, you will find that what 
is common is there before you are.”154 To put this another way, the Investigations refuse 
to let us insist that we have a private, and therefore privileged, position with respect to 
others. And in turn, this restores a dignity to the other that the fantasy of private 
                                                     
153 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 356. 
154 Ibid., 361. 
 251 
language risks to take away. More specifically, in the context of arguments about 
slavery, Wittgenstein’s uncovering of the problems of the arguments for private 
language shows that justice cannot apply to me in a privileged way while excluding 
certain others. To see this better, we need to clarify the distinction between privacy and 
subjectivity and then turn to Wittgenstein’s remarks on aspects and on his description of 
the body as a picture of the soul. The picture of Wittgenstein’s remarks on privacy 
sketched by Cavell in the fourth part of The Claim of Reason is meant in part to dismantle 
the confusion between being different individuals and privacy. This is what he calls the 
difference between being separate, a necessary part of being embodied, and being 
separated. More precisely, Cavell diagnoses the problem of skepticism on this respect as 
a confusion about the idea of knowing. The skeptic feels that each subject is in a 
privileged position with respect to his own sensations and that this position is necessarily 
exclusive. The idea of privacy “is an impression of necessary secrecy and that secrecy 
and privacy share the idea of excludedness or exclusiveness.”155 Cavell here looks at the 
statement of the skeptic that while I can only know what others feel indirectly through 
what others do and say, for instance cry out in pain, the other person actually and 
directly knows his or her own sensation: “And not only does he know, he must. My 
necessary failure of knowledge is his necessary success.”156 The problem with his idea, 
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Cavell points out, is that it speaks of knowing in the wrong way. What would it mean 
for someone to know that they are in pain? They have the sensation. But that is not the 
same as knowing: “Perhaps we are forced to the concept of knowledge here, hence 
employ a forced concept of knowledge, because we do not quite know how to speak of 
the other’s aliveness to himself, his being together with himself, by himself, in as it were 
a private place, a place he has to himself.”157 In chapter two, I quoted Marjorie Grene’s 
version of the idea of being present to oneself as distinguishing between knowledge and 
subjectivity. Her formulation is helpful in understanding what Cavell is discussing: 
“True, I am ‘within’ my own experiences and not some one else’s; but this ‘insideness’ is 
mere subjectivity, not knowledge. To suffer pain, to feel cold, is immediate and 
unquestioned, and ‘within’, but it is simply, it is not knowledge. To know is to interpret 
clues of which I am only subsidiarily aware.”158 
 Our embodied experience leads the skeptic to view the body as hiding what is 
inside. In this state of mind, the body is a wall or a veil hiding the soul from view. Cavell 
takes this to indicate that when we think of the body as a veil, we get a sense that “there 
is something we cannot see, not merely something we cannot know.”159 This is 
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something that Wittgenstein is trying to get us to see differently.160 In section four of the 
second part of The Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein shifts the focus from “I know 
that he is pain” to “I believe that he is suffering,” or, “I believe that he is not an 
automaton.” What would I be trying to convey with these statements? In which 
situations would I utter them? The statements alone do not make sense. Wittgenstein 
puts it this way: “My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the 
opinion that he has a soul.”161 What does this mean? Wittgenstein asks us to imagine 
what it means to understand the idea that a soul can exist after death: “Now do I 
understand this teaching?—Of  course I understand it——I can imagine plenty of things 
in connexion with it. And haven’t pictures of these things been painted? And why 
should such a picture be only an imperfect rendering of the spoken doctrine? Why 
should it not do the same service as the words? And it is the service which is the 
point.”162 It is following this series of questions that Wittgenstein tells us that the 
“human body is the best picture of the human soul.”163 With this remark, Wittgenstein 
gets to the point that the human soul is not hidden, but rather visible in the body. The 
body, like the picture, does the same service. As Cavell glosses this passage, if I fail to 
see another’s soul, it is not because the body is hiding it: “The block to my vision of the 
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other is not the other’s body but my incapacity or unwillingness to interpret or to judge 
it accurately, to draw the right connections. The suggestion is: I suffer a kind of 
blindness, but I avoid the issue by projecting this darkness upon the other.”164 This kind 
of blindness is not congenital, but rather it “could be thought of as a kind of illiteracy; a 
lack of education.”165 Cavell specifies what he means by “kind of blindness” by 
developing Wittgenstein’s example of the duck-rabbit. Body and soul are like two 
aspects of the duck-rabbit: it is not so much a matter of having to get through or beyond 
the one to reach the other, but rather they are two aspects, which are at the same level. 
By analogy, “[w]e may say that the rabbit-aspect is hidden from us when we fail to see 
it. But what hides it is then obviously not the picture (that reveals it), but our (prior) way 
of taking it, namely in its duck-aspect. […] So we might say: What hides the mind is not 
the body, but the mind itself—his his, or mine his, and contrariwise.”166 That is, it is not a 
necessary blindness, like the idea of a necessary privacy in the skeptic’s image of the self, 
but something that could, if we cared to, be overcome. 
 If it is not our bodies that separate us, what is it then? Cavell, explaining the idea 
of the mind hiding the mind, puts it this way: “If something separates us, comes 
between us, that can only be a particular aspect or stance of the mind itself, a particular 
way in which we relate, or which are related (by birth, by law, by force, in love) to one 
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another—our positions, our attitudes, with reference to one another. Call this our 
history. It is our present.”167 This is not to say that our relationships, the ways in which 
we relate and are related, are something that we need to go beyond in order to get to 
some essential identity—we do not see beyond the duck to see the rabbit. But rather that 
we can let one relationship take over all others. It is by perceiving relationships that we 
grasp aspects, as Wittgenstein shows in the Philosophical Investigations: “what I perceive 
in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation 
between it and other objects.”168 Thus, when Cavell talks about the call for seeing 
individuals as human, say around the isse of slavery, he asks: “But must a human being 
be something in addition, as it were, to being the person he or she is—say a master or a 
slave, or a parent or a child, a writer, a weaver, a stranger? If there are special ways of 
treating persons under such titles, that is because there are ways of behaving peculiar to 
holding them. Is there some special way of behaving peculiar to human beings as 
such?”169 In considering these questions, Cavell interprets the calls for seeing individuals 
as humans as calls for justice. Cavell describes the call for seeing slaves as human beings 
as a call for justice because what the slave-owner is missing is not knowledge: “[h]e may 
know roughly everything about human beings that I know. […] What he really believes 
is not that slaves are human beings, but that some human beings are slaves. […] this 
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man sees certain human beings as slaves, takes them for slaves. He need not claim that all 
such persons ought to be in slavery, merely that it is all right if some are.”170 What are 
the implications of this formulation? Here again the example of the duck-rabbit becomes 
relevant. The slave-owner does not need to know anything more about the slaves than 
he already knows, but rather he needs to see that a certain relationship holds between 
the slaves and justice, that is, that the slaves are relevant to the world of justice. The 
slave owner is “missing something about […] his connection with these people [the 
slaves], his internal relationship with them.”171 That is, he fails to acknowledge, to use 
Cavell’s term, that a certain group of people are to be counted within the realm of 
justice. The slave-owner “will appeal to history, to a form, or rather to a way, of life: this 
is what he does. He believes exactly what justice denies, that history and indefinite 
difference can justify his social difference of position. He need not deny the supremacy 
of justice […]. He need deny only that certain others are to acknowledged as falling 
within this realm.”172 And here we find a return of the problem of the fantasy of a 
private language that Cavell delineated earlier in Part 4 of The Claim of Reason. For the 
slave-owner the slaves are fundamentally separated from him: “he takes himself to be 
private with respect to them, in the end unknowable by them.”173 Because of this, 
because there is something incommunicable between himself and the slaves, he can 
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excuse his position that justice does not apply to them in the same way that it applies to 
him. 
 Aristotle would not have objected to this last statement. In both the Politics and 
the Ethics, slaves are a different kind of humans from free citizens. Justice does not 
extend to them; its scope includes only the encounters between members of the same 
polis. But as we have seen, Henry Parker, in Jus Populi, insists that the bonds of justice tie 
together all members of a commonwealth and brings this notion to bear against the 
Aristotelian idea that some people are natural slaves. Justice is abused in the Greek 
conception of slavery and thus a prince attempting to rule despotically has no proper 
jurisdiction, or political power, over his subjects.174 Moreover, Parker argues that slavery, 
and arbitrary government, leads to acts of abuse towards the slaves: “Arbitrary 
Government does not only rob slaves of that naturall interest which they have in 
themselves, and States of their publike Interests which they have both above lords and 
slaves; but it is often a very strong incentive to cause an abuse of that usurped 
Interest.”175 Parker illustrates this claim with the example of the Roman Vedius Pollio, 
who used to feed the slaves who displeased him to his lampreys.176 The Emperor 
Augustus, witnessing Vedius Pollio’s orders to throw a slave who broke a crystal glass 
into the lampreys’ pond, commands the pond filled with dirt and all of Pollio’s glasses 
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broken. Parker comments that, while this action was commendable, it did not solve the 
fundamental problem because the memorable example of Vedius Pollio is only one of 
the “thousands that might be produced.”177 Slavery, in and of itself, turns both masters 
and slaves into something less than human.178 Indeed, Parker argues that the existence of 
absolute servitude is a sign of a barbaric society: “the extreme rigour of arbitrary 
servitude was scarce ever entertained by any, but barbarous people.”179 In the case of 
Vedius Pollio, the correct solution would have been for Augustus to put all servants 
under the protection of laws. For Parker, servitude ceases to be slavery the moment the 
servant is protected by law: “where slaves are under the protection of other Laws than 
their lords wills, and where they are truly parts and members of the State, and so 
regarded; they cease to be slaves.”180 In that case, masters “might not have been any 
longer incited thereby to such prodigious degrees of inhumanity. By the same reason 
also, as this unbridled License make lords more insulting, it makes those that are 
insulted over the more vindicatives, false, and dangerous. Many horrid Stories might be 
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produced, to prove, that the cruelty of lords has always been retalliated with infidelity, 
hatred and desperate revenge of slaves.”181 Here, the clear threat to masters from 
rebelling and vindictive slaves is reminiscent of the constant threat of violent resistance 
to despotic rulers that we have seen in the Observations. Both domestic and political 
despotic rule are inherently prone to violent overthrow. 
3.4 Persuasion, Interpretation, and the Problem of Consent 
 Having established that both private slavery and despotic political rule are 
intolerable in a just commonwealth, Parker turns again to Biblical history to demonstrate 
that royal power varies from kingdom to kingdom and from time to time. That is, a 
survey of Scripture reveals that no given form of political organization is divinely 
mandated. In particular, Parker focuses his argument to demonstrate that absolute 
power is not granted directly by God. Indeed, the first form of government was mild 
and limited.182 When there were but a few people on the earth, government was truly 
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paternal as it was limited to those within the same family.183 It is important to note that 
for Parker, paternal rule is not meant to be the source and pattern of absolute rule, but 
rather it is an example of limited and gentle government—the opposite of the royalist 
position which, as exemplified by the writings of James I and Filmer, claimed that 
fathers originally had a right of life and death over the members of their household.184 
What prompts a change from this limited form of government to more absolute ones? 
Parker imagines that the power of a ruler would have remained limited if the territory of 
his rule had also continued to be small. Ruling over a larger number of subjects requires 
more discretion of power. However, fear of violence, and in particular, of invasion from 
other peoples prompted families to join with other families and form larger kingdoms.185 
After this observation, Parker turns to the story of Nimrod, a favorite royalist example of 
rule by right of conquest. In Patriarcha, for instance, Filmer points to Nimrod as the first 
monarch and argues that he created his empire by violence and conquest with no 
consent from the conquered people.186 The royalist use of the example of Nimrod 
emphasizes that the very first monarchy was based on violence and thus denies the role 
of the subjects’ consent. Parker is unwilling to concede this point. As he argued in the 
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Observations, no ruler can have power over his people without some form of consent. In 
the case of Nimrod, Scripture does not specify how he acquired his power: “it is left 
utterly uncertain, whether Nimrod laid his foundation upon force, or consent; whether 
he did by his tongue or his sword drive and hunt men out of Woods and the wilde 
Recesses into Towns and Cities: for that force by which he did prevail, can hardly be 
supposed to be it self wholly forced.”187 In Parker’s rendering of the story of Nimrod, the 
speech of the ruler is as important to his power as the sword. Indeed, the sword is never 
sufficient on its own since even if force allowed him to rule, his own force alone could 
not compel all others; some kind of persuasion is necessary. Moreover, the structure of 
the passage itself makes it difficult to extricate force from eloquence. The reader is first 
given the options of “force, or consent” for the basis of Nimrod’s power, but Parker then 
doubts that we can distinguish “whether he did by his tongue or his sword drive and 
hunt men.” In the parallel structure of the two clauses, we find tongue in the latter one 
in the position held by force in the first one. 
 A careful reader of Parker’s argument should however be suspicious of 
Nimrod’s use of rhetoric to create consent to his expansion of his kingdom. As we have 
seen earlier, Parker begins Jus Populi by stating that one of his purposes is to counter the 
false hermeneutics of royalist writers; specious scriptural interpretation along with 
seducing rhetoric is designed to teach English subjects to be docile to a tyrannical king. 
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Parker returns to this theme immediately after his account of Nimrod. He turns to 1 
Samuel 8.10-20, the narrative of Israel’s request of being ruled by kings rather than by 
judges, to demonstrate how royalist writers since James I have misinterpreted this 
Scriptural passage to justify the actions of tyrants.188 This biblical passage, according to 
Parker’s reading, does not outline what kings are allowed to do as a matter of right, but 
it is rather a warning to the Israelites of the likely abuses that a king will impose on 
them: “our Royallists, offer apparant violence to Scripture, when they will make God to 
call the usuall rapine and insolence of Kings, Jus Regis; whereas indeed, the word in the 
Original signifieth nothing but Mos Regis.”189 The royalist reading of 1 Samuel 8 is as 
violent as Nimrod’s tongue and used to the same purpose. Throughout Jus Populi, 
Parker repeatedly attacks royalist readings of Scripture. In particular, he offers his own 
interpretation of Romans 13 as more faithful to the intention of the text than the 
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royalists’ literal reading.190 Parker, in a move that resembles Milton’s approach to 
Matthew 5.32 and Matthew 19.6-9 in the divorce tracts, begins his exposition of Romans 
13 by focusing on the immediate context of the epistle. Since Paul wrote during the 
Roman Empire, it is necessary to understand the specific limits to the power of the 
emperor and of the Senate to understand to what extend Paul expected subjects to obey 
the instituted powers.191 Thus, any reading of the passage requires an understanding of 
the history of Roman government. Moreover, Parker argues that we do not consult 
Scripture in the same manner for everything: 
If our controversies were in credendis, or about things that did exceed the 
compasse of humane understanding, scripture might justly be opposed to policy: 
but when wee are treating of worldly affaires, wee ought to bee very tender how 
we seek to reconcile that to Gods law, which we cannot reconcile to mans equity: 
or how we make God the author of that constitution which man reaps 
inconvenience from.192 
 
While in matters of belief that are beyond “humane understanding,” “mans equity” 
cannot be placed ahead of Scripture, in “worldly affaires,” we must not accuse God of 
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imposing a “constitution which man reaps inconvenience from.” That is, human reason 
and equity can be used to supplement Scripture in matters of sovereignty and 
government. Thus, in their insistence that the Pauline prohibition cannot be contradicted 
by reason, the royalists “lurke between scripture and reason, and to remain in a kind of 
transcient posture, as that they may be confined neither to the one, nor to the other, nor 
yet to both.”193 But ultimately, for Parker, since power derives from the people, arbitrary 
rule is not allowed because it would derive from self-enslavement and self-enslavement 
is a kind of agreement to self-destruction. In particular, Paul could not have commended 
absolute rule since, even in Roman times, the people could not have enslaved 
themselves: “no man will say, that the people had any power to destroy it selfe: and 
what end could the people have (if that Law might bee said to bee the peoples act) in 
inslaving themselves, or giving away the propriety of themselves?”194 
 Dudley Digges’s The Unlawfulnesse of Subjects Taking up Arms against their 
Sovereigne in What Case Whatsoever (1643) is part of the royalist response to Parker’s 
Observations.195 The Unlawfulnesse stands out from other royalist apologia by arguing 
against Parker that subjects can indeed enslave themselves and renounce their original 
liberty: it is but a “pretence” that the people “may justly use their native liberty, and 
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resume their originall power, if civill constitution, which were agreed upon for their 
good, be not effectuall to that end, but prove disadvantageous to them.”196 Digges begins 
his pamphlet by justifying the need for his rebuttal of the Observations by reminding his 
reader, much in the vein of Ferne, Herle, and Parker, that “the greater part of mankind, 
as in other matters, so in this present case, are easily prevailed upon, to make truce with 
conscience, and eagerly prosecute what appears most profitable.”197 For Digges, the 
majority of subjects in any commonwealth are dishonest and incapable to see the full 
consequences of their actions.198 Because of this, the multitude “hath been tempted to 
catch at empty happinesse, and thereby have pulled upon themselves misery and 
destruction.”199 In particular, two principles have been responsible for leading the 
people astray. The first is the idea that the original liberty that is inherent in every man 
allows subjects to rebel whenever their government is perceived as curtailing this native 
freedom. Digges agrees that in the state of nature freedom was the birth-right of 
mankind. But he quickly points out how little this freedom amounts to: “This Freedome 
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was an unlimited power to use our abilities, according as will did prompt. The restraint 
of which would questionlesse have beene very grievous, but that experience did 
demonstrate, it was not so delightfull to do what ever they liked, as it was miserable, to 
suffer as much as it pleased others to inflict.”200 It is thus clear that the restraint of 
natural freedom need not be perceived as painful, but rather as arising necessarily from 
a clash of desires; the pleasure of one curtails the delight of another. Indeed, in this 
description, the state of nature is one of constant fear: “This was their unhappy 
condition, amidst feares and jealousies, wherein each single person look’t upon the 
world as his enemy, and doubted (as formerly Cain, when he was excommunicated and 
cut off from the civill body) lest the hand of every man might be upon him.”201 The 
analogy between the state of nature and the curse placed upon Cain, the founder of the 
first city, creates an image in which even those who are aggressors towards others long 
for constraints and laws. Here, the state of nature is implicitly depicted as 
fundamentally unstable. Cain is cut off from the natural society of his family and he 
longs to rejoin others. This is mirrored whenever a government disintegrates. Then, “an 
insupportable and generall calamity will quickly unite multitudes into a people 
again.”202 
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 For Digges, whenever a government dissolves, there is an almost-automatic 
reforming of the commonwealth under a ruler.203 He does not, however, consider by 
which means this is done. Men in the state of nature quickly perceive the dangers 
inherent in the absence of government and strive to unite into a body politic. Since all 
the evils of the state of nature are due to division, the evident “cure was to make 
themselves one, because no body is at variance with it self.”204 For Digges, the standard 
image of the state as a body gives a divided multitude a principle by which to cure its 
own ills. Because in a physical body each member strives for the well-being of the 
whole, a people in a state of nature—where each fights against all others—will remedy 
its enmity by uniting into a body politic. How is this formation of a body politic 
achieved? Digges imagines the multitude as desiring to form an actual body, but 
“[t]here being no way to effect this naturally, they reduce themselves into a civill unitie, 
by placing over them one head.”205 For this union to work, each member in the body 
politic has to surrender his will to the will of the ruler. However, this joining of wills is 
not unproblematic. The will of each individual commands, but cannot be commanded.206 
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In particular, the will of individuals who do not want to submit to the ruler cannot be 
instructed to desire such subjection. Thus, the union of wills can only be achieved “in a 
politique sense.”207 What does this entail? The political joining of wills “signifies the 
giving up of every mans particular power into his [the ruler’s] disposal, so that he [the 
ruler] may be inabled to force those who are unwilling upon some private ends, to be 
obedient for the common good; otherwise they would enjoy the benefits of others faith 
in observing lawes, and the advantages of their owne violations and breaches.”208 In 
Digges’ version of the history of state formation, what is crucial to social life is not laws 
and their enforcement, the reason for all sovereign power in Parker, but rather the union 
of wills.209 Here, the will of each individual is subsumed to the “common good” at the 
foundational moment of the state. That is, the formation of society is dependent on 
absolute surrender. 
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209 Digges does not deny the subject the right to make judgments. As Sarah Mortimer argues, all that Digges 
requires of the subject is to not act upon judgments which contradict the ruler’s. Presenting an unusually 
permissive position, Digges argues that the subject is free to judge in matters of religion and conscience. In 
his account, this freedom, if understood correctly, cannot prove dangerous to the state since Christianity 
commands obedience to rulers (Reason and Religion in the English Revolution: The Challenge of Socianism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 99-101). Victoria Kahn, on the other hand, sees Digges’ 
writing—especially with Falkland and Chillingworth—as attempting to obscure the “ever –present 
possibility of dissent” (Wayward Contracts, 105). 
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 The second principle that is used to lead the multitude to rebel against the king is 
that of self-preservation. The absolute contracting of the individual will to the sovereign 
inevitably runs against the urge of self-preservation of particular subjects. According to 
Digges, those who advocate this right to self-preservation claim that “the law of nature 
will defend us, whomsoever we kill, though the King, in our owne defence.”210 
However, while self-defense is a “native right,” we have given it up when we “made our 
selves sociable parts in one body.”211 Digges defends this surrendering of the right to 
self-defense through a probabilistic argument; it is more likely that we will not be 
harmed as members of a state than as independent individuals in the state of nature.212 
Alongside this argument based on self-interest, Digges proposes a rather different 
reason for obedience: “honesty and religion strickly bind them to preserve their faith 
intire, and this contract inviolable.”213 While the will cannot be compelled to keep the 
social contract, “honesty and religion” do so. This is not the last place where Digges both 
argues from the advantages of the social compact and, at the same time, urges that we 
must keep the contract even when it is against our best interest, i.e., that self-
preservation does not trump obedience. Later in the pamphlet, Digges responds to 
Herle’s answers to Ferne’s writings. In particular, he addresses the claim that the law of 
nature allows for self-preservation and that thus we are allowed to resist a tyrant. To 
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this, he counters Paul’s injunction in Romans 13 and argues that if we are ruled by an 
unjust king, “we ought not to be tempted to impatience, but should rather rejoice, that 
God hath enable us to stand out his fiery trial.”214 Indeed, even a tyrant can be seen as 
instrument to perfect the subjects’ Christian virtue: “[b]ad rulers (if we doe not imitate, 
whome we condemne, and neglect our duty, because they perform not theirs) are but 
unhappy instruments of our greater glory.”215 However, to this standard argument 
against rebellion, Digges adds an argument based on self-interest: “such Christian 
submission doth most commonly produce peace and plenty in our streets.”216 As 
Victoria Kahn argues: “Digges’s Unlawfulnesse dramatizes the tension between 
conscience and calculation, law and right. In arguing for an irrevocable political 
contract, he both appeals to the subject’s self-interest and condemns self-interest in favor 
of an argument from conscience.”217 But this tension in Digges’s writing also indicates 
that he imagines people in the state of nature as fundamentally different creatures than 
the subjects in a society. While Digges warns that removal of the sovereign will mean an 
instantaneous return to all against all, he also argues that those very same individuals 
that are only a contract away from violence should be capable to form a compact which 
serves justice and to which they will adhere even against their self-interest. What 
                                                     
214 Digges, Unlawfulnesse, 101. 
215 Ibid., 101. 
216 Ibid., 101. 
217 Kahn, Wayward Contracts, 107. 
 271 
Digges’s pamphlet leaves unanswered is how these conscientious individuals are 
supposed to be formed under the government of a tyrant. 
 Digges not only opposes the possibility of rebellion, he also argues that sovereign 
power must be concentrated in one absolute ruler. Once the social contract has been 
entered into, as in the case of England, any attempt to set up a second governing power, 
such as the Parliament, is an attempt to break the commonwealth apart. Those who do 
so “thereby dissolve the sinews of government.”218 Moreover, in England there is no 
legal justification for Parliamentary opposition to the king. According to the law, “not 
the two Houses, but the King alone is sworne to protect us” and only the king can 
decide, and undertake, what means are necessary for the safety of the commonwealth.219 
The coronation oath itself is for Digges a sign that the sovereign power is placed in the 
king alone. Moreover, the king’s absolute power is not an abuse of justice, as Parker 
would have it, but rather the most equitable form of justice possible: 
Though what is truly the right of any one, doth not cease to be so naturally by 
anothers sentence to the contrary; yet after positive constitutions, upon a Judges 
decision, he can challenge no title to it, because by his owne deed, and consent, 
he passeth it away in that judiciary determination. And equity and prudence 
both dictate, that it was a most honest and reasonable agreement, as conducing 
to publique peace, and the quiet of mankind, that persons publikely constituted 
and more unconcerned in the decisions, should put an end to all debates. 
Because otherwise the controversie was not likely to be ended, but with one of 
the parties; For each man out of naturall favour (the strongest corruptive of 
judgement) inclining to his owne Interest, there was nothing left but force to 
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determine it. There cannot be a more unhappy administration of Justice, then 
when strength is made the measure of right, and when all Iudges are bribed, as 
passing sentence to their owne advantage.220 
 
Part of what each individual contracts into by being a member of society is the surrender 
of his own absolute rights to the public good upon the decision of a proper judge. For 
instance, the right to dispose of one’s property is surrendered to the king for the 
protection of the kingdom. This surrendering of the one’s rights is done unconditionally; 
we may not judge for ourselves whether the greater good is actually being served, but 
we rather have to submit to a judge. This is a demand of justice, since interested parties 
would not give impartial judgments.  
 As the third section of the Unlawfulnesse goes to great pains to demonstrate, true 
justice can only be found in accordance to the king’s interpretation of law: “the King is 
the fountain of all justice […]. The King hath supreame power in all civill causes, and is 
super omnes, over all persons, over the body politique; all jurisdictions are in him; the 
materiall sword of right belongs to him, and whatsoever conduces to peace, that the 
people commited to his charge may lead peaceable and quite lives.”221 Directly 
countering the Parliamentarian arguments that absolute monarchy is a violation of 
justice, Digges argues that the king is the source of all law and hence of all justice. For 
Digges then, unlike Parker and Herle, justice can obtain even though the king is not 
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restricted by positive laws. The fundamentally unequal relationship between the king 
and the subjects is not problematic in Digges’s view, but rather it is what constitutes 
justice in the kingdom. More precisely, while Digges admits that such a king may at 
times be unjust, this occasional injustice is on the whole better for a commonwealth than 
the strife and threat of civil war that always occur whenever subject believe that they can 
hold the king accountable to law. Moreover, if the king is held to be the final judge in all 
cases, there would be at least a way to settle all disputes without violence, and justice 
would be served better even though any given decision may be unjust.222 Indeed, for 
Digges, what creates injustice in England is the attempt to create a balancing power 
outside of the king’s. 
 How have the Parliamentarian writers managed to seduce English subjects to 
rebel against the king? The problem is one of incorrect, and willfully self-interested, 
reasoning based on faulty analogy. Digges does grant that there are and have been 
commonwealths in which the king is bound by laws and in which he may be deposed by 
either the people or other magistrates for not following them. Sparta was one such 
example. There, the Ephors could take for themselves the “sword of Justice” if the king 
was found to be in breach of his duties. But this is not the case in England, where the 
“civill constitutions, and […] their owne oath” show that the king may not be deposed.223 
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Even though we might be convinced that a different form of polity would be more 
advantageous, if we take the liberty to rebel against the king out of mere desire to 
improve the commonwealth, rather than on sound legal ground, then “there were no 
such a thing as Justice, our oaths would be of no force against Interest; profit would be 
the measure of our actions, and we must conclude all right what ever was 
advantageous.”224 Keeping our oaths to the king is dictated by the demands of justice. In 
particular, Digges turns to the specific instance of the Oath of Supremacy. The focus of 
his discussion of this oath is the text of the oath itself. He argues that the “words [of the 
Oath of Supremacy] are so expresse, that not any colourable glosse can be invented to 
excuse the violation of this solemne Sacrament.”225 The oath is then reproduced in its 
entirety and Digges emphasizes that no concern for the intention or original context of 
the oath can take away from the duty to obey the literal meaning of the words. To those 
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who might object that “this Oath is taken in opposition to the Pope, to exclude the 
Supremacy usurped by him for many years,” Digges replies that “[t]hey speake truth, 
but not all the truth” since the oath both denies the supremacy of the Pope and asserts 
the supremacy of the king.226 The original intent of the oath does not matter. 
 Having contracted ourselves into this commonwealth and having sworn oaths 
that ask us to submit to the king, we have to adhere them even if the king turns tyrant. 
Rebellion is never lawful in England: “ It is an unhappy condition we shall live in, if he 
or they should be Tyrants, and take delight in our oppression. But we cannot helpe it, 
God out of his dominion might thus dispose of our fortunes and lives, and he declares 
his pleasure so to do, and therefore we must choose the least evill, which is not to resist, 
and by endeavouring to save our goods or bodies, to loose our soules.”227 Following this 
line of reasoning, Digges goes on to advocate obedience to the commands of a tyrant 
which are not directly against the laws of God. Not only can we not actively rebel 
against the ruler, we have to actively obey. The example he gives is that of paying taxes: 
“If our patience in submission to his precept be chargeable, we make God our debtor; all 
the taxes and tributes are put upon his accompt, and he will returne  them in as 
plentifull measure, as if we had spent so much charitably, (and we cannot lay out our 
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estate better.) The Magistrate is Gods receiver, as well as the poore.”228 Since all rulers 
have their power from God, paying taxes to a tyrant is part of our Christian duty, and 
our obedience to that duty will be rewarded as if we had given the money in charity.229 
Digges maintains this point even in the face of his own admission that there are extreme 
cases in which, when faced with a particularly cruel tyrant, the commonwealth suffers 
more by obedience than by rebellion.230 This is not to say that the king does not have a 
duty to keep his oaths or to guard the welfare of the commonwealth. But for Digges, a 
duty on the part of the king does not give a corresponding right of enforcement to the 
subjects: “let us not therefore break our duty, because Kings performe not theirs. If we 
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against rebellion based on the interests of the commonwealth, he turns to probabilistic reasoning. See, for 
example, his argument against resisting the King in the opening section of the pamphlet: by “obliging our 
selves not to resist publique authority […] it is most likely we should be lesse exposed to injuries” (6; 
emphasis mine). 
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live under a bloudy Prince, or covetous, or intemperate, or weake, or one that persecutes 
the most godly professors, let us call to minde our own sins, which have deserved 
greater castigations.”231 But what if the king’s tyranny destroys the entire 
commonwealth? This for Digges is a very unlikely event: “It is in our power to kill our 
selves, and yet we are not afraid of our selves, because there is a naturall dearnesse 
implanted in us, which secures every one from selfe-wrong: we have as little cause to be 
troubled, that it is in his power to make himself no King, by destroying his subjects.”232 
Since a king is only king in so far as he has subjects, we should no more fear him than 
we would fear our own self. Parker’s example of Vedius Pollio’s treatment of his slaves 
in Jus Populi seems to be designed to answer this kind of reasoning. While for Digges, 
both charity and justice amount to obedience to the king, for Parker, blind obedience to a 
tyrant is a dereliction of our duties to the other members of the commonwealth and a 
break in the bonds of justice.  
3.5 Milton, the History of the Church, and Tyranny  
A mighty hunter thence he shall be styled 
Before the Lord, as in despite of Heav’n, 
Or from Heav’n claiming second sovranty.233 
 
But what more oft in nations grown corrupt, 
And by their vices brought to servitude, 
Than to love bondage more than liberty, 
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Bondage with ease than strenuous liberty.234 
 
 In the early 1640s, rather than directly joining the arguments over the source and 
authority of political power, Milton focused his polemical writings on the expansion of 
liberty in the domestic sphere and the reformation of Church government. But these 
early pamphlets also labor to connect domestic and Church discipline with the political 
well-being of England. In particular, in Of Reformation, Milton counters the call of “no 
bishop, no king” by arguing that the bishops of the Church of England weaken the 
king’s power by corrupting English subjects.235  Bishops, insulting “the people of God,” 
discourage their parishioners from the study of virtue: “thus the people vilifi’d and 
rejected by them, give over the earnest study of vertue, and godlinesse as a thing of 
greater purity then they need” (CPW I: 547-8). Milton depicts an exodus of godly 
Englishmen pushed out of the country by the “mis-rule and turbulency of the Prelats” 
(CPW I:588). Bishops “have unpeopl’d the Kingdome by expulsion of so many 
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thousands” and have “hamstrung the valour of the Subject by seeking to effeminate us 
all at home” (CPW I:588). Those who instead remain in England are encouraged by their 
own Church to sloth and idolatry, because the virtuous activity that ought to 
characterize true subjects has been forbidden by bishops: “Well know every wise Nation 
that their Liberty consists in manly and honest labours, in sobriety and rigorous honour 
to the Marriage Bed, which in both Sexes should be bred up from chast hopes to loyall 
Enjoyments; and when the people slacken and fall to loosenes, and riot, then doe they as 
much as if they laid downe their necks for some wily Tyrant to get up and ride” (CPW 
I:588). In a clear link between domestic and public liberty, a link turned into a near-
threat to Parliament in the second edition of The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (CPW II 
229-30), Milton connects the corruption of Church discipline with the creation of corrupt 
subjects better-fitted for tyranny than for virtuous civic life. But what are Milton’s 
conceptions of liberty and tyranny? For parliamentarian writers such as Parker and 
Herle, the notion of liberty is firmly connected with rule by law, which, unlike rule by 
the arbitrary will of the sovereign, enables just relationships between subjects and rulers. 
As we will see, Milton to a certain extent adopts this framework of justice and rule by 
law, but strips it of its foundations in historical development. 
 This is not to say that Milton does not include historical narratives in his 
polemical pamphlets. The opening of Of Reformation begins with a history of the Church. 
Moreover, his use of ecclesiastical history in this tract demonstrates the same kind of 
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engagement with historical development that we will find in his later political writings. 
Here, as in the divorce tracts, Milton draws his readers’ attention to the origins of the 
institution. To understand marriage, we must understand its first instance in Eden; to 
understand the correct form of church policy, we must understand the first foundation 
of the Church. The opening lines of Of Reformation create a parallel between the life of 
Christ and the history of the Church: 
after the story of our Saviour Christ, suffering to the lowest bent of weaknesse, in 
the Flesh, and presently triumphing to the highest pitch of glory, in the Spirit, 
which drew up his body also, till we in both be united to him in the Revelation of 
his Kingdome: I do not know of any thing more worthy to take up the whole 
passion of pitty, on the one side, and joy on the other: then to consider first, the 
foule and sudden corruption, and then after many a tedious age, the long-
deferr’d, but much more wonderfull and happy reformation of the Church in 
these later days. (CPW I:519; emphasis original) 
 
The passage creates its governing parallel through the unspoken use of the description 
of the Church as the body of Christ. The histories of the suffering of both the incarnate 
Christ and the Church are worthy of our meditation and both provoke the same 
emotions. The story of “our Saviour Christ, suffering to the lowest bent of weaknesse,” 
and the story of the corruption and recent reformation of the Church both arouse “the 
whole passion of pitty, on the one side, and joy on the other.” Moreover, the parallel 
between the two stories serves as an interpretive guide to the history of the Church 
throughout the opening section of the pamphlet. In particular, the passage models two 
central principles of the pamphlet. First, it emphasizes a distinction between flesh and 
spirit. Milton’s language, on the one hand, highlights the suffering and weakness 
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experienced by Christ through the incarnation, “suffering to the lowest bent of 
weakness, in the Flesh.” While, on the other hand, the “highest pitch of glory” is attained 
in the Spirit and only consequently through this spiritual glory does the body also 
triumph over its previous weakness.  
 The second principle that is introduced in this passage and that characterizes the 
rest of the opening section of Of Reformation is the construction of multiple overlapping 
temporalities. Both stories, of Christ’s incarnation and of the development of the Church, 
are placed in indeterminate time. Christ is depicted “suffering” and “triumphing” before 
the eyes of “every man Christianly instructed” (CPW I:519). It is only once we reach the 
past-tense, “drew up,” that the passage places Christ’s resurrection in the past. 
However, as soon as that is done, the reader is brought forward in time by the clause 
“till we in both be united to him in the Revelation of his Kingdome.” The conjunction 
“till” indicates an extension of the action in the forgoing clause up to the time of the 
second coming. Up to this point in the passage, “his body” refers to Jesus’ physical 
body, but the turn at “till” brings in the second meaning of the mystical body of Christ, 
the Church. The extension in time of “drew his body also” becomes clear in the drawing 
up of the body of the Church and of its members who are both united now into the 
mystical body of Christ through the Scriptural “Revelation of his Kingdome” and will 
be, each one of them, united in body and spirit at the time of the resurrection. Within 
this one sentence in the opening of the pamphlet, Milton both sketches out and collapses 
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the history of the Church from its foundation at the time of the incarnation, through its 
history of decline and reformation, and finally to its triumphal moment at the 
resurrection of the dead. 
 Both the distinction between body and soul, and the construction of multiple 
temporalities is reinforced by Scriptural echoes. In particular, the suffering of the flesh 
and the triumphing of the spirit described in Milton’s passage recall verses 42-4 of 1 
Corinthians 15: “So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption; it is 
raised in incorruption:/ It is sown in dishonor; it is raised in glory; it is sown in 
weakness; it is raised in power:/ It is sown in a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. 
There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body” (underlining mine). Paul’s 
description of the resurrection of the dead is mirrored in Christ’s suffering “weaknesse, 
in the Flesh” and attaining “glory, in the Spirit.” But whereas Paul speaks of two bodies, 
one natural and one spiritual, Milton simply distinguishes between body and spirit. 
Moreover, the language of sowing and planting, latent in the echo of 1 Corinthians 15, 
becomes explicit a few lines later in Milton’s description of the corruption of the Church: 
Sad it is to thinke how that Doctrine of the Gospel, planted by teachers Divinely 
inspir’d, and by them winnow’d, and sifted, from the chaffe of overdated 
Ceremonies, and refin’d to such a Spiritual height, and temper of purity, and 
knowledge of the Creator, that the body, with all the circumstances of time and 
place, were purifi’d by the affections of the regenerat Soul, and nothing left 
impure, but sinne. (CPW I:519; italics original)  
 
Here the biblical allusions multiply. The image of sowing from 1 Corinthians 15 is linked 
to that of the parables from Matthew 13 of the sower (Matthew 13.3-8), and that of the 
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wheat and the tares (Matthew 13.24-30), as well as to that of the parable of the wheat 
and the chaff from Matthew 3. Along with the images of planting common to the 
Matthew passages, 1 Corinthians 15 is recast in these lines as a description of the 
“regenerat Soul” purifying the body. The “mystery” of the spiritual and natural bodies 
of Paul’s text is turned into a hierarchy of soul and body in Milton’s passage.  
 Milton uses these Scriptural echoes to collapse temporal distinctions. The still on-
going history of the Church is narrated in language associated with the eschaton. 
Milton’s use of the imagery from Matthew reinforces the identification of different 
points in time in ecclesiastical history by, on the one hand, the use of the past tense in 
most verbs in the passage and, on the other hand, the mixing of the language of verses in 
Matthew that deal with the spread of the Gospel with those that describe the second 
coming. The passage begins by narrating what appears to be a history of the primitive 
Church. The “Doctrine of the Gospel” was “planted by teachers Divinely inspir’d.” But 
immediately, we find that these very same teachers had to winnow and sift their 
doctrine “from the chaffe of overdated Ceremonies.” From the primitive Church, the 
passage jolts the reader to the Reformation. Moreover, the imagery in the passage mixes 
the Parable of the Sower with the burning of the chaff of Matthew 3. This indicates 
another shift in time. The separation of the wheat and chaff in Matthew 3.12 is set clearly 
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in the future.236 But the use of the past tense for the verbs in the passage, while 
appropriate for a history of the Church, creates the latent impression that a perfect 
discerning of the difference between wheat and chaff had already been obtained in the 
primitive Church or, by parallel, in the Reformed church. In this passage, Milton links 
the parable of planting the seeds of the “word of the kingdom” (Matthew 13.19) with 
that of the tares and wheat (Matthew 13.24-30) as well as with that of the chaff and 
wheat of Matthew 3. What is the combined effect of these temporal shifts? The passage 
creates a double-layered history within one sentence. On one level, Milton narrates the 
history of the Church from foundation to the corruption of the later Catholic Church. On 
the second level, he presents the decline of the English Church from the Reformation to 
its present level of corruption. This joining of the two historical periods creates the 
impression that the teachers of the primitive church had, from the very beginning, to 
refine and purify church doctrine. However, the Scriptural echoes from Matthew create 
the opposite image. One in which the Church has already, at different points in history, 
achieved the kind of discernment to be expected only in the members of the Church 
triumphant. That is, on the one hand, the passage claims that it is possible to obtain a 
Church discipline where there is “nothing left impure”—with a belated concession of 
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the Geneva edition rules out the possibility that this is a goal attainable in the present: “The triumphs of the 
wicked shall end in euerlasting torment.” 
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“but sinne”—and, on the other hand, that from the beginning the doctrine of the Church 
required purification from “overdated Ceremonies.” 
 The opening of the pamphlet, having seen the body—of the Church and of 
doctrine—purified by “the affections of the regenerat soul,” moves on to deny the need 
of the body itself: “Faith needing not the weak, and fallible office of the Senses, to be 
either the Ushers, or Interpreters, of heavenly Mysteries, save where our Lord himself in 
his Sacraments ordain’d” (CPW I:519-20). The mediation of the senses is not necessary to 
faith. Indeed, the fallible nature of the senses can too easily slide back into sin and 
idolatry: 
that such a Doctrine should through the grossenesse, and blindnesse, of her 
Professors, and the fraud of deceivable traditions, drag so downwards, as to 
backslide one way into the Jewish beggary, of old cast rudiments, and stumble 
forward another way into the new-vomited Paganisme of sensuall Idolatry, 
attributing purity, or impurity, to things indifferent, that they might bring the 
inward acts of the Spirit to the outward, and customary ey-Service of the body, as 
if they could make God earthly, and fleshly, because they could not make 
themselves heavenly, and Spirituall. (CPW I:519-20) 
 
Thus, a passage that started by describing the incarnation as the model for interpreting 
Church history ends by warning about the horrors of making “God earthly, and fleshly.” 
The refining attained by the teachers of the Gospel and the triumph attained by Christ 
after his weakness in the flesh is undone by attempts to re-incarnate God in earth and 
flesh. Moreover, here Milton indicates his view of how ceremonies and images are 
incorrectly used. In the passage, “sensual Idolatry” is an attempt to make what should 
be spiritual and internal, “the inward acts of the Spirit,” external and physical, “the 
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outward, and customary ey-Service of the body.” External acts of worship—“joining the 
body in a formall reverence” (CPW I:521)—and “things indifferent” are presented as 
imperfect and dangerous physical realizations of internal acts. Not only are such 
physical representations unnecessary, they prove to be dangerous. Indeed, the main 
thrust of the argument in Of Reformation is to denounce the bishops’ use of “sensuall 
Idolatry” to corrupt the purity of doctrine achieved by the Reformation, which in turn 
leads to individual and civic corruption. Superstitious forms of worship corrupt the 
souls of parishioners: “out of question from pervers conceiting of God, and holy things, 
she [the soul] had faln to believe no God at all, had not custom and the worme of 
conscience nipt her incredulity hence to all the duty’s of evangelicall grace instead of the 
adoptive and cheerfull boldness which our new alliance with God requires, came Servile, 
and thral-like fear” (CPW I:522; italics original). The process of turning God into earth 
and flesh produces a parallel process of “over-bodying” the soul (CPW I:522), which, 
thinking that it can meet God in the flesh, no longer strives to reach Him spiritually. 
Moreover, a fleshy soul that is accustomed to worship a fleshy God risks reenacting a 
version of the Fall, “she had faln to believe no God at all,” and it is only the remnant of 
conscience and custom that keeps it from turning, as it would if it were honest, atheist. 
Servile fear then becomes the only motivation for religious observance.  
 Milton returns to the problem of idolatrous ceremonies throughout the 
pamphlet. Over and over again, the primitive Church is brought forward as a 
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touchstone to evaluate the worth of the discipline of the current Church. And indeed, 
Milton calls to the Fathers of the Church to witness what the Laudian bishops have 
turned into: “What would ye say now grave Fathers if you should wake and see 
unworthy Bishops, or rather no Bishops, but Egyptian task-masters of Ceremonies thrust 
purposely upon the groaning Church to the affliction, and vexation of Gods people?” 
(CPW I:545). The bishops of the Laudian Church fail to be pastors and instead become 
“Egyptian task-masters” who turn their flocks into slaves in the service of empty 
ceremonies and physical idols: 
Thus then did the Spirit of unity and meeknesse inspire, and animate every joint, 
and sinew of the mysticall body, but now the gravest, and worthiest Minister, a 
true Bishop of his fold shall be revil’d, and ruffl’d by an insulting, and only-
Canon-wise Prelate, as if he were so slight paltry companion: and the people of 
God redeem’d, and wash’d with Christs blood, and dignify’d with so many 
glorious titles of Saints, and sons in the Gospel, are now no better reputed then 
impure ethnicks, and lay dogs; stones & Pillars, and Crucifixes have now the 
honour, and the almes due to Christs living members; the Table of Communion 
now become a Table of separation. (CPW I: 547-8) 
 
In this passage, Milton returns to the language of the mystical body of the Church that 
opens Of Reformation and is the guiding image of the pamphlet. Instead of the dead and 
enslaving bodies of the idolatrous services and stone idols imposed by the Laudian 
bishops, Milton depicts the primitive church as a true mystical body which is made alive 
by the “Spirit of unity and meeknesse.” In the opening passage analyzed earlier, the 
Spirit of Christ raises the weak body to glory. In this passage the same image is revived. 
The members of the Church should meet together in unity at the “Table of Community” 
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following the promptings of the Spirit, but they are instead divided by the closing away 
of the altar. Alms that should be used to nourish the members of the mystical body of 
the Church are spent on physical decorations of churches, on their “stones & Pillars.” 
The very creation of the physical edifice of the church becomes a means of keeping its 
members apart. 
 Not only do the bishops corrupt Church services, they also discourage English 
subjects from other forms of devotion and study on Sundays: 
this I am sure they took the ready way to despoile us both of manhood and grace 
at once, and that in the shamefullest and ungodliest manner upon that day which 
Gods Law, and even our own reason hath consecrated, that we might one day at 
least of seven set apart wherein to examin and increase our knowledge of God, to 
meditate, and commune of our Faith, our Hope, our eternall City in Heaven, and 
to quick’n, withal, the study, and exercise of Charity. (CPW I:589) 
 
For Milton, the Book of Sports is designed to destroy both domestic and religious virtue at 
once. With it, the bishops “despoile” the subjects of both “manhood and grace.” The 
passage models the difference between active virtue and passive vice. On the one hand, 
we have an active set of verbs for the subjects who have, following divine law, used 
their reason to consecrate the Sabbath so as to dedicate that day to “examin and increase 
our knowledge of God, to meditate, and commune of our Faith, our Hope, our eternall 
City in Heaven, and to quick’n, withal, the study, and exercise of Charity.” In keeping 
the Sabbath, the virtuous subject is actively working towards a perfection of virtue. On 
the other hand, in the subsequent lines describing the effects of The Book of Sports, the 
agency is given to the bishops: “at such a time that men should bee pluck’t from their 
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soberest and saddest thoughts, and by Bishops the pretended Fathers of The Church 
instigated by publique Edict, and with earnest indeavour push’t forward to gamin, 
jiggin, wassailing, and mixt dancing is a horror to think” (CPW I:589; underlining 
mine).237 In Milton’s description, the participation in Sunday recreations becomes a 
violent corruption of subjects who would instead by occupied with “their soberest and 
saddest thoughts.” They are “pluck’t” away from their prayers and “push’t forward” 
into games and dances. The bishops do not merely allow Sunday sports, but they rather 
force their parishioners to participate in them. 
 When published, the Book of Sports was introduced by a royal declaration. Milton 
is, however, careful to treat it as a creation of the bishops. This attempt to protect his 
                                                     
237 In reissuing the Book of Sports, Charles included in his declaration his father’s original statement from 
1618 stating that his subject in 1633 “did suffer in the same kind, though perhaps not in the same Degree” in 
being debarred from “Lawful Recreations” as his father’s subjects. James I’s rationale for the Book of Sports 
presents a mirror image of Milton’s view: “The report of this growing amendment amongst them, made us 
the more sorry, when with our own Ears we heard the general Complaint of our People; that they were 
barred from all Lawful Recreations, and Exercise upon the Sundays after Noon, after the ending of all 
Divine Service, which cannot but produce two Evils: The one the hindring of the Conversion of many, 
whom their Priests will take occasion hereby to vex, perswading them that no honest Mirth or Recreation is 
Lawful or Tolerable in Religion which the King professeth, and which cannot but breed a great 
discontentment in our Peoples hearts, especially of such as are peradventure upon the point of turning: The 
other Inconvenience is, that this Prohibition barreth the Common and Meaner sort of People from Using 
such Exercises, as may make their Bodys more able for War, when we, or our Successors, shall have occasion 
to use them. And in place thereof sets up Tipling and filthy Drunkenness, and breeds a number of idle and 
discontented Speeches in their Ale-houses. For when shall the Common-people have leave to exercise, if not 
upon the Sundays and Holy-days, seeing they must apply their labour, and win their Living in all Working-
days?” (The Book of Sports, As set forth by K. Charles the I. with Remarks (London, 1710), 1-2. Eighteenth 
Century Collections Online. (William Clark Memorial Library, UCLA). December 10, 2010.  
http://find.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/ecco/infomark.do?&contentSet=ECCOArticles&type=multipa
ge&tabID=T001&prodId=ECCO&docId=CW101511465&source=gale&userGroupName=duke_perkins&versi
on=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE). 
In James’ declaration, Puritan dislike is used by Catholic priests to prevent conversions to the official 
religion and it also prevents subjects from practicing sports that would prepare them from war and keep 
them away from drunken and idle speech. 
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criticism of the bishops from an accusation of attacking the king is typical of Milton’s 
strategy throughout the pamphlet. At this early date, he is still invoking the king’s 
support on Church reformation. By February 1649, the date of publication of The Tenure 
of Kings and Magistrates, the political situation however has changed drastically. The king 
has been tried and executed against the objections of Presbyterian ministers and large 
sections of the population. In particular on January 18th, 1649, a group of forty-seven 
Presbyterian ministers signed A Serious and Faithfull Representation to the General Councel 
of the Army to protest Charles’ trial.238 A Representation is addressed to the General 
Council of Officers as the illicit power behind both Pride’s Purge and the king’s trial. 
The Presbyterian ministers attack the General Council on three main grounds. Their first 
point is that the army leadership receives its authority from the full Parliament and that 
they, “in reference to the Power of Magistracy, are but private persons.”239 Thus, neither 
the Council nor the Rump Parliament have sufficient authority to legitimize the trial. 
Their second complaint centers on Church discipline. The Presbyterian ministers fear 
                                                     
238 In the Second Defence (1654), Milton depicts his decision to write The Tenure as prompted by the writings 
of “certain Presbyterian ministers, formerly bitter enemies of Charles, but now resentful that the 
Independent parties were preferred to theirs and carried more weight in Parliament” (CPW IV.i.626). A. E. 
Barker notes that, along with A Representation, Milton is also responding to A Vindication of the Ministers of the 
Gospel and to Prynne’s Briefe Memento to the Present Unparliamentary Iunto. A Representation is, however, the 
most influential Presbyterian pamphlet on the king’s trial, prompting answers not only from Milton, but 
also from Samuel Richardson, An Answer (January 27, 1649) and John Goodwin, Obstructors of Justice (May 
30, 1649) (Milton and the Puritan Dilemma, 142, n. 30). 
239 A Serious and faithfull representation of the judgments of ministers of the Gospel within the the province of London 
contained in a letter from them to the general and his councell of war (London, 1649), 5. Early English Books 
Online. (Union Theological Seminary Library, N.Y.). December 10, 2010. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:16412151.   
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that, under the pretence of stopping the spread of Catholicism in the Laudian Church, 
the army is now intent on tolerating all sects: “instead of preserving the Truth and 
purity of Religion and the Worship of God; we feare you are opening a door to 
desperate and damnable Errors and Heresies against the Truth of God, and to many 
licentious and wicked practises against the worship and ways of God.”240 Third, the 
writers of A Representation accuse the army leadership of being forsworn of the oaths 
and vows they took to preserve the life of the king. Referring to the text of the Solemn 
League and Covenant, which, in its third article, explicitly includes a vow to safeguard 
the king,241 the writers of the pamphlet insists on the validity of this oath: “In all which 
obligations, though the matter of them ay be in part, of Civil concernment, yet the bond 
and tye of an Oath and Covenant is Religious, sacred, and inviolable. Which though 
some may esteem no more then an Almanack out of date, yet we look upon it as the Oath 
of GOD, in whose Name we have sworn, and who will certainly require it at our 
hands.”242 
 The argument of the Tenure is designed to defend the legitimacy of the regicide 
against such accusations and to convince its readers to support the new government. 
The opening begins by connecting the opposition to the regicide with the subjects’ 
inability to reason correctly and freely: “If Men within themselves would be govern’d by 
                                                     
240 Serious and faithfull representation, 7. 
241 Samuel Rawson Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 269. 
242 Serious and faithfull representation, 6-7. 
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reason, and not generally give up thir understanding to a double tyrannie, of Custom 
from without, and blind affections within, they would discerne better, what it is to 
favour and uphold the Tyrant of a Nation” (CPW III:190). Like the political pamphlets of 
Ferne, Herle, Parker, and Digges, the Tenure depicts its audience as easily swayed by 
specious arguments. To such gullible readers, Milton opposes men “govern’d by reason” 
who can “discerne better” than those led by “blind affections.” In the pages immediately 
following this opening, Presbyterian preachers who first instigated the war against the 
king and now oppose the Rump and the king’s trial are anatomized to demonstrate that 
they too surrendered “thir understanding to a double tyrannie.” Since they are “but 
slaves within doors, no wonder that they strive so much to have the public State 
conformably govern’d to the inward vitious rule, by which they govern themselves” 
(CPW III:190). The king’s trial becomes a test of his subjects’ virtue. Those who oppose it 
demonstrate publicly their own “inward vitious” character. In particular, the 
Presbyterian writers’ arguments against the Rump’s actions demonstrate their inability 
to follow through the consequences of their own actions. The war against the king, 
which they supported, has as its most likely outcome a change of government: “If God 
and a good cause give them Victory, the prosecution wherof for the most part, inevitably 
draws after it the alteration of Lawes, change of Government, downfal of Princes with 
thir families; then comes the task to those Worthies which are the soule of that 
enterprise, to be swett  and labour’d out amidst the throng and noise of Vulgar and 
 293 
irrational men” (CPW III:192). The real work of the rebellion is not the fighting of the 
battles of the war itself, but rather the reconstructing of the government. Here Milton 
distinguishes between the “Worthies,” who will undertake this labor, and “Vulgar and 
irrational men,” who will oppose it by “contesting for privileges, customes, forms, and 
that old entanglement of Iniquity, thir gibrish Lawes, though the badge of thir ancient 
slavery” (CPW III:192-3). In these pages, Milton does not simply argue that Charles’ trial 
was a necessary outcome of Parliamentary victory in the Civil Wars. But rather, the basis 
of government itself has to be reformulated. England must undertake the “alteration of 
Lawes” and “change of Government.”  
 These opening passages give a first view of Milton’s understanding of tyranny. 
Quentin Skinner, in “John Milton and the Politics of Slavery,” sees continuity between 
Milton’s and Henry Parker’s accounts of liberty and slavery. For Skinner, Milton and the 
apologists of the English republic draw their conceptions of a free state from a classical 
framework indebted to Roman legal and political theory.243 In particular, Milton’s 
insistent invectives against those who oppose the regicide are a manifestation of his fear 
that “rendered abject and ignoble by tyranny of the Stuarts, the English may no longer 
                                                     
243 Quentin Skinner, “John Milton and the Politics of Slavery,” in Milton and the Terms of Liberty, ed. Graham 
Parry and Joad Raymond (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2002), 1-22, and especially 12-5. On Milton’s debt to 
classical sources, see also Martin Dzelzainis, “Milton’s Classical Republicanism” in Milton and Republicanism, 
ed. David Armitage, Armand Himy, and Quentin Sinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3-
24. 
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be able to summon the qualities needed to take advantage of their new-found liberty.”244 
And indeed, the first mention of tyranny in the pamphlet is not a depiction of Charles as 
a tyrant. The fundamental tyranny, which supports a tyrannical king, is the vicious rule 
of corrupted individuals, the “a double tyrannie, of Custom from without, and blind 
affections within.” But there is a fundamental difference between Parker and Milton. In 
the Tenure, we find, “customes” paired up with “gibrish Lawes” to form “the badge of 
thir ancient slavery.” Laws and custom, rather than being represented as limiting royal 
power, are here singled out as keeping subjects under the rule of a tyrant. The “gibrish 
Lawes” helped to habituate English subjects into servitude. This is strikingly different 
from the position that Presbyterian and Parliamentarian writers had argued in the early 
1640s. As we have seen, in their writings, a tyrant was an absolute ruler who could not 
be held accountable by laws or magistrates. This was represented as a fundamental 
breakdown of justice within the commonwealth. In Herle’s words, Charles was a tyrant 
because royalist writers insisted that he “owe[d] no duty to man at all.”245 (233). In 1642, 
in An Apology, Milton gives a similar view of a tyrant: “But their doctrine was plainly the 
dissolution of law which only sets up sov’ranty, and the erecting of an arbitrary sway 
according to his privat will, to which they would enjoyne a slavish obedience without 
law; which is the known definition of a tryant, and a tyranniz’d people” (CPW I:946; 
                                                     
244 Quentin Skinner, “John Milton and the Politics of Slavery,” 19. 
245 Herle, A Fuller Answer, 233. 
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emphasis mine). This language is still mirrored in the Tenure, where Milton objects that 
“to say Kings are accountable to none but God, is the overturning of all Law and 
government. For if they may refuse to give account […] we hold then our lives and 
estates, by the tenure of his meer grace and mercy, as from a God, and not a mortal 
Magistrate, a position that none but Court Parasites or men besotted would maintain” 
(CPW III:204). Thus, the Tenure contains two opposing views of the law. On the one 
hand, laws are seen as a restraint on the king and, on the other hand, they are depicted 
as “gibrish Lawes” that help to enslave the English subjects. 
 What is the connection between law, tyranny, and slavery in the Tenure? Like the 
other writers examined above, Milton constructs an imagined history of the creation of 
government to show the proper relationship between laws, ruler, and subjects. In the 
Tenure, we see that the original freedom of men is self-evident: 
No man who knows ought, can be so stupid to deny that all men naturally were 
born free, being the image and resemblance of God himself, and were by 
privilege above all the creatures, born to command and not to obey: and that 
they liv’d so. Till from the root of Adams transgression, falling among themselves 
to doe wrong and violence, and foreseeing that such courses must needs tend to 
the destruction of them all, they agreed by common league to bind each other 
from mutual injury, and joyntly to defend themselves against any that gave 
disturbance or opposition to such agreement. (CPW III:198-9)  
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As in the divorce tracts, Milton here turns to Genesis to understand how to organize 
political, as well as, domestic society.246 In doing so, he blurs the line between the pre- 
and post-lapsarian nature of man. All the writers, royalist, Parliamentarian, and 
Presbyterian alike, considered above, would agree that after the Fall, but prior to the 
formation of political communities, “all men naturally were born free.” But for those 
writers, that freedom amounted to unrestrained violence. Milton, on the other hand, 
downplays the connection between original liberty and violence. Freedom is found in 
“all men” and it is a reflection of the “the image and resemblance of God himself.” In the 
first sentence, the effects of the Fall are not visible and the reader is lead to imagine a 
moment in which men “born to command and not to obey […] liv’d so.”247 If we take 
this moment to be life in Eden, then the shift introduced in the next sentence with “till” 
should refer to the Fall. Instead what we encounter is not the Fall itself, but its 
consequences: “Till from the root of Adams transgression.” The construction of the 
sentence creates a gap between the Fall itself and the need to surrender our original 
freedom to prevent violence. This gap extends the native freedom and dominion of the 
first men to post-lapsarian times.248  
                                                     
246 The similarity between the divorce and regicide tracts was originally pointed out by A. E. Barker, Milton 
and the Puritan Dilemma, 144-6. 
247 On the other hand, in Book XI of Paradise Lost, the first vision of other humans granted to Adam by 
Michael is that of Cain’s murder of Abel: “Adam, now ope thine eyes, and first behold/ The effects which 
thy original crime hath wrought/ In some to spring from thee, who/ […]/ from that sin derive/ Corruption to 
bring forth more violent deeds” (XI.423-428). 
248 William Poole, in Milton and the Idea of the Fall, argues that, in the 1643-44 polemics over divorce and 
censorship, Milton’s writing develops to encompass a double view about the Fall. In particular, Poole points 
 297 
 Milton’s subsequent narrative of the formation of government follows a well-
worn path. Its general outline is very similar to that of Parker’s history in the 
Observations. Kings and magistrates are elected as authorities “that might restrain by 
force and punishment what was violated against peace and common right” (CPW 
III:199). Subsequently, laws, coronation oaths, and representative bodies, such as 
Parliament, are developed to curb the absolute power of kings (CPW III:199-200).249 
What is striking, however, in Milton’s account is the lack of emphasis on the possible 
dangers posed by the dissolution and re-formation of governments. As we have seen 
earlier, Parker focuses on the difficulty of setting up a just form of government.250 In the 
Observations, absolute kingship is a first attempt to contain within social bounds fallen 
human nature. But the consequences of original sin are felt in this institution as well. 
Absolute rulers become tyrants and their subjects turn to violent rebellion. The best 
                                                     
 
out that in the divorces tracts, we find Milton’s first depictions of Adam’s and Eve’s pre-lapsarian marriage 
as normative for contemporary, post-lapsarian marriage, while, at the same time, we find an insistence that 
mosaic divorce has to be allowed because of the consequences of the Fall (Milton and the Idea of the Fall 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 132-136). 
249 For the analogous narrative in Parker, see Observations, 13. In Eikonoklastes, Milton changes this narrative. 
In response to the King’s claim that Parliament may not make laws without him, Milton retorts: “Yet he 
professes to hold his Kingly right by Law; and if no Law could be made but by the great Counsel of a 
Nation, which we now term Parlament, then certainly it was a Parlament that first created Kings, and not 
onely made Laws before a King was in being, but those Laws especially, wherby he holds his Crown” (CPW 
III:467). 
250 This feature is even more prominent in royalist writing. For instance, Digges, in The Unlawfulnesse, does 
not deny that we have an innate freedom: “Though liberty be our birthright, yet it must not be made the 
cloake of sin, it takes not off those bonds with which God hath tyed up our hands from fighting against the 
supream power” (44). As we have seen earlier, for Digges, the original liberty that we had in the state of 
nature was more a curse than a blessing since it meant that we lived in constant fear of violence from all 
others. The only solution to this problem is be bound by a civil contract. 
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solution to this problem, that of balancing the power of the king with laws and of 
instituting representative bodies, is found only after a long history of violence and 
uprisings. For Parker, given the difficulty of reaching this solution, the balance of 
powers should not be lightly discarded. On the other hand, in Milton’s description of the 
origin of government, the possibility of social life without the constraints of laws or 
magistrates is left open. While the original agreement to come together in “common 
league” is necessary to prevent “mutual injury,” the members of the first commonwealth 
surrender their natural “authority and power of self-defence and preservation” to 
magistrates or a king “for ease, for order, and least each man should be his own partial 
Judge” (CPW III:199). Parker’s repeated insistence on the unsociability of men is not 
present in Milton’s account. Milton depicts men in the state of nature as capable of a 
form of justice. Rulers are appointed so that they may “execute, by vertue of this 
intrusted power, that justice which else every man by the bond of nature and of 
Cov’nant must have executed for himself, and for one another” (CPW III:199; emphasis 
mine). While Parker emphasizes the impossibility of administering justice without law 
and magistrates in post-lapsarian times, “without some magistracy to provide new 
order, and to judge of old, and to execute according to justice, no society could be 
upheld,”251 Milton’s narrative leaves open the possibility of justice without kings, 
magistrates, or laws even after the Fall.252 
                                                     
251 Parker, Observations, 13. 
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 This lack of emphasis on the dangers that might follow the dissolution of 
government in the Tenure goes hand in hand with Milton’s insistence on the legitimacy 
of the right to change government. More precisely, Milton oscillates between two 
arguments. On the one hand, he constructs in detail an argument defending the right to 
depose kings who become tyrants. He does this both by biblical exegesis, arguing that 
Romans 13 only requires obedience to good kings,253 and by a use of three of the 
standard Parliamentarian arguments developed the early 1640s. That is, first, he argues 
that the power of kings and magistrates derives from the people and it is given to them 
only in trust and for the good of the people (CPW III:202). Second, the idea that a king 
holds his kingdom by right of inheritance would amount to turning each of his subjects 
into “the Kings slave, his chattell, or his possession that may be bought and sould” 
                                                     
 
252 There is, however, a strong similarity between Milton’s description of the development of checks on 
kings—the movement from unfettered kingship, the bond of laws, and finally, the bond of oaths enforced 
by representative assemblies—and Parker’s. In the narrative of the foundation of government in The Tenure, 
the passage describing the formulation of the first laws, echoes Parker’s language in the Observations. Both 
pamphlets make it difficult to discern who frames the laws. In Milton’s version, once it becomes clear that 
unfettered kings can prove tyrants, “they who now by tryal had found the danger and inconveniences of 
committing arbitrary power to any, invented Laws either fram’d, or consented to by all, that should confine 
and limit the authority of whom they chose to govern them” (CPW III:199-200; emphasis mine). As the 
virtuous readers in Areopagitica are purified by “triall” (CPW II:515), the first legislators learn “by tryal” the 
dangers of arbitrary power. However, the laws that they invent are “either fram’d, or consented to by all.” 
Similarly, in the description of coronation oaths, a further check on arbitrary power, laws are depicted as 
being made by a rather vague, “they the people”: the King “upon those termes and no other, receav’d 
Allegeance from the people, that is to say, bond of Covnant to obey them in execution of these Lawes which 
they the people had themselves made, or assented to” (CPW III:200; emphasis mine). 
253 “Therefore Saint Paul in the forecited Chapter tells us that such Magistrates he meanes, as are, not a terror 
to the good but to the evil; such as beare the sword in vaine, but to punish offender, and to encourage the 
good. If such onely be mentiond here as powers to be obeyd, and our submission to them onely requir’d, 
then doubtless those powers that doe the contrary, are no powers ordain’d of God, and by consequence no 
obligation laid upon us to obey or not to resist them” (CPW III:210). 
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(CPW III:203), but since the people considered collectively are superior than the king 
considered singly, this must be manifestly false. Finally, he concludes that for the 
coronation oaths to be more than “meer mockeries,” kings must be accountable to the 
people as well as to God (CPW III:204). On the other hand, immediately following this 
line of reasoning, Milton expands his claim that we may depose tyrants to argue that a 
people may change their sovereign at will. This is proved by re-iterating the first of the 
three arguments above and by reasserting the natural liberty of all men: “since the King 
or Magistrates holds his autoritie of the people, both originally and naturally for their 
good in the first place, and not his own, then may the people as oft as they shall judge it 
for the best, either choose him or reject him, retaine him or depose him though no 
Tyrant, merely by the liberty and right of free born Men, to be govern’d as seems to 
them best” (CPW III:206).254 
 The Tenure defends the Rump Parliament’s trial and execution of the king in the 
name of liberty. More drastically, Milton argues that the freedom to abolish tyrannical 
rulers and re-organize the government is the very essence of a free nation: “And surely 
they that boast, as we doe, to be a free Nation, and not have in themselves the power to 
                                                     
254 This right does not, of course, extend to the Irish. In his Observations Upon the Articles of Peace, Milton 
accuses the King of attempting to establish a “pernicious and hostile Peace” with Ireland when he agreed 
“to disalliege a whole Feudary Kingdome form the ancient Dominion of England” (CPW III:307; emphasis 
original). For a reading of Milton’s view of Ireland and Irish Catholicism in the context of his other political 
writing, see Mary C. Fenton, in Milton's Places of Hope: Spiritual and Political Connections of Hope with Land 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006). She argues that Milton’s view of Ireland in the Observations is part of his 
larger understanding of the expansion of the boundaries of true religion as part of the practice of Charity 
(66-72). 
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remove, or to abolish any governour supreme, or subordinate, with the government it 
self upon urgent causes, may please thir fancy with a ridiculous and painted freedom, fit 
to coz’n babies; but are indeed under tyranny and servitude” (CPW III:236-7).255 The only 
true freedom in a nation is that which allows the subjects to remove not only the king (or 
any other oppressing governor), but to also reconstruct the form of government 
altogether. But while the royalist writers of the early 1640s and the Presbyterian 
ministers of A Representation raise the image of a return to an anarchical state of nature 
upon the dissolution of a given form of government, Milton, instead, produces the 
image of an orderly, but free household. Subjects who cannot change their government 
when they find it tyrannical, lack “that power, which is the root and sourse of all liberty, 
to dispose and oeconomize in the Land which God hath giv’n them, as Maisters of Family 
in thir own house and free inheritance” (CPW III:237). We thus see that while earlier in 
the pamphlet, Milton had declared that “who in particular is a Tyrant cannot be 
determin’d in a general discours, otherwise then by supposition; his particular charge, 
and the sufficient proof of it must determin that” (CPW III:197), the “general discours” 
of The Tenure argues that any king or magistrate who cannot be deposed at will is a 
tyrant and his subjects are slaves. How does this type formulation of tyranny compare 
                                                     
255 Milton returns to this figure of the infantilized nation in Eikonoklastes. Responding to Charles’s discussion 
of the nineteen propositions, he answers: “if the Kingdom shall tast nothing but after his chewing, what 
does he make of the Kingdom, but a great baby” (CPW III:469). For a discussion of Milton’s attack on the 
image of the king as farther through his emphasis on “aristocratic” rule by the heads of households in the 
political tracts, see Su Fang Ng, Literature and the Politics of Family in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 58-75. 
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with that proposed by Parker and Herle in the early 1640s? As we have seen, for Parker, 
the essential problem of despotic rule is based on a curtailing of justice and 
appropriation by the despot of the interest that each member of the community has in 
himself and in each other member. What is Milton’s conception of justice? And what is 
the role of the community in his political writing? 
3.6 Law, Tyranny, and Educating the Rabble 
 While the Tenure responds to Presbyterian opposition to the trial of the king by 
claiming a right to depose any tyrant, Eikonoklastes has to counter Eikon Basilike’s 
successful portrayal of Charles as a pious king violently and unlawfully deposed. Milton 
has to convince his readers that the regicide was necessary in order to ensure the well-
being of the commonwealth. As A. E. Barker originally pointed out, Milton’s argument 
in the regicide pamphlets “is the political application of the argument developed in the 
divorce tracts, that the end of all law, whether divine or human, is the good of man.”256 
The divorce tracts advocate that this goal is achieved by laws that allow for individual 
liberty, on the part of husbands at least, in deciding when to terminate a marriage. On 
the surface level, the regicide pamphlets argue along similar lines. As we have seen, in 
the Tenure Milton strenuously argues that the people have a right to depose a ruler at 
will. However, in Eikonoklastes, Milton has to account for the fact that the English 
people’s reception of Eikon Basilike proves their inability to correctly choose their form of 
                                                     
256 Milton and the Puritan Dilemma (144). 
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government. In this later pamphlet, he repeats the concern that his readers are easily 
swayed by his opponents’ writings. Specifically, the English people are prone to be over-
awed by the king’s book because, unaccustomed to judging arguments by the light of 
their own reason, they base their opinions on the weight of authority. While “any wise 
Man” or “any knowing Christian” would not be persuaded by the “Cleric elocution” of 
Eikon Basilike, the book does have an audience: “an inconstant, irrational, and Image-
doting rabble; {that like a credulous and hapless herd, begott’n to servility, and 
inchanted with these popular institutes of Tyranny, subscrib’d with a new device of the 
Kings Picture at his praiers, hold out both thir eares with such delight and ravishment to 
be stigmatz’d and board through in witness of thir voluntary and beloved baseness}” 
(Eikonoklastes, CPW III:601; bracketed material is from the second edition; emphasis 
mine). In this closing passage of Eikonoklastes, Milton registers the undeniable success of 
Eikon Basilike, which went through thirty-five editions in its first year of publication 
alone.257 The image of Charles as a martyr proved effective on the “Image-doting 
                                                     
257 More precisely, Milton had to deal with attack from both royalist propaganda, including Juxon’s The 
Subjects Sorrow, Fabian Philipp’s Kings Charles the First no Man of Blood but a Martyr for his People, as well as 
Eikon Basilike, and from Leveller writings, such as John Lilburne’s Englands New Chains Discovered (Skinner, 
Vision of Politics III:294). Skinner reads Milton’s Tenure as responding to the engagement controversy along 
the lines of Henry Parker’s representation theory: “Henry Parker and Henry Robinson both lent their 
support to the engagement with the claim that the new government reflects the will of the people, while the 
republication of Milton’s Tenure of Kings and Magistrates at the end of 1649 suggests that this line of thought 
was felt to have continuing relevance” (Skinner, Visions of Politics II:295-6). Go Togashi points out that there 
is a discrepancy between the first and second edition of The Tenure on who is allowed to depose a tyrant 
(“Milton and the Presbyterian Opposition, 1649-1650: The Engagement Controversy and The Tenure of Kings 
and Magistrates, Second Edition (1649),” Milton Quarterly 39 (2005): 59-81). In the first edition, Milton insists 
that anyone may do so. In the second edition, he defers to the Protestant theory of inferior magistrates (see, 
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rabble.” In particular, in the second edition, Milton expands this contemptuous 
characterization of the readers of the king’s book to emphasize that the English subjects 
have become “inconstant” and “irrational because they have been “begott’n to servility, 
and inchanted with these popular institutes of Tyranny.” Eikon Basilike is the last in a 
series of “institutes of Tyranny.” Similarly, in the preface, Milton attributes the “low 
dejection and debasement of mind in the people” not to “the natural disposition of an 
Englishman,” but rather to two other causes. The first, following along the lines of Of 
Reformation, is the negative influence of the Laudian church: “the Prelats and thir fellow 
teachers […] whose Pulpit stuff, both first and last, hath bin the Doctrin and perpetual 
infusion of servility and wretchedness to thir hearers” (CPW III:344). The second cause is 
the ambition of those who chose to either follow the king for their own gain: “the 
factious inclination of most men divided from the public by several ends and humors of 
                                                     
 
in particular, CPW III:257). Togashi traces this discrepancy to the changing political situation and, in 
particular, to the pressures of the Engagement controversy. In 1648-9, the Rump was the “private persons” 
intent on removing the king. In 1650, the Rump was the magistrates and the Presbyterian opposition was 
the “private persons.” On the engagement controversy, see also: Wallace, Destiny his Choice (43-68) and 
Sharon Achinstein, “Milton Catches the Conscience of the King: Eikonoklastes and the Engagement 
Controversy,” Milton Studies 29, (1992): 143-63. Achinstein argues that, in order to counter the image of the 
king as a martyr at prayer promoted by Eikon Basilike, Eikonoklastes has to deny the sincerity of the king’s 
appeal to the dictates of his conscience. Thus, for Achinstein, Milton can both deny the king’s right to force 
the conscience of his subjects, since his own conscience is “false,” and defend the Rump’s right to force the 
swearing of Engagement oath since it was an expression of a “true conscience” justified by God’s 
providence in winning the Civil war (156-8). For the publication history of Eikon Basilike, see the 
introduction in Eikon Basilike: The Portraiture of His Sacred Majesty in His Solitudes and Sufferings, ed. Philip A. 
Knachel (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), xv-xvi. 
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their own” (CPW III:344).258 Under the government of a tyrant supported by a corrupt 
Church, English subjects have abandoned their “natural disposition” to virtue. 
 What kind of government would instead restore Englishmen to their original 
civic virtue? For Parker, the difference between free subjects under a legitimate king and 
slaves under a tyrant is the rule of law. Do laws play any role in the formation of a free 
subject in Milton’s work? Both the Observations upon the Articles of Peace and The Tenure of 
Kings and Magistrates address the question of the relationship between laws, tyranny, 
and virtuous subjects that is a central concern of Eikonoklastes. In the Observations upon 
the Articles of Peace, we find a stirring indictment against the tyranny of the king in terms 
                                                     
258 In the early 1640s, Milton had expressed a desire that Parliament should reform a corrupt nation. In 
Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, he addresses Parliament as being entrusted by God to perform this 
arduous task even though there might be doubts that it is achievable: “Yee have now, doubtlesse by favour 
and appointment of God, yee have now in your hands a great and populous Nation to Reform; from what 
corruption, what blindnes in Religion yee know well; in what a degenerate and fal’n spirit from the 
apprehension of native liberty, and true manliness, I am sure ye find: with what unbounded licence rushing 
to whordoms and adulteries needs not long enquiry: insomuch that the fears which men have of too strict a 
discipline, perhaps exceed the hopes that can be in others, of ever introducing it with any great successe” 
(CPW II:226-7). The corruption of England is still a concern in Paradise Lost, where Milton echoes these two 
causes of servitude in a people: 
 
Returnd from Babylon by leave of Kings 
Thir Lords, whom God dispos'd, the house of God 
They first re-edifie, and for a while 
In mean estate live moderate, till grown 
In wealth and multitude, factious they grow; 
But first among the Priests dissension springs, 
Men who attend the Altar, and should most 
Endeavour Peace: thir strife pollution brings. (XII.348-55) 
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of the rule of law.259 Here, Milton denounces the surrendering of a “Feudary Kingdome” 
of England, Ireland, as an outrage to justice:  
it is again demanded by what expresse Law, either of God or man, and why he 
whose office is to execute Law and Justice upon all others, should sit himselfe 
like a demigod in lawless and unbounded anarchy; refusing to be accountable for 
that authority over men naturally his equals, which God himself without a 
reason given is not wont to exercise over his creatures? And if God the nearer to 
be acquainted with mankind and his frailties, and to become our Priest, made 
himself a man, and subject to the Law, we gladly would be instructed why any 
mortal man for the good and wellfare of his brethren being made a King, should 
by a clean contrary motion make himself a God, exalted above Law; the readiest 
way to become utterly unsensible, both of his human condition, and his own 
duty. (CPW III:307-8) 
 
Two features of this passage clarify Milton’s view of the relationship of law to political 
rule. First, the passage is a response to an implied royalist argument in support of royal 
prerogative. As we have seen in the work of Ferne and Digges, royalist writers claimed 
that the king could act in the name of salus populi outside the bounds of law and without 
accountability in case of emergencies. For Milton, such actions are intrinsically harmful 
to the commonwealth. A king who claims the right to act above the law risks becoming 
“unsensible, both of his human condition, and his own duty” and thus turning into a 
                                                     
259 The Observations upon the Articles of Peace was Milton’s first official writing for the new commonwealth, 
written in preparation of Cromwell’s expedition to Ireland. Thomas Corns, in “Milton’s Observations upon 
the Articles of Peace: Ireland under English eyes” in Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose, argues 
that Milton’s rhetorical strategy in the Observations is to reproduce the success of The Kings Cabinet Opened 
and to suggest “that the republican government acts in an orthodox defence of English interests, whereas 
the Articles of Peace constitute a dangerous and unprecedented deviation from traditional practice,” a 
practice that rests on England’s right of conquest (124; 126).  
 307 
tyrant.260 Indeed, even “God the nearer to be acquainted with mankind and his frailties” 
made himself “subject to the Law.” For a king to refuse to be bound by laws is a form of 
self-idolatry in which he makes “himself a God.” That is, to be human and to administer 
human justice is to be bound by laws. Second, Milton insists that even divine authority 
is not exercised “without a reason given.” As Merritt Hughes indicates in his notes to the 
Yale edition of the Observations, the preface of The Reason of Church Government presents 
a similar view of divine power and laws.261 There we find Milton’s use of both Plato’s 
Laws and Scripture to support the claim that laws ought to be accompanied by an 
explanation of why they are good for the commonwealth. Moses, knowing that no man 
could benefit from unexplained laws, prefaced divine law with Genesis: “Moses 
therefore the only Lawgiver that we can believe to have been visibly taught of God, 
knowing how vaine it was to write laws to men whose hearts were not first season’d 
with the knowledge of God and of his works, began with the book of Genesis, as a 
prologue to his laws” (CPW I:747).262 For Milton, like for Parker and Herle, a king not 
                                                     
260 In the Tenure, Milton puts the same sentiment in a different way. There, a king who rules above the law is 
somewhat less than human: “he that bids a man reigne over him above Law, may bid as well a savage 
Beast” (CPW III: 206). 
261 See note 21 to CPW III:307. 
262 This claim is not unique to Milton and it is also found in Coke’s Reports. In the preface to Part VI of the 
Reports, Coke turns to Moses to illustrate why reports of cases should be printed for instruction:“The 
reporting of particular cases or examples, is the most perspicuous course of teaching the right rule and 
reason of the law: for so did Almighty God himself, when he delivered by Moses his judicial laws, ‘exemplis 
docuit pro legibus’ as it appeareth in Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy.” The Reports of Sir 
Edward Coke, Knt. In Thirteen Parts (1826), xvii-xviii. HeinOnline. December 10, 2010. 
http://www.heinonline.org.proxy.lib.duke.edu/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults&handle=hein.beal/reporcok
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bound by laws is a tyrant who sets himself unjustly apart from his subjects—he is 
outside the bonds of justice. But moreover, in both the Observations upon the Articles of 
Peace and The Reason of Church Government, we see that for individuals to benefit from 
laws, they must know the reasons prompting the laws.  
 Good rulers are bound by laws and, in turn, good laws are accompanied by 
reasons so that the subjects may understand why they are enacted. In the Tenure Milton 
considers at greater length the question of what makes a king a tyrant and how his 
subjects can learn to reason correctly about their right to rebellion. After his first 
discussion of how kings and magistrates had been first created and by which authority 
they may be deposed, Milton turns to the task of explaining what a tyrant is and “what 
the  people may doe against him” (CPW III:212). At this point, Milton gives a concise 
definition of a tyrant: “A Tyrant whether by wrong or by right comming to the Crown, is 
he who regarding neither Law nor the common good, reigns onely for himself and his 
faction” (CPW III:212).263 Moreover, just as a good king can greatly benefit the members 
of the commonwealth, an unjust tyrant can do almost infinite harm. Since “his power is 
great, his will boundless and exorbitant,” he will commit “murders, massachers, rapes, 
adulteries, desolation, and subversion of Citties, and whole Provinces” (CPW III:212). 
                                                     
 
e0003&id=359&size=2&collection=beal&terms=His|Moses%20his%20judicial%20laws|Moses|judicial|his|la
ws&termtype=phrase&set_as_cursor=0#360. 
263 Milton adds specifies that it does not matter whether a king attained the crown “by wrong or by right” to 
respond to royalist claims that only tyrants who obtain power by unjust usurpation can be resisted. 
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Having given this image of tyrannical rule, Milton insists that the solution is self-
evident. “What the people lawfully may doe” against a tyrant “as against a common 
pest, and destroyer of mankind, I suppose no man of cleare judgement need goe furder 
to be guided then by the very principles of nature in him” (CPW III:212). However, clear 
judgment is rarely used: “[b]ut because it is the vulgar folly of men to desert their own 
reason, and shutting thir eyes to think they see best with other mens, I shall shew by 
such examples as ought to have most waight with us, what hath bin don in this case 
heretofore” (CPW III:212). Opposition to Charles’ trial is here represented as a form of 
willful blindness.  
 The Tenure attempts to teach its readers to see correctly with their own eyes by 
recasting the regicide within the context of appropriate historical examples. These 
examples range from classical, to Biblical, and finally to English history. Quickly 
dispatching the Roman and Greek examples, “lest it bee objected they were Heathen” 
(CPW III:213), Milton dedicates a lengthy digression to the example of Ehud.264 
Answering the argument that the case of Ehud’s killing of Eglon, a foreign invading 
king, cannot be applied to the deposing of a legitimate English king, Milton claims that 
                                                     
264 Milton focuses on Judges 3.14-21: “So the children of Israel served Eglon the king of Moab eighteen 
years./ But when the children of Israel cried unto the LORD, the LORD raised them up a deliverer, Ehud the 
son of Gera, a Benjamite, a man lefthanded: and by him the children of Israel sent a present unto Eglon the 
king of Moab./ […]/And Ehud came unto him; and he was sitting in a summer parlour, which he had for 
himself alone. And Ehud said, I have a message from God unto thee. And he arose out of his seat./And 
Ehud put forth his left hand, and took the dagger from his right thigh, and thrust it into his belly.” As the 
Yale editor points out, the example of Ehud had been addressed by royalist writers in order to neutralize the 
kind of argument for regicide put forward by Milton (n. 85 to CPW III:213). 
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“it imports not whether forren or native” (CPW III:213).265 Once a king breaks the laws of 
the nation he rules, “what differs he from an outlandish King, or from an enemie?” 
(CPW III:214). A legitimate king rules only according to his oaths and is bound by the 
nation’s laws. Charles’s behavior during the Civil War, “so many thousand Christians 
destroy’d […], polluting with their slaughterd carcasses all the Land over, and crying for 
vengeance against the living that should have righted them” (CPW III:214), 
demonstrates that he behaved as a foreign king attempting to invade England rather 
than as a legitimate ruler. Nationality is defined by being bound by the same laws. But 
immediately after this description of the atrocities of the war, Milton generalizes this line 
of reasoning. Echoing Cicero’s principle of universal human society, Milton turns to the 
bonds connecting all men: “Who knows not that there is a mutual bond of amity and 
brother-hood between man and man over all the World, neither is it the English Sea that 
can sever us from that duty and relation” (CPW III:214).266 Having opened the scope of 
“amity and brother-hood” to all the world, Milton turns to the bonds that tie those who 
live in ever-closer circles: 
a straiter bond yet there is between fellow-subjects, neighbours, and friends; But 
when any of these doe one to another so hostility could do no worse, what doth 
the Law decree less against them, then op’n enemies and invaders? or if the Law 
be not present, or too weake, what doth it warrant us to less then single defence, 
or civil warr? And from that time forward the Law of civil defensive war differs 
nothing from the Law of forren hostility. Nor is it distance of place that makes 
                                                     
265 Victoria Kahn, in Wayward Contracts, argues that in The Tenure Milton uses Scriptural history, and in 
particular the story of Ehud, to demonstrate “the natural right to interpret” (127). 
266 For reference to Cicero, see CPW III:214, n. 87. 
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enmitie, but enmitie that makes distance. He therefore that keeps peace with me, 
neer or remote, of whatsoever Nation, is to mee as farr as all civil and human 
offices an Englishman and a neighbour: but if an Englishman forgetting all Laws, 
human, civil and religious, offend against life and liberty, to him offended and to 
the Law in his behalf, though born in the same womb, he is no better then a Turk, 
a Sarasin, a Heathen. (CPW III:214-5; emphasis mine) 
 
The passage begins by acknowledging a closer bond between “fellow-subjects, 
neighbours, and friends” than between strangers. It then recalls the devastation of the 
civil war, rendered more vivid by the image of the “slaughterd carcasses” depicted just a 
few lines earlier, to persuade the reader that once the “straiter bond” of amity is broken, 
we are no longer bound to treat “neighbours, and friends” as such. Indeed, even family 
bonds need not be respected: “though born in the same womb, he is no better then a 
Turk, a Sarasin, a Heathen.” If a brother becomes no better than “a Heathen,” then a 
tyrant cannot be tolerated whether “outlandish, or domestic” (CPW III:215). In this 
passage, Milton asks his audience to learn how to re-interpret the bonds of social 
relationships based on the events of the Civil Wars. 
 But what happens when Englishmen do not see these bonds as broken? 
Eikonoklastes is a chapter-by-chapter response to Eikon Basilike and, in particular, it is a 
re-interpretation of the narrative presented in the king’s book of the events of the Civil 
Wars. For Milton, those who believe the version of history portrayed in Eikon Basilike are 
“the blockish vulgar” (CPW III:339). Though complaining that his audience is more 
easily persuaded by custom than by reason, Milton considers it necessary to present a 
corrected account of the wars: “though it be an irksome labour to write with industrie 
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and judicious paines that which neither waigh’d, nor well read, shall be judg’d without 
industry or the paines of well judging, by faction and the easy literature of custom and 
opinion, it shall be ventur’d yet” (CPW III:339). This passage is added to the second 
edition, when Eikonoklastes had indeed found few readers compared with Eikon Basilike. 
Eikonoklastes repeatedly registers a despair that a majority of its readers are not equipped 
to put its pages to good use. Nonetheless, critics have paid close attention to how 
Milton’s regicide tracts are meant to teach his readers how to interpret the king’s book 
and actions correctly.267 In particular, and influentially, David Loewenstein, in Milton and 
                                                     
267 See, for example, Sharon Achinstein, Milton and the Revolutionary Reader (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994). Achinstein argues that Milton in Areopagitica counters the “myth of the gullible readers,” that is, 
readers who will passively take royalist propaganda for the truth (139-142). In Eikonoklastes, according to 
Achinstein, Milton, less optimistic about the reading audience than when arguing against censorship, 
attempts to correct the vision of his readers by destroying the distorting image of the king presented by 
Eikon Basilike (155-68). David Ainsworth, in Milton and the Spiritual Reader: Reading and Religion in 
Seventeenth-Century England (New York: Routledge, 2008), sees Eikonoklastes as presenting a public example 
of the type of reading praised in Areopagitica (33). Ainsworth argues that Milton’s “evident scorn for the 
masses” in Eikonoklastes show that his aim for the pamphlet was not “merely propagandistic,” but rather to 
create “an educative polemic” (33). Ainsworth differentiates his reading of Eikonoklastes from Achinstein’s 
by focusing on “spiritual reading,” “a strenuous and rigorous expression of devotion and worship, one 
which ideally results in the inner spirit’s guidance and which advances the reader’s understanding of truth 
(and of God)” (3). Barbara K. Lewalski, in The Life of John Milton, argues that, in Eikonoklastes, Milton 
develops his attack on the king’s book by “posing insistent questions that require readers to weigh and 
judge, to give or withhold assent, in an effort to teach them how to engage with such duplicitous texts” 
(265). While Lewalski does note that the “construction of audience creates special difficulties since Milton, 
prophet-like, castigates the idolatrous populace as fiercely as the book-idol they worship” (266), she still 
concludes that in Eikonoklastes, “Milton sought to teach his audience how to read as free citizens of a 
republic: to weigh fine-sounding words against, actions, and to recognize propaganda that plays with 
emotions and sentiment” (267). Similarly, Thomas Corns in Uncloistered Virtue: English Political Literature, 
1640-1660 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) discusses the rhetorical style of Eikonoklastes as part of Milton’s 
strategy to demystify Eikon Basilike (209-20). In particular, Corns argues that Milton strategically uses the 
“interrogative mood” to implicate “the reader in the hostile appraisal of the king’s book” and to guide his 
audience in an “active alliance, […] hunting out the truth [and] considering the alternatives” (213). Lana 
Cable, in Carnal Rhetoric: Milton’s Iconoclasm and the Poetics of Desire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1995), argues that Milton’s use of metaphorical language is a form of “creative iconoclasm,” both destructive 
and imaginatively creative (4). Cable argues that the “habituated affective response to the icon” is 
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the Drama of History, sees Milton’s iconoclasm as a strategy aimed at reforming his 
readers. For Loewenstein, the iconoclasm of Eikonoklastes is a development of the 
iconoclasm found in the antiprelatical tracts, in which he attacks and figuratively 
destroys the twin idols of the Laudian Church and its bishops.268 The crucial difference 
between the two forms of iconoclasm is that, in the later tract, Milton’s strategy is not 
only destructive, but also creative and instructive. Milton “fiercely dismantles the fiction 
and symbolic icon of the royal text, and then, drawing upon his own powers of historical 
interpretation and literary invention, recasts that icon. […] His sense that iconoclasm is 
itself a creative and dramatic means of affecting the historical process, moreover, 
sustains his perception of history as a process which may be actively altered and shaped 
by vehement polemic.”269 In Loewenstein’s reading, Milton iconoclastically dismantles 
the king’s text, chapter-by-chapter and line-by-line, to rewrite and correct the false 
history of the Civil War propagated by Charles’ narrative. In doing so, a new narrative is 
                                                     
 
“conceptual peace and rest” (146), that is the opposite of the kind of active reading demanded by Milton. 
According to Cable, “Milton in Eikonoklastes applies his affective rhetoric to the specific political task of 
inducing imaginative self-transformation in the pamphlet-reading public” (148). That is, the iconoclastic 
move in Milton’s pamphlet is as much a taking apart of his reader as of the king’s book: “because sender 
and receiver, propagandist and consumer, participate simultaneously in their sanctioning of carnal claims to 
truth, the idolatries of both are reciprocally anatomized by a single act of analysis” (158). Richard Helgerson 
argues that Eikon Basilike is self-consciously a “verbal performance” as well as “verbal icon” (9) and that 
Milton’s strategy in Eikonoklastes, with its chapter-by-chapter reply to the king’s book, is to get “Eikon Basilike 
onto his own logocentric, print-covered ground” to demystify the image of the king (“Milton Reads the 
King’s Book: Print, Performance, and the Making of Bourgeois Idol,” Criticism 29 (1987): 12). 
268 David Loewenstein, Milton and the Drama of History: Historical Vision, Iconoclasm, and the Literary 
Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 51. 
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created which can reshape the unfolding events as well as his reader’s understanding of 
recent history. Moreover, for Loewenstein, Milton’s vision, in both the antiprelatical and 
regicide tracts, includes “the violent rejection of history as a process of accretion.”270 
History, in this reading of Milton’s perception, is “a dynamic process of change 
characterized by fierce conflict and struggle.”271 And indeed, those who are unwilling to 
recast history as Milton does, those who prefer Charles’ icon to Milton’s iconoclasm, are 
depicted as only capable of “judging, by faction and the easy literature of custom and 
opinion.” 
 This is why Eikonoklastes is needed to counter Eikon Basilike. As Milton explains in 
the prologue of the pamphlet, he chose his title to destroy the seducing “Kings image” 
following the example of “many Greek Emperors, who in thir zeal to the command of 
God after long tradition of Idolatry in the Church, took courage, and broke all 
superstitious Images to peeces” (CPW III:343). In Milton’s view of historical process, 
however, new idolatrous images are being constantly created: “But the People, 
exorbitant and excessive in all thir motions, are prone ofttimes not to a religious onely, 
but to a civil kinde of Idolatry in idolizing thir Kings, though never more mistaken in the 
object of thir worship” (CPW III:343). The purifying work of Eikonoklastes is always 
needed. It is the never-ending work of peeling back the idolatrous accruals of the 
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people’s actions. These are the same accruals that Milton attacks in the Tenure. There, as 
we have seen, he characterizes the Presbyterians who became reluctant to bring the king 
to trial as those “contesting for privileges, customs, forms, and that old entanglement of 
iniquity, their gibberish laws, though the badge of their ancient slavery” (CPW III: 192-
193). The pity they express for Charles cannot be “true, and Christian commiseration, 
but either levitie and shallowness of minde, or else carnal admiring of that worldly 
pomp and greatness, from whence they see him fall’n” (CPW III:193). Their pity for the 
king, like the ceremonies and buildings of the Laudian Church depicted in Of 
Reformation, is a symptom of an “over-bodied” soul. And it is here that Loewenstein’s 
description of Milton’s conception of iconoclasm as meant to re-educate his reader’s 
perception of history needs to be questioned. If Milton, on the one hand, conceives of 
history as “a dynamic process of change characterized by fierce conflict and struggle” 
and, on the other hand, views his readers as forming as well as formed by the very 
accruals of history his iconoclasm is meant to dismantle, how can his writing be 
considered a form of education in reasoning?272 
 What is the connection between history and reason? Marjorie Grene’s treatment 
of Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge is illuminating on the relationship between knowledge, 
reason, and history. Grene opens The Knower and the Known by presenting the ideal of 
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knowledge as “final, impersonal and certain.”273 To this ideal, she opposes Polanyi’s 
account of knowledge: “all knowledge entails the personal commitment of the knower 
to the reality with which he believes himself in contact. The knower, so committed, is 
limited by his bodily endowments, and he is also rooted in the traditions of his 
society.”274 For Grene, as for Polanyi, knowing is dependent both on the personal history 
of the knower as well as in the history of his traditions. In her discussion of Kant’s view 
of scientific inquiry, Grene further elucidates the dependence of reason on history. 
“History,” and not reason, “comes first.”275 To this, it might be objected that this 
conception of reason “puts what blindly happens ahead of logic, substitutes caprice for 
reason, inner commitment for impersonal truth.”276 As far as it goes, this objection does 
highlight a denial of the possibility of fully objective knowledge: “If I say that there is no 
grasp of truth apart from the historical situation of the aspirant to truth, I do indeed 
inject into the cognitive situation a risk of irrationality. I admit that there is no ultimate, 
unquestionable criterion by which truth can be recognized and labeled and stored away 
forever apart from human aims and interests.”277 But on the other hand, this objection 
only reaches so far: “Granted, the primacy of history puts reason in jeopardy; that is 
what it is to be ‘in the situation’, and that is where we are. But the primacy of history 
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does not contradict, or abolish, reason. It exhibits the risk of reason, not its non-
existence. Logic and situation, the ideal and the factual, reason and history, live as 
aspects of our lives in tension with one another, in ineradicable ambiguity.”278 
 The same critique of the Enlightenment’s and its successors’, in general, and 
Kant’s, in particular, conception of reason as ahistorical is found in MacIntyre’s work. 
For these thinkers, “it was hoped, reason would displace authority and tradition. 
Rational justification was to appeal to principles undeniable by any rational person and 
therefore independent of all those social and cultural particularities which the 
Enlightenment thinkers took to be the mere accidental clothing of reason in particular 
times and places.”279 One of the main tasks of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is to flesh 
out, through the history of, on the one hand, the philosophical tradition that connects 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas, and, on the other hand, the tradition populated 
by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, how the different accounts of rationality and 
justice presented by two traditions need to be understood, and can only be compared, as 
“socially embodied, historically contingent traditions.”280 And indeed, for MacIntyre, 
“[t]here is no standing ground, no place of enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of 
advancing, evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned arguments apart from that 
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which is provided by some particular tradition or other.”281 How does this 
understanding of the relationship of history to reason compare to that found in 
Eikonoklastes? Analyses along the lines of Loewenstein’s in Milton and the Drama of 
History focus on Milton’s strategies, iconoclastic or otherwise, to teach the readers of 
Eikonoklastes how to correctly interpret the king’s book and how to learn to develop right 
reason. But for both Grene and MacIntyre, any account of reason has to be tied to a 
tradition of inquiry manifested in a specific historical and social moment. On the other 
hand, as we have seen, in Milton’s writings, right reasoning is fundamentally detached 
from historical accrual. To think within a tradition is to follow the “easy literature of 
custom.” Thus, for Milton, education of his readers is necessarily iconoclastic. What 
alternative is there? 
 MacIntyre, in Chapter 10 of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, describes Aquinas’ 
understanding of education in the virtues:  
All education is the actualization of some potentiality. Hence to be educable is 
already to have a potentiality for learning whatever it is, but it is more than this. 
All education is in part self-education (Commentary on Posterior Analytics II, lect. 
20). Unsurprising in view of this ‘a teacher leads someone else to knowledge of 
what was unknown in the same way that someone leads him or herself to the 
knowledge of what was unknown in the course of discovery’ (De Veritate XI,1). 
The order of good teaching is the order in which someone would learn by and 
for him or herself.282 
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This brief passage immediately highlights the importance of continuity in development 
between the teacher and the student. If in teaching, the teacher retraces with the student 
the same development which he or she had undergone in order to arrive at the desired 
knowledge in the first place, then there can be no fundamental rupture between the 
world of the teacher and that of the student. For a student to be able to make sense of 
what Aquinas has to teach, he or she already has to share a great deal with the writer of 
the Summa. The Prima Secundæ outlines what introductory moral teaching ought to look 
like, and its argument “recapitulates at the level of theory the sequence of questions and 
answers which someone embarked on the moral life will find him or herself following 
through, as they make what they are doing and judging more and more intelligible to 
themselves, in the course of trying first to specify and then to achieve the kind of 
excellence appropriate to human beings.”283 Thus, not everyone can learn from the 
Summa: “it is only individuals thus embarked, educated into the making of certain kinds 
of discrimination that enable them to order the expression of the passions in the light of 
an ordering of goods—something which in the first instance they will have had to learn 
from their teachers—who will be able to understand that the argument of the Prima 
Secundæ are about themselves.”284 That is, the moral education of the Prima Secundæ 
requires a prior moral education—the training of the human “natural aptitude for 
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virtue.”285 This first training, for Aquinas, should happen in the household. But what 
about those individuals who have been deprived of such training? Aquinas does not 
excuse them from following the commands of divine law. Their intelligence prompts 
them to search after their good and after ways to learn what that good is. It should thus 
lead them to realize that “they cannot pursue their good, whatever it is, in isolation and 
that the relationships into which they enter in order to secure their most obvious goods 
need to be such as well enable them to improve their knowledge of what their good 
is.”286 
 This means that, in order to be educated in virtue and to learn to reason 
correctly, the student will need to form certain types of human relationships, those 
defined by natural law, within certain types of human communities, those defined by 
justice.287 In the context of Milton’s regicide tracts, the question then is, how is such a 
community constituted? And what is the relationship between justice and positive law? 
Aquinas’ account of justice, iustitia, begins by explaining its relationship with ius. Ius, for 
Aquinas, “as in Roman law, is the word used of those norms which define the 
relationship of each person to others, and so ‘iustitia’ names both the virtue of living by 
those norms and so exhibiting in one’s dispositions a constant and perpetual will to 
render to each person what is due or owed to him or her and the standard of right 
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required of each of us.”288 Thus, justice is a virtue “peculiarly concerned with relations to 
others.”289 How is this embodied in positive law? “Justice in the administration of justice 
requires respect of jurisdiction, no irrelevant discrimination between persons, no 
unfounded accusations, truth–telling by everyone in court, that if a poor person has no 
one to defend him or her here and now but this particular lawyer, this particular lawyer 
defend that poor person, and that no lawyer defend knowingly an unjust cause.”290 But 
what if the laws themselves are unjust? Or, in the extreme case, the ruler is a tyrant? 
Aquinas, as MacIntyre argues, is quite clear on this point: “It is important to remember 
at this point not only that Aquinas held that unjust laws do not require obedience […], 
but also that he agreed with Augustine that unjust laws do not have the force of law and 
do not merit the name of ‘law.’ And so also insofar as unjust regimes approach the 
character of tyrannies, they lose all legitimate claim to our obedience.”291 Finally, having 
understood the relationship between education in the virtues and just government, we 
can understand why a tyrant is not a legitimate ruler: “What is bad about tyranny is that 
it subverts the virtues of its subjects; the best regime is that whose order best conduces 
to education into the virtues in the interest of the good of all.”292 
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 In broad outlines, this shares much with the classical ideals of good government 
and justice as adopted by the resistance theorists discussed above and espoused by 
Milton. But what I hope stands out from this very compressed overview of Aquinas’ 
conception of justice and its embodiment in just government is the interconnectedness 
and specificity with which Aquinas accounts for the relationships between the political, 
interpersonal, and individual formation of justice. An individual seeking his own good, 
needs friendships based on the principles of natural law and just conduct, and these can 
only flourish within a just society, which, in turn is formed by just individuals. 
Moreover, if to this account of learning how to reason correctly, we add the necessarily 
historical nature of what we can recognize as rationality for which both MacIntyre and 
Grene argue, then Loewenstein’s assessment that in Milton’s writing we find “the 
violent rejection of history as a process of accretion” goes a long way to explain the 
description of his audience in the regicide tracts. For Milton, the task of Eikonoklastes is to 
bring truth to readers who have been presented with the distorted history of the war 
written in the king’s book. Eikon Basilike is an attempt to accomplish “after death that 
revenge upon thir Enemies, which in life they were not able” (CPW III:342). Their goal is 
to stir “the people to bring him that honour, that affection, and by consequence, that 
revenge to his dead Corps, which he himself living could never gain to his Person” 
(CPW III:342). The “conceited portraiture,” Marshall’s engraving, is put in the book “to 
catch fools and silly gazers” (CPW III:342). But while many have been caught by this 
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portrait, truth is not to be “smother’d, but sent abroad, in the native confidence of her 
single self, to earn, how she can, her entertainment in the world, and to finde out her 
own reader” (CPW III:339). This image, recalling Spenser’s Una, sees truth as something 
to be acquired despite historical accrual. Those who do not are the “miserable, credulous, 
deluded thing […], which is call’d the Vulgar.” 
 Similarly, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates is needed to teach its readers 
interpret correctly. As we have seen earlier, for Milton, a free nation is one which allows 
its citizens the power “to dispose and oeconomize in the Land” (CPW III:237). What 
happens if we lack this freedom? “Without which natural and essential powr of a free 
Nation, though bearing high thir heads, they can in due esteem be thought no better 
then slaves and vassals born, in the tenure and occupation of another inheriting Lord. 
Whose government, though not illegal, or intolerable, hangs over them as a Lordly 
scourge, not as a free government; and therefore to be abrogated” (CPW III:237; 
underlining mine). Victoria Kahn, in Wayward Contracts, discusses this passage in the 
Tenure in light of the connection made by Coke in his Institutes between tenure and legal 
contracts, which can be rendered invalid if the conditions are not performed.293 In 
Kahn’s reading, Milton uses the language of tenure to demonstrate that the royalist and 
Presbyterian version of the political contract—one in which the king cannot be 
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deposed—binds the English subjects to a version of voluntary servitude.294 This is a form 
of idolatry since Presbyterians and royalists hold kingship above the covenant between 
God and England: “[i]n Milton’s view, a rational and revocable political contract is the 
form of God’s covenant with the English people. And this in turn means that the 
historical ‘rights’ of the ancient constitution are effectively the same as the natural rights 
of resistance granted to men at birth.”295 That is, for Kahn, Milton locates the importance 
of the language of the ancient constitution in that it authorizes the right for individual 
interpretation: “[i]n this way Milton equated the historical precedent of the ancient 
constitution with the individual right to interpret, the right to interpret metaphorically 
or equitably according to the natural law of justice.”296 For Kahn, “the right to interpret 
metaphorically” is what distinguishes Milton’s discussion of the political contract from 
Hobbes’s.297 While Hobbes conceals that the political contract involves a transfer of 
power that it is only metaphorical since the actual power “remains fundamentally with 
the people,” Milton highlights this very fact in his regicide tracts.298 
 What are the consequences of such a metaphorical understanding of the political 
contract? The two main strands of Kahn’s argument that interest us focus on the role of 
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the passions in the formation of the political contract and on the right of interpretation. 
On the one hand, those who show pity for Charles, in the argument of both the Tenure 
and in Eikonoklastes, can only be expressing “a feigned, seditious, self-regarding pity, 
based on fear for one’s life. This fear naturally leads to enslavement or voluntary 
servitude to a tyrant.”299 In particular, for Milton, the Presbyterian’s use of Scripture to 
condemn the regicide is an act of renouncing the twin rights of interpretation and 
political freedom under the pressure of fear and self-interest: “[s]uch an idolatrous 
preoccupation with self-interest involved not only slavery to mere life but also the 
slavish inability to generate a new plot. […] In disowning their own actions [in the Civil 
War], they had effectively ceded their power to interpret—and thus their political 
power—to the king.”300 This, for Milton, is servile fear that leads the subject to bind 
himself in slavery to a tyrant. On the other hand, what the Tenure does is to show that 
the political contract as well as kingship itself are both metaphors and this, in turn, 
generates “a new narrative of political obligation.”301 This new narrative, the “new plot” 
that the Presbyterians could not generate, dictates rebellion: “the metaphorical contract of 
tenure obliged subjects to abrogate hereditary kingship; the metaphorical contract of 
sovereignty engaged subjects to take up arms against Charles, whose literal pretensions 
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to absolute monarchy had proved to be blasphemous.”302 As Kahn illuminatingly 
summarizes, in the Tenure, “Milton argued that the right sort of metaphorical 
interpretation dictated the violent plot of regicide, whereas the wrong sort would 
produce a tragic narrative of voluntary servitude. The Tenure was, in short, Milton’s 
lesson in the politics of reading for the year 1649.”303 But if Kahn’s analysis is correct, it 
shows that all that Milton’s lesson can amount to is the insistence in the changing a 
royalist narrative for a different one—a narrative that is no less pre-determined. 
 We can see this further in Milton’s discussion of the king’s tyranny with respect 
to the law of England. On the one hand, we see Milton denigrating those who hang on to 
“their gibberish laws” even though they are “the badge of their ancient slavery.” On the 
other hand, we find him insisting that the king behaved like a tyrant because he wanted 
to be above the law. In the discussion over the rights to raise a militia, the king is 
scolded like a stubborn child who will not learn his lesson: “it hath bin oft anough told 
him, that he hath no more authority over the Sword then over the Law; over the Law he 
hath noe, either to establish or to abrogate, interpret, or to execute, but onely by his 
Courts and in his Courts, wherof the Parlament is highest” (CPW III:454). The king is 
bound by the law and the law is made and interpreted through Parliament and the 
courts. Similarly, we see that the king can only act legally when he does so for the good 
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of the commonwealth, “unless it be in order to their good, he [the King] hath no rights at 
all; raining by the Laws of the Land, not by his own” (CPW III:458). And if he does not 
act for the good of the commonwealth, the laws themselves condemn him as a tyrant: 
“[i]f therefore he obtrude upon us any public mischeif, or withhold from us any general 
good, which is wrong in the highest degree, he must doe it as a Tyrant, not as a king of 
England, by the known Maxims of our Law” (CPW III:458). The argument that the king 
is bound by the laws of the land is, as we have seen above, in the work of Herle, Parker, 
and Rutherford. But Milton’s version is peculiar. In the second edition of Eikonoklastes, 
Milton elaborates on his condemnation of the king’s claim to royal prerogative to insist 
again that the king must rule according to Parliament’s law: “He himself hath many 
times acknowledg’d to have no right over us but by Law; and by the same Law to 
govern us: but Law in a Free Nation hath bin ever public reason, the enacted reason of a 
Parlament; which he denying to enact, denies to govern us by that which ought to be our 
Law; interposing his own privat reason, which to us is no Law” (CPW III:360). Here we 
see the difference between “their gibberish laws” and the “Law in a Free Nation.” In this 
second category, we find law as “public reason,” that is, using Milton’s statement about 
law and reason from the opening of Of Reformation (CPW I:747), laws that are made by 
representatives of the people and explained, reasonably to the people. These laws are the 
only kinds of laws in a free nation, that is the kind of nation that can change its ruler and 
form of government whenever the people, or those who can reason correctly, deem it 
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good. This kind of nation is a nation that is fundamentally and radically ahistorical. It 
has not been shaped by its own history or laws. 
 In Parker, obedience to the law is fundamental in avoiding tyranny because and 
in so far that the law protects the interests that each individual has in himself and that 
the community has in each individual; in Milton the law is public reason. It has to be 
understood by each true member of the commonwealth. A.E. Barker, in Milton and the 
Puritan Dilemma, sees Milton’s understanding of Christian liberty as “a right of the 
individual believer to judge for himself.”304 Similarly, good laws and good governments 
are those that promote this kind of liberty. Thus, a free nation is one which promotes 
virtue, but virtue is fundamentally understood as becoming independently reasoning 
individuals, freed from traditional and historical frameworks. Any historical accrual 
which promotes an attachment of custom leads to servile mind, that is, a non-reasoning 
mind in Milton’s terms. That is why law can be both invoked as the fundamental bound 
that keeps a king from becoming a tyrant and, at the same time, be “gibberish law,” 
which binds English subjects into servility. Milton’s frustration with those who, 
according to the political tracts, have acquired exactly this servile mind is similar to his 
frustration with that “image of earth and fleam” (CPW II:254) in the Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce. Like the unsympathetic wife of the divorce tracts, the “vulgar” 
people in Milton’s political tracts have minds impenetrable to reason and good 
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arguments. In the second edition of the preface to Eikonoklastes, Milton, dealing with the 
limited success of his book compared to the king’s, adds a pessimistic view of his 
audience. Because of them, “well it might have seem’d in vaine to write at all” (CPW 
III:339). Here he considers, “the envy and almost infinite prejudice likely to be stirr’d up 
among the Common sort, against what ever be writt’n or gainsaid to the Kings book, so 
advantageous to a book it is, only to be a Kings” (CPW III:339). Milton nonetheless keeps 
on writing for the sake of the truth: “the truth not smother’d, but sent abroad, in the 
native confidence of her single self, to earn, how she can, her entertainment in the world, 
and to finde out her own readers; few perhaps, but those few, such of value and 
substantial worth, as truth and wisdom, not respecting numbers and big names, have 
bin ever wont in all ages to be contested with” (CPW III:339-40).
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4. Shadows and Form: the People, Legislation, and 
Reform 
All forms are but as shadowes & subject to the end, & the safety of the people is above all forms, 
customes, &c. and the equitie of popular safettie is the thing which justifieth all forms, or the 
change of forms for the accomplishment thereof.1 
 
 The passage above is an excerpt from a letter addressed to General Fairfax and 
appended to The Case of the Army Truly Stated (15 October 1647), a document from a 
group of agents from five regiments expressing a series of grievances and urging the 
New Model Army not to allow itself to be disbanded before its requests have been 
addressed. The authors align themselves with the soldiers in the New Model Army and 
the letter explains why, even though the Army had been rebuked by Parliament for 
petitioning on matters of policy, they are writing again. To justify their transgression of 
orders, they adopt the language of Hebrews 8, “there are priests that offer gifts 
according to the law:/ Who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as 
Moses was admonished of God when he was about to make the tabernacle: for, See, 
saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern shewed to thee in the 
mount.”2 Their “pattern” is “the equitie of popular safettie” and all customs and laws 
can be changed if needed to preserve the people. This passage illustrates in a condensed 
form the claim put forward in different guises by the texts considered in this chapter. 
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Republican language, the Civil War rallying-call of salus populi encountered in the 
previous chapter, and the Scriptural language casting England as the New Jerusalem are 
blended together to argue that laws and political structures are just forms and shadows 
that may be remade. The joining of these idioms has been credited with making it 
conceivable for Englishmen to act to alter the constitution and laws of their nation in the 
mid-seventeenth-century. The standard version of this account is by J.G.A. Pocock. In 
the Machiavellian Moment, he argues for the importance of the role of specifically 
apocalyptic and prophetic language in articulating a new civic consciousness in 
England. As in the passage above, this Scriptural language is melded to Renaissance and 
early modern reformulations of classical republican language, and both elements are 
seen as crucial in providing impetus, and an idiom through which to understand and 
articulate justifications, for political change in the English Civil Wars.  
 Pocock’s study of the religious aspect of Civil War builds on and modifies 
Michael Walzer’s thesis in The Revolution of the Saints. There, Walzer argues that 
Calvinism provided the intellectual framework of early modern revolutions, a thesis 
later rejected by Quentin Skinner on the grounds that the origins of protestant resistance 
theory can be traced back to scholastic thinkers, in particular Gerson and Ockham.3 
Skinner, by retracing the genealogy of the resistance theory adopted by Calvinist writers 
from Catholic thought, not only corrects Walzer’s work diachronically in terms of 
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identifying the sources for this strand of Reformation political thought, but redirects the 
synchronic study of “radical Calvinists” to reconstructing the process of legitimation of 
their revolutionary practice.4 Nonetheless, while Walzer’s analysis of the role of 
Calvinism has been refuted, his concept of the “revolutionary” saint is embedded, 
though in a modified version, deep in Pocock’s formulation of the landscape of the 
English Civil Wars.5 Walzer’s work brings to the fore questions of the relationship 
between the individual and the “state” and of the individual’s role and responsibility in 
guiding, and remodeling if necessary, the nation as prompted by his conscience in 
preparation for the millennium. For Walzer, the saints were moved by a collective zeal 
that was the impetus for a “Puritan” revolution: “Puritan zeal was not a private passion; 
it was instead a highly collective emotion and it imposed upon the saints a new and 
impersonal discipline. Conscience freed the saints from medieval passivity and feudal 
loyalty, but it did not encourage the individualist, Italiante politics of faction and 
intrigue.”6 The saint presented by Walzer’s model as the engine for revolution is a 
clergyman or an educated layman associating with others of the same background and 
education and not the soldier, though drilled and organized by officer-saints such as 
Cromwell, signing a petition or an agitator debating at Putney. In The Revolution of the 
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Saints, warfare and military discipline are central to how the revolutionary saints 
organize, but more as a metaphor for the alienated godly individual fighting to remake 
societal norms, from the family to church discipline to political structures, than as the 
reality of the soldiers in the Army.7 In the Machiavellian Moment, Pocock argues that 
Walzer’s analysis captures only part of the forces at work on the saints during the Civil 
Wars and the Interregnum. Seventeenth-century “revolutionaries” did not see 
themselves in opposition to and fighting against “the state”; they were led instead by 
millenarian hopes that allowed them to envision reforming the laws of England. In the 
English Civil Wars, the “apocalyptic mode” is “one of those modes of secular 
consciousness which blurred the purity of ‘the revolution of the saints,’ and […] one of 
those modes of civic consciousness which antedated the arrival of the classical concept 
of citizenship.”8 Part of Pocock’s disagreement with Walzer’s argument is over the role 
played by the version of “the modern state” presented in The Revolution of the Saints. For 
Walzer, the saints played a part in creating the modern state by attempting to remake 
the existing political order according to their interpretation of Scripture, while, at the 
same time, it was the development of the centralizing apparatus of the modern state 
                                                     
7 Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, 268-99. 
8 J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 337. 
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overwhelming “traditional political life” that made possible the creation of the citizen-
saint.9  
 To respond to Walzer’s formulation of the relationship between saint and “state” 
and the saints’ opposition to a “traditional society”, Pocock brings to bear the “ideology 
of the Ancient Constitution” as furnishing a model of civic consciousness which allowed 
Englishmen to see themselves as possessing a sovereignty of their own making. This 
ideology allowed English lawyers, antiquarians, and MPs to see all English law as 
common law based on custom, immemorial and thus not made by any particular man, 
and therefore as safe from royal interference. This claim is built on Pocock’s earlier 
analysis in The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law in which he argues that common 
lawyers and parliamentarians used this conception of English law to resist what they 
perceived as early Stuart absolutist theory of monarchy expressed in attempts of royalist 
law reform, including the union of England and Scotland.10 In The Machiavellian Moment, 
the “common law mind,” though insisting that the political and legal make-up of the 
nation existed since time immemorial, is not a reflection of Walzer’s traditional society 
                                                     
9 Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, 1-16. 
10 Pocock argues that common lawyers, and Coke in particular, could deploy the conception of common law 
as immemorial custom to deny that English laws were ever created by the acts of sovereign kings (The 
Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, 37-55).  The importance and the extend of the conflict over the issue 
of royal power between Crown, on the one hand, and Parliament and common lawyers, on the other, before 
the Civil Wars has been revisited by Glenn Burgess in both The Politics of the Ancient Constitution and 
Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). In The Politics of the 
Ancient Constitution, Burgess argues for a strong Jacobean consensus on the extent of the royal prerogative 
and, in Absolute Monarchy, he proposes that the conflict that led to the Civil Wars was over specific policies 
in the government of Charles I and not against a growing monarchical absolutism in the Stuart period. 
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of “medieval passivity,” but rather a way to define the realm of England through the 
fabric of custom, which in turn is generated, refined, and clarified by Englishmen and, 
especially, by English landowners.11 This leads Pocock to modify Michael Walzer’s 
version of the saints. He agrees with Walzer that the saints saw themselves as called to 
political action in response to their understanding of each individual’s duty to God and 
that they held a growing tendency to conceive of England as the chosen nation, 
portrayed in prophetic or apocalyptic terms. But he rejects the view of the saint as 
shaped by, and in turn reshaping, Walzer’s version of an emerging “modern state.” 
Pocock’s saints, and this term includes the agents at Putney, are not alienated from a 
centralizing system of laws and institutions, but rather see themselves as deeply 
involved in English laws and liberties, and, in consequence of this involvement, they 
understand their calling as operating to transform and modify the laws, rather than 
abolish them.12 
 The concept of the state and its relationship to the language of republicanism has 
been explored by Jonathan Scott in his discussion of the tumults of the seventeenth-
century. Scott argues that the Civil War years did see a process of centralization and 
state formation on the part of Parliament going hand in hand with increasing military 
                                                     
11 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 340-1. 
12 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 374-6.  
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power.13 How this form of statebuilding developed is a complex story beyond the scope 
of this dissertation, but it suffices to note that local government became a source of 
stability during the struggle for control of the central government between Parliament 
and king and, once the “military-fiscal state” did take a solid foothold, it had to cut 
across these local structures.14 Scott focuses on two responses to this process of state 
formation. On one hand of the spectrum, English republicanism developed alongside 
and served to justify both Parliament’s military deployment and success as well as the 
fiscal apparatus constructed to sustain the protracted military engagement: “When 
English republicanism emerged, it did so as (among other things) the ideology of the 
first fiscally and militarily modernized English and British state. This helps to explain 
the deep and developing interest of republican writers in the economic, social, maritime 
and military bases of modern state power.”15 At the other end, Scott places the response 
of the Levellers. In particular, he sees the agents’ position in the Putney Debates as part 
of a Leveller fight against this process of centralization. Rainborough’s and Wildman’s 
demands for expanding the franchise “occurred in defence of a document, the first 
Agreement of the People, the primary concern of which was the radical decentralization of 
                                                     
13 Jonathan Scott, Commonwealth Principles: Republican Writing of the English Revolution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 67. 
14 Scott, Commonwealth Principles, 72. For a discussion of the concept and organization of the state and its 
development, see Michael J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 2000). As Braddick argues increased military power and the correlated increase 
in taxation was not the only force driving seventeenth-century state formation (13-4), but it was certainly 
one that attracted vocal opposition in during the Civil Wars and the Interregnum. 
15 Scott, Commonwealth Principles, 67. 
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political (in particular parliamentary) power.”16 For Scott, the argument over the 
expansion of the franchise at Putney is an attempt to counter the increasing 
centralization of political power. 
 If we look at the first response to Parliamentary centralization, English 
republicanism, we see that in Scott’s analysis it is characterized by a merging of classical 
republicanism, both Greek and Roman, and natural law theory.17 Building on Pocock’s 
discussion of the importance of the conception of time and mutability of governments in 
republican thought, Scott argues that English republican writers linked both “protestant 
antiformalism and Platonism” to their view that specific laws and forms of government 
could be changed at will when found to be “hindrances, to the good and enjoyment of 
humane societies.”18 This willingness to change governments could take the form of 
armed resistance.19 Scott sees the potential for English republicanism to manifest itself as 
a form of resistance theory, rather than just as a formulation of a theory of government, 
exactly because republican writers adopted natural law theories alongside classical 
republicanism and the language of the ancient constitution.20 Here, Scott builds on 
                                                     
16 Scott, Commonwealth Principles, 71. 
17 Scott, Commonwealth Principles, 89. 
18 Scott, Commonwealth Principles, 88; quoting Henry Vane as prototypical of English republican writers. 
19 Thus Scott takes issue of the revisionist view that republicanism in England manifested itself in reaction 
to, rather than motivating and justifying, the regicide (Commonwealth Principles, n. 12, p. 255). For an explicit 
argument against the revisionist view, see his discussion of Blair Worden’s “Republicanism, Regicide and 
Republic: the English Experience” in ed. Van Geldern and Skinner, Republicanism: A Shared European 
Heritage, 2 vols: vol. I. Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
20 Scott, Commonwealth Principles, 109-10. 
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Skinner’s corrective to Walzer’s model of protestant resistance theory.21 In this analysis, 
natural law, especially alongside Grotius’s theory of just war, is used to formulate an 
English republican language of resistance. In particular, Scott singles out Edward Sexby 
in Killing No Murder (1657) as the most sustained advocate of this form of republicanism 
during the Protectorate.22 In this account, in the hands of republican theorists, natural 
law inherited and adapted from the scholastic and neo-scholastic sources, is deployed to 
argue for the people’s right to regain their sovereignty when the ruler turns out to be a 
tyrant. But here a question arises that is left unanswered by Scott’s analysis. As Scott 
points out, Sexby’s Killing No Murder amalgamates in its pages quotes from Cicero, 
Augustine, Grotius, Aristotle, Milton, and Scripture, just to name a few of the explicitly 
cited sources in the pamphlet. But how does that affect the version of natural law which 
underpins Sexby’s argument? Grotius, whom Sexby quotes extensively and whose De 
                                                     
21 Scott sees the pre-regicide writers as distinctly using classical republican language alongside their 
deployment of continental resistance theory. On the other hand, Skinner’s view of the influence of 
republican formulations of theories of government in England has somewhat shifted over time. In Liberty 
Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), he sees neo-Roman language as becoming 
influential mostly after the regicide, while in Visions of Politics II chapters 11 and 12, he gives it an earlier 
place in the arguments over the justification of the Civil War. This is a matter of emphasis rather than drastic 
change. In Liberty Before Liberalism, the neo-Roman concept of libertas comes into play in reaction to the use, 
by royalist writers, of the Roman law formulation of sovereignty as residing in an artificial person of the 
state, rather than in the monarch or in the people viewed as a corporation. While this royalist theory is 
voiced soon after the outbreak of the Civil War, Skinner presents the Parliamentarian neo-Roman language 
as responding to Hobbes’s version of the royalist position in Leviathan (Liberty Before Liberalism, 4-16). A 
writer like Henry Parker, defending the Parliament’s actions against the king from the opening of the Civil 
Wars, is in this account a monarchomach thinker arguing that the people delegate their power to a ruler 
only for their own benefit and therefore retain the right to reclaim their sovereignty in defense of salus 
populi, but he does not share the neo-Roman understanding of libertas (Liberty Before Liberalism, n. 65, p. 21). 
Nonetheless, Skinner does not take the revisionist view that there was not a constitutional crisis before the 
regicide (see, for instance, Liberty Before Liberalism, 3). 
22 Scott, Commonwealth Principles, 110-18. 
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Jure Belli ac Pacis seems to be the direct source of most of his classical authorities, had 
tacitly used medieval and late scholastic thought to develop his theory of natural law 
and right and to elicit out of classical authors conceptions of ius that were not present in 
the original.23 But Sexby’s eclecticism is more problematic.  
 The first section of this chapter, “Killing No Murder: the People and Tyrannicide,” 
explores how Sexby’s indiscriminate appropriation of resistance theory arguments 
combined with his exegesis of Scriptural passages that had been the locus of debates 
over the lawfulness of tyrannicide, distorts and degrades the role of the people in 
forming a political community over time. My argument focuses on how paying attention 
to the legislative role of the community, understood as a corporate whole under natural 
as well as positive law, can help us to understand the impoverished version of the 
people and their political role underlying the republican resistance theory exemplified in 
Killing No Murder. By way of comparison, in section two, “Parliament as Nothing: 
Political Idolatry and Iconoclasm,” I turn to apologies of the dissolution of the Rump 
and the appointment of the Nominated Assembly in 1653 as presenting versions of the 
body politic in direct opposition to those that are central to English republicanism. For 
republican writers, a body politic is deemed free only if, as in the case of a natural body, 
its actions are self-determined.24 The texts considered in this section, attempting to 
                                                     
23 On this, see Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 324-9, who points out, in particular, the importance of the 
influence of Alanus, Ockham, and Suarez on Grotius’ thought. 
24 This is, baldly, the main strand of the argument of Quentin Skinner’s Liberty Before Liberalism. 
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justify the Army’s overt intervention in the government of England, argue that the 
people, though freed from the thralldom of monarchy, are not yet capable of exercising 
their liberties and rights in electing a representative parliament. However, these 
justifications of the dissolution of representative civilian rule in England share with 
Sexby the view of law and custom as merely external to just government. By comparing 
the language traced in section one through Killing No Murder that dismisses law and 
trials as formalities with the claim advanced by supporters of the Army’s actions that 
Parliament had become an empty name no longer signifying a true representative, we 
can see how the link of political reformation with iconoclastic language in texts at odds 
with each other ultimately stems from a joint attempt to replace historically bound, 
customary and legal embodiments of justice with an abstracted and a-historical 
conception of justice. 
 This comparison leads to the problem of how understandings of justice and law 
are related to questions of centralization of legislation and adjudication. To explore this 
problem within the context of the relationship between Parliament, the people, and the 
Army, in section three, I turn to the Putney debates (1647) and the arguments between 
the “Grandees,” Ireton and Cromwell, and the agents, especially Sexby and Wildman, 
and Rainborough, over the justification for the New Model Army’s involvement in the 
political and legislative restructuring of England. The proponents of An Agreement of the 
People argue for a certain set of birthrights due to Englishmen and soldiers based on 
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natural law and not simply granted by a Parliament. In this view, the Army is to be the 
engine of reform. Cromwell and Ireton argue against the agents on two main counts. For 
Ireton, insisting on right to franchise based on natural law risks denying the validity of 
any positive right, and in particular the right to property. Moreover, for both Ireton and 
Cromwell, the Army is not free to enter new engagements until it has been absolved of 
its previous ones. As Pocock has argued in The Machiavellian Moment, it is not that Ireton 
and Cromwell were unwilling to press for reform, but rather that they represented the 
traditionalist view that individuals were defined by the social and political institutions 
into which they were and to which they were bound by a system of custom and 
inheritable property.25 In Pocock’s influential interpretation, it is the Leveller-influenced 
agents, appealing to natural law, who best exemplify his modified version of Walzer’s 
saint, who wants to restore the laws and liberties of Englishmen to their original form 
rather than to uphold their inherited current structure.26 The Levellers based their 
requests on a version of ancient constitutionalism supported by a “radicalization” of 
natural law arguments.27 In this third section of the chapter, I explore the version of 
natural law theory formulated by the supporters of the Agreement at Putney to 
investigate their model of agency of the people and their resistance to the centralizing 
pull of the Parliament. In particular, I turn to their insistence that they fought to recover 
                                                     
25 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 375-7. 
26 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 374-5. 
27 For this reading of Leveller thought, see Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political 
Instability in European Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200), 283-9. 
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their birthrights as based on the law of nature and compare this claim with a model for 
the recovery and loss of rights already embedded in the practice of how common law 
courts dealt with rival claims of jurisdiction. 
4.1 Killing No Murder: the People and Tyrannicide 
If that promiscuous Right of Resistance should be allowed, there would be no longer a State, but 
a Multitude without Union, such as the Cyclops were, everyone gives Law to his Wife and 
Children. A Mob where all are Speakers, and no Hearers.28 
 
 The language of resistance used to justify first the Civil Wars and then the trial 
and execution of Charles I as a tyrant is in 1657 turned against Cromwell by Edward 
Sexby in Killing No Murder.29 Sexby had been a private soldier in the New Model Army 
up through 1647 and, as we will see in section three, he took part in the debates at 
Putney.30 He maintained his contacts with the Army and with the Interregnum 
                                                     
28 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace. Book I, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), 
338; emphasis original. 
29 Edward Sexby, Killing no murder: Briefly discoursed in three questions. Early English Books Online. William 
Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California, Los Angeles. May, 10, 2011. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:45097951. Killing Noe Murder is first published in 1657 in the 
Low Countries and re-printed in 1658 (a French translation; Brussels?); in 1659 (in English; Brussels?); and in 
two different editions in 1689 (David Wootton, ed., Divine Right and Democracy: An Anthology of Political 
Writing in Stuart England (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), n. 6, p. 388). The 1657 and 1689 editions contain the 
dedicatory letter to Cromwell and a dedicatory letter to the army, the latter of which is absent from the 1659 
edition. Throughout this chapter, all my quotes from Killing No Murder are from the 1689 edition. The 
pamphlet is written by Edward Sexby and possibly Silius Titus, but it carries the name of William Allen, one 
of Sexby’s fellow army agitators from 1647 (Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 358). For the question of 
Sexby’s authorship of the work, see: C. H. Firth, “Killing No Murder,” The English Historical Review 17 (1902): 
308-311. Firth argues for a co-authorship of Killing No Murder. For the life and career of Edward Sexby, see 
James Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger: Class Struggle in the English Revolution (New York: Verso, 2000), 305-333. 
Holstun assigns the authorship of the pamphlet to Sexby, while acknowledging a possible contribution from 
Titus (333). 
30 James Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger, 308-9. 
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government up through 1654.  But by 1657, he had become involved in negotiations with 
royalists and Spanish agents to assassinate Cromwell with the aid of royalist financing 
and to bring Charles II to the throne under a settlement granting certain liberties to 
English subjects.31 Killing No Murder is written to justify armed resistance to the 
Protectorate government and advocates the murder of Oliver Cromwell by any private 
individual. This section explores the model of political community and the conception 
and representation of law that are at the basis of Sexby’s claim that each individual can 
assassinate a tyrant. Sexby’s understanding of law and human society is expressed in the 
pamphlet through his use and interpretation of classical, patristic, and Scriptural 
sources. In particular, his interpretation of the narrative of the killing of the idolatrous 
Athaliah in 2 Chronicles, his central authorizing text for tyrannicide, presents a test-case 
for Sexby’s understanding of the relationship between individual judgment and political 
community. As we will see, in Killing No Murder, Sexby oscillated between an optimistic 
and a negative view of human nature and sociability. On the one hand, his reliance on 
the Aristotelian view of human beings as naturally sociable leads him, in an echo of the 
Parliamentary propaganda from the Civil War, to confidently appeal to the consent of 
the people as the legitimating authority of any government. On the other hand, his view 
of human nature as corrupted by original sin pulls Killing No Murder towards an 
indictment of the “vulgar” judgment of the Protectorate. 
                                                     
31 Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger, 319-22. 
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 Following Pocock’s framework, most of the work on English republicanism has 
focused on writers such as James Harrington, Marchamont Needham, Henry Vane, or 
John Milton.32 While interest in Sexby, as we will see in section three, is mostly centered 
on his role in the Putney Debates, Killing No Murder has been seen by David Norbrook as 
“uncompromisingly republican” and by Jonathan Scott as a prime example of the 
survival of English republican resistance theory during the Protectorate.33 But the most 
sustained discussion of Sexby’s Killing No Murder is found in James Holstun’s Ehud’s 
Dagger. Holstun agrees with Worden and Scott that Killing No Murder should be part of 
the English republican canon and his reading of the pamphlet is part of a larger 
challenge to Pocock’s and Skinner’s linguistic approach as well as to revisionist and 
new-historicist historiography and criticism of the 1640s and 1650s.34 Holstun’s attention 
to Sexby is particularly meant as a corrective to the approach of historians and literary 
critics who focus on contingency, consensus and traditional practices and loyalties, and 
patronage relationships.35 Against the interest in these loci of analysis, Holstun focuses 
                                                     
32 For a discussion of the development of the ever-expanding canon of republican writers since Zera Fink’s 
focus on Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana in The Classical Republicans, see Jonathan Scott, 
Commonwealth Principles, 1-5. 
33 Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 324; and Scott, Commonwealth Principles, 117. 
34 Holstun’s revisionist targets are J.C.D. Clark, Mark Kishlansky, John Morrill, Conrad Russell, and Kevin 
Sharpe. His account of the “English Revolution” is explicitly Marxist and views the conflict as “a class 
struggle […] among various groups that were endeavoring to maintain or transform the relations of 
production” (Ehud’s Dagger, 87-8). 
35 For his assessment of each of these approaches, see, respectively, Ehud’s Dagger, pp. 44-5; pp. 218-9, where 
Holstun is particularly attacking the account of early Stuart England presented by Glenn Burgess, as well as 
disagreeing with Mark Kishlansky’s analysis of the New Model and the Putney Debates; pp. 146-7. 
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his own account on “popular praxis,” understood as “action planned, accomplished, and 
reflected upon,” as it is “organized in five radical projects.”36 One of these five projects is 
Sexby’s attempt and call to tyrannicide. This challenge to the “new sort of monarchical 
charisma” of the Protectorate is seen by Holstun as a form of “godly republic[anism]” 
based on practices of popular and collective resistance.37 
 Holstun’s focus on popular praxis directs his reading of Killing No Murder as an 
expression of Sexby’s “associative practice.” Holstun sees Sexby acting as early as 
December 1653, after the dissolution of the Nominated Assembly, in conjunction with 
assorted “English radicals (including ex-Levellers, republicans, Fifth Monarchists, and 
Quakers)” and royalists, who formed an opposition to the Protectorate.38 This represents 
a fundamental change in Sexby’s mode of association and authorization from that of the 
time of the Putney Debates: 
Sexby’s conspiracies suggest a marked shift in his political practice. In 1647, he 
worked as an organic intellectual on behalf of a fused group; as a democratically 
elected Agitator, he attempted through petitions, manifestos, and 
communication networks to fabricate a new egalitarian party that would 
democratize the English state. In 1655-57, he worked as a conspiratorial bricoleur 
on behalf of a merely serial collective; as a self-authorized conspirator, he 
attempted to cobble together a makeshift alliance among preconstituted political 
parties united only by a shared opposition to Cromwell, and constantly 
threatening to fragment.39 
 
                                                     
36 Ehud’s Dagger, x-xi; emphasis original. 
37 Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger, 307, 335. 
38 Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger, 312. 
39 Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger, 317. 
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Strikingly, Holstun does not raise the question of whether a change in Sexby’s political 
practice may not also mirror, and influence, a shift in the accompanying understanding 
of community and political association. While his “associative practice” may have 
changed, for Holstun, Sexby is a “godly republican” pursuing democratic reforms in 
England in 1657 as well as in 1647. Holstun’s framework of republicanism is indebted to 
Pocock’s work. However, Holstun argues against Pocock’s focus on the languages and 
“discourse” of republicanism to the exclusion of praxis: “Pocock reduces practice to 
discourse, discourse to elite discourse, and plebeian oppositional writing and speaking 
to silence.”40 The consequence of this focus on “elite discourse” is, in Holstun’s view, 
particularly near-sighted and damaging to our understanding of the conjunction of 
republicanism and resistance theory. In Holstun’s account, “republican theory” views 
tyranny as the moment when “the ‘one’ threatens to extinguish the power of the ‘few’ 
and the ‘many,’ or when the sovereign representative begins to override the salus 
populi.”41 However, Holstun argues that by leaving out “plebeian” writing and actions, 
such as Sexby’s, from accounts of the period, the language of republicanism is left 
separated from the call to action of resistance theory. Sexby is left out “perhaps because 
[he] emphasizes republicanism’s Reformation dimensions as popular praxis over its 
Renaissance dimensions as elite discourse. […] Sexby made plain his desire to translate 
                                                     
40 Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger, 328; this passage from Ehud’s Dagger has in its sights Pocock’s Virtue, Commerce, 
and History. 
41 Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger, 329. 
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his reading into practice, and he can enrich our appreciation for the practical impulses in 
those antityrannical works Pocock sees as discursive structures only.”42 But by focusing 
on how he translates “his reading into practice,” Holstun neglects how Sexby reads his 
sources. It is to the specific form of resistance theory, natural law, and Scriptural 
exegesis that Sexby engages that I now turn. 
 Sexby’s anti-tyrannical practice draws on a combination of natural law 
arguments, classical and patristic quotations, and Scriptural examples. Old Testament 
celebrations of tyrannicide against usurping rulers and idolaters explicitly frame Killing 
No Murder. The title page of the pamphlet includes quotes from 2 Chronicles 23.21 and 2 
Chronicles 25.27, verses which celebrate the killing of the tyrants Athaliah and Amaziah, 
respectively.43 The stories of Athaliah and Amaziah frame Killing No Murder for its 
readers by recalling Scriptural verses that had been used by both resistance theorists and 
their royalist opponents before and during the Civil Wars.44 The killing of Athaliah, as 
                                                     
42 Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger, 330. On the link between resistance theory and republican language, see footnote 
21 above. 
43 “And all the people of the land rejoiced: and the city was quiet, after that they had slain Athaliah with the 
sword” (2 Chron. 23.21). The Geneva Bible commentary to this verse drives the point home: “For where a 
tyrant and an idolater reigneth, there can be no quietnesse: for the plagues of God are euer among such 
people” (Geneva Bible). “Now after the time that Amaziah did turn away from following the LORD they 
made a conspiracy against him in Jerusalem; and he fled to Lachish: but they sent to Lachish after him, and 
slew him there” (2 Chron. 25.27). 
44 Royalist writers argued that Athaliah could be killed by subjects only because she was an unlawful ruler 
who had usurped the throne. See, for instance, Charles I, The Kings Declaration from Carisbrook-Castle, Jan. 18. 
1647: “People when oppressed and wronged by their lawfull Superiour, have allowance onley to cry unto 
God, (as 1 Sam. 8.18) and to sue for reliefe by way of Petition, as the Israelites in Egypt did to Pharaoh, when 
they were so cruelly used by his Task-masters. But its otherwise, if men be usurpers, and set up themselves, as 
Abimelech the Bramble did Judg. 9. or endeavour to destry the Royall Family, as Athaliah did” (emphasis 
original); in The Kings most gracious messages for peace and a personal treaty published for his peoples satisfaction, 
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recalled in the pages of Killing No Murder, promises the end of discord in the nation. In 
using this Scriptural passage in the title page, Sexby hides a problem that will recur in 
the texts I analyze in this chapter: killing a tyrant does not automatically lead to a re-
covenanting of the country into “the Lord’s people” (2 Chronicles 23.16). The imagined 
histories of government formation analyzed in the previous chapter hinged on a 
rationalized forming of the body politic by necessity from the state of nature. Similarly, 
Sexby’s pamphlet envisions an automatic reformation of England after the assassination 
of the Lord Protector. But the narrative of Athaliah points in a different direction. Her 
story is told twice in the Old Testament, once in 2 Chronicles and once in 2 Kings. Both 
the Chronicles and Kings narratives of the story of Athaliah focus on her violent 
                                                     
 
that they may see and judge, whether the foundation of the Commons declaration, touching their votes of no farther 
addresse to the King, viz His Majesties aversenesse to peace, be just rationall and religious. (London, 1648), 129. 
Early English Books Online. Huntington Library and Art Gallery (San Marino, CA). August 25, 2011. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:13415192. For the use of the example of Athaliah in defense of 
the regicide, see John Goodwin, Hybristodikai. The obstructours of justice. Or a defence of the honourable sentence 
passed upon the late King, by the High Court of Justice. Opposed chiefly to the serious and faithfull representation and 
vindication of some of the ministers of London (London, [Thomason: May 30], 1649), image 1, and page 77. Early 
English Books Online. British Library (London). October 10, 2011. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99859273. More pointedly, in the context of Sexby’s links with 
royalist plans for the return of Charles II in the event of a successful assassination of Cromwell, the biblical 
verses celebrating the coronation of Jehoash as King of Israel by Johoiada after killing of Athaliah, as it is 
narrated in 2 Kings 11:12 and 17, had been used by Robert Douglas at the coronation of Charles II at Scone 
in 1651. See, The form and order of the coronation of Charles the Second, King of Scotland, England, France and 
Ireland as it was acted and done at Scoone, the first day of Ianuarie, 1651 (Aberdene, 1651), image 5. Early English 
Books Online. British Library (London). May 10, 2012. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:8713192. 
For use of the example of Athaliah before 1640 in support of resistance against a tyrant, see J. P. 
Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England: 1603-1640, 72. 
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usurpation of the throne and on her execution. Athaliah, Ahab’s daughter, becomes 
queen of Judah as Jehoram’s wife (2 Chronicles 21). While the Chronicles narrative gives 
few details of about Athaliah, it does emphasize her identification with the cult of Baal 
(2 Chron. 21.6). After Jehoram’s death, Athaliah takes the throne and attempts to 
assassinate all the legitimate claimants to the crown (2 Chronicles 22.10-2). But one, 
Joash, survives. During Athaliah’s six-year reign, Jehoiada keeps Joash, the legitimate 
heir, hidden in his house (2 Chron. 22.11-12). In the seventh year, Jehoiada organizes a 
rebellion to restore Joash to the throne, killing Athaliah and all her followers (2 Chron. 
23).  
 Athaliah’s assassination in 2 Chronicles 23 is celebrated for inaugurating a re-
covenanting between the people, the new king (the rightful ruler from the house of 
David), and God, and for instigating the destruction of the temple of Baal: “And 
Jehoiada made a covenant between him, and between all the people, and between the 
king, that they should be the LORD's people./ Then all the people went to the house of 
Baal, and brake it down, and brake his altars and his images in pieces, and slew Mattan 
the priest of Baal before the altars” (2 Chron. 23.16-17). The Chronicles narrative closely 
links the problems of idolatry with the problems of usurpers and tyrants; Athaliah is 
both an usurper and a worshipper of Baal. Thus, by killing her, Jehoiada restores both 
the rightful heir to the throne of Israel and the right worship of God. In her study of 
iconoclasm in the English reformation, Margaret Aston suggests a connection between 
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iconoclasm and deadly violence. Recalling the burning of sacred images in sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century England, as well as Savonarola’s bonfires of vanities, Aston 
comments that “[t]hese occasions also point to an aspect of iconoclasm which should not 
be lost sight of. There was a connection (occasionally indicated by contemporaries, but 
for the most part unacknowledged) between breaking images and killing people.”45 
Iconoclasts, wrote Luther in 1525 as he reflected on laws demanding the death penalty 
for idolaters, reveal that “there is a spirit hidden in them which is death-dealing, not life-
giving.”46 The story of Athaliah, narrating the murder of an idolatrous usurper to the 
throne of God’s chosen nation, brings to the surface this link between iconoclasm and 
violence, in this case between iconoclasm and political assassination, a link that is 
brought to the forefront of the argument of Killing No Murder. 
 In Sexby’s use of the story of Athaliah in Killing No Murder, Cromwell becomes 
idolater, idol, and the punishment visited upon England for the people’s idolatry all in 
one. Sexby introduces his reading of 2 Chronicles 23 while arguing that any individual 
may lawfully kill a tyrant. I will return to this argument for the lawfulness of private 
action and to Sexby’s definition of a tyrant below, but for the moment it is sufficient to 
note that Jehoiada is given as an example of a private individual, rather than a 
magistrate, whose actions justly and lawfully remove tyranny and idolatry from the 
                                                     
45 Margaret Aston, England’s Iconoclasts: Laws Against Images (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 5-6. 
46 Quoted in Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, 6. 
 351 
nation.47 His example is invoked throughout the pamphlet and, in particular, at the end, 
Sexby focuses on the killing of the supporters of Athaliah as described in 2 Chronicles: “I 
must not conclude this Story without observing that Jehoiada commanded, that 
whosoever followed Athaliah should be put to Death. Letting us see what they deserve 
that are Confederates with Tyrants and will side with them, and but appear to defend 
them, or allow them.”48 This explicit emphasis on the guilt and just punishment of all 
who are “Confederates with Tyrants” creates an ever-expanding circle of those whose 
death would automatically follow that of Cromwell: “his Highness, his Counsell, his 
Junto, and the Agaes of his Janizaries” will all share the same fate.49 The killing of 
Mattan, Baal’s priest, affords a similar occasion to include those divines who have 
supported the Protector from their pulpits: 
likewise his Highness’s Chaplains, and Tryers who are to admit none into the 
Ministry that will preach Liberty with the Gospel; may, if they think fit, observe, 
that with the Tyrant fell Mattan the Priest of Baal. And indeed none but Baal’s 
Priests will preach for Tyrants. And certainly those Priests that sacrifice to our 
Baal, our Idol of a Magistrate, deserves [sic] as well to be hang’d before their 
Pulpits, as ever Mattan did to fall before his Altars.50 
 
In this passage, Sexby turns Cromwell from an idolater to idol. In the Chronicles’ 
narrative, Athaliah is represented as luring her son into wickedness: “He also walked in 
the ways of the house of Ahab: for his mother was his counseller to do wickedly” (2 
                                                     
47 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 29. 
48 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 30; emphasis original. 
49 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 30. 
50 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 30; underlining mine. 
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Chronicles 22.3; emphasis mine). In Sexby’s version the tyrant’s ability to corrupt is 
changed from that presented in the Scriptural passage. Cromwell’s very existence as an 
idol leads to idolatrous behavior from his “Priests,” and his “Tryers” exclude those from 
the church any who “will preach Liberty with the Gospel.” Unlike Athaliah who 
counsels her son, Cromwell silences good ministers and becomes an occasion for 
sacrifices “to our Baal.” Alongside Cromwell’s transformation into an idol, Sexby’s 
retelling of the killing of Mattan makes “all the people” disappear. In 2 Chronicles 23.17, 
the people “went to the house of Baal, and brake it down, and brake his altars and his 
images in pieces, and slew Mattan the priest of Baal before the altars.” In Sexby’s 
version, the people no longer participate in the destruction of the idols. Instead, the 
killing of both Mattan and of the Cromwellian ministers is presented with passive verbs. 
Cromwell’s idolatrous “priests” are themselves turned into grotesque sacrifices being 
“hang’d before their Pulpits” just as Mattan “did fall before his Altars.” By hiding the 
agency of those who judge, and execute, the supporters of Cromwell as deserving to be 
hanged, Sexby covers up the vexing question of who has the authority of reaching such 
a judgment and by which standards and processes of justice the judgment is reached 
and carried out. What is the process of judgement and justice that is implicit in Sexby’s 
depiction of tyrannicide? 
 Sexby’s conceptions of justice and correct judgment come to light as we compare 
his depictions of good and bad forms of government. His understanding of good 
 353 
government is based on the use and interpretation of republican language of liberty and 
slavery, language traced by Quentin Skinner in his discussion of the English Civil Wars 
in Visions of Politics.51 Skinner has pointed out the centrality of Cicero’s so-called 
Philippics in the works of English republican writers in their definition of political liberty 
and, its opposite, political slavery during the Civil Wars and the interregnum.52 The 
eighth Philippic, in particular, became central to the defenses of the Commonwealth after 
the regicide. In this work, Cicero defines political slavery as the condition endured by 
any people who hold their liberty at the discretion of a ruler. Similarly, in De Officiis, he 
adds that a free people is ruled by law and not by the will of the ruler.53 Killing No 
Murder revisits these definitions of political liberty and slavery, and uses them to argue 
that the Protectorate is a tyranny. Throughout the pamphlet, Sexby insists that good 
government is characterized by the defence of the people’s liberty, while tyrants enslave 
their subjects. This republican argument is supported with Biblical examples. Sexby 
includes the positive example of David’s kingship, from whom Joash descended, as a 
counterweight to Athaliah’s idolatrous tyranny. In his analysis of Andrew Marvell’s 
                                                     
51 Skinner prefers the term “neo-Roman” rather than republican. While Pocock focuses on the influence of 
Aristotelian conceptions of government in classical republicanism, Skinner highlights the importance of 
Roman texts to early modern discourses of liberty and slavery (see, for instance, Visions of Politics II, Chapter 
7). For Skinner, the key sources are Cicero, Polybius, and legal texts such as the Justinian Code. Jonathan 
Scott has recently argued for a reconsideration of Greek sources. In Commonwealth Principles, he posits that 
Plato and Aristotle influenced the thought of English republicans such as Harrington must more extensively 
than either Cicero or Polybius (134). To prevent confusion by frequent changes of terminology, I use the 
more common term “republican” throughout. 
52 In particular, the Ciceronian definition of political slavery was applied to the personal rule of Charles I to 
argue that he behaved as a tyrant (Visions of Politics II:314-5). 
53 Visions of Politics II:315. 
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though, John M. Wallace has shown Marvell’s use of the imagery of Davidic kingship in 
The First Anniversary (published, January 1655) to portray Cromwell as called to 
kingship by God.54 In this use of this imagery, Marvell is appealing to the dual 
appointment of David, by God and by the people, to awaken the English people to 
create Cromwell as king by popular consent.55 Sexby counters this comparison by 
aligning Cromwell with Athaliah, a tyrant who attempted to keep David’s line out of the 
throne. In contrast to Athaliah’s slaughter of all the legitimate heirs in order to seize 
power, the reign of David is inaugurated by a pact between king, the elders, and the 
people: “David was anointed King […], but afterwards, after Saul’s Death, confirmed by 
the People of Juda and seven Years after by the Elders of Israel, the Peoples Deputies […] 
before his Inauguration they made a League ([2 Samuel 5.3]) with him; that is, obliged 
him by Compact to performance of such Conditions as they thought necessary for the 
securing their Liberty.”56 A model of contractual kingship, David’s reign begins when he 
places himself under obligation to rule according to whatever conditions the people57 
think necessary in order to secure their liberty. Sexby emphasizes that while David is 
                                                     
54 John M. Wallace, Destiny His Choice, 106-44. While The First Anniversary does not explicitly compare 
Cromwell to David, Wallace, in part following the work of Joseph Mazzeo (“Cromwell as Davidic King”, in 
Renaissance and Seventeenth-Century Studies (New York, 1964), 183-208; cited by Wallace, n. 1 to p. 108), 
argues that David’s reign is one of the models through which the poem interprets the Protectorate. 
55 Wallace, Destiny His Choice, 123-6. 
56 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 6; emphasis original. 
57 The people or the Elders. Sexby’s syntax contains a list of “they,” making it unclear who “they” are. 
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chosen by God and anointed by a prophet, he is truly made king only after he is 
confirmed by the people and constrained by the conditions that they imposed on him.  
 The Davidic image of the people binding a good king by obligating him to 
preserve the people’s liberties is placed in contrast to the repeated depictions of England 
enslaved by Cromwell. While the government of England may style itself as a 
commonwealth, Englishmen live in “a great Family, consisting of master and Slaves. Vir 
bone servorum nulla est usquam civitas, says an Old Poet, a Number of Slaves makes not a 
City.”58 Having no say in their form of government and being ruled by the will of the 
Protector, the English people are turning into docile slaves.59 Recalling the trope of 
England as Israel, Sexby depicts the recent call for a day of thanksgiving for Cromwell’s 
escape from a failed assassination as an attempt to make Englishmen thank God for their 
own slavery:  
if we had read in Scripture that the Israelites had cried unto the Lord, not for their 
own Deliverance, but the preservation of their Task-Masters, and that they had 
thanked God with Solemnity that Pharaoh was yet living, and that there was still 
great hopes of the daily increase of the number of their Bricks: Tho’ that People 
did so many things, not only impiously and prophanely, but ridiculously and 
absurdly; yet certainly they did nothing we should more have wondered at, than 
to have found them ceremoniously thankful to God for Plagues, that were 
commonly so brutishly unthankful for Mercies; and we should have thought that 
Moses had done them a great deal of wrong, if he had not suffered them to enjoy 
their slavery and left them to their Tasks and Garlick.60 
 
                                                     
58 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 32; emphasis original. 
59 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 33. 
60 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 2-3; emphasis original. 
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Sexby’s humorous description of the Israelites hoping for a “daily increase of the 
number of their Bricks” attacks the Declaration issued by Parliament to set a day of 
public prayers to celebrate the safety of the Protector.61 Nonetheless, the central sentence 
in the passage, starting with “Tho’ that People,” attempts to prevent, while at the same 
time recalling, a reading of Exodus that would indicate that the prayers of England for 
Cromwell’s safety may indeed be sincere. After all, the Israelites in the desert often 
demonstrated a desire to be left to “their Tasks and Garlick” in Egypt. The effort to 
forestall this line of thought leads to a strained rewriting of the Biblical story as the 
passage creates a parallel between Israel under Moses and contemporary England. If 
England is Israel and Cromwell is the plagues inflicted on Egypt, then, problematically 
for Sexby, Englishmen might indeed be “ceremoniously thankful to God for Plagues.” 
By adding adverb to adverb—the people of God act “impiously,” “prophanely,” 
“ridiculously,” and “absurdly”—the construction of the passage attempts, but fails, to 
suppress the possibility that England, as much as Israel, will not easily follow Moses 
into the desert. 
                                                     
61 The declaration: “And do hereby incite and encourage all persons, who are sensible of the Mercy of God 
to them, to come together in their several Congregations for the performance of this Duty, to praise the Lord 
for his goodness, humbly to intreat the continuance of his loving kindness to us, (though we have departed 
from him) that our God may be exalted in his own strength; and that Peace and Righteousness may flourish 
in these Nations.” (A declaration of His Highness the Lord Protector and the Parliament, for a day of publique 
thanksgiving on Friday the twentieth of February, 1656, p. 6; 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:image:169269) 
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 The possibility that Englishmen may prefer the garlic of Egypt to freedom in a 
Commonwealth permeates Killing No Murder. Sexby repeatedly depicts in evident 
horror the people as sliding into a servile “condition”: “nor must we think we can 
conti[n]ue long in the Condition of Slaves, and not degenerate into the Habits and 
Temper that is natural to that Condition: Our Minds will grow low with our Fortune, 
and by being accustomed to live like Slaves, we shall become unfit to be any Thing 
else.”62 This process of “degeneration” into slavery has already begun to take hold. 
Englishmen are untrustworthy and incapable of keeping promises, and England’s 
ministers are mere flatterers.63 Sexby singles out for his harshest critique the city of 
London itself. In a passage reminiscent of Revelation 17 and extending the earlier 
imagery of England as Israel in captivity, London becomes a docile beast following the 
bidding of Cromwell: “What is the City but a great Tame Beast, that eats and carries, 
and cares not who rides it? What is the thing called a Parliament, but a Mock? composed 
of a people that are only suffered to sit there, because they are known to have no Virtue, 
and after the Exclusion of all others that were but suspected to have any?”64 Sexby turns 
the standard description of a Parliament in session as “sitting” into an extension of the 
                                                     
62 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 33. 
63 “See but to what Degree we are come already: Can there any Oath be found so fortified by all Religious 
Ties, which we easily find not a Distinction to break, when either Profit or Danger persuades us to it? Do we 
remember any Engagements, or if we do, have we any Shame to break them?” (Sexby, Killing No Murder, 33-
4). The ministers “rake Scriptures for Flatteries […] and impudently apply them to his Monstrous Highness” 
(Sexby, Killing No Murder, 34). 
64 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 34. 
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enervated city; neither is capable of vigorous activity. London, rather than modeling 
itself on republican Rome, is turning into a new version of decadent imperial Rome. 
Earlier in the pamphlet, Sexby explicitly links England’s economic and commercial 
activity with that of the Roman Empire under Caligula or Nero. Immediately following 
his use of the narrative of Athaliah in 2 Chron. 23 to argue that it is lawful to kill a 
tyrant, Sexby responds to the possible objection that “there being now no Opposition 
made to the Government of his Highness, that the People following their Callings and 
Traffick, at home and abroad, making use of the Laws, and appealing to his Highness’s 
Courts of Justice. That all this argues the People’s Tacit consent to the Government; and 
that therefore now ‘tis to be reputed lawful, and the People’s Obedience voluntary,” 
with a mocking rejoinder that “we extreamly wrong Caligula and Nero in calling them 
Tyrants, and they were Rebels that conspired against them; except we will believe, that 
all the while they reign’d, that in Rome they kept the Shops shut, an opened not their 
Temples, or the Courts.”65 Sexby’s description of life under a tyrant points to two 
consequences. First, for Sexby, the daily life of the people, the legal system, and the 
church are corrupted by tyranny; shops, temples, and courts function even under a 
tyrant and the people are docile under his rule. Therefore, tyrannicide must be the act of 
individuals who cannot obtain sanction by the positive laws or by a clear demonstration 
that the people oppose the tyrant. 
                                                     
65 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 31-2; emphasis original. 
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 The second consequence is that tacit consent to Cromwell’s rule is either as 
impossible as denying that Nero and Caligula were tyrants or an indication of the 
deleterious effects of political slavery, of minds grown “low with our Fortune”; free 
rational consent to the Protectorate is a logical impossibility in Killing No Murder. The 
pamphlet works furiously to demonstrate that while Englishmen may appear to 
acquiesce to Cromwell’s rule, once freed from the Protector and his corrupting influence, 
they will rejoice at the killing of the tyrant. To authorize the argument that any private 
individual may lawfully assassinate a tyrant, Sexby turns to a classical source, Cicero’s 
Philippics.66 Recruiting Roman history, and in particular Cicero’s own version of the plot 
against Caesar in his attack against Marcus Antonius, Sexby turns to the Second 
Philippic’s equating of the after-the-fact approval of tyrannicide with active advising and 
inciting of the killing to insist that just as every virtuous citizen of Rome had the will to 
murder Julius Caesar, so does every virtuous Englishman: “Omnes boni quantum in ipsis 
fuit Caesarem occidenrunt: aliis consiluim: al[i]is animus: aliis occasion defuit, voluntas nemini. 
All good Men (saith he) as much as lay in them, killed Caesar: Some wanted Capacity: 
some Courage: Others Opportunity: But none the will to do it.”67 While Londoners’ tacit 
consent is dismissed by Sexby in his link between Cromwell and Nero and Caligula, his 
                                                     
66 Sexby appears to rely on Grotius’s De Jure for his quotes from Cicero’s Philippics and, in fact, misattributes 
to Cicero one of Demosthenes Philippics quoted by Grotius without attribution: “And he that goes armed 
against every Man; arms every Man against himself. Bellum est in eos, Qui judiciis Coerceri non possunt (says 
Cicero) we have War with those against whom we can have no Law” (Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, 
18). 
67 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 23. 
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use of Cicero’s Second Philippic, equates being “good Men” and “vertuous” citizens with 
being complicit in the murder of Cromwell, whether in action or in thought.68 As these 
passages begin to indicate, Sexby’s argument for tyrannicide develops towards two 
conclusions with respect to his depiction of the English people. First, the complicity of 
the people in a potential tyrannicide becomes more and more implicitly assumed as a 
given in Killing No Murder. And, second, (active) participation in the killing of Cromwell 
becomes a test of virtuous citizenship; only those who act to assassinate the Protector 
truly deserve the name of Englishmen. 
 These two developments in Killing No Murder are part of an argument for 
tyrannicide that is dependent on three related questions, namely, what is a tyrant; what 
counts as consent to a government; and what Sexby understand by “lawful”—both in 
terms of a lawful government or a lawful action. The three questions are inextricably 
connected in Killing No Murder since the idea of original consent is necessary to Sexby’s 
definition of a lawful government. The central stated aim of Killing No Murder is to 
determine whether Cromwell is a tyrant and whether he may be killed by any private 
individual.69 In order to address both of these issues, Sexby begins by giving an account 
of what is a lawful government. While families, continues Sexby by citing Aristotle, have 
a natural ruler in the father, the union of families that “together make up one Body of 
                                                     
68 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 23. 
69 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 4. 
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Common-Wealth” do not have a natural governor.70 From this point, Sexby argues that 
there are only two ways for a community to be ruled lawfully, either by direct divine 
appointment or by consent of the people.71 Moreover, even when God appoints a ruler 
directly, he leaves “the Confirmation and Ratification of that Choice to the people 
themselves.”72 Given this understanding of the origins of the just power of a governor, 
Sexby turns to the specific case of Cromwell: “This being considered, have not the 
People of England much reason to ask the Protector this Question; Quis constituit te virum 
principem & judicem super nos? Who made thee a Prince and Judge over us?”73 Neither 
God nor the people of England have granted Cromwell a right to rule over them.74 Since 
Cromwell has received no delegation of authority from the people and is governing 
tyrannically, he fits both traditional definitions of a tyrant: “Tyrannus sine Titulo, and 
Tyrannus Exercitio: The one is called a Tyrant because he hath no Right to govern; the 
                                                     
70 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 4; Sexby refers to Aristotle’s Politics, Book 1. 
71 “Wherefore all Power which is lawfully exercised over such a Society of Men (which from the end of its 
institution is called a Common-Wealth) must necessarily be derived either from the appointement of God 
Almight, who is Supreme Lord of all and every part, or from the consent of the Society it self, who have the 
next Power to his, of disposing of their own Liberty, as they shall think fit for their own good” (Sexby, 
Killing No Murder, 5). This formulation is not unique to Sexby. As Wallace explains, the call to magistracy, 
having ruled out the possibility of succession to the throne for Cromwell, was seen as either “immediate” 
from God or “mediate,” where God works through human appointment (Wallace, Destiny His Choice, 124). 
72 Sexby gives Saul and David as examples (Killing No Murder, 6). 
73 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 7. The question is taken from Exodus 2.14 and it is posed to Moses: “Quis 
constituit te virum principem & judicem super nos?” (Vulgate Bible). Moses, having killed an Egyptian in 
defense of one of his people just the previous day (Exodus 2.11-2), attempts to stop two Hebrews from 
fighting with each other and he is asked by what right he judges over them. I will turn to positive 
comparisons of Cromwell to Moses below. In this passage Sexby, who also uses the example of Moses 
killing the Egyptian to justify tyrannicide by a private man (Killing No Murder, 25-6), turns the image against 
Cromwell. 
74 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 7. 
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other because he governs Tyrannically.”75 As such, Cromwell may be killed by any 
private individual: “[s]uch a Person, as one out of all bounds of human protection, all 
Men make the Ishmael […] against whom is every Mans hand, as his is against every 
Man. To him they give no more security then Cain, his fellow-murtherer and oppressor, 
promised to himself, to be destroyed by him that found him first.”76 Moreover, the “Law 
of God it self decreed certain77 Death to that Man that would do presumptuously, and 
submit to no Decision of Justice. Who can read this, and think a Tyrant ought to live?”78 
In these passages, the term “lawful” therefore indicates that something is concordant to 
or allowed according to the law of nature or of God.79 And, at this point in the pamphlet, 
it is according to the law of God that “certain Death” is decreed to a tyrant.  
 But in Killing No Murder, the question of what is “lawful” is also raised in terms 
of human laws. By following how Sexby develops his use of human law alongside his 
understanding of natural and divine law, we can see how his argument for the 
lawfulness of tyrannicide by any individual by appeal to both human and natural law 
ironically presupposes a devaluing of human law as well as the conception of justice 
embodied in the actions and customs of the people. This, in turn, allows Sexby to see the 
                                                     
75 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 4. 
76 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 14. Sexby is thus going further than the standard monarchomach arguments 
proposed during the Civil Wars that Parliament, as the representative body of the people, could depose a 
tyrannical king (see chapter three above). For the origins of this argument see Quentin Skinner, The 
Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. II, especially part 3. 
77 Here Sexby gives a reference in a footnote to Deuteronomy: “Utique morietur vir ille Deut. 17.12” (25). 
78 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 25. 
79 Sexby does not draw a distinction between the law of nature and the law of God in Killing No Murder and, 
within this context, I will follow his usage by using the terms interchangeably. 
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English people as acquiescing to slavery under a tyrant because they are led by a 
corrupted reason that can be restored only by living in a free commonwealth. I will 
focus on two particular uses of human law in the pamphlet. First, English law is, 
alongside natural law, a standard by which Cromwell is identified as a tyrant. Second, 
and in tension with the first use, natural law for Sexby ultimately supplants human laws 
as the authorizing source for tyrannicide. Turning to the first point, Sexby follows Cicero 
in arguing that a commonwealth is best ruled by laws rather than by the will of the 
ruler. For Sexby human society is instituted so that we may not merely survive, but 
rather live happily. Government is need and so men may lead 
a Life answerable to the dignity and excellency of their kind. Out of Society, this 
happiness is not to be had, for singly we are impotent, and defective, unable to 
procure those things that are either of necessity, or ornament for our lives; and as 
unable to defend and keep them when they are acquired. […] We cannot 
possibly accomplish these ends, if we submit not our passions and appetites to 
the Laws of reason and justice. For the depravity of Mans will make him as unfit 
to live in Society, as his necessity makes him unable to live out of it.80 
 
Here Sexby combines a version of Aristotelian natural sociability of mankind, whereby 
man can only live a life appropriate to specifically human—rather than merely animal—
nature in a community, with a view of human will as fundamentally depraved and 
therefore in need to be curbed by the laws of reason and justice. However, the term 
“Law of reason and justice” is left ambiguous by Sexby. Traditionally, positive laws 
could be deemed licit and rational only in so far as they did not contradict the first 
                                                     
80 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 15. 
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principles of natural law. Thus, while positive law is a distinct concept from that of 
natural law, the two are related. But a variety of widely differing systems of human laws 
could be considered reasonable by this standard.81 By the use of the ambiguous term 
“Law of reason and justice,” Sexby can leave the passage open to two interpretations. 
On the one hand, following Cicero, the passage could indicate that it is not enough for a 
people to hold de facto freedom, that is, to live under a benevolent, but absolute ruler, but 
that a society is only free when men live under the rule of positive law.82 On the other, 
the passage could more generally be interpreted to mean that men first aggregated into 
societies in order to live according to natural law.  
 This ambiguity becomes important as Sexby’s argument develops. On the next 
page, Sexby points out that a society is held together by its own laws:  
That therefore by which we accomplish the ends of a Sociable Life, is our 
subjection, and submission to Laws, these are the Nerves and Sinews of every 
Society or Common-Wealth; without which they must necessarily dissolve and 
fall asunder. And indeed (as Augustine says) those Societies where Law and 
Justice is not, are not Common-Wealths and Kingdoms, but Magna Lactrocinia, 
Great Confederacies of Thieves and Robbers. Those therefore that submit to no 
Law are not to be reputed in the Society of Mankind, which cannot consist 
without Law.83 
 
With the image that the political body of a commonwealth is held together by laws just 
as a natural body is held together by nerves and sinews, Sexby recalls the possible 
                                                     
81 See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 10-13. For a medieval formulation of this relationship between 
natural law and positive law, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, (New York: Blackfriars and McGraw-
Hill), vol. 28 (1964), Ia-IIae, q. 95, art. 2. 
82 See Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics II:314-5. 
83 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 16; underlining mine. 
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derivation of “law,” lex, from the verb “to bind,” ligare.84 The laws in this expression 
indicated the specific positive laws of the given Commonwealth. Why does this matter? 
Throughout the pamphlet, Sexby accuses Cromwell of setting his will above the law and 
this is what makes the Protector a tyrant.85 Thus, by not ruling according to the laws of 
England, Cromwell is tearing the commonwealth apart. As we have seen, this 
Ciceronian formulation is common enough in English republican discourse, but what is 
striking in this passage is the conclusion that he draws from this once he combines it 
with his quotation from Augustine. The reference to a society “where Law and Justice is 
not” becoming but a “Magna Latrociania” is from Book IV of De Civitate Dei. Sexby is not 
quoting exactly, but rather paraphrasing Augustine’s formulation and his addition to De 
Civitate is telling. The original reads as follows:  
Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a large scale? 
What are criminal gangs but petty kingdoms? A gang is a group of men under 
the command of a leader, bound by a compact of association, in which the 
plunder is divided according to an agreed convention. If this villainy wins so 
many recruits from the ranks of the demoralized that it acquires territory, 
establishes a base, captures cities and subdues peoples, it then openly arrogates 
to itself the title of kingdom, which is conferred on it in the eyes of the world, not 
by the renouncing of aggression but by the attainment of impunity.86 
 
                                                     
84 This derivation is used by Fortescue in his discussion of the body politics in On the Laws and Governance  of 
England, Chapter XIII. The derivation used by Fortescue is originally from Alexander of Hales’s Summa 
Universae Theologiae, while the alternative derivation of lex a legendo that Fortescue dismisses is from Isidore 
of Seville’s Etymologies (John Fortescue, On the laws and Governance of England, Shelley Lockwood, ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), n. 79 to p. 21). 
85 See, for instance, page 7-8. 
86 Augustine The City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2003), 139. 
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Sexby’s change turns Augustine’s “justice” into “Law and Justice.” But what kind of law 
is he referring to here, human or natural or both? In De Civitate, Augustine’s target in 
this discussion is the Roman Empire. This passage is part of a larger critique of Roman 
pagan virtue as fundamentally infected by pride. As Jennifer Herdt argues, for 
Augustine, the Roman Empire’s lack of true justice is not a failure to order the 
community according to the rule of positive law. Rather, Roman virtues are oriented by 
a pursuit of the common (earthly) good as an end in and of itself instead of being 
directed by a love of God.87 Thus, while Rome may be ruled by laws and therefore 
pursue a semblance of justice, on Augustine’s analysis, Roman “justice” is not true 
justice. In Killing No Murder, by turning Augustine’s “justice” to “Law and Justice,” 
Sexby attempts to reduce the question of whether the actions of the Protectorate are just 
to one of whether they are legal. 
 The addition of the term “Law” to Augustine’s passage is not simply a matter of 
emphasis, but it is rather central to Sexby’s condemnation of Protectorate. This becomes 
clear as Sexby reworks the image of a confederacy of robbers in the subsequent pages of 
Killing No Murder. Sexby extends the comparison of Cromwell to a robber by turning to 
Exodus 22.2:88  
the Law of God permitting every Man to kill a Thief, if he took him breaking 
open his House in the Night: Because then it might be supposed he could not 
                                                     
87 Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting On Virtue, 48-50. 
88 “If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten that he die, there shall no blood be shed for him.” 
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bring him to Justice; but a Tyrant, that is the common Robber of Mankind, and 
whom no Law can take hold on, his Person should be, Sacrosanct, cui nihil sacrum 
aut Sanctum, to whom nothing is sacred, nothing inviolable? But the vulgar judge 
ridiculously like themselves. The glister of Things dazzles their Eyes, and they 
judge of them by their Appearances; and the Colours that are put on them. For 
what can be more absurd in Nature, and contrary to all common Sense, than to 
call him Thief, and kill him that comes alone, or with a few to rob me: And to call 
him Lord Protector and obey, that robs me with Regiments and Troops? […] I 
wish that number were defined, that we might know where the Thief ends, and 
the Prince begins. And to be able to distinguish between a Robbery and a Tax. 
But sure no Englishman can be ignorant, that it his is Birth-Right to be Master of 
his own Estate; and that none can command any Part of it but by his own Grant 
and Consent, either made expressly by himself, or virtually by a Parliament. […] 
In every Assessment we are robb’d, the Excise is Robbery, the Customs Robbery, 
and without Doubt, whenever ’tis prudent, ’tis always lawful, to kill the Thieves, 
whom we can bring to no other Justice. 
 
In this passage, Augustine’s accusation of the Roman Empire’s injustice and violence is 
reduced to a denunciation of the Protectorate’s illegal taxation; Cromwell is a thief 
because he robs the nation by imposing taxes not granted by a Parliament. Once this is 
granted, Sexby further literalizes Augustine’s language by applying Exodus 22.2. Any 
private individual may kill a thief caught in his own house. For Sexby, the Protector 
with his “Regiments and Troops” is simply a thief intruding in the nation and therefore 
Exodus 22 provides the authorization for any Englishman to kill him. This application of 
Exodus 22.2 is far from self-evident as it stands. Exodus 22.2, alongside a similar maxim 
from the Digest of Roman law, had indeed been used by resistance theorists in the 
sixteenth-century to argue for violent resistance. But for these writers the focus had been 
on repelling violence with violence and only in extremely qualified contingencies on 
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protecting property.89 For Sexby, however, the addition of his modification of 
Augustine’s passage shows that the violation of positive law forms the basis for an 
automatic judgment that Cromwell is a tyrant and therefore deserving of death. Having 
thus made the question of how to judge a ruler dependent on simple legal criteria, Sexby 
prods his readers to take his view of the Protectorate as a gang of thieves by mocking as 
ignorant and, much worse, as not an Englishman, anyone who does not know “that it 
his is Birth-Right to be Master of his own Estate.” Sexby’s ridicule and condemnation of 
the judgment of “the vulgar” represents those who disagree with him as judging against 
“common Sense.”90 Rather than seeing correctly, “the vulgar judge ridiculously like 
themselves.” The structure of the sentence leaves open two related interpretations. 
Namely, they are as ridiculous as their judgment, or they judge according to vulgar 
standards, that is, by common understanding and the common name of the thing. The 
vulgar, then, can be seen as judging both in a common way and, at the same time, 
lacking “common Sense.” In this characterization, their judgment is indeed “absurd in 
Nature.” 
 The accusation that the “vulgar” cannot see past appearances and that their eyes 
are dazzled by “the glister of Things” repeats a complaint voiced in the opening of 
Killing No Murder. There, Sexby addresses the discovery of a plot by Miles Sindercombe 
                                                     
89 See, Skinner, Visions of Politics II:246-55. I will return to the argument from private law and self-defence 
below to address the claim of the right to individual resistance raised by Sexby. 
90 The meaning of “absurd” denoting ridiculous does not become available until the 18th century (Oxford 
English Dictionary). 
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and Sexby himself to assassinate Cromwell. Under the direction of Sexby, Sindercombe 
had planned to assassinate Cromwell by burning Whitehall palace and, in January 1657, 
would have carried the plan through if one of his accomplices had not betrayed the plot 
to John Thurloe.91 Thurloe had Sindercombe and his accomplices arrested, and informed 
Cromwell and Parliament of the plot.92 As we have seen, the tensions in the use of the 
image of England as Israel in captivity praying for the pharaoh in Sexby’s attack on the 
Parliament’s Declaration for a day of thanksgiving brings to light the recurring threat of 
England’s willing submission to the Protectorate in Killing No Murder. Sexby’s pamphlet 
is in part an attempt to counter the version of England constructed by the official 
reaction to Sindercombe’s attempt. On January 23, the members of Parliament met with 
Cromwell at Whitehall to congratulate him on his escape.93 In his speech to Parliament, 
Cromwell turns their thanksgiving into an occasion to reflect on the mercy of God to the 
three nations they represent and to consider the country’s current state: 
But it is a goodly sight, if a man behold it uno intuito, and therefore this is a 
possession of your worthy congratulations. This is furnished […] with the best 
people in the world possessing so much soil; a people in civil rights,—in respect 
of their rights and privileges,—very ancient and honourable. And in this people, 
in the midst of this people, a people […] that are to God as the apple of his eye; 
and he says so of them, be they many or be they few. But they are many, a people 
of the blessing of God, a people under his safety and protection; a people calling 
upon the name of the Lord, which the heathen do not; a people knowing God, 
                                                     
91 Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 650. 
92 Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 650-1. 
93 Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 650. 
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and a people, (according to the ordinary expressions,) fearing God. (Abbott, 
IV:389)94 
 
In this speech, Cromwell encourages seeing the three nations in one sweep, “uno 
intuito,” thus emphasizing a united view of their people. Without distinction of 
nationality or political allegiance, the people are described as possessing “very ancient 
and honourable” rights and privileges. The passage elides the differences in rights and 
privileges between English, Scottish, or Irish people; they are viewed as a single people 
sharing the same soil and rights. The only distinction in this view is between the people 
in general and those who “are to God as the apple of his eye.” These are the people of 
Psalm 85. Those who fear God are those for whom “His salvation is nigh” (Abbott, 
IV:390; Psalm 85.9), and in this nation, “they are many.” Cromwell’s division, between 
those who fear God and those who do not, works to further dispels any distinction of 
nationality. The language of being “a people under his safety and protection” echoes the 
notion that subjects to a ruler are defined by being under the protection of their ruler.95 
Just as speaking of the “ancient and honourable” civil rights of the people suggests legal 
                                                     
94 The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, ed. W. C. Abbott, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1937-47). Throughout the chapter, all quotes from Cromwell’s speeches and writings will 
be from this edition and cited parenthetically. 
95 This language was used by Bacon to argue in favor of considering the post-nati, that is, Scottish subject of 
King James born after his ascension to the throne of England, as capable of inheriting land in England: “it is 
to be observed that it is nec coelum, nec solum, neither the climate nor the soil, but ligeantia and obedientia that 
make the subject born; for if enemies should come into the realm, and possess town or fort, and have issue 
there, that issue is no subject to the King of England, though he be born upon his soil, and under his 
meridian, for that he was not born under the ligeance of a subject, nor under the protection of the King” 
(Edward Coke, “Calvin’s Case,” The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt. In Thirteen Parts (1826), 10. HeinOnline. 
June 10, 2011 
http://heinonline.org.proxy.lib.duke.edu/HOL/Page?collection=beal&handle=hein.beal/reporcoke0003&id=6) 
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unity, referring to the godly members of three peoples as those who are “to God as the 
apple of his eye” points to another form of unity by hiding national differences of 
religion and identifying one people under the rule and blessing of God. 
 Moreover, in Cromwell’s speech, the members of Parliament are encouraged to 
legislate according to divine law and, if they do so, “We shall know, you and I, as the 
father of this family, how to dispose our mercies to God’s glory, how to dispose our 
severity, how to distinguish betwixt obedient and rebellious children, and not to do as 
Eli did” (Abbott, IV:389).96 In a speech giving thanks for an adverted assassination that 
would have destroyed the current government, Cromwell turns to the image of the 
legislator and governor as pater patriae, administering justice like a father. In dealing 
with a would-be assassin, Cromwell and Parliament become a collective father who 
must punish rebellious children to avoid Eli’s curse. Even more strikingly, this paternal 
rule, turns into an imitation of divine rule. In following God’s law, the Parliament and 
Protector are emulating God himself. Paraphrasing Psalm 85 again, “Mercy and Truth 
                                                     
96 Eli and his sons Hophni and Phinehas were priests of Israel. When Eli was warned by prophecy to stop his 
sons’ desecration of sacrifices, he insufficiently reproves them (see 1 Samuel 2, 1 Samuel 3.12-13, and 1 
Samuel 4.18). In The Cry of a Stone. Or a Relation of Something Spoken in Whitehall (1654), Anna Trapnel had 
described Cromwell as Eli: “O Gideon, when his own family there shall be that shall go naked and wanton; 
Oh this is found in thy family! David had not such in his family as thou hast, so many of these: and must 
thou rule a whole Nation, and canst not rule thy own family: Oh, thou sayest, I cannot rule them! canst thou 
not, says God? but I will make thee know what I did, to Eli of old, because of his sons” (The Cry of a Stone,” 
in A Company of Women Preachers: Baptist Prophetesses in Seventeenth-Century England, ed. Curtis W. Freeman 
(Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2011), 428). The reminder in Cromwell’s speech about the difference 
between “obedient and rebellious children” might have been a reference to the recent, divisive trial of the 
Quaker John Nayler, whom Cromwell sought to protect from the more severe consequences of the 
blasphemy trial (Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 650). 
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shall meet together, Righteousness and Peace shall kiss each other” (Psalm 85.10), 
Cromwell exhorts the members of Parliament to unite justice, truth, and mercy in their 
judgment: “mercy must be joined with truth, truth in that respect that we think it our 
duty to exercise a just severity, as well as to apply kindness and mercy” (Abbott, IV:390). 
Psalm 85 expresses a prayer for God’s anger to cease against His people and line 10 
constitutes a climactic moment in the Psalm in which four personified attributes of God 
lead Israel to follow God again, “Righteousness shall go before him; and shall set us in 
the way of his steps” (Psalm 85.10). In Cromwell’s speech, mercy, truth, and a “just 
severity” are made to join together by the Parliament itself in its rule of the people and, 
in the present case, in its punishment of Sindercombe. Sindercombe’s plot is thus 
presented as the rebellion of a sinful child against a paternal government and his just 
punishment will be a reflection of divine rule over a united nation. 
 In the opening of Killing No Murder, Sexby recasts the meaning of Sindercombe’s 
plot not as a failed attempt to murder a lawful ruler, but rather as the failed but just 
punishment of a malefactor. Sexby declares that he has been moved to publish not to 
“declaim against my Lord Protector or his accomplishes,” but rather because he must 
make his own account of the plot public to “examine whether if there hath been such a 
Plot as we hear of; and that it was contrived by Mr. Sindercombe against my Lord 
Protector, and not by my Lord Protector against Mr. Sindercombe (which is doubtful) 
whether it deserves those Epithets Mr. Speaker is pleased to give it, of bloody, wicked, 
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and proceeding from the Prince of Darkness.”97 Similarly, at the end of the pamphlet, 
Sexby returns to the need to reformulate the official account and disputes its judgment 
that Sindercombe died as a suicide. Sexby proposes that the stake driven through 
Sindercombe’s heart at his burial should be replaced with “the pillows and Feather-
beds” used to smother him in prison.98 The method of burial of Sindercombe is a 
physical realization of the Protectorate’s judgment and Sexby argues that if it “should be 
known how he died,” the stake must be removed and the true instruments of 
Sindercombe’s death should be allowed to advertise this crime to all those who “are 
unacquainted (if any be) with his Cruelties and Falshoods.”99 Here Sexby’s text shows a 
tension between claiming that the Protectorate’s manipulation of physical evidence as 
well as official reports hides the true nature of tyrannical actions and insisting that 
Cromwell’s “Cruelties and Falshoods” are almost universally known. By recasting the 
events of Sindercombe’s attempt on Cromwell’s life and his own death in prison, Sexby 
constructs a version of the people in tension with the view presented by Cromwell in his 
speech to Parliament. Rather than a united and godly people rejoicing at a ruler’s escape 
from murder, Sexby presents a people that has already judged Cromwell a tyrant.  
                                                     
97 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 3. 
98 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 41. 
99 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 41. 
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 Strikingly, however, this people is at the same time depicted as incapable of 
judging correctly. His own account is needed because “the Vulgar” are too easily 
persuaded by official interpretations: 
I know very well how uncapable the Vulgar are of considering what is 
extraordinary and singular in every Case, and that they judge of things, and 
name them by their exterior appearances, without penetrating at all into their 
Causes or Natures: And without a doubt when they hear the Protector was to be 
killed, they strait conclude that a Man was to be murthered, not a Malefactor 
punished: For they think the Formalities do always make the things themselves, 
and that ’tis the Judge and the Crier that makes the Justice.100 
 
What Sexby presents in this passage is not a dispute of what happened, “the Protector 
was to be killed,” but an alternative judgment to the official one, which is believed by 
the people, “they strait conclude that a Man was to be murthered, not a Malefactor 
punished.” In Sexby’s account, official language, through the verdict of a judge and the 
publication of the judgment, is enough to persuade “the Vulgar” that the arrest of 
Sindercombe averted a crime. Like the parliamentarian pamphlets we considered in the 
previous chapter, Sexby presents his argument as necessary to undeceive the “uncapable 
[…] Vulgar” who might be too easily deceived by officially sanctioned accounts of the 
events. His complaint about common people’s judgment parallels the language voiced 
in his characterization of Cromwell as a thief. But in the context of Sindercombe’s death, 
the “Formalities” of the law are implicated in Cromwell’s tyrannical distortion of the 
events. The people are lead to believe that “’tis the Judge and the Crier that makes the 
                                                     
100 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 3; emphasis mine. 
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Justice.” This accusation is followed on the very next page of Killing No Murder by the 
statement that one of the aims of the pamphlet is to answer the question of “Whether it 
is lawful to do Justice upon him without Solemnity, that is, to kill him?”101 The language 
used in the question of whether Cromwell may be “lawfully” killed without the 
solemnities of a trial betrays the tensions I have been tracing throughout Killing No 
Murder between Sexby’s use of lawful (i.e., just according to the law of nature) and legal 
(i.e., not violating positive laws). In advocating tyrannicide by any private individual, 
Sexby repeatedly attempts to divorce lawful from legal; that is, he insists that it is lawful 
to punish the Protector’s illegal actions through an illegal execution.102 But at the same 
time, in accusing Cromwell, Sexby argues that he is a tyrant because he breaks English 
law, that is, Cromwell’s actions are unjust, and therefore unlawful, because illegal. 
Strictly speaking, a “solemnity” is what makes a legal act valid, it is a “necessary 
formality.”103 This passage then points to the problem of trying to defend an illegal act, 
killing Cromwell without a trial, as lawful within a context, as that of Killing No Murder, 
where lawful and legal are alternatively blurred and pulled apart. If, in Sexby’s 
argument, Cromwell’s actions are unlawful because illegal, how is an illegal assassination 
                                                     
101 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 3; underlining mine. 
102 Thus Sexby goes much further than the de facto theorists of 1649-1650 who argued that, after the regicide, 
it was lawful for subjects to obey an illegal government in lawful demands (Wallace, Destiny His Choice, 6-68. 
See also Skinner’s discussion in “Conquest and Consent: Thomas Hobbes and the Engagement 
Controversy,” in The Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement, 1646-1660, ed. G. E. Aylmer (London: The 
Macmillan Press, 1972), 79-98). 
103 OED, s.v. “formality,” 4b. 
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defended as lawful? By setting aside the “Solemnity” of the law, Sexby’s “lawful” 
indicates that we may set aside human law in an exceptional case and still act lawfully. 
But the question then becomes, who judges when illegal is lawful and how? To 
understand how judgement is determined in Killing No Murder and to understand the 
consequences of Sexby’s line of argument on his conception of the role of the people and 
public judgment in violent resistance to a ruler, I will now follow this use of solemnities 
and formalities and the representation of “trials” in the pamphlet and then finally return 
to Sexby’s use of the story of Athaliah as a paradigmatic Scriptural trial. 
 Sexby argues that since Cromwell rules according to his private will, he has 
placed himself outside the reach of all legal forms of justice: “we find him an Enemy to 
all human Society, and a subverter of all Laws, and one that by the greatness of his 
villanies, secures himself against all ordinary course of justice: We shall not at all think it 
strange, if then he have no benefit from human Society, no protection from the Law, as 
if, in his case, justice dispenses with her forms.”104 Indeed, in the case of a tyrant, trusting 
to legal action can only prove dangerous: “But in a Tyrant’s Case Process and Citation 
have no place, and if we will only have formal Remedies against him, we are sure to 
have none. There’s small Hopes of Justice where the Malefactor hath a Power to 
condemn the Judge.”105 The problem, in the case of a tyrant, is that it is impossible to 
                                                     
104 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 15. 
105 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 25. 
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punish him through the legal system; there is a failure of justice. And therefore, the only 
“Remedy therefore against a Tyrant is Ehud’s Dagger.”106 As I argued in chapter three, 
the example of Ehud from Judges 3 had been used by royalist writers against defences of 
rebellion. For these writers, Ehud’s killing of Eglon is only justified because Eglon is a 
foreign, invading king. But Milton, in his Tenure, argued that once any king has turned 
into a tyrant, he could be treated like a foreign oppressor, “what differs he from an 
outlandish King, or from an enemie?” (CPW III:214). Moreover, he insisted that kings 
and rulers received their power from the consent of the people and held it only as long 
as they upheld the laws which the people had consented to (CPW III:198-200).107 
Similarly, for Sexby, the examples of Ehud, Moses from Exodus 2.11 and 12, and Samson 
all point to the same answer: “It cannot be but absurd to think it unlawful to kill him 
that oppresses a whole Nation and one that Justice as little reaches as it defends.”108 In 
Killing No Murder, Scriptural examples all point to the need for action by private men 
against tyrants who have subverted the usual channels of justice. To the possible 
objection that “these Examples out of Scripture are of Men that were inspired of God, 
and that therefore they had Call and Authority for their Actions, which we cannot 
                                                     
106 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 25. 
107 See chapter three, page 304. 
108 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 26. 
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pretend to,” Sexby answers by citing Milton: “I answer with Learned Milton, that if God 
commanded these Things, ’tis a Sign they were lawful and are commendable.”109 
 But Sexby goes further than Milton’s claim that these examples apply to 
domestic, as well as foreign, tyrants. He argues that a trial would be superfluous as 
English law simply does not apply to a tyrant. Cromwell is turned into a foreigner in 
England, he is no longer a member of the commonwealth and he has lost his right to be 
protected by English law: “There is no reason he should have the protection that is due 
to a member of a Common-wealth, nor any defence from Laws, that does acknowledge 
none.”110 The crucial relationship, for Sexby, is between the law and Cromwell. By 
placing himself above the law, Cromwell loses its protection. This move detaches 
Cromwell from English law and the English people conceived of as a community 
organized by its laws, customs, and “formalities.” In turn, this understanding of the 
relationship between individuals and the law is reflected in Sexby’s claim that a trial 
may be dispensed with because Cromwell’s and his supporters’ guilt and the 
appropriate punishment are self-evident, so much so that, at least at the beginning of the 
pamphlet, Sexby can insist that he need not even demonstrate it: “their own Actions did 
that work sufficiently, and I should not take pains to tell the World what they knew 
                                                     
109 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 30-1. Sexby is referring to The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (see CPW IV:407). 
110 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 17. In his denunciation of Cromwell as outside the protection of the law, Sexby 
ultimately turns him into a disease of the body politic: “Tyrant that submits to no Law; but his Will and Lust 
are the Law, by which he governs himself and others, is no Magistrate, no Citizen or Member of any Society 
but an Ulcer and a Disease that destroys it” (16). 
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before.”111 In the use of the Biblical example of Athaliah as an authorizing passage for 
tyrannicide in Killing No Murder, we find the logic of self-evident guilt spelled out:  
“Jehoiada had no Pretence to authorize this Action; but the Equity and Justice of the Act 
itself. […] Now what Citation was given to Athaliah, what Appearance of was she call’d 
to before any Court of Justice: Her Fact was her Trial.”112 The actions of both the tyrant 
and the tyrannicide self-evidently demonstrate their nature in being enacted. In Sexby’s 
reading, Jehoiada’s actions are self-authorizing because they are evidently just; 
Athaliah’s guilt and her sentence are similarly self-condemning without the need of a 
court of justice or a trial. The solemnities and the “forms” of justice are not necessary in 
the case of Athaliah because her actions, as well as Jehoiada’s, need no formal 
interpretation. That is, the essential form of Athaliah’s and Jehoiada’s action is 
transparent and thus the solemnities of justice and law become mere, external forms that 
have no relationship with the “Justice of the Act” and thus may be dispensed with. The 
formalities and solemnities of law are reduced to ornaments that may be discarded with 
no negative consequences for the community. Given this dismissal of the need for the 
“solemnities” of justice, any private individual may kill a tyrant: “an Usurper that by 
only Force possesseth himself of Government, and by Force only keeps it, is yet in the 
State of War with every Man, says the Learned Grotius: And therefore every Thing is 
                                                     
111 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 3. 
112 Sexby, Killing No Murder, 29; underlining mine. 
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lawful against him, that is lawful against an open Enemy, whom every Man hath a Right 
to Kill.”113 
 Holstun reads this passage in Killing No Murder as Sexby’s assimilation of the 
idea of “a Grotian war of all against one” caused by the tyrant because the “‘laws of God 
and nature’ insist that sovereignty must be social—that men should not be judges of 
themselves.”114 However, the “all” in Sexby’s “war of all against one” is far from a social 
“all,” as his selective retelling of Athaliah’s story demonstrates. What is particularly 
striking about Sexby’s reading of the story of Athaliah is that he de-emphasizes the dual 
covenanting described in 2 Chronicles 13. Twice, in this chapter of Chronicles, we find 
Jehoiada making a covenant between, first “the Levites out of all the cities of Judah, and 
the chief of the fathers of Israel” with the king, and then between all the people and the 
king.115 Sexby departs from this narrative and introduces the people only after the killing 
of Athaliah and the destruction of the temple of Baal: “How the People approved of this 
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glorious Action of destroying a Tyrant, this Chapter tells us at the last Verse. And all the 
People in the Land rejoiced, and the City was quiet, after they had slain Athaliah with the 
Sword.”116 In Sexby’s reading, Jehoiada acts on his own private judgment and the people 
appear only to rejoice and approve of the tyrannicide. Sexby’s use of the term approving 
exploits its full range of denotation. While approving could simply imply that they 
pronounced the tyrannicide good as demonstrated by their rejoicing, it also hints at a 
more official form of confirmation of Jehoiada’s actions implicit in the technical legal 
meaning of “approving” as officially sanctioning.117 However, by incorporating the last 
verse of 2 Chronicles 23 verbatim,118 but, at the same time leaving out the dual re-
covenanting of the original narrative, Sexby presents the people of Israel as both 
passive—they are the audience of Jehoiada’s actions and do not actively participate in it 
while it is unfolding—and, at the same time, as accomplices in the killing of Athaliah, 
since the biblical verse as quoted uses a plural subject when the people rejoiced “after 
they had slain Athaliah with the Sword.” Thus, ironically, while Sexby attempts to 
contain the people’s role in his retelling of the narrative of Athaliah to approving the 
tyrannicide after it is committed, his interpretation of Jehoiada’s actions is undermined 
by the inclusion the original Scriptural verse that points to Jehoiada’s securing the 
people’s support for the execution of Athaliah. 
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 Sexby’s claim that each individual member of the commonwealth could hold the 
ruler accountable even by violent means is a version of the argument of resistance 
theory that cropped up repeatedly in early modern political thought. In The Foundations 
of Modern Political Thought, Quentin Skinner has argued that this “anarchic or 
insurrectionary” version of the right of political resistance had alternately been 
suppressed and embraced by Protestant resistance theorists.119 In Foundations, Skinner 
traces the origins of the development of Calvinist resistance theory to Lutheran and 
Catholic sources. As he re-iterates in Visions of Politics, Skinner sees the sixteenth-century 
as the crucial period for the uptake of the theories of “popular sovereignty” in Northern 
Europe that had generated in the Italian city-states during the thirteenth-century: “Only 
in this period, in consequence, do we begin to encounter the idea that the power to resist 
and remove tyrannical kings must be regarded as a moral right possessed at all times by 
the body of the people—and perhaps even individual members—in virtue of their 
standing as the ultimate holders of sovereignty.”120 In Foundations, Skinner argues that 
Lutheran theorists were able to adapt ready-made theories formulated by Gerson in 
response to the Great Schism describing the Catholic Church as a sort of “constitutional 
monarchy” where sovereignty ultimately resides in the “General Council as the 
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representative assembly of the faithful.”121 From Gerson’s theory, revived by John Mair 
and Jacques Almain in the early sixteenth-century, stems a lineage of arguments placing 
the ultimate sovereignty in the entire community of the people in a commonwealth. 
Crucially, this sovereignty was seen as exercised not by the people directly, but by a 
representative body.122 These constitutional theories, however, held the potential of 
being extended to argue that the people themselves could resist and remove a tyrannical 
ruler, a potential already evident in some of the equivocations in Almain’s arguments 
over who held the right of resistance.123 As we have seen, the question of who can 
lawfully resist a tyrant is central to Sexby’s argument. But in rehearsing the history of 
Protestant resistance theory, I am less interested in describing the lineage of Sexby’s 
arguments than in paying attention to what is lost in the constitutional side of the debate 
as it responds to the push to reserve the right for individuals to violently resist a ruler. 
To bring this to the surface, I will need to trace two further strands identified by Skinner 
in the development of resistance theories. Alongside the conciliar strand of 
constitutional theory, Skinner identifies a “legal tradition” based on private law 
                                                     
121 Skinner, Foundations II:113-7. Quentin Skinner argues that Gerson begins from this Conciliarist view of 
the Church and constructs an analogous theory for secular political societies “by way of developing a 
‘subjective’ theory of rights” (Foundations II:116-7). In reading Gerson’s conception of rights, Skinner follows 
Michel Villey and Richard Tuck (Foundations II:117, n. 1), but such reading of Gerson’s understanding of 
subjective rights has been refuted by Brian Tierney (The Idea of Natural Rights, 210-220). While disagreeing 
with Skinner on Gerson’s conception of rights, Tierney finds Skinner’s treatment of fifteenth-century 
ecclesiology a positive corrective to the neglect of conciliar thought in histories of early modern political 
theory (Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought: 1150-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), n. 1 to p. 1). 
122 Skinner, Foundations II:117-8. 
123 Skinner, Foundations II:122. 
 384 
arguments from Justinian’s Digest that justified the use of violence in self-defence. In the 
Digest these arguments were not meant to apply to political resistance; a private 
individual, according to the maxims of private law, may resist violence from another 
private individual. In the middle ages, in the thought of Ockham and Gerson, the 
Digest’s allowance for private resistance was used to justify political resistance by the 
community against tyrannical rulers.124 But, as the use of these arguments in the 
sixteenth-century was to show, the application of private law to political resistance 
could lead to an assertion that any individual, rather than the entire community or its 
representatives, could resist a tyrant.125  
 A related, though separate, use of Roman law in resistance theory is relevant to 
understanding the problems in Sexby’s argument. Skinner traces this use of Civil law to 
Azo da Bologna in the thirteenth-century in his argument against Lothair over the issue 
of whether imperium, the power, according to the Justinian Code, to legislate and to 
command the army, could be wielded by “inferior magistrates” as well as the Emperor. 
Azo maintained that it could, while Lothair denied this.126 According to Skinner’s 
account of the dispute, Azo’s interpretation had two important consequences. First, 
“each Emperor at his election could be said to have signed a contract with the electors 
and other ‘inferior magistrates’ of the Empire, swearing to uphold the good of the 
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Empire as a whole and to protect the ‘liberties’ of his subjects” and that meant that the 
Emperor was bound by his oath for his authority.127 In turn, this meant that “since the 
electors and other princes of the Empire are bearers of the ius gladii no less than the 
Emperor himself, it must be lawful for them to use the sword against the Emperor if he 
should fail to observe the terms of his original oath.”128 Second, a similar conclusion of 
the right to depose a tyrannical Emperor could be derived from Azo’s constitutional 
theory by viewing the Empire as “a universitas, an organic unit in which each member 
has a duty not merely under positive but also under natural law to maintain the 
integrity of the whole. This was taken to include the possibility that the electors might 
wield the ius gladii against the Emperor in the name of the Empire if they judged that his 
conduct was undermining the norms of justice which, it was claimed, he had promised 
in his coronation oath to uphold.”129 There is one further element in Azo’s 
understanding of sovereignty that bears upon the question of imperium and that will 
help to illuminate the tensions within Sexby’s argument for tyrannicide, namely, the 
question of where exactly sovereignty resides in the Empire and how that relates to the 
power to legislate in addition to command the army. Since Skinner’s account in 
Foundations focuses on the development of resistance theories, he neglects this aspect of 
Azo’s thought. I will turn to Tierney’s and C.N.S. Woolf’s discussion of Azo and 
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Bartolus’s thought to fill out this strand of the argument below, but at this point, it 
suffices to note that according to the Code, imperium was concerned with legislation as 
well as with the ius gladii. 
 This thirteenth-century debate over the imperium of the electors and magistrates 
was rehearsed in 1529-30 when Charles V, as a Catholic Emperor, refused to 
compromise with the Lutheran contingent at the Diet of Augsburg.130 While Gregory 
Bruck, the Chancellor of the Protestant prince John of Saxony, used the private law 
argument to justify violent resistance to the Emperor, Andreas Osiander and Martin 
Bucer reintroduced a constitutional theory of resistance along the lines of Azo’s 
formulation.131 Both Osinder and Bucer rightly feared that a resistance theory, such as 
Bruck’s, based purely on a private-law argument would too easily lead to a justification 
of a right of resistance for every individual member of the commonwealth.132 And 
indeed, this individualist potential in the private-law argument is realized in the 
writings of the more militant Calvinist theorists. Christopher Goodman, for instance, 
argues that in the case of a tyrannical ruler who is not restrained by other legitimate 
magistrates, “‘it is lawful for the people, yea it is their duty, to do it themselves’, thereby 
ensuring that they ‘cut off every rotten member.’”133 But private law was not the only 
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route to the individual’s right of resistance. A similar conclusion is reached by the same 
theorists through the concept of a covenant between each member of the commonwealth 
and God so that, to take again the example of Goodman, the commonwealth is “ruled by 
no other laws and ordinances than by such as God had given them.”134 Having 
covenanted with God to uphold his laws, each individual has a duty to “‘maintain and 
defend these same laws’ against their own magistrates, and in this way to resist and 
repudiate the idolatry and tyranny of their government.”135 Skinner’s account traces how 
these arguments developed and, in the case of the more individualistic strands, were 
temporarily suppressed in response to the specific strategic needs of their proponents 
throughout the sixteenth-century. But already in this brief sampling of how some of the 
major lines of resistance theory developed, we see that even those who argued that the 
community retained the ultimate sovereignty emphasized the right to violently resist, 
rather than the right to legislate, as residing in the whole community. The body of the 
people enters the political process at the formation and, if necessary, at the dissolution of 
government. The right to legislate, even if theoretically placed in the people, tends to be 
deemphasized by the resistance theorists. This culminates, in Skinner’s analysis, in the 
discussion of consent in Huguenot writings. Positing that a commonwealth is formed to 
preserve the people’s welfare, Huguenot theorists argue that it can only be legitimately 
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constituted by the people’s consent.136 But this consent is not given directly. Rather, the 
people delegate their authority to magistrates below the ruler.137 For example, in 
Mornay’s formulation we see that by the term “the people,” he means “those who 
receive authority from the people, that is, the magistrates below the king who have been 
elected by the people.”138 As we have seen in chapter three, this slide in meaning of the 
term “people” from the body of the people to their representatives is typical of 
Parliamentary discussion of consent in government formation in the pamphlet from the 
1640s. 
 But this change in emphasis appears as early as the adaptation of Azo’s 
conception of sovereignty by Conciliarist writers in order to formulate an ecclesiology 
capable of dealing with the problem of the Great Schism. In response to the crisis of the 
schism, a fundamental feature of Azo’s understanding of the people as universitas was 
lost. Like Skinner, Brian Tierney traces the idea that inalienable sovereignty resides in 
the whole body of the people to the communal experiences of Italian cities in the 
thirteenth-century and to canonist teachings on the corporate body of the Church.139 
Again like Skinner, he points out the importance of Azo da Bologna’s work as it mostly 
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clearly articulates this theory of “popular sovereignty.”140 Azo argued that while each 
individual conceded the power to legislate to a ruler, he did not alienate it, and that the 
whole body of the people, the universitas, retained the ultimate sovereignty, including 
the right to depose a ruler.141 But unlike Skinner, who bases his reading of Azo’s dispute 
with Lothair on Jean Bodin’s account in the Six Books of the Commonweal, Tierney notes 
that Azo’s conception of universitas derives from Roman law and that, crucially, this 
means that Azo maintained a distinction between the people as a corporate body and 
the mere aggregate of individuals.142 It was in the corporate body that sovereignty 
resided. In the thirteenth- and fourteenth-centuries, Azo’s view was not widely received 
amongst Roman lawyers. Tierney gives the examples of the disagreement of Cynus da 
Pistoia and his student Bartolus as typical of the opposition to Azo’s formulation of 
“popular sovereignty” as derived from the understanding of the body of the people as a 
corporate body according to Roman law. Particularly interesting is the form that 
Cynus’s answer to Azo takes. Tierney quotes this comment by Cynus as a representative 
rejoinder: “I know that if in fact the Roman people should establish a law or custom no 
one would observe it outside the city.”143 The form which Cynus’s objection takes is as 
important as the fact that Azo’s view was not commonly accepted. Cynus’s comment 
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gives a clear view of the problems that presented themselves over the interpretation of 
Roman law within a very different political context and, more importantly, they show 
some of the issues surrounding attempts to adapt conceptions of political authority and 
sovereignty from one historical context and political constitution to another.  
 Tierney’s account in Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought of 
Cynus’s and Bartolus’s opposition to Azo on the issue of sovereignty is dependent on 
C.N.S. Woolf’s Bartolus of Sassoferrato, which gives this specific quote by Cynus within 
the context of a discussion on the source of Imperial authority. The question at issue is 
whether the power of the Emperor over the entire Empire derives from his coronation 
by the Pope or whether it is bestowed on him upon election.144 If imperial authority is 
founded on election, it is still necessary to understand how the practice of election by a 
group of German princes can be understood in terms of laws speaking of election by the 
Roman people: 
So far indeed as the ‘populus Romanus’ stood for the ‘whole Roman Empire,’ the 
electors might be considered as representing the Populus Romanus. But we have 
to remember that the medieval lawyers applied the term ‘populus Romanus’ not 
only to the whole Empire, but also, in a narrow sense, to the populace of the 
medieval city of Rome. […] It was with this narrow ‘populus’ in mind that the 
lawyers, for the most part, discussed the relations of the Populus Romanus to the 
Emperor.145 
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This use in the narrow sense comes to the fore in both Bartolus’s discussion of two 
crucial questions of sovereignty and in Cynus’s rejoinder quoted above. Bartolus asks 
whether, first, the delegation of imperial power could be revoked by the people and, 
second, whether the people retained any powers to legislate.146 Bartolus deals with the 
two questions together and comes to the conclusion that the people of Rome have given 
their power of election to the German electors, and that, by consequence of this transfer 
of the right of election, the people of Rome no longer retain any right to make laws for 
the Empire. Therefore, only the Emperor may interpret and make the law, and, finally, 
only the Pope may revoke the Emperor’s authority.147 It is at this point of the discussion 
that we find Cynus contributing the opinion quoted by Tierney above. For Cynus, the 
theoretical dispute over whether the right to make laws for the Empire remained in the 
people of Rome, understood in the narrow sense, has been already decided as a matter 
of fact: “The whole discussion as to the power of the Populus Romanus, with regard to 
law or custom, was by this time merely a remnant of an antiquated conception of the 
Populus Romanus, as represented by the actual Roman populace.”148 For Cynus, due to 
the historical differences between the status of the city of Rome during the classical and 
the medieval Empires, the people of Rome no longer held a political role with respect to 
the rest of the Empire that would allow their customs to acquire the status of general law 
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beyond the borders of the city itself. In this view, a theory of “popular sovereignty” 
could not be derived from Roman law and its conception of the corporate body of the 
people along the lines developed by Azo.149 
 Azo’s view regained popularity, however, during the crisis of the Great Schism, 
when it was revived in the ecclesiastical context.150 Versions of this argument then found 
their way into Protestant works of resistance theory, such as Willaim Prynne’s Soveraigne 
Power of Parliaments, which quotes a speech containing elements of Azo’s discussion of 
corporation made at the Council of Basle in the 1430s by Alfonso Garcia, bishop of 
Burgos.151 But in adapting Azo’s theory of the sovereignty of the corporate body of the 
people to the Church, the Conciliarists introduced a significant shift in meaning: “Azo 
had in mind the people of the city of Rome, who could actually assemble together. 
Ludof [of Sagan in 1409] was thinking of the general council as a representative body 
acting on behalf of the whole church. Later Conciliarist writers often asserted that the 
pope was sovereign over individual members of the dispersed church but not over the 
corporate whole assembled in a council.”152 As both Tierney and Skinner argue, it is this 
Conciliarist version of Azo’s position that influenced Protestant resistance theory. 
However, by paying attention to how Azo’s interpretation of Roman Law was changed 
through its adaptation by Conciliarist theorists we can recover the link between 
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legislation by popular custom and the theory of a ruler’s accountability to the people as 
it was debated in the thirteenth-century. In turn, by considering this link, the elision of 
the role of legislation by custom inherent in the reformulation of Azo’s arguments in 
terms of representatives of the people becomes evident. In Azo’s formulation, the 
corporate body of the people, rather than the mere aggregate of individuals, is 
intrinsically bound up with the legislation that governs it, legislation that, in part, is 
promulgated in the customs of the universitas of the people itself.153 The key point here is 
that by focusing on the post-Conciliarist formulation of Azo’s version of popular 
sovereignty the role of the people becomes merely that of transferring their rights and 
authority to either a sovereign or a group of representatives and the conditions under 
which they—the people directly or through their representatives—might reclaim that 
authority. What gets lost is the ongoing political activity of the people that consists of 
their customary actions as a form of legislation. This right to legislate is fundamentally 
connected, as Cynus’ comment highlights, with their right to revoke authority from a 
sovereign. In this view, a community’s structures of action and customs and the forms in 
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which its contracts, trials, and institutions of governance are run and adjudicated are an 
important source of legislation and express that community’s shared understanding of 
its political life and, ultimately, its conception of justice.  
 This stands in stark contrast with the dismissal of the solemnities and forms of 
justice found in Killing No Murder. If we contrast Azo’s view of a community with the 
one that emerges from following Sexby’s condemnation of Cromwell and his use of the 
example of Athaliah, we see a striking tension in the pamphlet. Sexby argues that each 
individual is capable of standing as both judge and executioner over a tyrant, “over 
whom every Man is naturally a Judge and an Executioner, and whom the Laws of God, 
of Nature, and of Nations expose, like Beasts of Prey, to be destroyed as they are met.”154 
However, at the same time, the people are depicted as incapable of rational judgment 
and easily deceived by appearances. For Sexby, this indictment of the people extends, as 
we have seen, to a dismissal of the “formalities” and “solemnities” of justice as mere 
forms that are easily manipulated by those in power and need not therefore be respected 
in attempts to resist tyranny. Justice, for Sexby, is ultimately independent of “her 
forms.” Comparing this dismissal with Azo’s description of the people’s legislative 
power through repeated action is revealing. Sexby is willing to replace the judgment and 
reasoning of the people as expressed through the system of law and custom with the 
individualized reason of the tyrannicide. In the logic of Killing No Murder, this latter 
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form of reason is presumably independent and therefore not dazzled by the “glister of 
Things.” What is left unanswered by Sexby is how the tyrannicide’s correct judgment 
has developed independently of his education in justice—an education conducted 
through his encounter of those very forms of justice that Sexby dismisses—within the 
community. More precisely, by insisting that Cromwell’s guilt is as self-evident as 
Athaliah’s, “Her Fact was her Trial,” while, at the same time, accusing the common 
people of being unable to judge beyond appearances, Sexby places the correct judgment 
of the would-be assassin of Cromwell in a separate category. The judgment of the 
tyrannicide is separated from that of the other members of the community by a divide 
that could not be breached by any form of rational argument. 
 Ultimately, Killing No Murder is not meant to provide a rational argument for 
tyrannicide to the people. This can be seen in Sexby’s appeal for action against the tyrant 
to the only pre-existing community that he deems capable of judging correctly and 
acting accordingly, his fellow soldiers. Before encountering the main argument of 
pamphlet, the reader is greeted by two dedicatory letters. The first letter is addressed to 
Cromwell himself, and the second one is addressed to “all those Officers and Soldiers in 
the Army, that remember their Engagements, and dare be Honest.”155 In the second 
letter, the soldiers of the army are reminded that they were raised to be the defenders of 
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England’s liberty and not to support a tyrant.156 Sexby appeals to his shared experience 
as a soldier, but one who has refused to serve the Protectorate: “This is from One that 
was once One amongst you, and will be so again when you dare be as you were.”157 The 
messianic language is paired with a representation of the soldiers willing to act against 
Cromwell as a honest few who have survived numerous purges: “I Heartily wish for 
England’s Sake, That your Number may be far greater than I fear it is; and that His 
Highness’s frequent Purgations may have left any amongst you” who still “dare to be 
Honest.”158 It is to this faithful remnant that Sexby addresses the final plea in Killing No 
Murder: “Hitherto I have spoken in general to all Englishmen; now I address my 
Discourse particularly to those that certainly best deserve that Name, our selves, that 
have fought, however unfortunately, for our Liberties under this Tyrant.”159 Thus, only 
the soldiers who are willing to resist Cromwell can truly deserve the name of 
Englishmen and tyrannicide becomes a test for citizenship in Killing No Murder. 
 As we have seen, Killing No Murder has been read as one of the best 
representatives of the articulation of a theory of resistance in the language of English 
republicanism during the Protectorate. Holstun, in particular, reads the two opening 
epistles as demonstrating the two aspects Sexby’s opposition to the “re-emergence of a 
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new sort of monarchical charisma under the Protectorate.”160 The first letter mocks the 
client-patron relationship to argue for the overturning of the current “hierarchical social 
order,” while the second produces a call of “prophetic solidarity in a lay sermon calling 
for civic virtue.”161 The rest of Killing No Murder, in Holstun reading, is characterized by 
an oscillating movement between these two poles. The pamphlet “alternates between 
the ideology critique of the first epistle, with its savage iconoclasm directed against the 
mystifying fictions of de facto monarchical rule, and the utopian association of the 
second, with its passionate effort to recall, construct, and prophesy the righteous 
collectives of the godly republic.”162 Holstun interprets Sexby’s “republicanism” along 
the lines defined by Pocock in the Machiavellian Moment: “[u]nlike the traditional vision 
of monarchy as a timeless and hierarchical reflection of the heavenly order, the republic 
is a civic entity existing in time. […] Republican citizens associate themselves through 
rational and voluntary discursive forms, not through the client’s mystifying assertion of 
filial relation to his patron.”163 Here, and throughout his reading of Killing No Murder, 
Holstun agrees with Sexby that the only true republican citizens are the soldiers of the 
army who are willing to respond to his call for tyrannicide. The “vulgar” are left to, in 
Sexby’s words, “judge ridiculously like themselves.” While he does register that Sexby is 
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163 Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger, 335-6; the ellipses indicate a long quote from Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 
62, 53 on page 336. 
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“considerably less sanguine” when he turns from “the hoped-for future collective 
solidarity of the republic” to his “pious but small-witted countrymen” who 
accommodate the Protectorate, Holstun views Sexby’s upbraiding of indolent 
Englishmen who do not recognize that their birthrights have been taken away as an 
attempt to galvanize them to create “a virtuous English republic that the stab of his pen 
will shock into being.”164 But as we have seen, Sexby’s enthusiasm for his fellow 
countrymen as they could be leads him to erase and deny their claim to citizenship of 
Englishmen as they are. In Killing No Murder, the would-be tyrannicide becomes the 
only true citizen and, as such, the only one whose political and moral judgment is to be 
trusted. The role of the people is to “approve,” as in Sexby’s telling rewriting of the 
Athaliah’s narrative, the action of the self-authorizing tyrannicide. Holstun is right in 
stating that Killing No Murder’s form is “savage iconoclasm,” but alongside the idol that 
is Cromwell, Sexby erases from the pages of his pamphlet and from his imagined 
virtuous republic, the embodiment of the people’s judgment and understanding of 
justice by refusing to imagine that “formalities” and “solemnities” could be more than 
external trappings of the processes through which justice manifests itself in a 
community. Thus, in Killing No Murder, instead of trials by jury, Sexby portrays corpses 
of idolatrous Protectorate ministers hanging, through no visible agency, in front of their 
altars. Such denials of the people’s judgment are not unique to Sexby, but rather typical 
                                                     
164 Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger, 351, 352. 
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of iconoclastic discourse. To see how the language of iconoclasm functions, I turn to 
apologies of the Protectorate from 1653. 
4.2 Parliament as Nothing: Political Idolatry and Iconoclasm 
 After Pride’s Purge in December 1648, the Rump Parliament assumed power in 
January 1649 (though England was not declared a Commonwealth until March 1649) 
and retained it until it was dissolved by Cromwell in April 1653.165 With the dissolution 
of the Rump, the Council of Officers appropriated the power to choose a new 
government and, while deliberating on which form it was to take, it instituted a 
temporary Council of State to deal with the day-to-day business of the nation.166 Rather 
than calling for the elections of a new Parliament, the Council settled on putting into 
place a Nominated Assembly in July 1653, which, however, remained in power for less 
than a year and dissolved itself in December of 1653.167 The causes immediately 
                                                     
165 For the over-all account of the period, I follow Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, especially pp. 514-36 on the 
dissolution of the Rump and on the rule of the Nominated Assembly. 
166 Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 537-8. 
167 The Nominated Assembly is also known as Barebone’s Parliament after the name of one of its members, 
Praise-God Barebone. Since the name was adopted by opponents of the Nominated Assembly as a social 
and economic sneer based on stereotypes of the saints and meant to give credence to the allegations that the 
Assembly was dominated by fanatical “mechanic preachers,” I use the term Nominated Assembly. For the 
make-up of the members of the Assembly and the role played by gathered churches in suggesting 
nominations, see Austin Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 114-28. By 
the middle of December 1653, the Council of Officers had adopted the Instrument of Government and, on 16 
December 1653, Cromwell became Lord Protector (Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 563). While the 
Protectorate brought about a certain level of stability, the experimentation with forms of government did 
not halt during the period. Cromwell had to deal with two ineffective Parliaments and, in an attempt to 
reform local administration, he experimented with the rule by the major-generals from 1655 to 1657 
(Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, Part V). It was during the sitting of the Second Protectorate Parliament and 
at a time when the Parliament was at odds with Cromwell over the case of James Nayler and the Parliament 
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precipitating Cromwell’s dissolution of the Rump in 1653 are not fully identifiable. In 
April, Cromwell and the Council of Officers had been engaged in a series of negotiations 
both amongst themselves and with members of the Rump on how a new representative 
was to be formed.168 A bill, which was to provide for the election of a new Parliament, 
had been drafted and, on April 20th, it was to be voted on. Cromwell intervened to stop 
the vote and dissolved Parliament. The motivation for this dissolution is unclear since 
there is no extant document of the bill and its content has been subject for speculation. 
Blair Worden, in The Rump Parliament, argues that the bill did not aim at recruiter 
elections and that, nonetheless, even if it had, that would not have been the motive for 
Cromwell’s dissolution of the Rump: “Cromwell’s objection at the time of the 
dissolution to the bill for a new representative […] was not that it provided for recruiter 
elections. It was that it provided for elections at all.”169 According to Worden, by 
dissolving the Rump, Cromwell aligned himself with the Fifth Monarchists: “The 
dissolution of the Rump marked the capture of Cromwell by the chosen” and that the 
dissolution was “the triumph of [Thomas] Harrison and the prophets of the imminent 
                                                     
 
itself was bitterly divided over whether to continue the decimation tax and thus continue the rule of the 
Major Generals, that Sindercombe’s plot was discovered (Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 548-50). 
168  Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate, 61-67. 
169 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament: 1648-1653 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 345. 
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millennium.”170 On the other hand, Austin Woolrych argues that the bill that was to be 
passed on April 20th was deemed dangerous by Cromwell, who believed, correctly or 
otherwise, that it provided for some form of recruiter elections.171 Moreover, Woolrych 
dismisses the hypothesis that Cromwell had been persuaded by Harrison and other 
Fifth Monarchists in opposing any elections for a new representative.172 Harrison’s own 
account of the dissolution, as reported by Ludlow, is that Cromwell had found the 
Rump split by interests and incapable of governing justly. Cromwell had “loaded the 
Parliament with the vilest reproaches, charging them not to have a heart to do anything 
for the publick good, to have espoused the corrupt interest of Presbytery and the 
lawyers, who were the supporters of tyranny and oppression, accusing them of an 
intention to perpetuate themselves in power.”173 
 Harrison’s report of Cromwell’s attack on the Rump is supported by his own 
comparison of the new Assembly with the old Parliament. In his speech at the opening 
of the Nominated Assembly, Cromwell recollects his interpretation of the workings of 
Providence at the moment the events were unfolding to justify his dissolution of the 
                                                     
170 Worden, The Rump Parliament, 380, 374; Major General Thomas Harrison had proposed an assembly of 70 
members appointed by the gathered churches who would rule England along the model of the Sanhedrin 
until the coming of Christ as universal king. 
171 Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate, 68-102. 
172 Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate, 75-6. Bernard Capp, in his study of Fifth Monarchists, agrees 
with Woolrych’s reading of the events and argues that the members of the Nominated Assembly were 
selected by Cromwell and the officers with minimal input from the gathered churches (The Fifth Monarchy 
Men: A Study in Seventeenth-century English Millenarianism (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972), 64-6). 
173 The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, ed. Charles Harding Firth (Oxford: Clarendon, 1894), vol. 2, 351-5, quoted 
in Abbott, II:643. 
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Rump. In his discussion of the Bill for a new representative, Cromwell explains that the 
members of the Rump were pushing through the Bill in “preposterous haste” and that 
their “spirit was not according to God; and that the whole weight of this cause,—which 
must needs be very dear unto us who had often adventured our lives for it, and we 
believe it was so to you,—did hang upon this business” (Abbott, III:56). Cromwell’s very 
understanding of the motives of the members of the Rump is brought upon him by 
divine action: “When it pleased God to lay this close to our hearts; and we found the 
interest of His people was grown cheap and not laid to heart, but that if we came to real 
competition, the cause, even among themselves, would also in everything go to the 
ground: indeed this did add more considerations to us, that there was a duty incumbent 
upon us” (Abbott, III:56). Thus, Cromwell emphasizes that his, and the Army’s, actions 
had been prompted and authorized by Divine Providence in conjunction with his own 
understanding of the Parliament’s unwillingness to rule for the wellbeing of God’s 
people. But as the speech proceeds to its exhortative message to the Nominated 
Assembly, Cromwell’s performance evolves into a complex attempt to deny that any of 
the actions of the Army that have led to the Assembly’s formation and to the opening 
speech itself are needed. In reminding them “to endeavour the Promoting of the Gospel” 
(Abbott, III:62), Cromwell finishes giving his advice by asserting that he did not need to 
do so: “I need not discourse of these things to you; I am persuaded you are taught of 
God, in a greater measure than myself, concerning these things” (Abbott, III:63).  
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 Cromwell’s denial of the need to advise the Nominated Assembly within a 
speech of advice mirrors his attempt to disguise the lack of constitutional authority in 
his calling of its members by claiming precedent and proper standing for his position. In 
the introduction to his remarks, the contorted syntax he uses attempts to construct a 
tradition that does not exist in English history: 
It hath been the practice of others who have, voluntarily and out of a sense of 
duty, divested themselves of power, and devolved the government into the 
hands of others; I say, it hath been the practice of those that have done so; it hath 
been practised, and is very consonant to reason together with the authority to lay 
a charge (in such a way as I hope we do), and to press the duty: [concerning] 
which we have a word or two to offer you. (Abbott, III:60; emendation Abbott’s) 
 
In this passage, the repetition of “it hath been the practice” and “it hath been practiced” 
indicates that Cromwell is attempting to find a formulation for the unprecedented 
divestment of power to the Nominated Assembly. As Carlyle points out in his edition of 
Cromwell’s speeches, the position of calling a Parliament would have traditionally and 
legally belonged to the king.174 Cromwell, as we have seen, laboriously establishes that 
the Nominated Assembly has been called by God and not by him. His position is that of 
a caretaker passing on the supreme authority completely to the Assembly.  And by using 
the impersonal constructions, “it hath been the practice,” “is very consonant to reason,” 
Cromwell disguises his agency in summoning the Nominated Assembly while, at the 
                                                     
174 “He seems embarrassed lest he be thought to have some authority over this new Little Parliament [the 
Nominated Assembly], and to treat them as if he were their King. The dissolving of the old Parliament has 
also its embarrassment, though not so prominent here; and both together make an intricate paragraph” 
(Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches with Elucidations, ed. Thomas Carlyle, 3 vols. (New York: John B. 
Alden, Publisher, 1885); n. 2, II:357). 
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same time, attempts to ground a novel event into a practice or tradition.175 While he is 
performing a role legally reserved to the king, Cromwell insists that he is acting under 
the guidance of Providence. In the dissolution of the Rump and in the calling of the 
Nominated Assembly, the military leadership acted not in its own interests, but rather to 
facilitate the work of God just as earlier, through the Self-denying Ordinance of 1645, the 
leadership of the army had been changed in accordance to the will of God.176 Cromwell 
grounds his claim for divine authorizations of the Army’s intervention in the political 
life of England by reminding the Assembly of the New Model’s military victories: 
“forasmuch as considering the works of God, and the operations of His hand, is a 
principal part of our duty; and a great encouragement to the strengthening of our hands 
and of our faith, for that which is behind those marvelous dispensations which have 
                                                     
175 This is of course strikingly different from the traditional formulation of a Parliament, which, for instance, 
Coke defines as a court summoned by the king and consisting of: “This Court consisteth of the Kings 
Majesty sitting there as in his Royall politick capacity, and of the three Estates of the Realm: viz. On the 
Lords Spirituall, Archbishops and Bishops, […]; And every one of these when any Parliament is to be 
holden, ought, ex debito justitiae to have a Writ of Summons. The Lords Temporall, Dukes, Marquisses, Earls, 
Viscounts, and Barons […]: and likewise every one of these being of full age ought to have a Writ of 
Summons ex debito justitiae. The third estate is the Commons of the Realme whereof there be Knights of 
Shires or Counties, Citizens of Cities, and Burgesses of Burghes. All which are respectively elected by the 
Shires or Counties, Cities and Burghes, by force of the Kings Writ ex debito justitiae, and none of them ought 
to be omitted: and these represent all the Commons of the whole Realme, and trusted for them.” For each 
estate, Coke emphasized that they called by “force of the Kings Writ ex debito justitiae,” as a matter of right 
(Edward Coke, The fourth part of the institutes of the laws of England (London, 1797), image 11. Eighteenth 
Century Collections Online. Gale. 29 Nov. 2011 
http://find.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/ecco/infomark.do?&contentSet=ECCOArticles&type=multipa
ge&tabID=T001&prodId=ECCO&docId=CW125187193&source=gale&userGroupName=duke_perkins&versi
on=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE). Even though Cromwell insists that he is following “the practice of others 
who have, voluntarily and out of a sense of duty, divested themselves of power,” he is in a position that 
does not recall any of the procedure of the English Parliament. 
176 It “pleased God, much about the midst of this war, to winnow (if I may so say) the forces of this nation; 
and to put them into the hands of other men of other principles than those that did engage them at the first” 
(Abbott, III:53). 
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been given us” (Abbott, III:53). Their military success, granted by Providence, 
encourages Cromwell to assert that the actions of the Army in dissolving the Rump and 
forming a new government are guided by God. 
 In the speech, the insistence that all the Army’s actions in settling the nation have 
been done by the will of God is used to create a firm contrast between the merely human 
authority of the Rump and the divinely ordained Nominated Assembly. While the 
Rump was divided by factions and self-interest, the member of the Nominated 
Assembly are described through the words of Isaiah 43.12: “You are as like the forming 
of God as ever people were” (Abbott, III:63).177 For Cromwell, it was the call of God that 
made them members of the Assembly: “You have been passive in coming hither; being 
called,—and that’s an active work. This people I have formed: consider the circumstances 
by which you are called hither, though what difficulties, through what strivings, 
through what blood you are come hither” (Abbott, III:62). The “active work” is done by 
God and not by the Council of Officers or the gathered churches and communities that 
sent nominations. Cromwell compares this calling by God to the human, and therefore 
corruptible, process of election of the members of the Long Parliament.178 Having been 
formed by God into a new government, they are now called to work towards re-forming 
the English people so that they, in turn, may become capable of electing a representative 
                                                     
177 “This people have I formed for myself; they shall shew forth my praise” (Isaiah 43.21). 
178 “I may say also, never a people so formed, for such a purpose, so called,—if it were a time to compare 
your standing with those that have been called by the suffrages of the people” (Abbott, III:64). 
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fit for the work of God. This forming of the people is done primarily by God.179 
However, how the members of the assembly proceed in their calling in government can 
also move the people “to own the interest of Jesus Christ”: 
what is there more like to win the people to the interest of Jesus Christ, to the 
love of godliness (nay what stronger duty lies upon you, thus being called), but 
an humble and godly conversation? So that they may see you love them; [that] 
you lay out yourselves, time and spirits, for them! Is it not the likeliest way to 
bring them to their liberties? And do not you, by this, put it upon God to find out 
times and seasons for it by pouring forth his Spirit? At least by convincing them 
that, as men fearing God have fought them out of their thralldom and bondage 
under the regal power, so men fearing God do now rule them in the fear of God, 
and take care to administer good unto them. (Abbott, III:64) 
 
In The Revolution of the Saints, Michael Walzer identifies this sense of being “called” to 
political office as a crucial element motivating and authorizing the saints’ opposition to, 
and encroachment upon, the prerogative of the king in the 1640s. Saints in Parliament 
viewed themselves as “instruments of God” and, as such, could undertake to fulfill 
duties that did not traditionally belong to MPs.180 In the 1640s, the role of instruments of 
God belonged to elected members of Parliament, as the zealous preaching before the 
elections of the Long Parliament to convince the voters to make a “holy choice” rather 
than to decide based on traditional alliances demonstrates.181 However, by 1653, the 
English people are seen by Cromwell as incapable of making such “holy choice” or to 
                                                     
179 “Who can tell how soon God may fit the people for such a thing [godly suffrage], and non can desire it 
more than I! Would all the Lord’s people were prophets. I would all were fit to be called, and fit to call” 
(Abbott, III:64). 
180 Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, 257-8. 
181 Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, 259-60. 
 407 
demonstrate “religious care” in exercising their “liberties,” including their right to 
franchise.  
 Here again, as in Cromwell’s divestment of power in the earlier section of the 
speech, the grammar of the passage betrays the difficulty inherent in claiming that an 
assembly nominated against English law could bring the people to their liberties. 
Cromwell attempts to legitimate the authority of the members of the Assembly by 
creating a parallel construction between the men who, in the past, “have fought them 
[the people] out of their thralldom and bondage” and those who, in the present, “now 
rule them in the fear of God, and take care to administer good unto them.” It is this 
second group of men who will, in the future, “bring” the people “to their liberties.” As 
can be seen in the full quote above, in the original speech the temporal order is upset, 
placing the future action of bringing the people to their liberties before the past and 
present actions in the parallel construction that ends the quote. This helps to disguise 
that, if the temporal order is restored, the passage strangely states that while the people 
are no longer under “thralldom and bondage,” they have not yet acquired their liberties. 
In this ambiguous state, neither free nor under bondage, the people become objects, 
rather than actors, in this movement from thralldom to liberty; they have been “fought 
out of” and the Assembly will “bring them.” The people have been divested, by the very 
instituting of the Nominated Assembly, of the ability to exercise their traditional liberty 
of the franchise, they have lost their “voice” in government. But in Cromwell’s speech 
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this is presented as the necessary process to bring the people to their liberties. Ironically, 
as we will see below in section three, on the third day of the debates at Putney in 1647, 
Cromwell had opposed exactly this kind of claim, put forward by Sexby, Wildman, and 
Rainborough, of divine authorization to act with no warrant from either the Long 
Parliament or a direct manifestation of the people’s demand for reform. In 1653, 
however, Cromwell justifies what he had opposed at Putney with an appeal to divine 
providence and the calling of the members of the Assembly by God. 
 While Cromwell, in his speech at the opening of the Nominated Assembly, tried 
to conceal the power of the military, apologies that appeared after the dissolution of the 
Rump based their arguments on the army’s power as the necessary condition of 
existence of the Parliament. One such pamphlet is the anonymous The Army No Usurpers 
([Thomason: May 20] 1653).182 For the author, once the Long Parliament had taken up 
arms against Charles I, it had stopped functioning as a true representative and had taken 
on the ruling function that traditionally and legally belonged to the king.183 In The Army 
No Usurpers, the proper power of any Parliament was that of restraining the king, the 
                                                     
182 Anon., The Army no usurpers, or The late Parliament not almighty and everlasting: shewing, that the present army 
in their former opposing, and late dissolving of the Parliament, have done nothing contrary to law, but according to 
equity. And that the late Parliaments claim of power to do what they please, until they should be dissolved by their own 
consent, is long since made void by their own act. Early English Books Online. British Library (London). May 10, 
2011. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99871983. 
183 “The Parliament having declared against the King, step[t] up into his Throne, by taking upon them the 
ruling power. So that whereas before they were as the People, ruled; Assembled onely (pro tempore) to 
control their Rulers, and make Laws for them to rule by; they are now the standing Rulers that are subject to 
like control from the People; For, Both these powers they could not have at once, because there was no Law 
for it, and it was against equity” (The Army No Usurpers, 4). 
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actual ruler. Having usurped the ruling function, the Long Parliament, and 
subsequently the Rump, could not, “against equity,” claim to still hold its traditional 
role of protection the people from unchecked royal power. Moreover, alongside its 
restraining function, the Parliament, as a representative of the people, acted on behalf of 
the nation itself in legislating; that is, they exercised “a National Power, I mean a power 
to Act and do whatsoever the Nation it self (being present) might do.”184 This power is 
now in the army: “[t]his power in a time of peace is in Parliaments, but in a time of War 
it ought to be in the Trained Bands, or such as are worthy to be Intrusted to Act for 
them; For in a time of War the National trust is not to be put in Councels but in Armies. 
[…] Councells may be dissolved by the Adversary or suddain commotions, whilest if 
Armies stand and be faithful, the Nation is upheld.”185 The New Model’s ability to 
defend the nation in a time of war is seen as a demonstration of its embodying the 
“Nation it self” by acting in self-defense as it “might do.” While Cromwell denied that 
the people of England were capable of electing a representative body to rule after the 
dissolution of the Rump, the author of The Army No Usurpers argues that the very act of 
fighting against the royalist forces has demonstrated that the soldiers are the true 
representatives of the nation; fighting is presented as equivalent to voting.186 Just as 
                                                     
184 The Army No Usurpers, 9. 
185 The Army No Usurpers, 9. 
186 Like Cromwell, the author of The Army No Usurpers argues that the conduct and success of the Army in 
the Civil Wars shows that they are instruments of Divine Providence. The army is not composed of 
“Souldiers of fortune,” but of “many gallant men” who fight “for love of their Country” (Army No Usurpers, 
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those who do vote act for the rest of the country in selecting members of a 
representative, those who fight “venture their lives and limbs for freedom (and that not 
as Soldier of fortune, but as their design),” while the rest of the country declines to 
participate in the war: “The Nation of England is invited to appear in its own defence; 
the Peoples leisure will not give way, but they permit these to appear for them; and this 
permission is a trust put upon them to Act in their stead.”187 The language of trust which 
in the 1640s had been used to describe the relationship between people and the elected 
members of Parliament is here redirected to claim representative authority for the army. 
For the author of The Army No Usurpers, by not participating in actual fighting, all the 
other members of the nation have indicated that they entrust all political activity to the 
soldiers. In this pamphlet political activity is explicitly reserved for those who have 
responded to God’s call by fighting.  
                                                     
 
2-3). Their victories mark them as instruments of Divine Providence: “They find in every thing success to 
wonder, acknowledged by friends and enemies to be from a divine presence.” (The Army No Usurpers, 3). 
This is contrasted with the treachery of the Rump. As soon as the army had attained victory, the Parliament 
asked them to “lay down Arms, that others whose ways tend to persecution and oppression (especially 
against men of their practices & Judgements) may take them up, and reap all the sweet fruits of these mens 
losses, of their blood and limbs, of their precious friends slain in the service (and the Widdows and Orphans 
made thereby) of the incomparable diligence, unexampled adventures, Invincible courage, miserable 
hardships undergone by them, and many other things of what moment soever, not at all now to be spoken 
of, but they are doomed to submit all this, yea and their lives, yea and their posterities, yea and some things 
relating to their souls, to the mercy of those that they plainly perceive, do implacably hate them, manifested 
in this their undeserved cruelty” (The Army No Usurpers, 2). The passage focuses in detail on the suffering 
and sacrifices of the soldiers as giving them a right to the “sweet fruits” of their victories. The long list 
shows how the soldiers loss of their “blood and limbs” and “precious friends,” as well as their “miserable 
hardships” are just part of the innumerable sacrifices, “not at all now to be spoken of,” that they have 
endured. 
187 The Army No Usurpers, 10. 
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 Such claims by Cromwell and his supporters share an underlying view of liberty 
and political reformation with Sexby’s advocacy of tyrannicide in Killing No Murder. To 
see this, I turn to Reasons Why the Supreme Authority of the Three Nations (For the Time) Is 
not in the Parliament, a pamphlet that was published anonymously in May 1653, but was 
recently attributed to Sir Thomas Urquhart (1611-60) by Nicholas McDowell.188 Not 
much attention has been given to Reasons Why. Woolrych dismisses it as the work of an 
anonymous “pamphleteer [who] argued even more crudely [than the author of The 
Army No Usurpers] that parliament, being the king’s great council and summoned to 
parley with him, had become extinct when the monarchy was abolished.”189 Similarly, 
Norbrook sees it as the work of “one enthusiast” who views Cromwell as a Caesar.190 
Both Woolrych and Norbrook seem unaware of the attribution of the pamphlet to 
Urquhart. Nicholas McDowell, on the other hand, by highlighting Urquhart’s 
authorship of the pamphlet, reconstructs the context for its focus on Scotland and its 
attacks on Presbyterianism, but gives scant attention to Reasons Why’s manipulation of 
the language and tropes found in other pamphlets supporting the dissolution of the 
                                                     
188 The pamphlet is anonymous, but its authorship has been traced to Sir Thomas Urquhart, a former 
Scottish royalist, with the probable co-authorship of John Hall (Nicholas McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance in 
the English Civil Wars: Marvell and the Cause of Wit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 244-5). The 
original discovery of the authorship of the pamphlet is due to the work of Hugh H. G. Candy and C.H. 
Wilkinson (McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance, n. 87 to p. 245). Urquhart had fought on the royalist side of the 
Civil Wars and was arrested after the defeat of Charles II’s forces at Worcester in September 1651 
(McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance in the English Civil Wars, 240-1). McDowell sees Urquhart as convinced by 
Hall to support the union of England and Scotland after the defeat of the royalist forces as a way to curb the 
Presbyterian influence in Scotland (McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance, 241-3). 
189 Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate, 132. 
190 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, 299. 
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Rump. McDowell’s reading of The Reasons Why focuses on Urquhart’s rejection of the 
anti-humanist ethos of the Scottish Presbyterians and on his hopes, fostered by Hall, that 
his translation of “Rabelais would find acclaim and reward in a post-royalist Britain.”191 
The pamphlet is less unequivocally supportive of Cromwell and the Army than it may 
seem at first and Urquhart’s praise of the Army’s coup is moderated by a critique of 
military interference in government. Reasons Why is riddled with passages that expose 
the logic of political violence that forms the foundation for the Army’s dissolution of the 
Rump. While pamphlets such as The Army No Usurpers attempt to give unequivocal 
legitimacy to the Army’s actions, Urquhart’s pamphlet shows that any claim of the 
lawfulness of the military coup can be reduced at best to an argument from necessity or 
expediency. 
 Reasons Why styles itself as an answer to a “Letter sent from a Gentleman in 
Scotland to a friend in London.”192 The original “letter,” which is included in the first page 
of the pamphlet, voices a concern that whatever “favor” the people of Scotland may 
have hoped to receive from “the Presbyterian party sitting in the House” has now 
                                                     
191 McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance, 245. 
192 C. N. [Sir Thomas Urquhart], Reasons why the supreme authority of the three nations (for the time) is not in the 
Parliament, but in the new-established Councel of State, consisting of His Excellence the Lord General Cromvvel, and 
his honourable assessors. Written in answer to a letter sent from a gentleman in Scotland to a friend of his in London. 
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disappeared.193 The response to this letter begins by reassuring Urquhart’s fictional 
correspondent of the abilities of the Army to settle the three nations; England, Scotland, 
and Ireland will all enjoy “greater apparent happiness under it then the former 
Government.” 194 But more importantly, the pamphlet makes a claim for “the lawfulness 
of the change” and insists that it will “propound little or nothing of Necessity.”195 Thus, 
the opening of Reasons Why makes “lawfulness,” rather than necessity, the standard by 
which to judge the dissolution of the Rump by the army and the subsequent actions by 
the Council of Officers. To do this, Urquhart turns next to the question of the legal status 
of the Rump and asks what defines a Parliament. He offers two possible answers to his 
own question. First, Parliament could simply be defined, acknowledging the power of 
the army, as “that kind of convention which the army did allow to sit at Westm[inster].”196 
Or second, by adopting the usual meaning of the word, the term Parliament can be 
reserved for the body “consisting of King, Lords, and Commons, which (as the soul of man 
is said to comprehend the rational, sensitive, and vegetative faculties) was first constituted 
triennial, and afterwards by vertue of the same Royal source, from whence the former 
grant did flow, prolonged or perpetuated at the pleasure and discretion of the sitters.”197 
                                                     
193 Reasons Why, 1. In particular, the writer of the letter fears that “the unexperiencedness, and illiteracie of 
military men in the disquisition of divine or legal concernments, will by all appearance bring us to submit 
our necks to the absolute, uncontroulable, and arbitrary yoak of the sword” (Reasons Why, 1). 
194 Reasons Why, 2. 
195 Reasons Why, 2; emphasis original. 
196 Reasons Why, 3; emphasis original. 
197 Reasons Why, 3; emphasis original. 
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The second, and traditional, definition of Parliament is constructed to deny the Rump 
any pretense of being able to direct the nation. If England is likened to a body and 
Parliament to its animating soul, the Commons are no more than the “vegetative 
facult[y].” Moreover, if anyone were to insist that “the army derived its power from the 
Parliament, and not the Parliament from it,” Urquhart replies that the army had been 
chosen by the Lords and Commons together and that it was the army that “took into 
their protection that part of the House which voted down Monarchy.”198 Not only did the 
Army protect Parliament, but the Rump is exposed as a mere body animated by the 
army: “whilst the Parliament sate, it was the Army did animate them, the Army was their 
soul, and the Master-wheel by which they moved, in which sense I think my Lord 
General did acknowledge the Parliaments soveraginty, and in so doing did derogate 
nothing from himself and the Officers, who virtually governed by them.”199 The 
dissolution of the Rump is simply an uncovering of what was already reality; the soul 
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behind the “outward Organs Microcosmically Representative of the great body of the 
Republick” was the army.200  
 Urquhart’s depiction of the body politic represented “Microcosmically” in the 
Rump, which, in turn, was animated by the Army, is developed in two directions in 
Reasons Why. First, the use of the simile between Parliament and the human soul draws 
on the tradition of likening the political body of the nation with a natural body. This 
language had a long history by the writing of Reasons Why, but, as Quentin Skinner 
argues in Liberty Before Liberalism, it had been used by Parliamentarian writers during 
the 1640s and English republican theorists after the regicide to argue that if the laws of a 
nation are not enacted with the consent of the members of the body politic, then that 
nation is not a free state as the body politic would be moved and animated by the will of 
another and be enslaved.201 Moreover, individual liberty, for republican writers, is 
inextricably connected to living in a free state.202 Urquhart’s engagement with the 
republican version of this trope is made evident when he turns to the question of 
whether England and Scotland can be considered free nations under the rule of the 
Army. The pamphlet insists that the Army has fought to preserve the liberties and rights 
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201 Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, 24-8. Skinner’s formulation on this issue is problematic. He puts the 
point this way: “if a state or commonwealth is to count as free, the laws that govern it—the rules that 
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202 Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, 59-77. 
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of England.203 The argument then expands to include not only England’s liberties, but 
those of Scotland as well. In the last section of the pamphlet, Urquhart turns to reassure 
his “correspondent” that he need not worry that a union with England will mean that 
Scotland will lose its freedom. Subjugation and liberty, being ruled by “Masters” and 
retaining one’s rights, are not incompatible: 
To be a free Nation, is to be subject to reasonable men: for, to conquer our own 
passions, and submit our selves to a just power, is the greatest freedom of any. 
To be left at random without Governours; to be in a continual state of war with 
your neighbours; or, like Cannibals, to be still devouring one another, without 
fear of Law, or terror of punishment, is not to enjoy the liberty of a free Nation; 
for that permission to do wickedly, cannot be accounted liberty in humane 
society; nor is the freedom of such of the West-Indian Savages as remain 
unconquered, any great honour to them.204 
 
While Scotland may wish to be unconquered like “the West-Indian Savages,” under its 
native Presbyterian rule, it has not known real freedom.205 In this passage, Urquhart 
                                                     
203 Those “who no less freely expose their persons for the defence of their Country, and maintenance of the 
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themselves the next day” (Reasons Why, 15). This claim echoes those made by the Army in 1647, insisting 
that it fought for the liberties of England and Parliament. For instance, “A Declaration or Representation 
from his Excellency Sir Thomas Fairfax, and of the Army under His Command” from June 14, 1647 states 
that : “we were not a meer mercinary Army, hired to serve any Arbitrary Power of a State but called forth 
and conjured by the several Declarations of Parliament, to the defence of our own and the People's just 
Rights and Liberties” in John Rushworth, Mr. Rushworth's Historical collections abridg'd and improv'd, vol. 
6 (London, 1708), 565; underlining mine. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. 18 Nov. 2011  
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ASCIMILE. For Henry Ireton’s role in drafting “A Declaration,” see Barbara Taft, “From Reading to 
Whitehall: Henry Ireton’s Journey,” in The Putney Debates of 1647: The Army, the Levellers, and the English 
State, ed. Michael Mendle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 177-8.  
204 Reasons Why, 24, 25-6; emphasis original. 
205 “What is (I pray you) the freedom you had under the Presbyter? […] By which tyrannie of theirs, and 
other pressures proceeding from them, the most part of the inhabitants of the Land were so heavily 
oppressed, that laying aside those that are sequestred, whereof there are not may, the remanent of the 
Country is now under a far more easie yoak then it was at any time these nine years past” (Reasons Why, 24). 
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takes the republican term “free Nation” and redefines it, against the conclusions of 
republican authors, to mean that a nation is free if it is ruled by “reasonable men,” 
whether or not they rule with the consent of the people. The metaphor of the body 
politic is employed to depict Scotland as a body governed by its unruly passions and 
thus not capable of enjoying “the liberty of a free Nation.” Since Scotland cannot govern 
itself, these passions need to be restrained by reason imposed from outside. In this 
image, just as a natural body needs to “conquer” its own passions, so does the body 
politic of Scotland need to be submitted to the “just power” of the English Army. 
However, as the description proceeds, the ability of England to supply the reason 
needed to curb these passions becomes suspect. Urquhart argues that Scotland’s own 
history as an unconquered land has little to do with the virtue of its people. Only its 
difficult terrain has kept Scotland inviolate throughout its history: “hills, bogs, heath, 
hunger, cold, or such-like, proceeding from the inaccessibility and poverty of the 
Country, hath kept you till now a Virgin-nation, unexposed to the embraces of a foreign 
Conquerour.”206 In this image, it is the “foreign Conquerour,” rather than Scotland, who 
needs to be restrained, and it is the physical landscape of the country that serves as a 
curb to passions. While this description may not attribute any virtue to Scotland for 
having defended itself like an “encloystred Nun,” England, as the passage develops, 
turns out to have been corrupted by its frequent changes of rulers: “England hath had 
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more change of Governours [than Scotland], so have fair women of suiters, even unto 
prostitution.”207 By the end of this section of Reasons Why, the initial claim that England 
could supply the “reasonable men” necessary to make Scotland into a free nation as 
defined by Urquhart has become suspect.  
  The second use of the language of the body politic in Reasons Why focuses on the 
relationship between soul and body. As we have seen above, in the pamphlet, the Army, 
as the animating “soul,” is privileged over the mere body of the Rump. Having depicted 
the dissolved Parliament as only a physical token of the body politic, Reasons Why 
dissolves the connection between the name of the “Representative” and its function in 
the political life of England by adopting iconoclastic language. In this idiom, to trust in 
the empty name of a Parliament turns out to be a form of idolatry. To make this point, 
Urquhart recalls the image of the Brazen Serpent raised by Moses in Numbers 21 to 
create a parallel between, on the one hand, the Rump and the old dispensation and, on 
the other, the Army and the new dispensation.208 This parallel is used to argue that while 
the Long Parliament had indeed served as a remedy against the king’s assault on the 
people’s liberties, it is now lawful to dissolve the Rump, which is now a mere bodily 
form, and to replace it with a government instituted by the army, the animating “soul”:  
                                                     
207 Reasons Why, 25. 
208 For the use of this image in the New Testament, see John 3:14-5: “And no man hath ascended up to 
heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven./ And as Moses lifted 
up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up:/ That whosoever believeth in 
him should not perish, but have eternal life.” 
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Whereas there is a buzzing, that the only refuge of the People was in former 
times the Parliament: so may I say that the people of Israel in their stinging 
afflictions had the like recourse to the Brazen Serpent, which nevertheless was 
afterwards very lawfully taken down: we ought not to be such nominal 
Statesmen as to dote upon the words of Parliament, Law, Priviledges, or I cannot 
tell what, whilst all the things signified by them are violated and infringed even 
by those them that idolize them in outward professions.209 
 
The passage recalls the destruction of the Brazen Serpent by King Hezekiah.210 In 2 Kings 
18, Hezekiah destroys, along with other cultic sites and images, the Brazen Serpent that 
Moses had fashioned under the direction of God to cure the Israelites of snake bites 
(Numbers 21). The healing powers of Moses’ Brazen Serpent had been connected, 
through John 3, to the crucifixion and the spiritual rebirth of Christians. But, as Margaret 
Aston points out in a discussion of the evolving understanding of the image of the 
Brazen Serpent in Tudor England, the Geneva Bible cross-referenced Numbers 21.8-9 to 
2 Kings 18.4 and John 3.14 to make the explicitly iconoclastic point that even images 
originally instituted according to God’s command can become objects of idolatry and as 
such ought subsequently to be destroyed.211 The injunction against images is driven 
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210 “Now it came to pass in the third year of Hoshea son of Elah king of Israel, that Hezekiah the son of Ahaz 
king of Judah began to reign./ Twenty and five years old was he when he began to reign; and he reigned 
twenty and nine years in Jerusalem. His mother's name also was Abi, the daughter of Zachariah./  And he 
did that which was right in the sight of the Lord, according to all that David his father did./  He removed the 
high places, and brake the images, and cut down the groves, and brake in pieces the brasen serpent that 
Moses had made: for unto those days the children of Israel did burn incense to it: and he called it 
Nehushtan./ He trusted in the Lord God of Israel; so that after him was none like him among all the kings of 
Judah, nor any that were before him” (2 Kings 18:1-5). 
211 Margaret Aston, The King’s Bedpost: Reformation and Iconography in a Tudor Group Portrait (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 118-9. 
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home by the commentary on the figure of Hezekiah.212 In the 2 Kings narrative, 
Hezekiah is described as a king who “did that which was right in the sight of the Lord” 
and the marginal notes in the Geneva Bible interpret Hezekiah’s physical iconoclasm as 
being accompanied by a verbal iconoclasm. In the commentary, the word “Nehushtan” 
is glossed to indicate that Hezekiah called the serpent “but a piece of brasse,” thus 
reducing the image to its physical components by renaming it.213  Reasons Why takes up 
the iconoclastic interpretation of the Brazen Serpent to accuse those who oppose the 
Army’s dissolution of the Rump of being but “nominal Statesmen” who “dote upon the 
words of Parliament, Law, Priviledges,” even though “all the things signified by them are 
violated and infringed.” The Rump is thus recast as a Parliament in name only and its 
supporters as idolaters who worship empty words. The political violence in the 
dissolution of the Rump is presented in the guise of godly iconoclasm. 
 This link between iconoclasm and the dissolution of the Rump develops 
alongside the discussion of whether the actions of the Army are legal. As we have seen, 
Urquhart opens Reasons Why by insisting that he will demonstrate the lawfulness of the 
dissolution. But after attacking the Rump as an empty idol, Urquhart dismisses, in 
language reminiscent of Sexby’s, the need to act legally as an inexpedient formality. 
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Addressing the complaint that if Charles I’s attempt to remove the five members from 
the House in 1642 was considered sufficient grounds to rebel against him then the 
dissolution of the entire Rump should be considered a proportionately graver assault 
upon the liberties of the people, Reasons Why draws a stark distinction between the two 
occasions: 
the late King by his thus forcible coming in unto the House did break the 
priviledges which both his predecessors & himself had given, and therefore 
having resigned his power to that Parliament, by vertue whereof they then sate 
legally, he ought, if there were any refractory members, to have consulted with 
the remainder of the body concerning them, who together with the rest of the 
house had by him that place them undoubtedly had been raised, had not they 
been taken into the tuition and patrociny of the Army, whose Power being from 
God, he hadth accordingly continued unbroken amidst the revolution of various 
and innumerable dangers.214 
 
In this passage, Urquhart traces legality and legitimate authority through transfers of 
power. In 1642, the king, by entering Parliament to arrest the five members, acted 
illegally by breaking the MPs priviledges. Parliament sat “legally” because he had 
resigned his power to them. In 1653, the Army did not act illegally in dissolving the 
Rump because Parliament was under their protection. The Army’s own authority 
derived, and continues to derive, directly from God. In this quote, all that divides the 
Parliament’s legal authority and priviledge in 1642 and its subordination and 
dependence on the Army’s power is a comma. By claiming that Parliament was under 
the protection of the Army and that the Army’s own power derives from God and not 
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from Parliament itself, Urquhart elides Parliament’s agency in raising the Army. In the 
underlined clause, the authorizing relationship between Parliament and Army is turned 
upside down. Parliament is “taken into the tuition and patrociny” of an Army that is 
portrayed as existing independently of the body of government that raised it and whose 
continued legitimacy is demonstrated by its military victories. While the five members 
escape capture from the king, the whole Parliament loses all agency grammatically by 
being passively—the members had “been taken”—captured by the Army’s custody and 
tutelage. The consequences of this move are spelled out in the next paragraph: 
As for that which is called the rupture of the Parliament, it was as nothing: for if 
the action in it self was just (as I affirm it was) officious lingering circumstances, 
in such important matters as can admit of no delays, are not to be regarded: 
Formalities, at best, in such a juncture of occasions, are but imbellishing 
ornaments, or as paintings upon Sepulchres, where there is any rottenness in the 
main intendments covred by them.215 
 
The dissolution by the Army of a Parliament that is seen as authorized by that same 
Army is indeed “as nothing.” Once the traditional and legal relationships between King, 
Parliament, and Army are dissolved, questions of the legality of actions become 
“officious lingering circumstance” and “imbellishing ornaments” which need not be 
regarded. Moreover, while the passage insists that the action of dissolution was just, its 
ending is more ambiguous. Formalities can be used to cover “any rottenness” of action, 
but the destruction of formalities does not guarantee the soundness of the action.  
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 The inclusion of iconoclastic language in Reasons Why exposes the problem 
inherent in the use of this idiom to authorize political change.216 As I argued in section 
one, Sexby linked iconoclastic language to a discourse of republican liberty. In Killing No 
Murder, the example of Athaliah is recruited to argue that the assassination of an 
enslaving tyrant is authorized by Scripture as part of the godly iconoclastic purge of 
idolatry. But, in Sexby’s pamphlet, the attempt to free Englishmen from an idol-like 
tyrant leads to the suppression of the agency and judgment of the common people, that 
is, of those who do not belong to the godly remnant in the Army. As Urquhart’s use of 
the destruction of the Brazen Serpent indicates, Sexby’s attack on Cromwell as an idol 
and the enslaved English people as idolatrous is part of a wider aspect of the 
intersection of political and iconoclastic discourse. This connection between iconoclasm 
and political reform and the associated representation of idolatrous objects as both 
religiously and politically enslaving to the common people is brought out by James 
Simpson in Under the Hammer. In the opening chapter of the book, Simpson argues that 
“Western anti-idolatry discourse is remarkably consistent in its identification of idolatry 
with thralldom. The call to liberty is what justifies and characterizes iconoclasm. 
                                                     
216 As we will see in further detail in the context of Fifth Monarchist writings in chapter five, claims of divine 
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Idolatrous art enslaves.”217 In the English context, the identification of idolatry with 
slavery predates “Puritan” iconoclastic zeal. John Lydgate, in his Troy Book (1412-20), 
sees idolatry as serving to “bring ‘folkes that be ffre’ into ‘servage.’”218 This connection 
between the religious and the political dimensions of iconoclasm in Simpson’s argument 
is grounded in the idolatrous psychology of the common people as imagined by the 
iconoclast. Discussing Wyclif’s attack of idolatry, Simpson argues that even moderate 
opposition to images, which might begin by condemning only the wrong use of 
otherwise indifferent images, eventually takes a more aggressive stance: “as soon as a 
potential iconoclast says that images are permissible as long as they are not subject to 
worship, he will start imputing acts of worship to the naïve, into whose minds he feels 
confident to look.”219 
 The presumption of idolatry in the minds of the “naïve” on the part of the 
iconoclast is part of what Simpson calls the “kinesis of iconoclasm,” in which “breaking 
one image necessarily implies the need to break others. Not only does an iconoclastic act 
rightly imply that the past had its semiotic system; iconoclasm institutes a system of its 
own.”220 This kinesis is driven by the blurring of the initial line drawn to distinguish 
between which uses of images are permissible and which are not. Consequently, any 
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religious image may potentially present the occasions for iconoclasm.221 As Margaret 
Aston’s study of iconoclasm in England confirms, during the Civil Wars and thus within 
recent memory at the writing of Reasons Why, this systematic process of iconoclasm 
escalated to paradoxical levels, destroying the very commandment tables that had been 
placed by earlier iconoclasts as safe replacements for dangerous images.222 Even secular 
imagery did not survive the onslaught. At least one portrait of Edward VI, the reforming 
and iconoclastic young king, was destroyed by a soldier linking the Tudor monarch with 
the idolatry promoted by the Book of Common Prayer.223 The drive to destroy all 
imagery and decoration in churches was far from unique to Civil War soldiers lashing 
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222 Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, 94. On the debate over the interpretation of the prohibition on graven images 
in the Decalogue and on the placement of commandment tables in English Churches in the sixteenth-
century, see England’s Iconoclasts, 343-92. 
223 Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, 94. On the association of Edward VI with the young Josiah as a model of 
iconoclasm, see James Simpson, Burning to Read: English Fundamentalism and its Reformation Opponents 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 10-7. 
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against the perceived idolatry of the established Church. Indeed, it was preceded by 
warnings from such divines as John Ponet, Alexander Nowell, and William Perkins in 
the sixteenth- and early seventeenth-centuries that even secular imagery might turn the 
viewer to idolatrous worship. The fear of the idolatrous potential encoded in even non-
religious representation was dependent on an aetiology of idolatry and “paganism” 
claiming that they were based on the “deification” of ancestors.224 Even secular images 
can thus become suspect as outside the pale of Christianity. In Aston’s account, while 
Perkins had allowed, though with warnings of its potential misuse, clearly secular and 
political imagery, the tendency of more aggressive reformers was to condemn all 
pictures as usurping the place of the Word. 225 
 This process ultimately leads to a desire to obliterate mental idols. This meant, as 
Aston argues, that the iconoclast and the preacher had to attempt to establish a fine 
balance between admitting that thinking is in part a representational activity, and that 
therefore “the mind itself was a book with pictures,” and uphold their Christian ideal “to 
rise above the physical imagings of the mind” in order to make room for the Word and 
God.226 The impetuous for the iconoclast’s action is that images, even mental ones, 
become the idols forbidden by the second commandment because they usurp and 
                                                     
224 Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, 433-51. 
225 Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, 450-1. 
226 Aston, England’s Iconoclasts, 464, 463. 
 427 
distort the place of the Word by producing “fantasies of the divine.”227 While Simpson 
agrees with Aston’s assessment of the evolving target of the iconoclast’s attacks, he 
views her lines of analysis as only a partial reconstruction of the process of iconoclasm, 
which he sees as part of the “larger, violent drama of Protestant modernity and 
abstraction, a drama of which doctrinal positions are symptoms as much as motors of 
change.”228 For Simpson, this “drama of modernity” drove a centralization and 
concentration of jurisdiction, which, in turn, “produced increasingly transcendent 
imaginations of power in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Those movements of 
transcendence, both religious and political, required violence towards what was now 
described as past and foreign.”229 Exemplifying the jurisdictional fight involved in the 
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control process of re-decoration of parish churches according to the model established in the cathedrals and 
college chapels. Fincham’s and Tyacke’s study provide numerous examples of local parishes going above 
and beyond the conformity required by the Laudian administration under the initiative of parishioners (see, 
for example, Altars Restored, 253-65), but this should not obscure the centralizing move by Canterbury. 
Adornment of parish churches could function to concentrate jurisdiction, by taking it away from local 
bishops and putting it in the hands of Canterbury—sometimes quite literally as in the case of Bishop 
Williams of Lincoln (see Altars Restored, 207-9),—as much as Civil War and Interregnum iconoclasm would 
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iconoclasm of the Civil War in Simpson’s account is the figure of William Dowsing who, 
starting in 1643, guided a program of destruction of all church adornments condemned 
by the Parliament ordinance of 28 August 1643.230 In this account, Dowsing’s iconoclasm 
is more than an attempt to clear away unscriptural images to make room for the Word, it 
is a reflection of the push for jurisdictional concentration:  
Jurisdictions need symbolic expression, and they need to clarify the relations of 
subjects to power; in this case, a jurisdictional simplicity needs to reshape both 
place and history, through new representations. A single jurisdiction (of a 
Puritan Parliament) replaces a triple, overlapping jurisdiction of monarch, 
Parliament, and clergy. […] Within the intensely symbolic space of the parish 
church, divided space and jurisdictions are undivided: altar rails are to be 
removed, and chancel steps leveled.231 
 
While Simpson highlights the spatial and visual reconstruction of jurisdiction, it is worth 
noting that Dowsing battled English law with Scripture. When he met with resistance 
from a local inhabitant who denied Dowsing’s jurisdiction in such matters by recurring 
to the book of statutes, Dowsing answered by citing Acts and Calvin’s commentary.232 
Thus, in addition to the jurisdiction of a “Puritan Parliament,” Dowsing is here claiming 
that the authority of Scripture, as interpreted by Dowsing’s Calvin, trumps that of 
                                                     
 
attempt to representationally concentrate all jurisdiction in the hands of a “Puritan Parliament” (Simpson, 
Under the Hammer, 88). 
230 Simpson, Under the Hammer, 86. 
231 Simpson, Under the Hammer, 88-9. 
232 Simpson, Under the Hammer, 88. 
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English law. Dowsing quoted Acts and not the warrant which he had obtained from the 
Early of Manchester.233  
 Simpson’s argument extends to cover a long-term process from English 
reforming iconoclasm to the practices of modern museums that is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, but his analysis of the political dimensions of iconoclasm in the Civil Wars 
and the Interregnum in England is helpful in contextualizing the problems raised by the 
use of iconoclastic language in Killing No Murder and Reasons Why. In Sexby, the link 
between the iconoclast and the political reformer is made evident as Killing No Murder 
calls for the assassination of Cromwell as both idol and idolater who enslaves 
Englishmen. It is the iconoclast who will set England free by destroying the empty idol 
of the Protector. That is, Sexby connects a republican ideal of Ciceronian libertas with the 
language of iconoclasm directed against a secular, but idolatrous and idol-like, object 
and uses it to redefine the jurisdiction of English law as limited by natural reason and 
law. However, in this attempt, Sexby’s iconoclasm does not strike only at the Protector. 
As Simpson’s analysis of the jurisdictional dimensions of iconoclasm indicates, Sexby’s 
iconoclasm against the “formalities” and “solemnities” of the common law strives to 
replace the messy and historically bound expression of the judgment of the people with 
an a-historical and allegedly self-evident jurisdiction of his conception of natural reason 
and law. In Reasons Why, the same language is adopted with much more ambiguity. As 
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we have seen above, Urquhart’s denial of the need for legal “formalities” in dissolving 
the Rump is linked to the uncovering of the already-achieved military coup. The Rump 
was but the Army’s empty shell. 
 The iconoclasm of Reasons Why shatters the image of legal legitimacy that the 
Rump had claimed as the representative of the people. But in the process of 
demonstrating that the Rump was not a true parliament, the pamphlet ends up by 
revealing that all claims for the legitimacy of military rule must be founded on seeing 
the nation as under a constant threat of war. The problem with insisting that the Rump 
was a legitimate ruling power, according to Reasons Why, is not only that the Army was 
the power behind the Parliament since Pride’s Purge, but also that it was composed of 
men who were not fit for their office. Answering the opening letter’s accusation that “the 
unexperiencedness and illiteracie of military men” disqualifies them as good rulers, 
Urquhart retorts that they have all the necessary qualities for political authority.234 While 
the members of the Rump may have had the technical qualifications needed to rule, they 
“have been enriched by private contentions, will never harbor in their brests such 
publike spirits as shall suffice to establish domestick safety, and gainstand forraign 
invasion.”235 It is to men endowed with “publike spirits” that the safety of the nation can 
be entrusted: 
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The Safety of the People is said to be the Supreme Law, yet are those that have 
the power in their hand the fittest Judges of that safety; because they are the best 
able to consider what and where the strength is in which is the Guard of the 
Nation: nor is there any reason why we should be diffident of the discretion of 
those Officers, who are men of Publike spirits.236 
 
Having the power to ensure the safety of the people and being “men of Publike spirits,” 
the officers of the army “therefore deserve to be accounted our Masters by defending us 
from the violence of others, and preserving us in those Rights that belong unto us.”237 
The passage points to an image of England as a nation under siege and shows the 
consequences of living in a commonwealth at war.238 The officers and the Army become 
the people’s “Masters” under the ostensible goal of preserving them “in those Rights 
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238 The representation of England as a nation under siege is not unique to Urquhart. See, for instance, the 
anonymous A Warning Seriously Offered to the Officers of the Army. This pamphlet represents England as 
potentially becoming a garrison of the Saints: “when this Island (as a Garrison) shall be well victualled and 
stored with Righteousnesse, Faith, and Truth, though all the Nations of Europe should besiege it, it shall be 
relieved by the coming of the Lord with thousands of his Angles” (Anon., A Warning seriously offered to the 
officers of the Army, and others in power (London, [Thomason: May, 18] 1653), 8. Early English Books Online. 
British Library (London). May 10, 2011. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99872691). But this will happen only if the army and 
Cromwell do not succumb to pride and temptation. The author recounts in two short pages the history of 
the world as a series of Falls due to pride (4-5). Just as Adam’s initial pride condemned all of humanity to 
slavery and suffering, “When Adam (the first prided) himself above the meek, humble Spirit of God, although 
he was before Heir and Lord of all, he and all his children were turned out of doors to wander from the 
heavenly Paradisicall nature, and to this day they are slaves and Beggars in the gates of the Creature” (4), so has 
suffering continued through history with the pride of rulers such as Nimrod, Alexander, the Roman 
Emperors, and the Pope (4-5). Scriptural and profane history are mingled together to show how pride 
overtakes rulers who subsequently fall. The moral is drawn quickly and clearly: “now if these Souldiers do 
not deny themselves, and tread their steps very even according to God, but rather grow lordly, lofty, worldly 
and humoursome, fierce, self-confident, by ended, and touchy, that a man cannot speak to them; Down they also 
tumble with all their Swords, Pikes and Cannons, and a better Generation shall take their place” (7). 
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that belong to us.” What those “rights that belong to us” consist of is left glaringly 
unspecified. 
 What is striking about the plea for military rule as justified by the safety of the 
nation is that it fails to produce the kind of argument based on the legality of the 
government by the army that the opening of Reasons Why had explicitly set out to build. 
The principle of salus populi, as we have seen in Chapter 3, had been argued by writers 
such as Henry Parker as being a fundamental element of natural law and, as such, the 
foundation of all government and law. In the opening of the pamphlet, Urquhart 
explicitly distances his own argument from that of the Parliamentarian writers during 
the war and insists that he does not follow those who “have said that the preservation of 
both the Army and Country did totally depend upon this late resolute action of breaking 
up the Parliament.”239 However, as the argument of Reasons Why develops, he turns to the 
safety of the people as the justifying principle of the army’s rule. While the insistence 
that he is defending the legality of the Army’s intervention remains throughout the 
pamphlet, his use of arguments on the basis of salus populi highlights that “justice” and 
“legal right” are reduced to an Hobbesian power of protection: “as it is just where the 
power of Protection is, that there should be the Authority (all of us owing obedience to 
those that do protect us) so is it no new thing that so legal a right be practically 
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exerced.”240 The passage does not only claim that protection simply entails lawful 
obedience in the subjects, but rather it gives authority and legal right to the protector. 
However, here, legal has taken on the meaning of what I have been referring to as lawful, 
that is, of allowed by natural law. This argument ultimately suppresses the rights and 
liberties of the people beyond their basic safety from “the Invasion of stranger, and 
discovery of Plots amongst our selves at home”241 in order to advocate for the “legal […] 
right” of the Army to rule. Most importantly, the right clearly denied to the people by 
this argument on the basis of salus populi and natural law is that to elect a Parliament. 
4.3 The Putney Debates: Conflict of Laws and Silencing the 
People 
 At Putney in the fall of 1647, natural law was invoked on the other hand to argue 
for an expansion of the franchise beyond the current legal limits. There, the role of the 
Army in securing and defining the birthrights of Englishmen was debated by members 
of the Army itself and civilian agents claiming to speak for the soldiers. In late October 
of 1647, with the king in military custody, the General Council of the Army met to 
discuss two pamphlets that had recently been published. These pamphlets were signed 
by agents claiming to represent five regiments of the Army. Earlier in the year, in 
February of 1647, the Scotts, to whom Charles had turned himself in after the royalist 
army had lost Oxford in June of 1646, had sold the king to Parliament and left English 
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soil.242 As soon as the Scottish army departed, the presbyterians in the Commons moved 
to disband the New Model Army by using the need to organize a force for Ireland as an 
excuse to break apart regiments that had fought together in the war, and by attempting 
to take the command of the forces that were to remain in England away from Fairfax 
and give it the Presbyterian Richard Graves.243 The Army, however, resisted 
disbandment and reorganization under these conditions. In particular, a petition begun 
to circulate amongst the cavalry voicing the concerns of soldiers and officers. They 
complained of three main problems: “the threat of being disbanded without their full 
arrears of pay, which ran to forty-three weeks in the cavalry; their liability, when 
disbanded, to be prosecuted for acts committed in war; and the conditions of service that 
they faced if they were sent to Ireland.”244 The complaints raised by this first petition are 
directly related to the conditions and threats faced by the soldiers as soldiers at 
                                                     
242 Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 348-50. 
243 Austin Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen: The General Council of the Army and Its Debates, 1647-48 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), 26-31. I follow Woolrych’s convention in Britain in Revolution and use the term 
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the Army (Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, 352-55). 
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disbandment. This was to change as the situation developed and as the soldiers begun to 
insist that they had fought not only for pay, but to preserve their rights as Englishmen.245  
 The House of Commons made it clear that it was not willing to allow the Army 
to interfere with matters of public policy; soldiers did not have a right to collectively 
petition Parliament. In response, a series of pamphlets were printed over the next few 
months justifying the position of the soldiers and officers of the Army. In mid-April, 
eight cavalry regiments in Essex and East Anglia elected agitators to represent their 
concerns. The practice soon spread outside the original cavalry regiments, and infantry 
units also began to elect two agitators each.246 By the end of May, regiments, under the 
initiative of the agitators’ own organization, begun to work to secure their position 
against possible threats from Parliament by taking charge of the artillery at Oxford. On 
May 31, Cornet Joyce set off with 500 horse to Holmby, where the king was being held 
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under Parliamentarian guard. Joyce was acting with the approval of Cromwell to 
prevent the removal of the king by the presbyterian faction.247 In a surprising turn of 
events, within a few days, Joyce removed the king from Holmby and conducted him to 
Newmarket, where Fairfax was assembling a general rendezvous of the Army, 
prompted by a petition from the agitators of sixteen regiments.248 The regiments present 
at the rendezvous assented to the Solemn Engagement of the Army, a document 
consciously recalling the Solemn League and Covenant. The Solemn Engagement “was 
essentially a military covenant, whereby the whole army entered into a mutual pledge 
not to allow itself to be disbanded or divided until it received satisfaction on certain 
stated matters.”249 The Solemn Engagement also stated that the army would disband only 
when satisfied that the soldiers, “once in the condition of private men, or other the 
freeborn people of England […] shall not remain subject to the like oppression, injury, or 
abuse […] by the same men’s continuance in the same credit and power (especially if as 
our judges), who have in the past proceedings against the Army so far prevailed to 
abuse the Parliament and us and to endanger the kingdom.”250 In effect, this amounted 
to a request to remove the presbyterian faction in Parliament. Consequently, on June 14, 
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1647, articles of impeachment for eleven MPs hostile to the soldiers were delivered on 
behalf of the Army to parliamentary commissioners.251 The satisfaction of the full 
requests of the Solemn Engagement was to be confirmed by a new entity, the General 
Council of the Army, composed of two soldiers and two (regimental) officers elected by 
each regiments in addition to the members of the Council of the Officers.252 It was the 
General Council of the Army that was to meet at the end of October at Putney to discuss 
a document called An Agreement of the People.  
 On 18 October 1647, a paper entitled The Case of the Army Truly Stated was 
presented to Fairfax by agents from five cavalry regiments. The five regiments were 
“Cromwell’s, Ireton’s Fleetwood’s, Whalley’s, and Rich’s, all cavalry, and all noted for 
their religious radicalism and political awareness.”253 Unlike the original agitators, these 
agents, who had clear ties to John Lilburne, may not have been elected by the regiments 
they claimed to speak for and therefore they had a dubious right to sit in the General 
Council of the Army. Sexby may also have been connected to this group of new agents, 
but if so, his name was kept separate from theirs in order to insure his seat in the 
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General Council.254 Given the new agents’ connections with the Levellers, the likelihood 
that they were not elected, and that none of the original agitators spoke, as far as 
Clarke’s manuscript records, at Putney, the text of the debates cannot be taken as a 
representative record of the views of the general soldiery.255 The Case of the Army Truly 
Stated was the agents’ response to a belief that the generals of the army were not 
addressing the concerns of the soldiers and to a growing restlessness with the king’s 
response to the Heads of the Proposals, a paper drafted by Ireton and supported by the 
General Council which proposed a general peace settlement.256 The General Council of 
the Officers was to convene at Putney to discuss The Case of the Armie on 27 October 
1647. Asked to explain The Case of the Armie, its promoters arrived at the meeting with a 
new document, the Agreement of the People.257  
 The Agreement of the People was read on the first day of the debates recorded by 
Clarke, but it wasn’t until the second day, 29 October 1647, that the participants engaged 
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in a full argument over its contents.258 Most of the second day of the debate was spent on 
discussing the proposal for an enlargement of the franchise put forth in The Case of the 
Armie and in the Agreement.259 The Case of the Armie and the Agreement have been seen as 
being heavily influenced by Leveller thought.260 And accordingly, especially since the 
work of C.B. Macpherson, critical attention has been largely focused on the issue of the 
franchise in both the Agreement and the subsequent discussion at Putney within the 
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wider context of Leveller thought.261 However the question of the extent of civilian 
collaboration on and of the authorship of these tracts does not only reflect on our 
understanding of Leveller thought. It has also been linked to the problem of whether the 
debates at Putney over these texts and their claims for rights can be seen as addressing 
the concerns of only the soldiery or as proposing a program of political reformation for 
the nation at large. Recently, contributing to a collection of essays on the debates, John 
Morrill and Philip Baker have argued against a Leveller authorship of The Case and have 
instead proposed Sexby as the principal author. In their view, Sexby’s, and the 
document’s, ties to the Levellers have been overstated. In particular, they argue that, in 
the debates at Putney, Sexby was mostly concerned with the rights and demands of the 
soldiers in particular rather than of the people in general: “The key here is that he slips 
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unselfconsciously between the rights of the people and the rights of soldiers. Whenever 
he says ‘we’ he means the soldiers and not the people.”262 While Morrill’s and Baker’s 
case of Sexby’s co-authorship of The Case is convincing, their reading of the referent 
implied by the use of “we” is overly restrictive. As we will see, Sexby and the other 
proponents of The Case and An Agreement at Putney had no trouble assuming that the 
soldiers did indeed speak for the people. In the passage that forms the immediate 
context of Morrill’s and Baker’s point, Sexby’s “we” does indeed refer to the rights of the 
soldiers, but of soldiers claiming their “birthrights and privileges as Englishmen.”263 The 
question is then, what does it mean for Sexby to “slip unselfconsciously” between his 
rights as an Englishman and his demand of those same rights as a soldier? 
 Michael Mendle, in an essay in the same collection, argues that Putney can be 
seen as a debate between the grandees and the proponents of the Agreement over who 
was part of the commonwealth in the full political sense, a question that became 
particularly urgent as the soldiers faced imminent disbandment.264 Indeed, a prospective 
return to civilian life without a clear settlement of the soldiers’ requests, especially 
around the question of indemnity, can be seen exerting pressure on the language of The 
Case of the Armie. The Case bases its demands on the principle that “all power is originally 
and essentially in the whole body of the people of this Nation, and […] their free choice 
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or consent by their Representors is the only originall or foundation of all just 
government.”265 From this basic ideal, it asks for a new Parliament to be elected within a 
year on the basis of an expanded franchise, which would exclude those who “have or 
shall deprive themselves of that their freedome, either for some years, or wholly by 
delinquency.”266 The Case also links the specific grievances of the soldiers with respect to 
pay with the oppression of the people through taxation, thus aligning the interests of the 
army with those of the general population.267 Moreover, the authors of The Case argue for 
the right of the soldiers as soldiers to petition and demand their rights as “commoners.” 
That is, they want Parliament to acknowledge that they have a right not only to ask for 
the resolution of their grievances, such as arrears and indemnity, as soldiers, but that 
they may petition collectively on issues of national policy because, unlike mercenary 
soldiers, they have fought as members of the nation: “they thought we would have 
stood only as mercenary Souldieres, hired to serve their arbitrary power, and not 
remembered that we by their invitation took up armes in judgment and conscience, to 
preserve the nation from tyrannie and oppression, and therefore were obliged to insist 
upon our rights and freedoms as Commoners.”268 By depicting themselves as “citizen 
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Armes, in judgement and conscience, for the peoples just rights and liberties, and not as mercenary 
Souldiers, hired to serve an arbitrary power of the State, and that in the same manner it continued in armes 
at that time, and pag. 7. of the same Declaration, it was declared that they proceeded upon the principles of 
right and freedome, and upon the law of nature and Nations,: But the strength of the endeavours of many 
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soldiers,” they reframe their collective actions as those of “commoners” claiming their 
native rights. That is, The Case explicitly denies the difference between petitioning as 
members of an army and petitioning as Englishmen. An Agreement of the People goes one 
step further. While this second document restated some of the demands of the first, it 
eschews the details contained in The Case, such as specific requests for reforms on taxes, 
monopolies, and Church lands in order to raise money for soldiers’ pay. Instead, the 
Agreement is explicitly not a petition to Parliament, whose legislation is not deemed 
permanent enough to ensure the preservation of the people’s “native Rights,” but a 
constitutional document meant to frame a settlement of government on the foundation 
of the people’s consent.269 While The Case presents its demands as the rights of the 
soldiers speaking as “citizen soldiers,” the Agreement frames its requests as rights 
belonging to any people living under a government that takes its power in trust from the 
people themselves. 
 The Agreement presents a substantial departure from previous attempts at 
compromise between the Army, the king, and Parliament. And indeed, upon its reading 
                                                     
 
hath been, and are now, spent to perswade the Soldiers and Agitators, that they stand as Soldiers only to 
serve the State, and may not as free Commons claime their right and freedom as due to them” (Wolfe, 
Levellers Manifestoes, 202-3; emphasis mine). 
269 “But if any shall enquire why we should desire to joyn in an Agreement with the people, to declare these 
to be our native Rights, & not rather petition to the Parliament for them; the reason is evident: No Act of 
Parliament is or can be unalterable and so cannot be sufficient security to save you or us harmless, […] and 
besides Parliaments are to receive the extent of their power, and trust from those that betrust them; and 
therefore the people are to declare what their power and trust is, which is the intent of this Agreement” 
(Wolfe, Levellers Manifestoes, 230). 
 444 
on the first day of the debates at Putney, Cromwell’s immediate reply registers this 
difference: 
Truly this paper does contain in it very great alterations of the very government 
of the kingdom, alterations from that government that it hath been under, I 
believe I may almost say, since it was a nation. {…} I say, if there were nothing 
else [to be considered] but the very weight and nature of the things contained in 
this paper. Therefore, although the pretensions in it, and the expressions in it, are 
very plausible, and if we could leap out of one condition into another that had so 
specious things in it as this hath, I suppose there would not be much dispute—
though perhaps some of these things may be very well disputed. How do we 
know if, whilst we are disputing these things, another company of men shall 
[not] gather together, and put out a paper perhaps as plausible as this?270 
 
In this passage, Cromwell registers three crucial objections to the Agreement. The first is 
the fear that another document will supersede the Agreement as the Agreement 
superseded The Case. Second, while Cromwell does not necessarily reject the Agreement’s 
requests, he does insist that some of its specific proposals “may be very well 
disputed.”271 Here, the strength of the Agreement over The Case in terms of principled 
coherence and brevity is also what gives Cromwell pause. The Agreement, though 
proposing principles that Cromwell evidently found “very plausible,” also shows itself 
as requiring drastic reforms in general terms that that need to be fleshed out. In turn, 
Cromwell bases his main, and third, complaint on the difficulty of implementing such 
overarching principles of reform. Voicing an objection to which he returns several times 
                                                     
270 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 7; underlining mine. Throughout this chapter, emendations by 
Woodhouse will be indicated in square brackets, my emendations in curly brackets. 
271 The term “specious” used by Cromwell along with “plausible” did not necessarily have the modern 
negative connotation. According to the OED, specious was just starting to acquire the negative connotation 
in the 1600s. In this context, it is clear that Cromwell meant both words in their positive sense. 
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in his reply to the reading of the Agreement, Cromwell argues that changing the 
fundamental nature of the political organization of England requires careful 
consideration of the nature of the people. The nation cannot simply “leap out of one 
condition into another.” Before supporting any reform, Cromwell continues, the Army 
must make sure that “the spirits and temper of the people of this nation are prepared to 
receive and to go on along with it.”272 
 Cromwell’s third concern stems from the Agreement’s claim to speak for the 
nation as a whole by framing its demands in terms of the “native Rights” of the English 
people. In addition, the Agreement posits a specific way of addressing the grievances of 
the people based on law-reform by embedding the rights of the people in a 
constitutional framework that sets the bounds to, and at the same time stands outside of, 
the nation’s body of law and the conjoined form of political association. This attempt, as 
I will argue below, stands in striking contrast with what had been traditional 
experiences of the recovery and defense of particular rights in England. The Putney 
debates have been framed as presenting two different, and competing, versions of rights 
and law: on the one side, we have Ireton defending the fundamental law of England, 
standing since time immemorial and in which political participation is based on a 
“permanent interest” in the nation founded on property; on the other side, we have An 
                                                     
272Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 8. Cromwell elaborates this point further:  “It is not enough to propose 
things that are good in the end, but suppose this model were an excellent model, and fit for England and the 
kingdom to receive, it is our duty as Christians and men to consider the consequences, and to consider the 
way” (Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 8). 
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Agreement and its Leveller-influenced promoters arguing for a new constitution based 
on the free consent of the people exercising their natural rights which had been taken 
away by the Norman Conquest.273 This framework for the debates explains such 
exchanges as those between Ireton, Rainborough, Petty, and Cowling on the second day 
over the extension of the “birthright” to the franchise.274 However, this theoretical 
quarreling over the bases, either in natural or common law, of right took place within 
established practices for dealing with competing claims to rights under different laws 
within the legal system. Thus, I ground my analysis of the theoretical conflict at Putney 
in a comparison to the practical experience of individuals with the legal resolution of 
conflicts of jurisdiction between systems of law in England. In this section, after 
following the key points of the debate over the birthrights of soldiers and Englishmen at 
Putney, I turn to the example of rights to (and to be free from) tithes during the 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century. I choose this particular example for two reasons. 
First, tithe reform was a central point of contention throughout the Civil War and The 
Case engages the issue.275 Second, the question of tithes allows us to see how in practice 
two different traditions and conceptions of the law, canon and common, negotiated the 
problem of conflicting rights. When a right to tithes was claimed or challenged, the 
lawsuit would involve two different jurisdictions that clashed over whose rights to 
                                                     
273 For this standard account, see Woolrych, Soldiers and Statesmen, 220-2 and Scott, England’s Troubles, 281-9. 
274 See Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 52-3. 
275 Wolfe, Levellers Manifestoes, 216. 
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uphold and, more fundamentally, on what could count as a right.276 At Putney, natural 
law is used to demand rights that are, according to their proponents, self-evidently prior 
and thus more valid than those embodied in positive and customary law. But who gets 
to determine what rights are granted by natural law? And who is silenced when custom 
is set aside? The debates at Putney are an opportunity to see how arguments for the 
foundation of a new political organization based on consent are worked out in the 
context of a lack of agreement in the debate itself as well as in the absence of the explicit 
consent of the people. 
 The question of conflicting rights and conflicting conceptions of the law appears 
very early on in the debates. This is in part because any compromise between 
Parliament, king, and Army would have to balance Parliamentary privilege with royal 
prerogative, as well as the Army’s demands and the claims to fundamental rights of the 
people set forth in The Case and the Agreement. Such balance would be difficult to 
achieve and indeed Sexby depicts the task as hopeless from the very start of the debate: 
“I think all here {…} have leaned on, and gone to Egypt for help. {…} The cause of our 
misery [is] upon two things. We sought to satisfy all men, and it was well; but in going 
[about] to do it we have dissatisfied all men. We have laboured to please a king, and I 
think, except we go about to cut all our throats, we shall not please him; and we have 
                                                     
276 It is also relevant that Wildman, Ireton’s most vocal opponent on the second day of the debates, had had 
some legal education (“Wildman, Sir John (1622/3–1693),” Richard L. Greaves in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence 
Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29405 (accessed July 18, 2012)). 
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gone to support an house which will prove rotten studs—I mean the Parliament, which 
consists of a company of rotten members.”277 Punning on the term “the houses of 
Parliament” and on the metaphor of a nation as a building with its laws and political 
system as foundations, Sexby depicts the Parliament as particularly unfit to provide a 
settlement.278 This claim that neither king nor Parliament can be trusted is one to which 
Sexby and the other agents return to repeatedly during the debates. On the third day, 
the meeting reconvening after a morning spent seeking God, Francis Allen, Nicholas 
Cowling, and Henry Lilburne explain that they had found confirmation of this same 
distrust of king, Lords, and “Norman Laws” in answer to their prayers.279 In response, 
finding such specific prompting from God to be worrisome, Cromwell steers the 
discussion away from direct divine revelation to the issue of legitimate political 
authority. Crucially, Cromwell attempts to create boundaries on how far the Army can 
influence Parliament on civil matters: 
For the actions that are [now] to be done, and those that must do them, I think it 
is their proper place to conform to the Parliament, that first gave them their 
being. {…} And therefore I think there is much [need] in the Army to conform to 
those things that are within their sphere. For those things that have been done in 
the Army, as this of [issuing] The Case of the Army Truly Stated, there is much in it 
useful, and to be condescended to; but I am not satisfied how far we shall [do 
                                                     
277 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 2. Sexby’s distrust of Parliament was shared by other soldiers. For a 
discussion of the eroding sense of obligation from members of the army towards Parliament in the late 
1640s, see Barbara Donogan, “The Army, the State and the Soldier in the English Civil War,” in The Putney 
Debates of 1647: The Army, the Levellers and the English State, ed. Michael Mendle  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 79-102. 
278 For an example of this imagery during the pamphlet wars of the 1640s, see Dudley Digges, The 
vnlavvfulnesse of subjects taking up armes against their soveraigne, 7 and 15. 
279 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 95-6. 
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well to] press [it]. Either they are a Parliament or no Parliament. If they be no 
Parliament they are nothing, and we are nothing likewise. If they be a 
Parliament, we are [not to proceed without them in our plan for settlement, but] 
to offer it to them.280 
 
Cromwell, after two full days of debate, returns to the problem he had originally voiced. 
While there is much in The Case of the Armie that he finds commendable, proposals for 
reform must be implemented, as far as possible, within the legal and political framework 
of the nation. To attempt to do otherwise is to undermine the legitimacy of the Army as 
well as of Parliament. If the current Parliament is no legitimate Parliament, the Army is 
“nothing likewise.”  Cromwell’s deflection of Allen’s, Cowling’s, and Lilburne’s 
prophetic statements is a striking departure from his habitual providentialism.281 For 
instance, in a letter dated 1 September 1648, Cromwell reminds Oliver St. John that the 
recent victory at Preston can only be due to the providence of God, who “will not fail 
His People.” During the war, Cromwell continues, Isaiah 8.10 has been a “great stay” to 
him: “Take counsel together, and it shall come to nought; speak the word, and it shall 
not stand: for God is with us.”282 In this letter, Cromwell typically interprets military 
victory as a dispensation of God; human planning comes “to nought” in the face of 
divine providence. Strikingly, at Putney, his use of Scripture is much more limited.283 In 
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281 On the topic of Cromwell’s providentialism, especially during the Protectorate, see Blair Worden, 
“Providence and Politics in Cromwellian England,” Past & Present 109 (1985): 55-99. 
282 The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, I:644. 
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response to claims of divine inspiration by the proponents of the Agreement, Cromwell 
bases the authority of the Army on legal, rather than Biblical, grounds. 
 Cromwell’s uncharacteristic avoidance of providential and Scriptural language is 
intrinsically connected with his conception of political authority as demonstrated at 
Putney. By focusing on the issue of legitimate authority, Cromwell attempts to reframe 
the question of whether the Army should “press” The Case in terms not of the value of 
the proposals themselves, but on whether they have a right to do so to begin with. 
Traditionally, parliamentary privilege meant that Parliament was not to be pressured 
while debating pending legislation.284 Cromwell warns that for the soldiers to 
collectively petition on non-strictly-military matters without consulting with the 
officially sanctioned parliamentarian commissioners would amount to a statement that 
the Army is questioning Parliament’s authority and legitimacy. This, in turn, would 
impugn the identity of the Army as a legitimate Army, rather than as a gang of thieves, 
to paraphrase Sexby from 1657. On the previous day, Ireton had made the point even 
more forcefully and warned that such intrusion in government would be an usurpation 
                                                     
 
(Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 97). While Scripture is invoked, it is done through a general moral sense 
rather than as indicating specific works of Providence in contemporary events. 
284 The breach of parliamentary privilege during the Civil War was acutely felt as the City of London had at 
times felt entitled to pressure Parliament on matters of national concern given their financial support of the 
Parliamentary cause against the king. While customarily the City corporation had been allowed to petition 
Parliament for matters that affected it directly, it was a breach of privilege to interfere with general 
legislation. For the issue of Parliamentary privilege and its breach in 1646 and 1647 by the Corporation of 
the City of London, see Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Army, chapter four.  
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of political power and a clear attempt to make the Army into the “conclusive authority 
of the kingdom”: “Our indemnity must be [owed] to something that at least we will 
uphold, and we see we cannot hold [the Army] to be a conclusive authority of the 
kingdom.”285 For Cromwell, the only thing that could warrant such intrusion in political 
matters on the part of the Army would be a clear sign of support from “the people”: “If I 
could see a visible presence of the people, either by subscriptions or number, [I should 
be satisfied with it]; for in the government of nations that which is to be looked after is 
the affections of the people.”286 What this sign would consist of is unspoken. But in 
response, Sexby changes register and legitimizing language by assuming the role of 
Jeremiah. While both Cromwell and Ireton ground the range of legitimate actions of the 
Army, including petitioning, within a system of authority in which the Army must 
ultimately be authorized by a (legitimate) civilian government or “a visible presence of 
the people,” Sexby attempts to bypass such concerns by projecting the assembled 
members of the General Council within Biblical history. Sexby warns that Parliament 
will certainly restore the king and uphold his prerogative and if the Army allows this to 
happen, “{w}e are going about to set up that power which God will destroy.” Those 
present at Putney are “in a wilderness condition,” and Sexby prophetically urges that 
“{w}e find in the word of God, ‘I would heal Babylon, but she would not be healed.’ I 
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think that we have gone about to heal Babylon when she would not. We have gone 
about to wash a blackamoor, to wash him white, which he will not.”287 Embedding the 
debates in Scriptural time allows Sexby to argue that the traditional English constitution 
of king, Lords and Commons is to be forsaken because “her judgment reacheth unto 
heaven.”288 In this mode, Sexby can predict the outcome of a compromise with Charles I 
as a foregone conclusion. 
 Sexby and the other proponents of the Agreement justify this claim for military 
authority in political matters through their arguments with Ireton in the first two days of 
the debates. After the first reading of the Agreement on October 28th, Cromwell guides 
the debate to the question of previous engagements. To “insist upon good things” in 
their proposals is not enough. The Army must make sure that they don’t transgress 
“without faith; for faith will bear up men in every honest obligation,” on what they 
engaged to do in previous declarations.289 John Wildman responds by asking whether 
the Army’s previous engagements are just or not: “they do apprehend that whatever 
obligation is past must afterwards be considered when it is urged whether [the 
engagement] were honest and just or no; and if it were not just it doth not oblige the 
persons, if it be an oath itself.”290 Wildman here speaks on behalf of the other new 
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agents—“they” in the quote—who are not present at the General Council. Their claim 
that unjust previous engagements do not bind becomes a central point of contention 
between Wildman and Ireton. But Ireton reintroduces a presence that had been elided 
by the agents’ argument and that is implicit in Cromwell’s statement that the Army 
must not break their faith by reneging on their promises. Engagements, Ireton points 
out, are from one party to another: 
But to take it as it is delivered in general, [that we are free to break, if it 
subsequently appear unjust], whatever engagement we have entered into, 
though it be a promise of something to another party, wherein that other party is 
concerned, wherein he hath a benefit if we make it good, wherein he hath a 
prejudice if we make it not good: this is a principle that will take away all 
commonwealth[s], and will take away the fruit of this [very] engagement if it 
were entered into; and men of this principle would think themselves as little as 
may be [obliged by any law] if in their apprehensions it be not a good law.291 
 
Ireton links the keeping of engagements to the preservation of commonwealths; those 
who believe that they can break an engagement if they judge it unjust may just as well 
break a law if “in their apprehensions it be not a good law.” This formulation highlights 
the problem of an individual asserting the right to judge, alone, the justness of an 
engagement. To do so implies that he may release himself from obligations to others 
independently of the other party in the engagement. 
 As his reply to Wildman develops, Ireton draws a distinction between being 
“absolved” of an obligation, the word he uses to characterize Wildman’s position with 
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respect to the previous engagements of the Army, and finding oneself unable to perform 
what one engaged due to fears that it is unjust or unlawful: “when we are convinced of 
them {previous engagements}, that they are unjust, truly yet I must not fully concur with 
that gentleman’s principle, that presently we are, as he says, absolved from them {…}. 
Though we were convinced that we are not bound to perform it, yet we should not make 
it our act to break [it].”292 The word absolved carried then, as it does now, the sense of 
being excused or discharged of an oath or promise. However, at the time of the debates, 
it carried the now rare meaning of accomplishing or completing an act and thus 
discharging oneself from an obligation.293 While Ireton’s primary sense must be that of 
being excused from an obligation, at the same time, the availability of absolving oneself 
by completing an action or an obligation brings out even more strongly his 
understanding that not to fulfill an obligation is an act in and of itself that damages the 
party we are obliged to and that thus “we should not make it our act to break” an 
obligation. To deem a previous engagement as unjust does not automatically dissolve 
the engagement, but it rather requires an action from the parties involved. To absolve 
oneself, in Ireton’s representation of Wildman’s and the new agents’ position, can then 
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293 OED, 3b. The OED points to an illustration of this second meaning in Milton’s usage in Paradise Lost: 
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imply that no amends are needed and that one can self-judge to have completed or done 
enough to justly not fulfill a promise without an act of “absolution” from the other party. 
It is this claim of independence of judgment in engagements that Ireton views as 
threatening the commonwealth. 
 Cromwell, after Rainborough answers Ireton by insisting that unjust 
commitments may be broken, returns to Ireton’s reminder that engagements are 
between two parties: “Our engagements are public engagements. They are to the 
kingdom, and to every one in the kingdom that could look upon what we did publicly 
declare, could read or hear it read. They are to the Parliament. And it is a very fitting 
thing that we do seriously consider of the things.”294 This is answered by an agent 
identified by Clarke as “Bedfordshire Man” who redefines the issue of unjust 
engagements in terms of conflicting rights:  
I apprehended, at least I hope, that those engagements have given away nothing 
from the people that is the people’s right. It may be they have promised the King 
his right, or any other persons their right, but no more. If they have promised 
more than their right to any person or persons, and have given away anything 
from the people that is their right, then I conceive they are unjust. {…} I conceive 
that for the substance of the paper, it is the people’s due.295  
 
For the proponents of the Agreement, the Army is only obligated as far as its 
engagements undertake to uphold giving “all persons,” the king, Parliament, and the 
people, “their right” and upholding the “people’s due.” This stance states the 
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understanding that the Case and the Agreement are expressions of the just balance of 
rights which the Army fought for in the war. In this view, what is due to each person in 
England, including the king, is not something to be negotiated or that has been 
established through previous engagements, but it is rather a set of rights independent of 
both the Army’s promises and what is granted by positive law. For Cromwell and 
Ireton, on the other hand, the Army’s engagements are a form of contract between the 
Army, “every one in the kingdom,” and Parliament. The existence of such a contract 
gives both the people and Parliament rights over the Army, rights that cannot be 
discarded unilaterally by the Army. That is, in his speeches at Putney, rights are 
understood by Ireton not absolutely, but in specific relationships of right, duty, law and 
contracts between individuals. Similarly, for Ireton, what is “just” in an engagement is 
different from what is “evil” or a “sin” in an absolute sense. A man may break an 
engagement if it bound him to “a thing that is not just—to a thing that is evil, that is sin 
if he do it.”296 But in the question of whether the Army may break their engagements, 
what is at stake is “justice between man and man” and not what is sinful: “But when we 
talk of just, it is not so much of what is sinful before God (which depends upon many 
circumstances of indignation to that man and the like), but it intends of that which is just 
according to the foundation of justice between man and man.”297 Human justice, he 
                                                     
296 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 26. 
297 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 26. 
 457 
continues, is based on the keeping of covenants and positive law itself is a covenant 
between people. In this conception of justice, the law of nature cannot specify particular 
rights to, for instance, property, but simply that a right to property in general is 
allowed.298 
 This question of rights takes over the rest of the first day of the debates as 
Wildman, supported by Rainborough, enters into a protracted argument with Ireton on 
what is the foundation of the rights of the people. J.G.A. Pocock, in The Machiavellian 
Moment, frames the argument between Ireton and Cromwell and the proponents of the 
Agreement as a fight between, on the one side, a conception of positive law as necessary 
for determining what is just, that each man should have his own, and, on the other, the 
position that the law of nature could be appealed to in order to restore the original rights 
and freedom of the people.299 In this influential reading of Ireton’s position, the “rights 
and personality” of each individual in a society are given to him by “law and 
property.”300 That is, the rights of the individual as understood by Ireton are specified by 
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the law of England which, like the freehold property that Ireton insists is an essential 
requirement for franchise, must be understood as an “inheritance of customs from time 
immemorial, since there was no other way of anchoring the individual, from birth and at 
the moments of majority and inheritance, within a structure of law and property he 
could be obliged and committed to defend.”301 I will turn to Pocock’s larger argument in 
The Machiavellian Moment in greater detail in chapter five, but at this point, it suffices to 
say that in Pocock’s analysis the focus is on the potential of natural law, combined with 
a millenarian vision, to radically reform law and social institutions being opposed by 
Ireton in the name of property and laws existing since time immemorial.302 Pocock’s 
discussion of Putney focuses on the relationship between individual and the law in 
defining each individual’s rights with respect to those of others. But this analysis leaves 
out Cromwell’s and Ireton’s insistence that the Army and the proponents of the 
Agreement cannot judge for themselves whether they may justly be absolved from their 
previous engagements because an engagement sets up obligations and rights between 
parties rather than impersonally between individuals and the law. I now turn to the 
passages that lead to the conflict between positive and natural law at Putney in light of 
Cromwell’s and Ireton’s insistence that engagements and contracts are fundamentally 
interpersonal. 
                                                     
301 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 375. 
302 Pocock points out that this did not make Ireton unwilling to accept and propose far reaching reforms, but 
these reforms had to be grounded on some form of positive law rather than in the law of nature (Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, 376). 
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 The main point of disagreement between grandees and the supporters of the 
Agreement is not the extent of needed reform, but rather how it is to be achieved. As 
Cromwell argues, “I cannot see but that we all speak to the same end, and the mistakes 
are only in the way.”303 Cowling, on the third day, expressed the agents’ view of positive 
law as a means to deny the people their rights that must be reformed by the Army in its 
most stark form: “the sword was the only thing that had from time to time recovered 
our right[s], and which he {Cowling} ever read in the word of God had recovered the 
rights of the people; that our ancestors had still recovered from the Danes and Normans 
their liberties, by the sword.”304 Cowling moves without pause between the “rights of 
the people” in Scripture, the rights of “our ancestors,” and “our rights.” In this passage, 
“rights” are abstracted from their specific context; they are simply rights that must be 
recovered if taken away. For Cowling, English law denies, rather than frame and 
protect, the rights of the people. In this formulation, the fundamental rights of the 
English people have been unjustly taken away and the soldiers, as both soldiers and 
Englishmen, have the means to reform the law so as to recover their lost rights. 
Similarly, the framework of the Agreement, which requires the people to sign on to a 
fundamental constitution by explicit consent, denies the possibility that the people may 
lose or gain rights not through foreign oppression, but through usage. Moreover, 
                                                     
303 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 104. 
304 Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 96. 
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through its recourse to natural law, the Agreement also rejects Ireton’s position that 
whether those rights can be reclaimed against the rights of other parties cannot be 
judged a priori outside the frame of customary action and positive law.  
 How could rights be gained or lost through usage? The Case of the Armie points to 
tithes as an example of an infringement of rights which supported by “oppressive 
statutes, enforcing all persons though against their consciences to pay Tythes, whereby 
the husbandman cannot eate the fruit of his labours.”305 This was not a new complaint. 
By the sixteenth century, canon law demanded that every person pay a tenth of his 
income to the parish church.306 In practice, however, it was not unusual for tithes to be 
converted to a fixed customary payment which could amount to less than the full tenth 
to be paid. This was the case for both England and Europe prior to the Reformation. In 
post-Reformation England we see a growth in litigation over tithes in ecclesiastical 
courts into the seventeenth-century.307 This is due to changes in legislation in the 
previous century. On the one hand, statutes passed under Henry VIII and Edward VI 
had upheld the right to pay tithes according to established usage rather than to the letter 
of the law. But at the same time, post-Reformation legislation and procedural changes 
encouraged tithe holders to sue for the full tenth by allowing, for instance, lay “farmers” 
                                                     
305 Wolfe, Levellers Manifestoes of the Puritan Revolution, 216. 
306 R. H. Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 90. For simplicity sake, I am not distinguishing between praedial, personal, and mixed tithes, which 
Helmholz describes in loc. cit. 
307 Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England, 90. 
 461 
of tithes to sue for payment in their own name.308 Tithe holders preferred to sue in 
ecclesiastical courts as canon law held that the full tenth was owed unless one could 
strictly demonstrate a specific grant or a valid custom for a different modus decimandi, 
that is, for a prescriptive right to pay less than the full tenth. Moreover, demonstrating a 
custom for a lower payment that would hold in an ecclesiastical court proved difficult as 
any deviation from the customary payment or any discrepancy in the witnesses’ 
testimony as to the validity of the custom could lead to a loss of the right.309 Common 
law courts, however, did not let the matter rest in the hands of ecclesiastical courts. 
Here, we see a contention between two areas of jurisdiction and two claims to rights, one 
based on ecclesiastical courts who claimed that the full tenth was due by jure divino and 
the other by common law courts that upheld the validity of customary rights. How did 
                                                     
308 Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England, 91-4. Technically canon law did not allow laymen to 
hold tithes, but they could “farm” them for a cleric. Post-Reformation legislation still used the terminology 
of tithe farmers even though the tithe was held by a layman (Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation 
England, 91). Christopher Hill, in Economic Problems of the Church: From Archbishop Whitgift to the Long 
Parliament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), traces the difficulty that the clergy faced in collecting tithes in 
the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century (77-131). In this time period, the church found it difficult to provide 
preaching clergy to parishes where a modus decimandi had been established before the steep inflation in cost 
of living, including food, that occurred in the period from 1500 to 1640 (108-113). In addition to inflation, 
clergymen had to contend with economic developments that made assessing tithes more difficult. It was 
well established that tithes were due on the fruits of the earth as “free gifts from God,” but questions of 
what constituted such free gifts became more common as forms of production changed. For instance, 
English agricultural production moved away from wheat farming towards pasture, vegetable-gardening 
and fruit growing in the period under question and tithing was not clearly established on these new 
industries (80-82). This meant that new wealth escaped tithing and, as Hill argues, it was often the wealth of 
the same groups who opposed royal attempts to collect greater tax revenues through such “innovations” as 
Ship Money and forced loans (120-21). 
309 Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England, 95-9. According to civil law, to establish a matter of 
fact, there was a need of the testimony of two witnesses who agreed on all matters of substance. Common 
lawyers, starting in the reign of Elizabeth, attempted to stop ecclesiastical courts from implementing this 
rule (Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England, 179-80). 
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common law courts uphold rights made by mere custom against claims made in the 
name of jure divino, which gave a presumptive and, according to canon law stronger and 
higher, right to the full payment of tithes? Common law courts attempted to take over 
the jurisdiction of tithes litigation from ecclesiastical tribunals by insisting that if a modus 
decimandi were pleaded in order to pay tithes other than the full tenth, then only 
common law courts could establish the validity of a custom. That is, common lawyers 
maintained that customs could not be judged by ecclesiastical courts because they could 
only be affirmed by the judgment of a jury comprising twelve men from the area in 
which the custom was allegedly in force.310 Both sets of courts and lawyers, canon and 
common, argued that they had the authority to determine whether a custom was 
sufficiently established to count as a valid exception to the letter of the law. But while 
common law made proving a custom easier, neither side attempted to deny that local 
custom, that is, repeated usage, could effectively give rights against existing law and 
that interruption or change in usage could remove a right. Common lawyers, however, 
defended their courts’ jurisdiction by insisting that custom could only be judged by the 
people who effectively formed it as represented by a jury; a judge in an ecclesiastical 
court could not substitute his judgment for theirs. 
 The supporters of the Agreement at Putney would of course refuse to identify 
their argument from natural law with the ecclesiastical courts’ claims of jurisdictions 
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based on canon law; the Army, as Sexby insists, is not composed of “mere mercenary 
soldiers,” but of Englishmen fighting to recover the rights of the people against 
enslaving positive law. And in particular, as the focus on the franchise on the second 
day of the debate demonstrates, they supported the right of a broad segment of 
Englishmen to have a voice in the formation of government and the creation of laws. 
Ironically, this commitment is based on an understanding of natural law that 
undervalues the expression of the natural reason of common people through customs 
and repeated action. By demanding reform on the basis of the law of nature, 
independent of the framework of English law, they silence the “voice” that the people 
have expressed in legislation through action rather than explicit consent. As the example 
of Sexby’s representation of the people in Killing No Murder indicates, such reductive 
conception of the law of nature can as easily be used to advocate a claim that the 
“vulgar” cannot judge in matters of government. That the same understanding of the 
law of nature is the basis of both An Agreement and Killing No Murder can be seen in the 
letter appended to the Agreement: “if any shall enquire why we should desire to joyn in 
an Agreement with the people, to declare these to be our natives Rights, & not rather 
petition to the Parliament for them; the reason is evident: No Act of Parliament is or can 
be unalterable, and so cannot be sufficient security to save you or us harmless, from 
what another Parliament may determine, if it should be corrupted.”311 The requests of 
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the Agreement vary from issues of the frequency of parliaments to the soldiers’ 
indemnities, that is, they concern both the settlement of the nation at large and the 
immediate needs of the soldiers. For the authors, neither type of request can be trusted 
to a Parliament. And while the fear that a Parliament may become hostile to the soldiers 
was well-grounded in the recent experience of the Army, it is important that no 
Parliament, rather than simply the present one, is to be allowed to interfere with the 
rights demanded in the main body of the document. The Agreement speaks of a 
willingness to prevent any future judgment on soldiers’ action from civilian 
government. 
 A similar letter, justifying the writing of The Case, anticipates both the rhetoric of 
the Agreement and the problem of judgment I have traced in the debates at Putney. The 
letter to Fairfax appended to The Case states that the requests of the authors have been 
made according to the promptings of their conscience; they write because they “find 
such deep obligations upon [their] consciences, written naturally by the finger of God in 
[their] hearts.” Therefore, they must pursue such obligations even against orders: 
for, Sir should you [Fairfax], yea, should the whole Parliament or Kingdome 
exempt us from this service, or should command our silence & forebearance, yet 
could not they nor you discharge us of our duties to God, or to our own natures. 
[…] for all forms are but as shadowes & subject to the end, & the safety of the 
people is above all forms, customes, &c. and the equitie of popular safettie is the 
thing which justifieth all forms, or the change of forms for the accomplishment 
thereof.312 
                                                     
312 Wolfe, Levellers Manifestoes, 219-20. 
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The language of forms and shadows is adopted from Hebrews 8: “there are priests that 
offer gifts according to the law:/ Who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly 
things, as Moses was admonished of God when he was about to make the tabernacle: 
for, See, saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern shewed to thee in the 
mount.”313 The “pattern” of legal and political reform for The Case is “the equitie of 
popular safettie” and consequently all customs and laws can be discarded in order to 
preserve the people. The language of forms and shadows recalls that used by Sexby in 
Killing No Murder. As Sexby in 1657 will justify foregoing the “solemnities” of the law by 
the authority of natural and divine law, the authors of The Case appeal to their 
consciences and “duties to God” to persist in “this service” even if “the whole 
Parliament and Kingdome exempt” them. This passage from The Case exemplifies the 
obverse of the problem identified by Ireton around the issue of previous engagements at 
Putney. As we have seen, during the debate, the proponents of An Agreement insisted 
that their own judgement sufficed to clear them of the obligation to keep the previous 
engagements; they did no need to be “absolved” by others. Here, the authors, punning 
on the recent attempt to “discharge” the soldiers of the New Model from their positions, 
refuse to be cashiered from their duty to press the demands of The Case.314 The agents 
present themselves as engaged upon a service from which they cannot be released even 
                                                     
313 Hebrews 8.4-5. 
314 According to the OED, “discharge” did have connotations specifically associated with the cashiering of 
soldiers (s.v. “discharge v.,” 5b). 
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by “the whole Parliament or Kingdome.”315 What is, however, left unanswered by the 
letter is to whom they owe this service. By insisting on a duty to serve, intransitively, the 
authors can express a right to write and petition which recognizes no other authority 
than the duty itself to perform this service.316 For the proponents of the Case and the 
Agreement, natural law is the source of the people’s natural rights. As such, it can be 
called upon as more fundamental than the positive laws of England in order to dissolve 
human laws, customs, and the institutions formed by them, when it is judged that these 
same laws, institutions, and customs impinge on the safety of the people and their 
rights.  
 As we have seen, Ireton feared that such claims from natural law would dissolve 
all “civil right.”317 But appeals to natural law need not sweep away all laws and custom 
wholesale. The idea that positive laws must agree with the law of nature in order to 
have legitimate authority had been used in fact to defend the customs of a people 
against zealous reformers by Aquinas. In the Summa, Aquinas points out that a law that 
                                                     
315 “Service” had not yet acquired the sense of “military service.” 
316 Compare with Milton’s link between serving and waiting on God in his sonnet, On His Blindness. In the 
sonnet, a overly willful desire to “serve” (5) is reminded by “patience” that “they serve him best” who “bear 
his mild yoke” (11) and that they “also serve who only stand and wait” (14). On the connection between the 
ideals of serving God and Christian liberty in Milton, see Stanley Fish, How Milton Works (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 319-325. 
317 Ireton had also made the point on the second day: “if you make this the rule I think that you must fly for 
refuge to an absolute natural right, and you must deny all civil right {…}. This, I perceive, is pressed as that 
which is so essential and due: the right of the people of this kingdom, and as they are people of this 
kingdom, distinct and divided from other people, and that we must for this right lay aside all other 
considerations; this is so just, this is so due, this is so right to them” (Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty, 53). 
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contradicts natural law “will not be law, but a corruption of law,”318 and, as MacIntyre 
argues in “Natural Law as Subversive: the Case of Aquinas,” this understanding of the 
relationship between legitimate human laws and the law of nature can have radical 
consequences, but consequences that point in the opposite direction than the one 
advocated by the promoters of the Agreement. Aquinas argues that human laws are 
constructed by natural human reason from its understanding of the law of nature, and 
consequently “the vulgar” are capable of knowing the precepts of natural law.319 The 
manner in which these precepts are known is of crucial importance to Aquinas’s 
conception of human law and this, in turn, brings into relief the devaluing of the reason 
of common people implicit in the Agreement and its proponents’ arguments at Putney. 
Individuals acting in accordance to the precepts of natural law need not to explicitly 
articulate these precepts each time they engage in an activity, but it is in participating in 
activities with others who respect and organize their actions by these principles that we 
learn the precepts of the law of nature: “[w]e come to know them practically as precepts 
whose binding authority is presupposed in any situation in which learning and enquiry 
between rational individuals about their individual and common goods can be 
advanced and by any relationship in which individuals can conduct themselves with 
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319 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Natural Law as Subversive: the Case of Aquinas,” Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), II:47. This is not to say that Aquinas argues that all persons know 
equally well what the good is, but just that, in so far that they are rational, they will recognize the precepts 
of Natural Law. 
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rational integrity.”320 In particular, the precepts of natural law and the requirements of 
justice which are defined by it are presupposed in and essential to the organization of 
any society that aims at the common good. Any positive law that violates such precepts 
will be unjust and, crucially, common people have the ability to judge which laws are 
unjust and ought not to be obeyed.  
 Aquinas credits every rational individual with the ability to make sophisticated 
discernments with respect to what it means for a law to be unjust and whether, in 
certain situations, disobeying an unjust law may not cause grater harm than obeying it:  
laws may be unjust, when they are not conductive to the common good, when 
they are imposed by someone without the requisite authority to do so, and when, 
although designed to promote the common good, they place a disproportionate 
burden on some for the benefit of others. Such laws no one is bound to obey. 
What each person has to judge is whether disobedience to unjust laws may not 
cause scandal or some greater harm, to a degree that gives one good reason to 
conform out of prudence, rather than from a respect for justice.321 
 
From this understanding of the ability of common people to judge positive laws and to 
understand the precepts of natural law, there are two conclusions to which Aquinas 
arrives that are relevant to the conception of rights based on natural law debated at 
Putney. The first is that the people are the source of all legislative authority.322 And the 
second is that “laws can be changed and published by repeated actions, as much as by 
speech, and indeed that from actions repeated so that they have become customary 
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‘something can be established which has the force of law.’”323 In turn, this means that the 
utmost care must be taken in considering whether to change the laws and customs of a 
nation.324 This does not mean that common people are not capable of ignorance and 
shared injustice, but it does mean that they can be brought to overcome their ignorance 
by arguments to which they are capable of assenting rationally.325 Moreover, it also 
means that the customs and laws of a nation cannot be seen as mere “shadowes” or 
“formalities.” It follows from Aquinas’s discussion that to appeal to the law of nature in 
order to argue that a law or custom must be changed as unjust should be done only 
when prompted by strong reasons and that the argument for such change must be 
intelligible and convincing to “the vulgar.” In particular, a claim such as that made in 
The Case and the Agreement that the demands put forward by their authors must be put 
beyond the reach of all future legislative action would be suspicious because it insists 
that the law be modified by an act of a non-legitimate legislative authority, i.e., the 
Army, and that such modification could at no point be discovered as defective and 
therefore in need of change. From this vantage point, the understanding of natural law 
advocated by the promoters of the Agreement is revealed as divorced from a concomitant 
conception of natural reason as embodied in the customs and repeated actions of the 
people. And, in turn, this indicates that the agents’ claims of fighting for the rights of 
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Englishmen even though, in the words of The Case, the “whole Parliament or Kingdome” 
were to exempt them from it, presupposes that the people are incapable of recognizing 
their own rights. 
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5. Forming the “Lord’s People”: Law, Action, and 
Reason in the Interregnum  
5.1 “We ought to obey God rather then men”: the Proposals of 
the Fifth Monarchists 
 Acts 5.29, enjoining us to obey God rather than man, is invoked by John Rogers 
in Ohel or Beth-shemesh to defend Independent church government against objections 
raised by his Presbyterian opponents: a “true Church of Christ then is […] gathered and 
ordered by Christs rule alone. […]. As the Apostles said, Acts 5.29.3.1 to the Priests and 
others, that commanded them to preach no more Christ, We ought to obey God rather then 
men, who hath exalted Christ to be a Prince and Saviour; and we are his witnesses.”1 This 
injunction is repeated, in one form or another, in the writings of most Fifth Monarchists, 
a movement of Independents and Baptists who demanded legal and political reforms in 
preparation for the imminent coming of the kingdom of Christ.2 As we will see, Fifth 
                                                     
1 John Rogers, Ohel or Beth-shemesh. A Tabernacle for the Sun (London, 1653) 137-9; underlining mine. Early 
English Books Online. Union Theological Seminary (New York, N.Y.). May 10, 2011. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:12686509. In Ohel, Rogers defends Independent churches 
against the “papist” traditions of the Presbyterian church, including infant baptism. Rogers defines a true 
church as “1. A society of Believers sanctified in Christ Jesus; 2. Separate from the world, false-ways, and worships, 
united together into one Body, Independent; or having a plenary power within its self, without the least subordination, 
to any but Christ; 3. Having the special presence of God, in the midst of her; 4. and being gathered and ordered by 
Christs rule alone; 5. all here Members freely, and voluntarily, embodying without the least compulsion  (having 
communion with the Father and the Son,) 6. All seeking the same End, viz. The honeor and glory of God in his 
worship” (Ohel, 137). 
2 I apply the term “movement” to Fifth Monarchists to indicate a fluid and loose association. While Fifth  
Monarchists gradually came to see themselves as a group distinct from the Baptists and Independents from 
which they drew their numbers, they did not adhere to a well-defined shared set of beliefs. They even held a 
variety of view on the crucial question of how Christ would rule on Earth, some arguing that He would rule 
directly, others, such as Aspinwall, envision a divine kingdom administered through the rule of the Saints. 
On Fifth Monarchists’ religious views, see B. S. Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men: A Study in Seventeenth-century 
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Monarchists take the message of Acts 5.29 to demand a rejection of all non-Biblical 
institutions and laws. These millenarian writers and militants view the dissolution of the 
Rump and the calling of the Nominated Assembly as first steps towards instituting a 
kingdom of God, organized according to Scriptural law and ruled by King Jesus, in 
England. At the same time, as we will see in Rogers’ writings, appealing to Acts 5.29 
carries along a question faced by all Christian communities: how are Biblical commands 
to be translated into precepts for life in a contemporary community? How Fifth 
Monarchists answer this question reveals their understanding of political and legislative 
authority. In the last section of chapter four, I considered how the proponents of the Case 
of the Army Truly Stated and the Agreement of the People insisted that natural law is “more 
fundamental” than human laws and customs and that, consequently, natural law 
safeguards the birthrights of Englishmen. As I argued, their appeal to natural law 
ironically undermined the legislative authority of the people. How legal reform is 
implemented is inextricably bound with questions of political authority. Fifth 
Monarchists also appeal to a law “more fundamental” than human law, but base their 
calls for political and legal reform on their millenarian expectations. Expecting the 
imminent advent of Christ’s kingdom on earth, the movement centered its hopes on the 
                                                     
 
English Millenarianism (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972), 172-94. The movement coalesced around 
meetings in the churches of St Anne’s, Blackfriars and Allhallows the Great in London, under the 
leadership, respectively, of Christopher Feake and John Simpson (Austin Woolrych, Commonwealth to 
Protectorate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 18). 
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seventh chapter of Daniel, predicting the Fifth Monarchy. Daniel’s vision portrayed four 
beasts, representing four earthly empires, being destroyed to make way for the kingdom 
of the saints, “These great beasts, which are four, are four kings, which shall arise out of 
the earth./ But the saints of the most High shall take the kingdom, and possess the 
kingdom for ever, even for ever and ever.”3  
 Members of the movement saw this prophecy beginning to come to fruition in 
the Civil Wars and the regicide, which they interpreted as the destruction of an anti-
Christian king. Following the dissolution of the Rump, tract after tract were published 
by Fifth Monarchists urging Cromwell and the New Model to establish a government by 
the Saints.4 Typical of Fifth Monarchist support for the dissolution of the Rump are the 
writings of John Spittlehouse. Spittlehouse, a former member of the Ironsides, composed 
two pamphlets, published less than a month apart, in support of Cromwell:  The Army 
vindicated, in their late dissolution of the Parliament and A warning-piece discharged: or, 
Certain intelligence communicated to His Excellencie the Lord General Cromvvel, with all the 
real and cordial officers and souldiers under his command.5 In both pamphlets, Spittlehouse 
                                                     
3 Daniel 7.17-8. 
4 There is little critical agreement on the extent of Fifth Monarchists’ political influence. On the debate over 
their possible role in the dissolution of the Rump and the calling of the Nominated Assembly, see chapter 
four above, pages 54-7. 
5 Thomason dates The Army Vindicated on April 24 and A Warning Piece on May 19. The opening of A 
Warning Piece confirms Thomason’s dating by referring to Spittlehouse’s publication of a “Vindication of 
[Cromwell’s] then-late thrice-noble actions” on April 24 (John Spittlehouse, A warning-piece discharged: or, 
Certain intelligence communicated to His Excellencie the Lord General Cromvvel, with all the real and cordial officers 
and souldiers under his command. Wherein the present tempers of each society of people in this Commonwealth, under 
each degree or notion whatsoever, are inserted and controverted, in relation to the election of a new representative. As 
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voices the enthusiasm common to all Fifth Monarchists for the dissolution of the Rump 
and looks upon Cromwell as a new Moses to guide England out of anti-Christian 
captivity.6 Spittlehouse’s proposals in both pamphlets demonstrate Fifth Monarchists’ 
conceptions of human government and history. Published only four days after the 
dissolution of the Rump, The Army Vindicated opens by arguing that the Rump was no 
Parliament. Spittlehouse bases this claim on two reasons. First, Parliaments are called by 
the king and the Rump no longer sat with the king’s approval. Second, the Rump had 
lost all right to the claim to represent the nation because “all their other Electors had 
wholly deserted them, even unto blood.”7 Because Parliament’s authority flows directly 
from the king’s, a new government must be formed so as to reflect that England is no 
                                                     
 
also, a brief and full parallel betwixt the history of Israel and our late and present series of affairs. In which simile, our 
present general is compar'd with Moses, as he was their deliverer, judge, and general. By John Spittlehouse, a late 
member of the Army (London, 1653), 1. Early English Books Online. British Library (London). May 10, 2011. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99863520). Spittlehouse had served in the army from 1643 to 
1651. On Spittlehouse’s military career, see Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate, 113. Capp describes 
Spittlehouse as “accepting Cromwell as an absolute ruler by divine right” (The Fifth Monarchy Men, 64). 
However, like other prominent Fifth Monarchists, after the dissolution of the Nominated Assembly 
Spittlehouse began to write in opposition of the Protectorate and was arrested for seditious writing (Capp, 
The Fifth Monarchy Men, 72-5). 
6 On the comparison of Cromwell with Moses, see Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, 62-3 and Wallace, Destiny 
his Choice, 118-9. 
7 John Spittlehouse, The Army vindicated, in their late dissolution of the Parliament: with several cautions and 
directions in point of a new representative. Published for the satisfaction of all the real and cordial members of the 
Commonwealth, whose aid and assistance is required herein (London, 1653), 2. Early English Books Online. British 
Library (London). May 10, 2011. http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99863516.  
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longer a monarchy.8 However, this new “representative” must only be elected by the 
“real members” of the Commonwealth.9 Who belongs to this category?  
 Spittlehouse’s definition of the “real members” of the Commonwealth is 
dependent on his representation of the events of the Civil Wars. Anyone who had 
supported the king since the Civil Wars is to be excluded: “it is irrational to imagine that 
such persons and Parsons, &c. whose Principles are as contrary to a commonwealth, as 
darkness to light (which all Royallists of the Nation, whether of the Presbyterian or 
Cavalier parties are notoriously known to be)” should be involved in forming a 
government for the Commonwealth.10 Spittlehouse urges that by losing the war, 
royalists have been shown to be “such as God hath rejected.”11 For Spittlehouse, royalists 
include anyone who supported the Solemn League and Covenant and opposed the 
regicide. Strikingly, he justifies this inclusion by arguing that Presbyterians who have 
supported the king after first opposing him and have “not continued faithful unto the 
end.”12 That is, the regicide cannot be separated from the aims of the Civil Wars, thus 
making the Presbyterians not “faithful unto the end.” By adhering to the Covenant and, 
                                                     
8 In the describing the relationship between king and Parliament, Spittlehouse uses the same metaphor as 
Urquhart in Reasons Why. Parliament is a stream and the king as its springs (The Army Vindicated, 2 and 
Reasons Why, 10). 
9 Spittlehouse, The Army vindicated, 1 and 3. 
10 Spittlehouse, The Army vindicated, 2. 
11 They “have not been thought meet by God to be made co-operators with the present Army, and their 
adherents in those great actions that have lately been accomplished, but that the Lord hath rather left them 
to follow their own inventions; What are we, that we should entertayn such as God hath rejected?”  
(Spittlehouse, The Army vindicated, 4; emphasis original). 
12 Spittlehouse, The Army vindicated, 3; emphasis mine. 
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to that extent, supporting the monarchy, the Presbyterians have proved “destructive to 
the present Army, and their adherents, who are the alone proper subjects of this present 
Commonwealth.”13 More broadly, Spittlehouse proceeds to explain that anyone who 
opposed the New Model Army has acted against “the designe which Jesus Christ is now 
about to accomplish by them [=the Army], who without all controversie is determined to 
pluck up all Monarchical, and Antichristian Rule and Government; to the end he may 
accomplish his yet unperformed promises as to rule all Nations.”14 In this sentence, the 
actions and designs of the Army and Christ are indistinguishable. Grammatically, the 
antecedent of the relative pronoun “who” appears at first to be “them,” i.e. the Army, 
but the presence of the singular verb “is” singles out “Jesus Christ” as the correct 
antecedent. The ambiguity in the construction of the sentence allows Spittlehouse to 
present the Army’s continued military campaign as fulfilling the prophecies of Daniel 7. 
This passage comes as the answer to an imagined interlocutor’s objection to excluding 
Presbyterians from the ranks of the “proper subjects” of the commonwealth.15 That is, 
Spittlehouse excludes from membership in the commonwealth anyone who will not 
support the removing of “all Monarchical, and Antichristian Rule.” 
 As Spittlehouse’s argument develops, it becomes increasingly clear that The Army 
Vindicated’s aims exceed questions of England’s constitutional arrangements. England, 
                                                     
13 Spittlehouse, The Army vindicated, 3. 
14 Spittlehouse, The Army vindicated, 3-4; emphasis mine. 
15 Spittlehouse, The Army vindicated, 3. The entire pamphlet beyond the opening argument is organized in a 
question and answer format. 
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through the Army and the congregated Churches, is represented as a catalyst for the 
beginning of the Fifth Monarchy on Earth. In a striking passage, Spittlehouse links the 
Army’s destruction of all monarchies to a world-wide work of conversion: “I take it to 
be the onely peculiar work of the Congregated Churches &c. to hold forth the golden 
Scepter of the love of God in Christ Jesus unto the Nations of the world, and thereby to 
labour to allure them into the Church with that golden bait, and so to convert them.”16 
The passage recalls the image of the golden scepter described in the book of Esther. In 
the Old Testament book, anyone who approached king Ahasuerus without formal 
invitation would be put to death unless the king extended his golden scepter.17 Esther, as 
Ahasuerus’ second wife, approaches the king unsolicited to intercede on behalf of the 
Jewish people who have been unjustly accused of rebellion. Her life, and that of her 
people, is spared as Ahasuerus extends his scepter. In reworking the image, Spittlehouse 
softens it by turning the golden scepter into the “the golden Scepter of the love of God” 
and into a “bait” to “allure” other nations into the church. However, the threat of death 
implicit in the image of Ahasuerus’ golden scepter is reinforced by pairing it with the 
“rod of iron” of Revelation. In Revelation 12.5 and 19.15 the “rod of iron” is used by 
                                                     
16 Spittlehouse, The Army vindicated, 6. 
17 “Whosoever, whether man or woman, shall come unto the king into the inner court, who is not called, 
there is one law of his to put him to death, except such to whom the king shall hold out the golden sceptre, 
that he may live” (Esther 4.11). 
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Christ to rule all the nations.18 In The Army vindicated, the conquering “rod of iron” is to 
be wielded by the New Model for Christ. The Army will impose Christ’s rule wherever 
it “either hath or by providence may yet conquer, and so by gradation, until the 
Kingdom and Dominion, and greatness of the Kingdome under the whole heavens, shall 
be given to the people of the Saints of the most high.”19 Combining the two images 
allows Spittlehouse to represent the Army’s violent military conquest as preliminary 
work for the Saints’ conversion of the world. Strikingly, as he urges for immediate action 
in spreading the kingdom of “the most high,” Spittlehouse’s writing changes from 
argumentative to prophetic. In these passages of The Army Vindicated, Daniel’s dream 
unfolds in seventeenth-century England: “The time being now present, that the antient 
of days is come, and judgement is given unto the Saints of the most high, so that they 
shall take the Kingdomes of the world into their possessions, and that for ever, even for 
ever and ever. Even so be it Lord Jesus; Amen, Amen.”20 
                                                     
18 In The Army vindicated, while members of the Congregated Churches, in their capacity as ministers, may 
follow the Army in order to convert the world, they must not directly rule other nations since it is 
“altogether improper” for the “Congregated Churches and their well-wishers […] to take upon them to rule 
the Nations with a rod of Iron, (viz. in a Magistratical employment)” (Spittlehouse, The Army vindicated, 6; 
emphasis original). 
19 Spittlehouse, The Army vindicated, 7. 
20 The Army Vindicated, 7. Compare with the following passages from Daniel: “I saw in the night visions, and, 
behold, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they 
brought him near before him./ And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all 
people, nations, and languages, should serve him: his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not 
pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed” (KJV, Daniel 7.13-4). And: “But the saints of 
the most High shall take the kingdom, and possess the kingdom for ever, even for ever and ever” (KJV, 
Daniel 7.18). 
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 The joint “labour” of the Army and the Congregated Churches depicted by 
Spittlehouse is in part an expression of the close connection between soldiers and some 
Fifth Monarchy leaders. A number of the officers of the English troops in Scotland, in 
particular, kept an ongoing exchange of letter with Feake, Simpson, and Powell.21 
However, Spittlehouse’s proposal for a godly military campaign is more than a 
reflection of existing links between soldiers and Saints; it arises from an understanding 
of human government and history that flattens all local laws, customs, and historical 
development by regarding them as equally antichristian. This becomes evident in 
Spittlehouse’s return to the ideal of international propagation of the gospel in The First 
Addresses to His Excellencie the Lord General (1653).22 In the dedicatory letter to Cromwell 
that opens this pamphlet, Spittlehouse returns to the image of the general as a new 
Moses. However, this comparison contains a warning as well as praise. If Cromwell 
rests before the work of universal conversion is completed:  
as you have been parallel’d with Moses in your acts of valour, so you shall 
likewise die in Mount-Nebo […] but I hope the Lord hath not onlely intended to 
shew you the Land of Canaan, but will also lead you over the flood Iordan, into 
the Land of the Canaanites, &c. (viz. over the Narrow Seas, into Holland, France, 
                                                     
21 Capp, Fifth Monarchy Men, pp. 53-4. 
22 John Spittlehouse, The first addresses to His Excellencie the Lord General, with the Assembly of elders elected by 
him and his Council for the management of the affairs of this Commonwealth; as also, to all the cordial officers and 
souldiers under his command. Containing certain rules & directions how to advance the kingdome of Jesus Christ over 
the face of the whole earth. By John Spittlehouse, a late member of the Army, and a servant to the saints of the most 
high God, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and whom all dominions shall serve and obey, Dan. 7.27 
(London, 1653). Early English Books Online. British Library (London). May 10, 2011. 
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99863518. 
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and so to Rome itself, to the end you may pluck up all Antichristian power 
whatsoever doth oppose Jesus Christ in the least.23 
 
Just before his death, Moses views the land of Canaan from the mountain of Nebo. 
Because he had “rebelled against [God’s] commandment in the desert of Zin, in the strife 
of the congregation, to sanctify me at the water before their eyes,” Moses is denied 
entering Canaan, which is instead conquered by Joshua.24 Spittlehouse recalls the event 
to warn Cromwell, but goes against the grain of the Biblical narrative. The passage 
expresses hope that Cromwell may yet conquer “the Land of the Canaanites.” By 
changing Scriptural history, the dedicatory letter also rewrites the typological 
connection between Canaan and salvation. A common application of this particular 
Deuteronomic verse by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century exegetes points to the 
insufficiency of Mosaic Law for salvation.25 Spittlehouse ignores this standard reading 
                                                     
23 John Spittlehouse, The first addresses, “To his Excellency the Lord General Cromwell.” 
24 For God’s condemnation of Moses, see Numbers 27.14 and Numbers 20.12-13. For Moses’ death, see 
Deuteronomy 34. 
25 Jason P. Rosenblatt, “Adam’s Pisgah Vision: Paradise Lost, Books XI and XII,” ELH 39 (March, 1972): 68-75. 
Rosenblatt points to, for instance, Henry Ainsworth’s commentary as illustrating a typical reading. 
Ainsworth was a prominent scholar of Hebrew who published a frequently-referenced explication of the 
Pentateuch. Ainsworth links Deuteronomy 34.4, “And the LORD said unto him, This is the land which I 
sware unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, saying, I will give it unto thy seed: I have caused thee to 
see it with thine eyes, but thou shalt not go over thither,” with Galatians 3.4, “Wherefore the law was our 
schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith,” to conclude that the Law is not 
sufficient for salvation: “This view was by the marvellous worke and grace of God towards his servant, that 
in one place and time hee should behold so large a Countrie […] the beholding therof was the beholding of 
the blessings to be enjoyed by Christ Iesus; unto whom Moses and his law is a Schoolemaster, Gal.3.24” 
(Henry Ainsworth, Annotations upon the five bookes of Moses, the booke of the Psalmes, and the Song of Songs, or, 
Canticles VVherein the Hebrevv vvords and sentences, are compared with, and explained by the ancient Greeke and 
Chaldee versions, and other records and monuments of the Hebrewes: but chiefly by conference with the holy 
Scriptures, Moses his words, lawes and ordinances, the sacrifices, and other legall ceremonies heretofore commanded by 
God to the Church of Israel, are explained (London, 1627), 167. Early English Books Online. December 29, 2012. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
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and, mapping Canaan unto seventeenth-century Europe, links the conquering of 
“Holland, France, and so to Rome itself” to destroying all who “doth oppose Jesus Christ 
in the least.” Cromwell and the army are indentified, through the Song of Songs, with 
the army of the kingdom of Christ: “so that the Church or kingdom of Jesus Christ may 
appear in its now proper posture (viz.  terrible as an Army with Banners, unto all the 
Nations upon the face of the whole earth.”26 England is both ancient Israel and the 
kingdom of Christ at the onset of the millennium. 
 Such dual identification of seventeenth-century England is also found in A 
warning-piece discharged. This pamphlet, published within a month of The Army 
vindicated, insists that Cromwell should be allowed to nominate the new government. 
England, as the nation of Israel wandering in the desert, needs the guidance of a new 
Moses: “we are now put into the same estate and condition with the aforesaid Israelites 
in their wilderness-condition” and, as such, “all the cordial members of this 
Commonwealth may henceforth look upon our present General, as the aforesaid 
Israelites did upon Moses.”27 Throughout the tract, Spittlehouse moves seamlessly from 
                                                     
 
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99842509). As Rosenblatt also notes, the typological 
relationship is explicitly brought out by Milton in the final book of Paradise Lost. Writing after the 
Restoration, Milton sounds a much more pessimistic note than that evinced by the Fifth Monarchists when 
he draws attention to this Deuteronomic passage. In Book XII, Michael explain to Adam that the Law and 
Moses cannot redeem sin, but that “Joshua, whom the Gentiles Jesus call” will be the one to lead the people 
of Israel into Canaan (PL, XII.310; for the entire admonition, see PL, XII.290-314). 
26 John Spittlehouse, The first addresses, “To his Excellecny the Lord General Cromwell.” 
27 Spittlehouse, A warning-piece, 11, 10. 
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the history of Israel in the Old Testament to the history of Civil War and Interregnum 
England. Through movement in time, Spittlehouse can predict the future of England by 
projecting the recent history of his country onto the Biblical narrative of the history of 
Israel. 1653 England is Israel in the “wilderness-condition” and, as such, the nation 
should accept Cromwell’s dissolution of the Rump based on the example of Israel under 
the guidance of Moses. By equating England’s history with Israel’s, Aspinwall can 
justify Cromwell’s intervention in government by representing it as a reenactment of 
Scriptural history. Using this parallel, Spittlehouse sweeps away all objections as the 
“murmurs” of the “ingrateful” Israelites in the desert, having “presently waxed fat, and 
(Jesuron-like) kicked against the Lord and his servant Moses.”28 This first link between the 
history of England and Scripture is doubled by urging that England, as the New Israel, 
is now on the verge of the millennium.29 This second temporal layering is made explicit 
at the end of the pamphlet. Spittlehouse concludes A warning-piece with a framed quote 
of two biblical passages. There, he fuses together Luke 2.13-4, recounting the birth of 
                                                     
28 Spittlehouse, A warning-piece, 12-3. 
29 I am indebted to Boyd M. Berry’s analysis of seventeenth-century typology in Process of Speech: Puritan 
Religious Writing and Paradise Lost. In his discussion of “Puritan” typology, Berry argues that this mode of 
exegesis is pervasive in revolutionary Scriptural and historical thought: “as the Puritans so ranged 
backward and forward through time, they fused a literal with a wildly figurative reading of the Bible, drew 
their models of conduct from an ancient, literal Israel while they sought to erect an eschatologically typical 
Israel; the latter had, though the peculiar process of Puritan theologizing, been reduced from a type to a 
mere analogue of the English Church and nation. […] But because, in their view, everything, in all times had 
been the same, the Puritans showed a marked tendency simultaneously to reduce ecclesiastic types to literal 
statements and to extend their sense of security about the phenomenal basis of ecclesiastic typology to 
speculations about the apocalypse” (Boyd M. Berry, Process of Speech: Puritan Religious Writing and Paradise 
Lost (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 127).  
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Christ, and Revelation 19.1-10, the prophecy of the triumph over the Whore of Babylon: 
“And sodainly there was with the Angel a multitude of the heavenly hoast praying God, 
and saying, glory in the highest, and on earth peace, good will towards men. And after 
these things I heard a great voice of much people in heaven saying, Alleluja, salvation, 
and glory, and honour, and power unto the Lord out God: For true and righteous are his 
judgements; for he hath judged the great whore.”30 In this concluding passage, the praise 
and rejoicing of angels at the birth of Jesus are followed immediately by the alleluias of 
Revelation 19.1. The conjoining phrase, “and after these things,” marks the beginning of 
Revelation. In the original Scriptural passage, it points back to the prophecy of the 
destruction of the “great city Babylon” in Revelation 18.21; in A warning-piece, 
grammatically, it points to the Incarnation. This move allows Spittlehouse to effectively 
erase the narrative of the life and crucifixion of Christ and the history of the Church 
militant.31 On the last page of A warning-piece, the moment of the birth of Christ is also 
the time of triumphant judgment and destruction of the “great whore.”  
 Spittlehouse’s approach to Scriptural history underwrites his exhortations for 
military conquest in The Army vindicated. By identifying England’s military campaigns 
with Israel’s conquest of Canaan and, at the same time, with the destruction of 
“antichristian” monarchies at the beginning of the millennium, Spittlehouse erases the 
                                                     
30 Spittlehouse, A warning-piece, 25; underlining mine.  
31 In On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity, Milton checks this impulse and reminds his reader that the “bitter 
cross” has to follow the joy of the nativity: “But wisest Fate sayes no,/ This must not yet be so, /The Babe lies 
yet in smiling Infancy,/ That on the bitter cross/ Must redeem our loss” (149-3). 
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historical specificity of the Army’s actions. The closing passage in A warning-piece 
condenses the New Testament into the moment of the birth of Christ, depicted as an 
event that perfects the Old Testament nation of God into a New Israel poised at the 
beginning of the millennium. In doing so, Spittlehouse can view all those nations that do 
not embrace the “labour” of conversion of the Congregated Churches as antichristian 
opposition to the beginning of the Fifth Monarchy. Since England is also a new Israel led 
by Moses, Spittlehouse can confidently predict the destruction of all such opposition. In 
this model there is no room for the political and ecclesiastical forms developed during 
the long history that separates Israel from seventeenth-century England. Fifth 
Monarchist identification of England with Israel becomes fully fleshed out in their calls 
for law reform. Written and published in the first half of 1653, The Army Vindicated, The 
First Addresses, and A warning-piece were brief pamphlets responding to the quickly 
changing political situation. Their primary concern was the justification of Cromwell’s 
dissolution of the Rump. To see how Spittlehouse’s approach to Scripture and history 
could be turned into a call for a fundamental reconstructing of the body of law itself, I 
turn to Fifth Monarchist writings produced from 1654 to 1656.32 In this period, the Fifth 
                                                     
32 That law reform was needed was not a uniquely Fifth Monarchist claim. Austin Woolrych identifies three 
schools of thought advocating for law reform during the tenure of the Nominated Assembly: “The first, to 
which Cromwell and the moderate majority in the House adhered, wanted to preserve the historic common 
law of England in its essentials but to improve and expedite its procedures, clarify its obscurities and 
archaisms, abolish parasitic fees, make its benefits available to a wider public, and render it more humane, 
especially with regard to insolvent debtors and the excessive number of capital crimes. A more radical 
objective was pursued by the Levellers and their fellow-travellers, who regarded the current legal system as 
a product of the Norman Yoke imposed by the Conquest, and aimed to scrap it altogether. They wanted to 
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Monarchists’ initial enthusiasm for Cromwell’s dissolution of the Rump turned into 
disappointment as the Nominated Assembly dissolved itself and Cromwell became 
Lord Protector. Many Fifth Monarchists had predicted that Daniel prophecies would be 
fulfilled in 1656. Ironically, by the end of 1656 and the beginning of 1657, the Saints had 
begun to lose enthusiasm for militant opposition to the government as their expectations 
went unfulfilled and they repeatedly failed to gain support in the army.33 By early 1657, 
while some militant Fifth Monarchists still opposed the Protectorate as the “Fourth 
Monarchy,” the movement’s activities were effectively contained by Thurloe’s 
                                                     
 
replace it with a simple written code that would be easily comprehensible to the laity and could be 
completely administered by popularly elected magistrates, holding court at frequent intervals in every 
county, without any need for professional advocates. The third school of reformers consisted of Fifth 
Monarchist and other extreme sectaries, who believed that the kingdom of Christ was in process of being 
established and that the only laws fit to be observed in it were those contained in the Scriptures, whether in 
the Mosaic code or the teachings of Christ” (Britain in Revolution, 548-9). For an overview of Fifth Monarchist 
views on law reform, see B. S. Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, 157-71. Requests for law reform had been 
widespread ever since the regicide and already had a well established history by then: for an overview of 
this movement in the mid-seventeenth-century, see Donald Veall, The Popular Movement for Law Reform: 
1640-1660 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); for a study of the subject within the context of the calls for 
reform starting with the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I, including Bacon’s proposals for the rationalization 
of the law, see Barbara Shapiro, “Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England,” The American Journal of 
Legal History 19 (Oct., 1975): 280-312; for a comparison of attempts at law reform in England and New 
England, see G. B. Warden, “Law Reform in England and New England, 1620 to 1660,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly 35 (Oct., 1978): 668-690. The Rump Parliament itself had created the Hale Commission in 1652 to 
explore possible ways to implement a certain measure of law reform. The Commission produced an 
extensive program of reform, but the Rump failed to implement its recommendations (see Mary Cotterell, 
“Interregnum Law Reform: the Hale Commission of 1652,” The English Historical Review 83 (Oct., 1968): 689-
704. In particular, Cotterell demonstrates the legal expertise of the members of the Hale Commission and 
how their recommendations, rather than being the work of millenarian extremists, were developed in 
collaboration with the Parliamentarian committee on law reform. 
33 B.S. Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, 105, 113-4. 
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surveillance and arrests.34 Nonetheless, Fifth Monarchist pamphlets continued to appear 
urging the reformation of England’s laws and government along Biblical lines. 
 While the Fifth Monarchist leaders Christopher Feake and Vavasor Powell 
attacked the Lord Protector as the little horn of Daniel 7, and thus turned against 
Cromwell the identification with they had previously aimed at Charles I, others still 
appealed to Cromwell as a type of Moses capable of reforming England’s laws and 
government. William Aspinwall is representative of the latter group. Aspinwall had 
been a merchant and an explorer in New England, participating in the Massachusetts 
Bay colony’s legislature as one of Boston’s deputies. He returned to England in the early 
1650’s after difficulties with the colony’s authorities over his interpretation of Scripture.35 
Believing that the kingdom of Christ was imminent even after the dissolution of the 
                                                     
34 B.S. Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, 102-30. The notable exception is Thomas Venner who organized a 
rising in London in 1657. The rising failed when most other prominent Fifth Monarchists refused to support 
his efforts. Having been arrested after the abortive rising, Venner remained in prison until 1659 (Capp, The 
Fifth Monarchy Men, 105, 115-6). After the Restoration, Venner organized a final London rising in 1661. While 
his group managed to kill some soldiers, the rising was put down and Venner was arrested and executed 
(Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, 105, 199-200). 
35 In particular, he advocated the adoption of John Cotton’s Mosaic Law code and supported the religious 
views of Anne Hutchinson (Francis J. Bremer, “Aspinwall, William (d. in or after 1662),” in Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, eee online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/76217 (accessed December 6, 2012)). For the context of Aspinwall’s 
program of Mosaic Law with respect of the Massachusetts legislature, see R. H. C., “The Rule of Law in 
Colonial Massachusetts,” The University of Pennsylvania Law Review 108, no. 7 (May, 1960): 1001-1036. 
Aspinwall had immigrated to Massachusetts in 1630, but he had been expelled from Boston from 1637 to 
1642 as an antinomian. He returned to England in either 1652 (Capp, Fifth Monarchy Men, 240) or possibly 
1653 (according to Bremer’s article in the DNB). There are several namesakes of William Aspinwall who 
lived in both England and New England in this period which might account for discrepancies between 
Capp’s and Bremer’s chronology of Aspinwall’s life. David Loewenstein aligns Aspinwall with Feake’s and 
Powell’s attacks on Cromwell in early 1654 (Representing Revolution in Milton and His Contemporaries: Religion, 
Politics, and Polemics in Radical Puritanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), n. 18 to p. 147). 
However, Capp notes and as it is clear from An Explication, Aspinwall was willing to work with the 
Protectorate to usher Christ’s kingdom. 
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Nominated Assembly, Aspinwall addresses his An Explication and Application of the 
Seventh Chapter of Daniel to Cromwell and proposes a plan for legal and political 
reform.36 In his dedicatory letter, Aspinwall explains that he is writing an interpretation 
of Daniel 7 for two reasons. On the one hand, the events of the recent past can only be 
fully understood as a partial fulfillment of that prophecy. The seventh chapter of Daniel 
shows “the true ground of all the great Revolutions that have happened in these 
Nations, which are founded upon the Eternal Counsel of God” and, by correctly 
interpreting Daniel’s prophecy, Cromwell’s actions will be justified: “all men may see 
the just warrant you had from Christ, to act as you have done.”37 Countering Feake’s 
and Powell’s condemnations of the Protectorate, Aspinwall uses his pamphlet to make 
very specific identifications between verses of Daniel 7 and details of Charles’ reign.38 
                                                     
36 The full title of the pamphlet gives a clear first sketch of its argument: An Explication and Application of the 
Seventh Chapter of Daniel: With a Correction of the Translation. Wherein is briefly shewed The State and Downfall of 
the four Monarchies; But more largely of the Roman Monarchy, and the Ten Horns or Kingdomes; And in Particular, 
the Beheading of Charles Stuart, who is proved to be the Little Horn by many Characters, that cannot be applied to 
any before or after him. And what is meant by the Carkass of the Beast, which yet remains to be burned. Together with 
a Hint of the Slaying and Rising of the Two Witnesses (London, [Thomason: March 20th], 1654). Early English 
Books Online. British Library (London). May 10, 2011. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99865974. The full title of An Explication contains a rejoinder 
to Feake’s and Powell’s identification of Cromwell with the little horn of Daniel 7.8. The title asserts that in 
the pamphlet “Charles Stuart, who is proved to be the Little Horn by many Characters, that cannot be applied to any 
before or after him.” 
37 Aspinwall, “To his Excellencie the Lord General Cromwell,” An Explication. 
38 Typical is his reading of Daniel 7.25, “And he shall speak great words against the most High, and shall 
wear out the saints of the most High, and think to change times and laws: and they shall be given into his 
hand until a time and times and the dividing of time” (KJV). Aspinwall interprets it as representing both the 
“unsoundness of this Prince [Charles I] in matters of Religion” as well as his attempt to “wear out the saints 
[…] to wit with Tributes, Loans, Ship-monies, &c. all which may be understood by the word,       for ׄ ולְבּ 
which comes of the same root signifies Tribute” (Aspinwall, An Explication, 16). The Hebrew word       is 
taken to represent specifically English forms of tribute, “Loans, Ship-monies.” 
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On the other hand, having established a correspondence between the Old Testament 
prophecies and the recent events in England, Aspinwall points to the unfilled promises 
foretold by Daniel to insist that the work of the Saints is not finished. While, the “Beast is 
slain, none can deny it, and the Sultanship is utterly removed; the Body or Carkass, 
which hath been enlivened by that spirit of Prerogative, is not given to the burning of 
the flame.”39   
 The twin goals of An Explication are mirrored in its division into two sections. 
The first focuses mainly on issues of translations and meaning, but it also gives a 
preliminary interpretation of the reign of Charles I and the Civil Wars in the light of his 
translation. The second and longer section is a full application of Daniel’s prophecy to 
history. In this latter part of the pamphlet, Aspinwall reads ancient history as a 
verification of Daniel’s description of the reign of the first four monarchies. The recent 
history of England, instead, is taken to demonstrate that the Second Coming is 
imminent. In the seventeenth-century, the term “prophecy” could refer both to a 
divinely inspired utterance, including, but not restricted to, a prediction of future events, 
as well as to the interpretation and explanation of Scripture.40 In both sections of An 
Explication, Aspinwall’s expounding of Daniel 7—“prophecy” in the second meaning—is 
modeled on the prophet Daniel’s account of the experience and understanding of his 
                                                     
39 Aspinwall, “To his Excellencie the Lord General Cromwell,” An Explication. 
40 Nigel Smith, Perfection Proclaimed: Language and Literature in English Radical Religion, 1640-1660 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), 24-7.  
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divinely inspired dream—a “prophecy” in the first sense. The pamphlet oscillates 
between statements arguing that the meaning of Scripture can be made clear with the 
knowledge of the original languages and the warning that Daniel’s prophecies can only 
be interpreted correctly because they have finally begun to unfold.41 In his explanation 
of Daniel 7, Aspinwall moves between the Scriptural verses and the recent events with a 
simple “to wit.”42 This is usually done in the midst of detailed explanations about his 
translation from the original Hebrew text. Interpretation of Scripture becomes almost a 
form of translation. 
 In the opening of the first section, Aspinwall explains at length Daniel’s 
experience and method of narration of the prophetic dream. In particular, on pages 3-5, 
Aspinwall focuses on the verbs in verses 8 and 9 that introduce the prophetic dream.43 In 
                                                     
41 Aspinwall repeatedly argues the original languages of the Scripture are in and of themselves essential to 
understand biblical revelation. Recalling Tremellius’s complaint that few Christians study Hebrew, 
Aspinwall encourages the reading of Scripture in the original languages: “in that Tongue (together with 
Greek) is contained, so much of the boundless and unsearchable wisdome of God, as is meet and necessary 
for us poore creatures to know, or we [are] capable to receive.” At the same time, Aspinwall argues that 
until the Second Coming the very perfection of biblical languages can make Scripture difficult to interpret: 
“And that is indeed one Excellencie in those Eastern Languages, to express sundry and different things, by 
one and the same word. […] Whence it comes to pass, that a perfect, and full application cannot well be 
made of such Predictions, until the Prophesies be accomplished, or at least in accomplishing; Nor then 
neither, without some beam of light from Christ, and diligent comparing the Word of God, and his Works 
together” (“To his Excellencie the Lord General Cromwell,” An Explication). But Aspinwall has come to 
believe that Daniel’s prophecies are indeed being fulfilled and he has done so following Cromwell’s own 
example: “I remember an Expression of Yours, to one now at rest with the Lord, That these times are of 
accomplishment of Prophesies” (“To his Excellencie the Lord General Cromwell,” An Explication; emphasis 
original).  
42 For examples of his use of “to wit,” see pages 4, 5,16, 17, and 28. 
43 “I considered the horns, and, behold, there came up among them another little horn, before whom there 
were three of the first horns plucked up by the roots: and, behold, in this horn were eyes like the eyes of 
man, and a mouth speaking great things./ I beheld till the thrones were cast down, and the Ancient of days 
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the case of verse 8, he explains that the expression “I was considering […] properly 
denotes an act of Understanding, and being used in this Conjugation, it argues a reflect 
act of the Intellectual faculty upon itself, in a way of meditation or contemplation.”44 For 
Aspinwall, it is clear that Daniel’s receiving of the vision is not a passive act. The 
prophet is called upon to interpret and understand the dream: “So that Daniels meaning 
is to shew, that as God at first made a cleer and distinct representation of things unto 
him in his Dream; so now being awake he takes up the several passages and 
circumstances attending the same, and revolvs them in his mind.”45 Similarly, in verse 9, 
we see that the original word for “I was contemplating”:   
     doth properly signifie a distinct apprehension and discerning of the Object, as well 
by the Understanding, as by the Eye […] And then it is more properly translated 
Contemplating. […] So the summe of the matter is this, God represented to Daniel in his 
Dream, this Vision in an orderly and discreet manner, and when he was awake, he took 
up the same in his meditation and contemplation in the like discreet order.46 
 
                                                     
 
did sit, whose garment was white as snow, and the hair of his head like the pure wool: his throne was like 
the fiery flame, and his wheels as burning fire” (KJV, Daniel 7.8-9). 
44 Aspinwall, An Explication, 3. 
45 Aspinwall, An Explication, 3. 
46 Aspinwall, An Explication, 4-5. 
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Commenting on this passage, Nigel Smith argues that Aspinwall’s disagreement with 
the Geneva translation of this passage allows the Fifth Monarchist to define inspired 
prophecy as “a rational, well-ordered and contemplative activity, as opposed to frenzied 
enthusiasm.”47 More strongly than that, it allows Aspinwall to create a parallel between 
Daniel’s prophetic interpretation and his own expounding of Scripture. By methodically 
paying attention to lexical and grammatical details of the Daniel’s original vision, 
Aspinwall presents his own interpretive method as working in the same way as that of 
Old Testament prophet. Both the dream, as granted by God, and Daniel’s meditation on 
it are described as “cleer,” “distinct,” “orderly,” and “discreet.” Aspinwall’s reading of 
Daniel 7 follows the same principles, moving through the vision verse by verse and, in a 
meticulous manner, explaining his translation and its application to history. 
 Having closely identified his interpretation of Scripture with the prophet’s own 
exposition of the inspired dream, Aspinwall confidently appropriates Daniel’s language 
to launch an attack on England’s laws and forms of government. The call for legal 
reform is based on the identification of the “little horn” of Daniel 7.8 with Charles I. 
While the little horn has been slain,48 a final step is yet to be taken to fully destroy all 
monarchical power: “Thirdly, Against the Emblems, or if you will, the Figures, and 
                                                     
47 Nigel Smith, “The Uses of Hebrew in the English Revolution,” in Language, Self, and Society: A Social 
History of Language, ed. Peter Burke and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 59. 
48 “First against his person, they beheaded him […]. Secondly, against his Power and Prerogative, they took 
away his Sultanship here in this verse; And this they did by some publick Act of State” (Aspinwall, An 
Explication, 17-8). 
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Representations, of his Kingly Prerogative, which Daniel calls, His Body or Carcasse: that 
is all such things as carry the stamp, forme, or figure of Prerogative Royal, and are 
animated by his power, as the body is animated by the soule, all these they shall utterly 
destroy.”49 What is the “carcasse” of the late king? After a menacing reference to the 
possibility of also beheading Charles’s children,50 Aspinwall turns his attention to 
English laws. All of England’s laws have their roots in the king’s arbitrary government 
and, even though Charles is dead, they are still used to persecute the Saints: “There is a 
thing called a Body of Laws, which have been inlivened, with Le Roy le Vult, I mean the 
Spirit of Prerogative hath given power & life to many Laws by which many of the dear 
Saints of Christ have been cast into Prisons, and burned at stakes, and the Prerogative of 
Christ laid aside, and this body, as Daniel sheweth, must in a speciall manner be given to 
the burning of fire.”51 For Aspinwall, this means that English law is fundamentally 
                                                     
49 Aspinwall, An Explication, 18. 
50 Aspinwall, An Explication, 36. 
51 Aspinwall, An Explication, 29. The attack on England’s laws as the product of the tyrannical power of 
kings is typical of Fifth Monarchist writings. For instance, in The First Addresses (1653), Spittlehouse 
denounces human laws in language reminiscent of Aspinwall’s: “for what are the national Laws of Kings 
other [than] the decrees of tyrants, and corrupt men, whose foundation and institution had their being from 
the corrupt reason of the heathen, whose proceedings, laws, and punishments, do infinitely differ from the 
laws and punishments imposed by God?” (Spittlehouse, The First Addresses, 16). Unlike the everlasting 
divine law, human edicts are changeable and uncertain: “what are they other then things full of 
uncertainties, and changeableness” (Spittlehouse, The First Addresses, 16). That the laws of England have 
existed for time immemorial is of little consequence to Spittlehouse. It is his “very end and purpose” to 
overthrow even ancient human laws since they stand in “defiance to the aforesaid Laws of God himself” 
(Spittlehouse, The First Addresses, 21). For Spittlehouse, Scriptural law was never abolished, but it was only 
set aside “until such times as Jesus Christs world should be made apparent, in which he should reign as 
King over the face of the whole earth” (Spittlehouse, The First Addresses, 23). All that is left to do for 
Englishmen is to “work with a cordial resolution to erect the aforesaid Laws of God, and Ordinances of 
Jesus Christ” (Spittlehouse, The First Addresses, 24). As similar argument for law reformation is put forward 
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corrupted. Similarly, the language of “publick good” is part of the “Body or Carcass” of 
“King-craft.”52 As discussed in chapter three, the idioms of “publick good” and of salus 
populi were used by the king in the 1630s and appropriated by Parliamentarian writers 
in the 1640s to justify extraordinary actions outside of the boundaries of English laws.53 
In An Explication, Aspinwall represents the language of “publick good” as a way for 
those who use it to accumulate “power in their hands, and then improve the same for 
their owne ends, and not publick interests.”54 By applying his interpretation of Daniel 7 
to contemporary English history, Aspinwall links both England’s body of law and the 
language of “publick good” to the carcass of the fourth beast.  
 Aspinwall argues that both English law and the appeal to salus populi are 
defective because they are founded on forms of human, rather than divine, authority. 
                                                     
 
by John Brayne’s The Authority of God over Men, In the Law Cleared (1653). Bernard Capp in The Fifth Monarchy 
Men does not see Brayne as a Fifth Monarchist, but he indicates that the list of Biblically-inspired laws found 
in Brayne’s The New Earth was considered by Fifth Monarchists such as Spittlehouse and John Rogers as a 
model for reform (Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, 164). In The Authority of God over Men, Brayne uses Paul’s 
epistles to advocate for law reform along the lines of  Mosaic Law: “Paul writes to the Romans Gentiles, 
shewing, that the Law had dominion over them, whiles they lived, as a husband over a wife, and the Reason 
(because they knew the Law) the knowledge of it actually enjoyns obedience to it” (John Brayne, The 
authority of God over men, in the law cleared, shewing that its no persecution for the magistrate as Jehovah's deputy, 
in Jehovah's name, to enforce it on the people, but that he is bound to do the same (London, [Thomason: Jan. 4], 
1653), 1. Early English Books Online. British Library (London). May 10, 2011. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99865879). Brayne explains that the Law in this case does not 
only mean the Ten Commandments: “By the Law, cleerly the Apostle understands not the ten commands 
only, but the whole judicial Law, its Statutes and judgements” (Brayne, The authority of God, 2). 
52 Aspinwall, An Explication, 29. 
53 See chapter three above at page 198. 
54 Aspinwall, An Explication, 29. 
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While England’s government and law need to be reformed, this cannot be done by 
human legislators. Aspinwall’s approach to law reform, typical of Fifth Monarchist 
proposals, reveals his understanding of the role of human reason and judgement in 
legislating and governing.55 Central to Fifth Monarchist conception of political authority 
is the idea that human law-giving is an usurpation of a power that ought to belong only 
to Christ. Consequently, no human law can be deemed just.56 Aspinwall argues that by 
imposing Biblical law, the Saints simply execute Christ’s laws; they do not legislate: 
“Christ giveth Laws, [the Saints] execute his Laws; Christ judgeth all things according to 
the rule of his owne will, but they judge not according to their owne wills, but according 
to their discerning of his word and will.”57 In The Army vindicated, Spittlehouse had 
aligned the actions of the Army with Christ’s “designe” to destroy all antichristian 
monarchies. Similarly, through a parallel construction, Aspinwall appropriates for the 
Saints legislative and judicial authority while claiming to relinquish it: the Saints “judge 
not according to their own wills,” instead they discern “his word and will.” Echoing 
Psalm 1, Aspinwall depicts the Saints as directly guided by the word of God: “the 
                                                     
55 For an overview of Fifth Monarchist law reform proposals, see Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, 157-71. 
56 Interpreting Daniel 7.12, “As concerning the rest of the beasts, they had their dominion taken away: yet 
their lives were prolonged for a season and time” (KJV), Aspinwall argues that the law-giving power, 
“when exercised by men, is an exorbitant usurpation. It is Christs Prerogative, and his only, to be his 
peoples Law-giver” (Aspinwall, An Explication, 7). Aspinwall specifies that by Christ’s government he does 
not only mean Church, but also secular, government. The very Hebrew word used to describe Christ’s 
prerogative indicates civil rule: “By the subject ma er about which this power is conversant, it is a 
Kingdom, in a relation to Civil administrations,      ; For I do not remember that the word       is any where 
applied to Christs spiritual Regiment in his Church” (9). 
57 Aspinwall, An Explication, 19; emphasis mine. 
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Administration of Judgement, according to these Lawes, is committed to Saints; to holy 
men that walk with God, and judge for God, and make his word the Man of their 
Councel.”58 In this passage, the term “councel” recalls the English translation of the New 
Testament term for the Jewish Sanhedrin, the authoritative religious court of ancient 
Israel. After the dissolution of the Rump, Fifth Monarchist had argued for modeling the 
supreme governing body of England on the Sanhedrin.59 Aspinwall recalls this proposal 
and, in the formulation of The Army Vindicated, Scripture itself is animated and becomes 
                                                     
58 Aspinwall, An Explication, 19. Psalm 1: “Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, 
nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful./ But his delight is in the law of the 
LORD; and in his law doth he meditate day and night./ And he shall be like a tree planted by the rivers of 
water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season; his leaf also shall not wither; and whatsoever he doeth shall 
prosper./ The ungodly are not so: but are like the chaff which the wind driveth away./ Therefore the 
ungodly shall not stand in the judgment, nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous./ For the LORD 
knoweth the way of the righteous: but the way of the ungodly shall perish” (KJV; emphasis mine). 
59 The Greek συνέδριον (rendered in the Vulgate as concilium) is translated in the Authorized Version as 
“councel” in, for instance, John 11.47 (Oxford English Dictionary, OED online, s.v. “council” (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/Entry/42589?rskey=0qrIko&result=1&isAdvanced=false 
(accessed December 10, 2012)). Before the appointment of the Nominated Assembly in 1653, Fifth 
Monarchists had formulated various proposals for organizing the governing body that was to replace the 
Rump according to Scriptural descriptions of the Sanhedrin, (Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, 63-4). 
Throughout the 1650s, Aspinwall continued to advocate for such a council. In The Legislative Power (1656), 
Aspinwall outlines a proposal for a representative body elected by the Saints along the lines described in 
Deuteronomy 1.13, Exodus 24.1, and Numbers 11.24. The powers of this representative body include the 
executive authority that would traditionally have belonged to a king: the council is to “deliberate about all 
Matters that concern the Publick Tranquillity and Peace of the State; To negotiate with Forraign Princes and 
States; To conclude of Peace and War; to order the Militia; To impower fit Officers for the service of the 
Commonwealth, and to limit their Power; To call all Officers, higher or lower, to an account, and if there be 
just cause, to displace them” ([William Aspinwall] W. A., The Legislative povver is Christ’s peculiar prerogative 
(London, [Thomason: Aug. 20], 1656), 21. Early English Books Online. British Library (London). May 10, 
2011. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99865193). While judicial duties are in most occasions not a 
concern of the representative, its members do “have Power to direct, and determine, in hard and difficult 
cases of Judgement, such as may be transmitted to them from inferior Judicatories” (Aspinwall, The 
Legislative Power, 21). The second kind of ministerial power, active, is the power to “execute Judgement and 
Rigteousness: And this also is a Lordly Ruling Power, but subordinate to the former. And such is the Power 
of all Judges and Justices, and other inferior Officers” (Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 21; emphasis 
original). 
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a member of this governing council. By turning Scripture into a legislator, Aspinwall can 
draw a stark distinction between merely human laws and the law implemented by Fifth 
Monarchists: “And such be the Laws that Christ hath given. […] And if the Lawes be 
perfect, and such as administer the Lawes be Saints, by calling, and have a promise of 
divine assistance, how can it in reason be judged lesse safe, then to have imperfect 
Lawes (as all humane Lawes be) and such to execute those Lawes, as have not the 
promise of divine assistance?”60 
 Aspinwall presents the implementation of Scriptural law by the Saints as not 
only Biblically mandated, but as securing justice for the commonwealth. The 
government of the Saints in the Fifth Monarchy will be characterized “by the free 
passage of Justice, the tranquility and peace of the Government, the subjection of his 
enemies, and the homage which shall be yielded to him by all.”61 In a later pamphlet, The 
Legislative Power is Christ’s (1656), Aspinwall argues that government by Christ through 
the Saints is most suited to a commonwealth.62 In the Fifth Monarchy, magistrates are 
“called, according to Christs appointment, and by the suffrage of the people.”63 Using 
Deuteronomy 1.13 as Scriptural support, Aspinwall proposes that magistrates be 
appointed through a dual system of election and selection. First, the people elect 
                                                     
60 Aspinwall, An Explication, 20. 
61 Aspinwall, An Explication, 8. 
62 The Legislative Power includes some veiled criticism at the Protectorate government. Significantly, unlike 
Aspinwall’s other tracts, it does not advertise the author’s identity, but carries only Aspinwall’s initials. 
63 Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 22. 
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candidates from among “the wise men” of the community. Then, the “Supreme Power” 
in the commonwealth chooses magistrates from this group of elected candidates.64 This 
form of election is contrasted to the appointment of judges and other magistrates in 
monarchies. In a monarchy, the governing power flows directly from the king. 
Consequently, magistrates, accountable only to the prince, will “rule over the People of 
God with rigour, like as the Egyptians did over the Israelites.”65 In recalling the narrative 
of the Egyptian captivity, however, Aspinwall glosses over the murmurs of the Israelites 
upon being freed from the Egyptian yoke. The omission is telling. While his program for 
the appointment of magistrates indicates that in the Fifth Monarchy “the People of God” 
have a voice in government, Aspinwall’s specific legal recommendations argue 
otherwise. In his list of laws, Aspinwall closely follows the prescriptions found in John 
Cotton’s An Abstract of Laws and Government. In 1655, Aspinwall had published a London 
edition of Cotton’s work and, The Legislative Power follows An Abstract in classifying 
adultery as a capital crime.66 This insistence on making adultery punishable by death is, 
                                                     
64 Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 22. 
65 Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 23-4. 
66 Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 31. Aspinwall’s edition of Cotton’s An Abstract of Lawes and Government 
and included a dedicatory letter written by Aspinwall himself to the English reader, recommending the 
implementation of Cotton’s laws (John Cotton, An abstract of laws and government wherein as in a mirrour may 
be seen the wisdome & perfection of the government of Christs kingdome accomodable to any state or form of 
government in the world that is not antichristian or tyrannicall (London, 1655). Early English Books Online. 
Union Theological Seminary Library (New York). July 25, 2011. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:7901033). John Cotton was part of a committee, comprising, 
alongside Cotton, Sir Henry Vane (the governor), Hugh Peter, and Thomas Shepard, constituted in 1636 to 
write a body of laws for Massachusetts (Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate, 271). Cotton’s draft of the 
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on a certain level, redundant; such a law had been enacted in 1650, that is, six years 
before the writing of The Legislative Power.67 However, the bill for the ordinance against 
adultery included, in part thanks to the efforts of Edmund Ludlow and Henry Marten, 
rather strong safeguards for the accused.68 In addition, juries proved extremely reluctant 
to condemn adulterers to death. These two factors account for the extreme rarity of 
convictions in these cases.69 Similarly, in the New England of the 1630s and 1640s 
                                                     
 
laws, attempting “a synthesis between the Mosaic Law and current legal practice in the colony,” was never 
adopted (Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate, 272). An earlier edition than Aspinwall’s had been printed 
in London in 1641 (Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate, 272). 
67 The bill had originally been proposed in 1644, but not passed until 1650. In the 1640s, the Long Parliament 
had abolished the ecclesiastical courts and, until a secular counterpart was instituted, adultery, previously 
under the jurisdiction of bishops and church courts, was left unpunished (see Bernard Capp, “Republican 
reformation: Family, community and the sate in Interregnum Middlesex, 1649-60,” in The Family in Early 
Modern England, ed. Helen Berry and Elizabeth Foyster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 42; 
and Keith Thomas, “The Puritans and Adultery: The Act of 1650 Reconsidered,” in Puritans and 
Revolutionaries: Essays in Seventeenth Century History Presented to Christopher Hill, ed. Donald Pennington and 
Keith Thomas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 275). In 1644, a bill designed “to repress incest, adultery, 
whoredom, drunkenness, swearing, blasphemy, and other vices” was brought before Parliament (Thomas, 
“The Puritans and Adultery,” 275). However, more urgent matters and the Civil Wars took precedence and 
it wasn’t until 1649 that the Rump was able to revisit the bill (Thomas, “The Puritans and Adultery,” 276). 
The ordinance against adultery, incest, and whoredom was finally passed in May 1650 (Thomas, “The 
Puritans and Adultery,” 275). As Keith Thomas argues, the Rump was under both internal and external 
pressure to pass legislation to curb vice and, in many fast-day sermons, its members had been warned that 
allowing sin to go unpunished in England would certainly bring about God’s retribution against the nation: 
“it is noticeable that it was on fast days that the adultery bill tended to make most progress” (Thomas, “The 
Puritans and Adultery,” 276-7).  
68 The alleged adulterer “could produce witness for the defence; the indictment had to be filed within twelve 
months of the offence; the penalty for adultery did not apply to a man who did not know that the woman 
concerned was married; nor did it touch a married woman whose husband had been overseas for three 
years, or was by common fame reputed dead, or whose whereabouts had been unknown to her for three 
years. Most crippling of all, the confession of one party was unacceptable as evidence against the other; nor 
could husbands and wives testify against each other” (Thomas, “The Puritans and Adultery,” 278-9). 
69 Thomas, “The Puritans and Adultery,” 280-1. This does not indicate, however, that adultery went 
unpunished. Local authorities found ways to inflict less stringent penalties and, as Bernard Capp 
demonstrates for the case of Middlesex, adulterers were often punished by magistrates with binding-over 
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(Aspinwall’s model for the law on adultery), there was a marked reluctance from the 
legislators themselves to implement the death penalty for adulterers because they feared 
that the law had not been properly made public.70 The experience of the 1650 adultery 
act and of colonial Massachusetts indicated that attempts to modify customary law to 
comply with Mosaic Law could meet with stiff resistance. English- (and New English-) 
men were as recalcitrant against Mosaic Law as the ancient Israelites yearning for the 
fleshpots of Egypt. Magistrates, judges, juries, and witnesses resisted the strictures of the 
new law and mitigated its consequences. 
 Aspinwall’s solution is to argue against the need for juries in English courts. In 
the discussion of juries in The Legislative Power, it becomes evident that proposals for the 
wholesale removal of customary law are dependent on imagining England as a 
fundamentally different kind of political and social community, governed by new, 
Scripturally-based institutions. In a sustained attack on English courts, Aspinwall argues 
that “We have not one word of a Jury of twelve men, in all the Scripture; but the Judges 
having heard the cause and the Testimonies, they give Judgement according to the Law; 
and the party or parties are to sit down with this Judgment, as proceeding from Christ, 
                                                     
 
orders in cases where it seemed unlikely that sufficient evidence for a trial and sentence would be found 
(Bernard Capp, “Republican Reformation,” 51). 
70 R. H. C., “The Rule of Law in Colonial Massachusetts,” 1022. 
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who sitteth upon the Throne amongst the Judges.”71 In the 1640s and 1650s, complaints 
about juries and the procedure for calling witnesses were common and not the sole 
prerogative of Fifth Monarchists basing their arguments on Scriptural reasoning. Like 
many contemporaries, Aspinwall complains about the number of witnesses called 
during trials. Judges ought to be able to determine the case based on the evidence heard 
“at the mouth of two or three witnesses […] Deut. 17.6 and 19.15” and Aspinwall 
complains that the admitting “scores of witnesses” has come into usage only to “satisfy 
the lusts of the plaintiffs and defendants, and to increase the Courts fees.”72 Here too, on 
the issue of the number of witnesses, Aspinwall uses the same scriptural verses cited in 
Cotton’s An Abstract. But whereas Cotton uses the Deuteronomic places to give a 
minimum of witnesses needed to come to a judgment, Aspinwall uses them to limit the 
number of witnesses.73 Lawyers interested in reforming criminal trial procedure also 
complained that the process for selecting members of a jury needed to be improved; 
some went so far as to advocate abolishing their use altogether.74 However, what stands 
out about Aspinwall’s solution, rather than his complaints, is his insistence that juries 
are simply judges by another name:  
                                                     
71  Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 26; emphasis original. 
72 Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 26, 25. 
73 For Cotton’s argument, see An abstract, 29. 
74 See Veall, The Popular Movement for Law Reform, 1640-1660, 156-59. Similarly, the seemingly eccentric 
complaint about the number of witness evinced by Aspinwall is grounded on concrete problems with 
evidence giving in criminal trials. A particular target of complaints were procedures that denied accused 
prisoners the ability to call their own witnesses. Moreover, in Common Law criminal trials “[t]here were no 
rules about the admissibility of evidence at trials,” and “[h]earsay evidence was accepted” (Veall, The 
Popular Movement for Law Reform, 1640-1660, 19). 
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it may be granted, these Jurors are indeed Judges of the causes brought before 
them, and be men qualified and chose according to the Rule, and be obliged to 
give in their Verdicts and Judgements according to the perfect rule of the Word 
of Truth; and that in every circuit, whether town, hundred, or shire, such 
knowne fit persons may be constituted, I disallow not: it is not the name [of 
juror] I take offence at, for I would not strive at words.75 
 
The passage argues that the difference between judges and properly-understood jurors 
is only a linguistic one. However, in the seventeenth-century, as now, the role of jurors 
was simply a matter of assessing questions of fact and not law.76 Aspinwall’s willingness 
to argue that “Jurors are indeed Judges of the causes brought before them” shows that he 
views acts of legal judgment as simple questions of fact. The only task left for a judge is 
to discern matters of fact and to then classify them to fit a particular law.77 By equating 
all legal judgments to resolving questions of fact, Aspinwall reduces human judgement 
to the application of rules.  
                                                     
75 Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, “To the Reader”; emphasis original. 
76 For a brief history of the function of juries, see Veall, The Popular Movement for Law Reform, 1640-1660, 21. 
Veal points out that originally the jury “consisted of a body of witnesses summoned form the neighborhood 
to a trial to give evidence on oath because of their special knowledge of the facts” (21). While with time their 
function evolved from giving evidence to evaluating the evidence given by witnesses, even in the early 
seventeenth-century, they were allowed to use their own knowledge of the case to come to a decision, thus 
preserving some of the function of a witness (21). Sir Edward Coke, in The First Part of the Institutes, makes it 
clear that juries are to stick to matters of fact, not law: “Hereby it appeareth, that it is the office of the judges 
to instruct the grand assise or jury in points of law; for the grand assise or other jurors are triers of the 
matters of fact, ad questionem facti non respondent judices, so ad questionem juris non respondent juratores” 
(L.3.C8. Sect. 514. 295.a.295.b). 
77 Aspinwall makes clear that a verdict reached by a council modeled on the Sanhedrin would be infallible, 
with no grounds for appeal: “if the matter prove too difficult for the Judges to determine, then are they to 
repair unto the great Councel, and to advise with them Concerning the Law and the Judgement; […]. There 
was no appeale allowed, for that would have been a dishonour to Christ, to suppose his Judgment 
changeable, like mens minds and places are” (Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 26). Christ’s laws, 
administered by judges and officers drawn from and elected by the Saints, inevitably produce just verdicts. 
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 In addition, Fifth Monarchists’ insistence on the perfection of Deuteronomic law 
indicates that the same set of rules can organize all societies at all times. This becomes 
evident in his definition of laws: a law is “a prescribed Rule, for the well ordering of mens 
Conversation, whether in Church or in Common-wealth.”78 While the definition of a law 
as a rule or a measure of human interactions is traditional, Aspinwall uses it to argue 
that all civil laws are part of the Decalogue: “there is no Civil Law, but is comprehended 
within the Decalogue, which we call Moral Laws.”79 In this definition, the term 
“comprehended” is used in a strict and strong sense; civil laws do not simply have to 
agree with the Decalogue, they are rather contained in it. Aspinwall’s strict Scriptural 
faithfulness in matters of legal reform is intimately connected to his conception of the 
relationship between just laws and political society. In the very next page of The 
Legislative Power, he lists as an intrinsic property of all moral laws “that Laws and 
Judgements should be perfectly righteous, and by consequence unvariable; Such as do 
binde all Persons, in all of Ages, and in every Nation.”80 That is, all political societies can 
                                                     
78 Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 16; emphasis original. 
79 Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 16; emphasis original. By “Civil Laws,” Aspinwall means positive law 
rather than the technical term “civil law.” Aquinas also defines human laws as rules, see his definition in the 
Summa, Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 2. I will return to Aquinas’s definition of laws in greater details below in my 
discussion of John Rogers. 
80 Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 17; emphasis mine. John Brayne makes a similar point when arguing that 
Mosaic Law has never been abolished. The Law’s purpose is not simply to show us our sins, but it is also to 
teach us how to judge and punish them: “Such offences are committed among us, and such offenders are 
abiding with us, and the Law was made for them, not onely to shew them their sin, and let them al[o]ne in 
it, but to punish them for it, and judge them by it” (John Brayne, The new earth, or, The true Magna Charta of 
the past ages, and of the ages or world to come: called The Jews commonweal (London, [Thomason: Octob. 2], 1653), 
2. Early English Books Online. British Library (London). May 10, 2011. 
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be ruled by the same laws. Consequently, as a set of perfect laws has already been 
revealed and made available through Scripture, there is no legitimate human legislative 
action. In Aspinwall’s formulation, Mosaic Law is such that it completely classifies human 
action. In this framework, interpretation of the law is reduced to ascertaining the facts of 
the case; the law is presented as self-interpreting and almost self-administering. Justice 
and equity are self-evidently inscribed in the dictates of Scripture itself, which are 
independent of tradition or custom.81 I have been belaboring the point about jury reform 
because, as we have just seen, Fifth Monarchist calls for deep and broad legal 
reformation, both on the substantive as well as procedural level, are linked with their 
conception of legitimate legislative authority. But what Aspinwall and other Fifth 
Monarchists leave unanswered is how to apply Biblical law to seventeenth-century 
English society. That is, given that the customs and laws of the English people 
                                                     
 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99866304). Mosaic Law is a manifestation of the covenant 
between God and His people and, consequently, to accept any other law is to place human rule above God’s 
rule: “if mortal men made Kings, adjudge men to death for denying their supremacy, doth not man more 
justly dye for denying Gods? was it Treason to declare any other King in a Nation then he that is Legally 
such? How much more doth he deserve death, that sets up another King then God over men, by Idols?” 
(Brayne, The authority of God, 4). 
81 “Now the perfection of these Laws of Christs Kingdom appears, 1. By the equity of them, they are most 
just: 2. By the comprehensiveness of them; for though they be but few in number, yet may be extended in 
the application of them, by way of proportion, unto all cases and actions, that do or can fall out, at Sea or 
Land; all circumstances being duly weighed, and rightly applied. 3. By the extent of them, which reacheth 
all persons in all ages, and in all Nations. For unrighteousness, is unrighteousness, as well in one person as 
in another; as well in one age and in one Nation, as in another. And by consequence, as unrighteousness is 
one and the same, so also must the Judgment and the punishment be” (The Legislative Power, 32; underlining 
mine). 
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manifestly differ from those provided by Scripture, how are the people of England to be 
turned into the people of the New Israel envisioned by the Fifth Monarchists? 
  The question of how to relate Scriptural injunctions to contemporary societies 
formed by a host of traditions and customs is, of course, one that has been faced well 
before Fifth Monarchists published their proposals. As MacIntyre argues in After Virtue, 
it is a problem that explicitly resurfaced with the rediscovery of classical texts in the 
middle ages. In the twelfth- and thirteenth-century, as MacIntyre explains, this problem 
was manifested both on the theoretical level, with respect to the rediscovery of pagan 
philosophy, and on the practical level, with respect to the local pagan elements in 
European medieval society. How could scholars reconcile pagan with Christian virtue?82 
Fifth Monarchists, labeling all laws and forms of government that were not strictly 
Biblical as anti-Christian, attempt to bypass a version of this very question, that is, how 
to reconcile human custom with Scriptural law. However, as MacIntyre points out, the 
dismissal of pagan teachings in certain strands of medieval and early modern thinking 
left an intractable problem: “That problem is one of translating the Bible’s message into a 
particular and detailed set of discriminations among contemporary alternatives and for 
                                                     
82 When “in the twelfth century the question of the relationship of pagan to Christian virtues is explicitly 
posed by theologians and philosophers, it is much more than a theoretical question. It was indeed the 
rediscovery of classical texts […] which first occasioned the theoretical problem. But the paganism with 
which scholars such as John of Salisbury and Peter Abelard or William of Conches wrestled was partly 
within themselves and their own society, even if in a form quite other than that of the ancient world” 
(Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 
2007), 167). 
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that task one needs types of concepts and types of enquiry not made available by the 
Bible itself.”83 Fifth Monarchists are blind to the existence of this problem. At no point in 
his detailed accounts of law reform does Aspinwall express awareness of any need to 
give an account of how and by which means the English political community can become 
the New Israel. Fifth Monarchists’ account of the relationship between divine law as 
revealed through Scripture and human law or customs is oppositional and adversarial. 
For laws to be just, divine law must replace human law wholesale and, consequently, 
the institutions and forms of political association that are shaped and defined by those 
human laws and customs must also be supplanted. 
 By sweeping under the rug the question of how to reconcile Scriptural law with 
the institution and customs of seventeenth-century English political community, Fifth 
Monarchists reveal a central aspect of their understanding of political and legislative 
authority. How legal reform is brought about is inextricably connected to the conception 
of how laws and, more broadly, political authority compel individuals. In turn, how 
laws compel individuals is dependent on the question of where legitimate legislative 
authority resides. The connection between these two issues is evident, for instance, in 
Roman law. In particular, it is found in the Digest, a text that, as Brian Tierney explains, 
formed the foundation of all subsequent arguments over the binding authority of 
custom. The Digest argues that custom has the force of law exactly because it is an 
                                                     
83 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 167. 
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expression of the will of the people, that is, of the ultimate legislative authority in a 
community: “Since statutes are binding on us only because they have been accepted by 
the judgement of the people … What does it matter if the people declares its will by 
voting or by the very nature of its actions?”84 By contrast, Aspinwall views customs and 
human laws as having no power, other than brute force, to compel. His line of reasoning 
is made explicit in both An Explication and The Legislative Power. In An Explication, 
Aspinwall draws a distinction between human law’s and divine law’s power to compel: 
“all Gods laws doe binde the conscience, as well as the outward man, and so do not the 
Lawes of men.”85 His understanding that only divine laws bind in foro conscientiae has an 
important consequence for the relationship between political authority and the people. 
For Aspinwall, in a godly government under the rule of God’s laws, men would not be 
able to disobey due to conscientious qualms: “If God command, wee may not say, wee 
will suffer the punishment for our conscience sake: For there can be no Conscience, or 
pretence of Conscience against any Law of God.”86 Aspinwall’s denial of the possibility 
of conscientious resistance against political authority ruling through divine law is 
presented as a guarantee of stability; the claim that God allowed men to legislate is an 
                                                     
84Digesta, in Corpus Iuris Civilis, ed. T. Mommsen and P. Krueger, (Berlin: Weidmann, 1868), Dig. 1.3.32 
quoted in Brian Tierney, “Vitoria and Suarez on ius gentium, Natural Law, and Custom,” in ed. Amanda 
Perreau-Saussine and James Bernard Murphy, The Nature of Customary Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 118. 
85 Aspinwall, An Explication, 20; underlining mine. See also Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 17. 
86 Aspinwall, An Explication, 20-1. 
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“unsafe” principle.87 What is important to note in Aspinwall’s argument is not the 
simple statement that divine law binds in foro conscientiae, but rather the conclusion he 
draws from it: no other law binds the conscience and therefore no other law can create a 
stable and just political community because other forms of law can be objected to.  
 In chapter four, I argued that the proponents of the Agreement of the People at the 
Putney Debates used natural law to demand rights for the English people while, at the 
same time, they implicitly denied the expression of the people’s legislative authority 
embodied in customary law. Fifth Monarchists go further. They explicitly reject human 
laws as neither legitimate nor just. To paraphrase Aspinwall’s title, the legislative power 
is Christ’s at all times in all nations and Christ’s law, unlike human law, binds the 
conscience. However, we have seen that Aspinwall’s proposals required obedience to a 
government of the Saints as the only authority capable of applying and administering 
divine law. While Aspinwall’s arguments rarely cite authorities beyond the Bible, the 
Fifth Monarchist John Rogers, as we will see below, relies on Aquinas’s Summa Theologiæ 
for his discussion of legal reformation. However, even in the case of Aspinwall, 
comparison with Aquinas elicits two questions about the Fifth Monarchists’ conception 
of the law.88 First, in The Legislative Power, Aspinwall argues that not only do Christ’s 
                                                     
87 Aspinwall, An Explication, 20. 
88 As we have seen in the case of Aspinwall and Spittlehouse, Fifth Monarchists based their program of legal 
and political reform on their interpretation of Scripture and, in particular, of Daniel 7. Consequently, 
scholarly work on the movement has centered on their Biblical hermeneutics and their own prophetic 
productions as the basis for their political activities. While B. S. Capp’s careful account of the movement 
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acknowledged the presence of university educated members who “cited classical and mediaeval Greek and 
Latin authors, as well as Hebrew works,” overall scholarship on Fifth Monarchists still ignores non-
Scriptural influences on their thought (The Fifth Monarchy Men, 189). Capps’ account carefully discriminates 
between different Fifth Monarchists. While some of them, such as Spittlehouse, attacked university 
education, others, including Rogers, took university degrees. His acknowledgment of Fifth Monarchists’ 
engagement with the university curriculum is, however, brief and has gone largely unnoticed.  This 
tendency has been reinforced by interest in female Fifth Monarchist prophets, such as Anna Trapnel and 
Mary Cary. Though adding a welcome level of attention to women’s voices in the analysis of Interregnum 
politics, scholarly work on Baptist and Fifth Monarchist prophetesses centers, understandably, on the 
authorizing strategies in their verbal and written utterances as well as on the highly dramatic quality of their 
prophesying. Consequently, the visionary and prophetic element of Fifth Monarchists’ millenarian hopes 
has received more attention than the use of classical and medieval authorities by writers such as John 
Rogers. Phyllis Mack, for instance, argues that female prophets justify speaking and writing on religion and 
politics by appealing to the common representation of women’s “essence” as “irrational” and “emotional” 
and therefore more responsive to visions (Phyllis Mack, “Women Prophets During the English Civil War,” 
Feminist Studies 8 (Spring 1982): 23). In Visionary Women, Mack argues that seventeenth-century women 
prophets were far from “being a marginalized, hysterical fringe group,” but rather depicted themselves as 
“empty vessels” for God’s spirit in order to justify their religious and political activities (Phyllis Mack, 
Visionary Women: Ecstatic Prophecy in Seventeenth-Century England (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1982), 93, 33). Nonetheless, such emphasis on women’s prophetic strategies foregrounds the 
spectacular and “irrational” element in the Fifth Monarchist movement. On female prophecy in the 
revolutionary and restoration period, see also Elaine Hobby, Virtue of Necessity: English Women’s Writings, 
1649-88 (London: Virago Press, 1988), 26-53. Erica Longfellow argues that Anna Trapnel’s prophetic activity 
manipulates the categories of “private” and “public” around the question of women’s speech (Women and 
Religious Writing in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 149-79). Nigel 
Smith also focuses on Trapnel’s life and need to authorize her prophetic activity (Perfection Proclaimed, 45-
53). Similarly, when considering John Rogers’ writings, Smith pays close attention to the question of 
inspiration and prophecy (Perfection Proclaimed, 26-9, 33-45, 67-84, and 99-100 (conversion experience)). On 
Mary Cary, see also: David Loewenstein, “Scriptural Exegesis, Female Prophecy, and Radical Politics in 
Mary Cary,” Studies in English Literature 1500-1900  46 (Winter 2006): 133-53. In Ehud’s Dagger, James Holstun 
argues for the importance of women’s prophetic writings in the English revolution (262-6). Holstun pays 
attention to the educational function of female conventicles in Baptist and Independent churches for women 
prophets (260). However, the bulk of his discussion focuses on Trapnel’s prophecies against Cromwell as 
“symbolic actions” and her sexuality (279, 270-2). Trapnel’s prophetic actions and utterances are linked by 
Holstun to the larger Fifth Monarchist program. For Holstun, attacks on Fifth Monarchists “from Cromwell 
to the present,” including apparently Woolrych’s discussion in Commonwealth to Protectorate, are “strategic 
attempts to obscure […] the rational, democratic, and carefully elaborated quality” of the movement’s 
project (274). Like Christopher Hill, he sees Fifth Monarchist reform proposals as the result of “genuine 
small producer radicalism” (Ehud’s Dagger 275; cf. Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical 
Ideas During the English Revolution (London: Penguin Press, 1991), 97). Accordingly, instead of carefully 
questioning Fifth Monarchists’ accounts of political and legal reformation, Holstun likens Trapnel’s 
subversion of male authority by submission with the movement’s “servile yet anti-tyrannical fealty to King 
Jesus” (280). This strand of scholarship contributes to the association of Fifth Monarchist militant and 
aggressive millenarianism with “self-dramatization and exhilarating prophecies” based on “radical” 
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laws ensure a safe and stable government, they also apply “to all cases and actions,” 
leaving no crime or sin unaccounted for.89 Aquinas considers this very question in the Ia-
IIae. Quæstio 96, art. 2 asks whether human law should restrain all vice and Aquinas 
answer that “human law rightly tolerates some vices without suppressing them.” As 
MacIntyre argues, Aquinas’ answer stems from his conception of the educative role that 
the law has to play in a community. While the purpose of the law is to help habituate 
human beings into the virtues, the law is written for everyone in the community and, 
consequently, its primary goal is to educate those who are imperfect in the virtues. 
Aquinas warns that to demand perfect virtue from those who are only beginning to be 
educated in the virtues will be ineffective.90 As we have seen, Aspinwall’s discussion of 
law reform lacks exactly an account of how the English people are to be educated into 
becoming a New Israel. Aquinas’s account prompts a question about Fifth Monarchists’ 
legal theory: what is the role of the law in the moral life of the community?  
 Second, for Fifth Monarchists, the only legitimate legislative authority is Christ’s 
and his laws are revealed in Scripture. Aquinas, on the other hand, “appealed to natural 
reason, not only for his account of the purpose and function of law, but also for the 
                                                     
 
readings of the Old Testament (David Loewenstein, Representing Revolution in Milton and His Contemporaries: 
Religion, Politics, and Polemics in Radical Puritanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 116).  
89 Aspinwall, The Legislative Power, 32.  
90 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Natural Law as Subversive: the Case of Aquinas,” in Ethics and Politics: Selected 
Essays, vol. 2, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 47. 
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standard to which all positive legal enactments and administrative measures must 
conform, if they are to be appropriate law rather than merely an expression of the will 
and interest of those who enact and administer.”91 As we have seen, Aspinwall appeals 
to divine law to argue that rule by the Saints cannot be justly opposed. In doing so, he 
places the administration of the law beyond the grasp of the resources of natural reason 
which Aquinas sees as available to all members of the community. For Aquinas, since 
the role of the law is to promote the common good and to educate the members of a 
political community in the virtues, legislative authority ultimately belongs to the people: 
“The chief and main concern of law properly so called is the plan for the common good. 
[…]. Therefore to make law is the office of the entire people or the public personage who 
cares for them.”92 Moreover, since human law is from natural reason, every member of a 
community, if possessed of sufficient rationality, can determine whether laws conform 
to the standard set by reason. Central to Aquinas’ account of the people’s legislative 
authority is a specific conception of human reason and the role of law in the moral 
education of a community. What is the Fifth Monarchists’ conception of the role of 
human reason in government? The pamphlets we have considered so far do not directly 
address this question, but the work of John Rogers does. In particular, as we will see, 
Rogers borrows from Aquinas his discussion of reason as well as his definition of the 
                                                     
91 MacIntyre, “Natural Law as Subversive: the Case of Aquinas,” 47. 
92 Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 3, Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, vol. 28, trans. Thomas Gilby (Cambridge: Blackfriars Press, 
1965). 
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law, but comes to drastically different conclusions. What happens when the connection 
between human reason and legislation set out in the Summa is taken out of the context of 
Aquinas’s conception of education in the virtues? 
5.2 Reason and the Law: John Rogers’ Conception of Natural 
Law  
 John Rogers published his views on church discipline and a collection of 
conversion narratives from his congregation in Dublin in Ohel, or Beth-shemesh (1653). 
The son of a Church of England minster, Rogers was estranged from his family when he 
decided to enter the Presbyterian Church. After earning his degree from Cambridge in 
1646, he became the Presbyterian minister of a congregation in Essex, a position he left in 
less than one year. By the time he came to write Ohel Rogers had served as minister to 
Independent congregations, first in London and then in Dublin, and had begun to justify 
congregational ecclesiology in millenarian terms.93 On his return to England from 
                                                     
93 In Ohel, Rogers narrates how, at the age of ten, he was “struck” with the realization of his sinfulness while 
listening to one of William Fenner’s sermons (Ohel, 419-422). On Rogers’ life and on his time as a 
Presbyterian minister, see also: Suellen M. Hoy, “John Rogers: A Disillusioned Fifth Monarchy Man,” Albion: 
A Quarterly Concerned with British Studies 4 (Autumn, 1972): 125-146. Moving to London after leaving his 
position in Purleigh, Essex, Rogers attracted the attention of the council of state and was commissioned to 
Dublin in 1651. There, he gathered a congregation that admitted members who both believed in and 
opposed infant baptism. His sermons were attended by officers of the Cromwellian Army stationed in 
Ireland. In both London and Dublin, Rogers attacked Presbyterianism as imitating the Catholic church in 
their acceptance to church membership of non-visible saints (“Rogers, John (b. 1627),” Richard L. Greaves in 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, eee ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); 
online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23983 (accessed 
December 14, 2012)).  For a summary of Rogers’s career, see: Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, 261. In 
particular, Rogers had supported Cromwell and the army up to the dissolution of the Nominated Assembly, 
but starting in December 1653, with the beginning of the Protectorate, Rogers criticized Cromwell both 
privately and in print (Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, 103-4). For Capp’s reading of Rogers’s program of law 
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Ireland, Rogers begun to openly associate with Fifth Monarchists. While in Ohel, Rogers 
addresses legal reformation, and particularly condemns tithing, his full account of law 
reform along Scriptural lines appears in a later tract, Sagrir or, Doomes-day drawing nigh 
(1653). Sagrir was written while the Nominated Assembly was still sitting and explicitly 
links Rogers’ proposals for legal reform with the institution of a government by the 
Saints ushering in the Fifth Monarchy. Rogers, like other Fifth Monarchists, believes that 
England is on the verge of turning into a New Israel in covenant with God. In Sagrir, the 
members of the Nominated Assembly are charged with the task to bring about this 
transformation by enacting the laws of God: “O that you might bee used of God, for 
Christ in this work of magnifying his Law in this Commonwealth of England! (I was ready 
to say of Israel, but it is not so yet) which should be to your Fame for ever! The Lord Jesus 
awaken you with the noise of his Monarchy! which is swift in motion, and now nigh us! 
least you be surprised.”94 In language reminiscent of Jesus’ sermon on the last times found 
                                                     
 
reform, see The Fifth Monarchy Men, 158-60. On Rogers’ congregation in Dublin, see Crawford Gribben, God’s 
Irishmen: Theological Debates in Cromwellian Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 38-59.  
94 John Rogers, Sagrir, or, Doomes-day drawing nigh, with thunder and lightening to lawyers in an alarum for the 
new laws, and the peoples liberties from the Norman and Babylonian yokes : making discoverie of the present ungodly 
laws and lawyers of the fourth monarchy, and of the approach of the fifth, with those godly laws, officers and ordinances 
that belong to the legislative power of the Lord Iesus : shewing the glorious work incumbent to civil-discipline, (once 
more) set before the Parliament, Lord Generall, army and people of England, in their distinct capasities, upon the 
account of Christ and his monarchy (London, 1654), 140; emphasis original. Early English Books Online. 
Huntington Library and Art Gallery (San Marino, CA). May 10, 2011. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:12435814. There is an earlier edition of Sagrir, published on 7 
November 1653 (Capp, The Fifth Monarchy Men, 293). 
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in Luke 21, “And take heed to yourselves, lest at any time your hearts be overcharged 
with surfeiting, and drunkenness, and cares of this life, and so that day come upon you 
unawares” (Luke 21.34; underlining mine), Rogers warns the members of the 
Nominated Assembly that the kingdom of Christ is imminent and that they must hasten 
to turn England into the New Israel.95 In this passage, the “work of magnifying his Law” 
is connected with the necessary preparations for the Second Coming: to delay the 
reformation of English law is to risk being “surprised” by the coming of the Kingdom of 
Christ. Jesus’ warning about the destruction of Jerusalem in Luke 21—or in the parallel 
verses in Mathew and Mark—surfaces in both the opening and closing passages of 
Sagrir.96 In the address to the reader, Rogers uses Matthew 24 to admonish those who 
oppose the reformation of English law that Christ’s kingdom will come and find them 
unprepared: “the Floud begins; and as in Noah’s Arke after the doores were shut up there 
was no mercy.”97 The effect of these Scriptural echoes is to both urge quick action in 
implementing divine law as well as to depict the transformation of the “Commonwealth 
of England” into the Commonwealth of Israel as being but a slip of the pen away: “this 
                                                     
95 Rogers, like many other Fifth Monarchists, predicted that the Fifth Monarchy would begin in 1656 (Sagrir, 
“To the Reader of all sorts,” image 13). 
96 Rogers variously uses the parallel versions in the Synoptic Gospels. The verses parallel to Luke 21.31-8 are 
Matthew 24.34-51 and Mark 13.30-7. 
97 Rogers, Sagrir, “To the Reader of all sorts,” image 13; emphasis original. Matthew 24.38-9 warns: “For as in 
the days that were before the flood they were eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, until 
the day that Noe entered into the ark,/ And knew not until the flood came, and took them all away; so shall 
also the coming of the Son of man be.” Neither Luke 21 nor Mark 13 uses the image of Noah’s flood.  
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Commonwealth of England! (I was ready to say of Israel, but it is not so yet).”98 In Sagrir, 
the application of Deuteronomic law is both a necessary preparation for the kingdom of 
God on earth and a characteristic of Christ’s rule during the Fifth Monarchy. 
 At the same time, Rogers presents the adoption of Deuteronomic laws as a return 
to England’s true and original laws. In urging legal reform, Rogers weaves together the 
language of the ancient constitution with Fifth Monarchist millenarianism to target the 
“Norman and Babylonian yokes.”  The “Norman” yoke represents the common law and 
its lawyers, and the “Babylonian” yoke, tithes and the national clergy.99 The unjust 
“Norman laws” that oppress Englishmen cannot be amended by imposing new human 
laws. Rather, Scriptural law is the only true “Magna Carta” of England capable of 
preserving the “Rights, Priviledges, and Freedom” of all “Free-born Country-men.”100 Rogers 
conflates the language of the rights and freedoms of all “free-born” Englishmen 
preserved by the “Magna Carta” with Biblical language and texts. Mosaic Law, unlike 
the failed attempts at legal reform by the Rump, presents for Rogers a perfect body of 
law.101 This conflation of England and Biblical history is not unique to Fifth Monarchists. 
As we have seen in chapter four, the Leveller Cowling at Putney argued that he had 
“ever read in the word of God [that the sword] had recovered the rights of the people; 
                                                     
98 Rogers, Sagrir, 140; emphasis original. 
99 Rogers, Sagrir, “To the Reader of all sorts”; image 11; emphasis original. 
100 Rogers, Sagrir, “To the Reader of all sorts”; image 11; emphasis original. See also page 4 in the body of the 
tract. 
101 Rogers, Sagrir, “To the Reader of all sorts”; image 5. 
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that our ancestors had still recovered from the Danes and Normans their liberties, by the 
sword.” 102 Similarly, Rogers abstracts the rights and privileges of the English people 
from their specific historical context by presenting them as grounded in Biblical law. 
However, unlike Cowling, Rogers does not simply use Scripture as a warrant for action 
in recovering English rights, he also argues that those rights are fully defined and 
protected by Mosaic Law. In the opening letter to Cromwell, Rogers urges him to “wall 
us with the good and wholesome Lawes and Liberties of the People, as we were before the 
Norman invasion, or rather as Israel of old, Deut. 6.1.”103 Such laws are represented in 
Sagrir as ready to be directly and immediately implemented in England: “Why are there 
so many perplexable cares about the Lawes? Hath not God given you a Booke of Lawes 
ready to your hand? and can men make Lawes better then God?”104 
 While Rogers insists that it is obvious that men cannot make “Laws better than 
God,” the one hundred and fifty pages of Sagrir are dedicated to a lengthy justification 
and explanation of this call for reform. His justification is supported by extra-Biblical 
arguments. In the opening address to the reader, Rogers develops a threefold argument 
based on the law of nature, the law of nations, as well as on the law of God, to justify his 
“call” and “warrant” to propose legal reform.105 Rogers’s tripartite division of the law 
deserves attention because it brings focus to his understanding of the relationship 
                                                     
102 See chapter four above at page 453. 
103 Rogers, Sagrir, “To the Right Honourable The Lord. Gen. Cromwell”; image 3; emphasis original. 
104 Rogers, Sagrir, “To the Reader of all sorts”; image 5; emphasis original. 
105 Rogers, Sagrir, 4. 
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between the law and human community. Rogers defends his threefold definition of the 
law by rejecting the well-known classification by Ulpian in the Digest.106 Ulpian divides 
the law into natural law, which is common to all animate creatures; the law of nations, 
which is common to all human communities; and civil law, which is obeyed in a specific 
society or nation. Rogers opposes the definitions of the Digest and insists that the law of 
nature pertains only to rational creatures. Additionally, he subsumes civil law into the 
law of nations and replaces Ulpian’s third category, civil law, with the law of God.107 
Such redefinition creates an ambiguity in Rogers’ discussion of civil law, an ambiguity 
particularly problematic since the aim of Sagrir is to advocate for the reform of English 
civil law. In legal tradition, there had been little difficulty in distinguishing the law of 
nations from civil law. Civil law pertained to a particular society; the law of nations was 
shared by all nations. The thornier problem had always been that of distinguishing 
between the law of nature and the law of nations.108 Suarez, whom Rogers repeatedly 
cites on natural law, clearly separates the law of nature from the law of nations by 
                                                     
106 Rogers argues against the definition of natural law as being the law in common to all “sensitive 
Creatures” put forward by “greedy lawyers” Rogers, Sagrir, 33. 
107 Rogers, Sagrir, 7. For Ulpian’s classification, see Brian Tierney, “Vitoria and Suarez on ius gentium, 
Natural Law, and Custom,” 103. It is important to note that, when Rogers uses the term “civil law,” as in the 
case of Aspinwall, he clearly means the laws and statutes of a particular society, rather than the technical 
term “civil law.” Thus, for Rogers, “civil law” can indicate English common law. 
108 The problem can be traced back to debates in Roman law. Cicero, who is also invoked as an authority by 
Rogers, produced conflicting discussion of the distinction between the two types of law. On Cicero’s 
inconsistent definitions of the law of nature and the law of nations, see M. B. Crowe, The Changing Profile of 
the Natural Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), 36-41). Marcia L. Colish argues that the inconsistencies 
in Cicero’s treatment of natural law can in part be accounted by the differing aims of his rhetorical and 
political works, see The Stoic Tradition From Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, vol. 1 Stoicism in Classical Latin 
Literature (New York: Leiden, 1990), 95-101. For a discussion of the law of nations in the sixteenth-century 
context, see Brian Tierney, “Vitoria and Suarez on ius gentium, Natural Law, and Custom,” 101-124. 
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insisting that the latter is a form of customary law.109 Saurez’s solution, however, 
involves granting custom and repeated usage authority as law. What about Rogers’ 
approach? His opening account includes civil law in his discussion the law of nations. 
How does he distinguish the law of nations, and consequently civil law, from natural 
law? Rogers states that the law of nations is “drawn out of the Law of Nature, and the 
Principles of Reason, as so many Axioms or demonstrative Conclusions.”110 In giving this 
definition, Rogers registers, but does not attempt to resolve or clarify the problem in his 
classification: if the law of nations, including civil laws, is a direct consequence of the 
law of nature and the “principles of reason” why should they from two distinct 
categories? Indeed, Rogers equivocates by stating that since the two are so similar, he 
need not dedicate much space to discussing the law of nations: “This Law of Nations is to 
be brought out of the Law of Nature; and looking so alike the other, I shall say the lesse 
to it.”111  
 Rogers’ equivocation in distinguishing between the law of nations and natural 
law becomes even more glaring as he argues that his case for legal reform along 
Scriptural lines can be based on natural law. The law of nature “teaches us to maintaine 
and defend our lives and liberties; yea, and fellow-members too, against all injuries and 
wrongs.” In turn, “our liberties” are defined by divine law, which teaches us our 
                                                     
109 For Rogers’ explicit use of Suarez on natural law, see Sagrir, 9, 33, 36 and 106 (in connection with the law 
of God), and 44 (on the relationship between laws, reason, and natural law).  
110 Rogers, Sagrir, 7; underlining mine. 
111 Rogers, Sagrir, 7; emphasis original. 
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ultimate, supernatural telos.112 Having identified England’s liberties with Israel’s and 
basing its argument on the law of nature, Sagrir, though addressed to an English 
audience, generalizes the “our” in this passage. Citing Cicero’s De Officiis, Rogers argues 
that he must write to urge legal reform because the law of nature “commands and 
ordaines that every man endeavor and procure the good of another whatsoever he be, 
only because he is a man; otherwise all bonds of society, and mankind must needs run to 
ruin.”113 In this quote, Rogers paraphrases the argument put forward in De Officiis III.26-
28. The paraphrase is however stronger that the original, where Cicero argues that we 
must not harm another for our own benefit. Rogers instead explicitly extends this 
argument to indicate a duty to actively bring legal reform along Scriptural lines beyond 
the boundaries of England. He urges “our Army and Statesmen” to reform the laws of 
England’s continental neighbors in order to protect the Saints who live there:  
How durst our Army to be still, now the work is to do abroad? Are there no Protestants in 
France and Germany even now under persecution? […] it is the Lord hath sent for us 
thither, and calls for a part of our Army, at least, into France or Holland.114  
 
                                                     
112 Rogers, Sagrir, 4. In this passage, Rogers gives reference to Ephesians 5.29, “No man ever yet hated himselfe, 
but loves and cherishes himselfe” (Sagrir, 4; the text incorrectly gives the reference as Eph. 5.39). He defines the 
law of God through Luke 10.27: “The Law of God saies, Luk. 10. 27. Love the Lord thy God, &c. and thy Neighbor 
as thy selfe. Besides the Law of Nature, and Nations, the Law of God is unavoidably necessary (ad ultimum finem.)” 
(Rogers, Sagrir, 11; emphasis original). 
113 Rogers, Sagrir, 12; underlining mine. 
114 Rogers, Sagrir, 14-15; emphasis original. 
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In making this call for active military involvement in Europe, Rogers connects his 
argument for legal reform in England to the Fifth Monarchist understanding that the 
work of preparing for the kingdom of Christ extends beyond national bounds.115 As in 
the case of Aspinwall, for Rogers all human law, not just English, must be reformed.  
 In Sagrir, however, Rogers’ willingness to extend the reforming work of the 
English Army to other nations is clearly linked to a particular understanding of 
rationality. This conception of reason emerges from his discussion of natural law. For 
Rogers, “the Law of Nature is one and the same to all Nations (qu[o]d prima principia) 
inclining all a like (ad agendum secundum rationem) to things according to Reason.”116 
As we saw in chapter four, traditionally, positive law was considered “rational” and licit 
only if it did not contradict the law of nature.117 While positive law is not simply a set of 
direct consequences of the first principles of the law of nature, the two are related and 
                                                     
115 Steven Pincus has argued that Fifth Monarchists supported the Dutch War because they viewed the 
United Provinces as having failed to fully reform (Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of 
English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 115-25). Pincus thus sees a 
temporary alliance between millenarians, hoping for further reformation, and republicans, wary of Orangist 
factions in the United Provinces, in pursuing an aggressive policy towards the Dutch. Against the economic 
interpretation of the war, Pincus argues for an ideological alignment of republican and millenarian interests 
in the early 1650s (Protestantism and Patriotism, 85-6). In his account, hostility towards the Netherlands in 
1652-3 was formed by republican fears of Orangist factions and by the millenarian view that the Dutch 
reformation had stalled as the United Provinces had been corrupted by wealth and commerce (Protestantism 
and Patriotism, 115-25). Pincus’s account focuses on a broader group of millenarians than Fifth Monarchists, 
the “apocalyptics” in his terminology (Protestantism and Patriotism, 24, 76). Indeed, for Pincus, “there were 
no Fifth Monarchists” until after the movement crystallized around opposition to the Protectorate 
(Protestantism and Patriotism, n. 20 to p. 122). 
116 Rogers, Sagrir, 5. The marginal note to this passage cites Isidore: “Isidorus in lib. 5 c. 4. Etymolog. Jus 
naturale est commune omni nationi” (Sagrir, 5). I suspect, however, that here, as throughout Sagrir, Rogers is 
copying his quotes from Isidore from the questions on the law in the Summa (in this case, Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 
4). All of the quotations from Isidore that I have found in Sagrir are also quoted by Aquinas. Given Rogers’ 
extensive use of the Summa throughout the tract, it seems likely that he did not refer back to the Etymologies. 
117 See chapter four above, page 358. 
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human reason can recognize their connection. In this formulation, just human laws will 
incline individuals to act according to reason. In turn, acting according to reason means 
following the first principles of the law of nature. In Sagrir, Rogers partially appropriates 
and reshapes this understanding of the relationship between positive and natural law. 
For Rogers, acting reasonably also means acting according to the law of nature. More 
specifically, a reasonable action is one that is just and promotes the common good.118 The 
question, however, arises of how to judge whether a given action conforms to the 
dictates of reason and justice. To answer this question, Rogers distinguishes between 
understanding actions as virtuous in themselves or according to the principles of natural 
law: 
it is one thing to see vertuous acts, as they are actions in themselves, (for so they 
are to be considered in propriis speciebus, not of the Law of nature, but according to 
their vertue, which is given beside nature, as Art; or above nature, as grace, or the 
like) and it is another thing to see them as they are rationall, vertuous, and morally 
good, (as just, mercifull, &c.) and so they appertaine to the Law of nature; for every 
thing naturally inclines to operation according to its forme, as Fire to heat, Sun to 
shine.119 
 
This formulation of the distinction between actions as understood “in themselves” and 
actions as understood as “they are rationall, vertuous, and morally good” is borrowed 
from the Summa Theologiæ Ia-IIae, q. 94.120 In Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 3, Aquinas debates 
                                                     
118 Sagrir, 6; emphasis original. 
119 Rogers, Sagrir, 7. 
120 Rogers quotes, both with and, as here, without attribution, extensively from Aquinas throughout Sagrir. 
As we will see, in his discussion of natural law, Rogers works his way through the questions on law in the 
Ia-IIae. 
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whether all just acts belong to natural law and, in the passage used by Rogers, considers 
just acts both with respect to virtue and in general: “There are two ways of referring to 
acts of virtue, the first, in so far as they are virtuous, the other, in so far as they are acts 
of a certain specific kind. If we are speaking of them as virtuous, then all of them are 
matters for natural law.”121 Since humans are rational creatures, Aquinas goes on to 
explain, for them to act virtuously is to act according to reason: “All things have a 
natural tendency towards activity befitting their natures, like fire to heating. Since the 
rational soul is man’s proper form, he has a natural tendency to act according to reason, 
that is to say, according to virtue. Consequently in this sense all acts of virtue are of 
natural law, for each man’s own reason naturally dictates that he should act 
virtuously.”122 
 Rogers returns to Aquinas’ discussion of reason in the second chapter of Sagrir. 
There Rogers considers how reason interprets natural law in order to formulate just 
laws. The chapter opens with an argument for the necessity of good laws in promoting 
the wellbeing of a polity: “for civil Order and use, good and plain laws are unavoidably 
necessary; this will appeare upon the very definition of the Law, which is quoddam 
                                                     
121 “Dicendum quod de actibus virtuosis dupliciter loqui possumus: uno modo inquantum sunt virtuosi; alio 
modo inquantom sunt tales actus in propriis speciebus considerati. Si igitur loquamur de actibus virtutum 
inquantum sunt virtuosi, sic omnes actus virtuosi pertinent ad legem naturæ” (Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 3). 
122 Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 3. In my reading of Aquinas, I follow MacIntyre’s reading of the Summa in Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). As MacIntyre argues, the 
questions on law, Ia-IIae, 90-97 need to be read within the context of the rest of the Summa Theologiæ (Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?, 177-182). 
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dictamen practicae rationis, a certain dictate of practicall reason.”123 Though Rogers does not 
cite Aquinas in this passage, the Latin definition of the law is from the Summa Ia-IIae, q. 
91.124 In the Summa this definition is developed to explain the role of human law within a 
discussion of the varieties of law. But Aquinas’s classification of laws differs profoundly 
from Rogers’. What are the consequences of detaching one element from Aquinas’ 
specific system of classification? In question 91, Aquinas begins by considering the 
eternal law and then, having established its existence, he turns to natural, human, and 
divine law. Before returning to Rogers’ formulation in Sagrir, I will follow Aquinas’s 
discussion of the relationship between eternal and human law. Understanding this 
relationship will clarify Aquinas’ conception of the relationship between reason and law. 
In turn, how Roger appropriates the Summa’s discussion helps us to understand his 
formulation of the role of reason in legislating and governing. Starting with eternal law, 
Aquinas, quoting Augustine, explains that it is unlike other laws since it is “the supreme 
exemplar to which we should always conform.”125 All other laws are derived from the 
eternal law. Natural law itself is linked to the eternal law.126 In turn, human laws have 
force of law only in so far as they conform to natural law and thus to the eternal law. 
Consequently, for Aquinas, the definition of a legitimate human law is bound up with 
                                                     
123 Rogers, Sagrir, 31; emphasis original. 
124 See, in particular, ST Ia-IIae, q. 91, art. 3 for Aquinas’ use of this formulation in discussing human law. 
125 “lex æterna est summa ratio, cui semper obtemperandum est” (Ia-IIae, q. 93, art. 1; Thomas Gilby 
references Augustine, De lib. arb. I, 6. PL 32, 1229). 
126 Ia-IIae, q. 93, art. 3. 
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that of the eternal law. Aquinas explains that the eternal law is divine reason: “law is 
nothing but a dictate of practical reason issued by a sovereign who governs a complete 
community. Granted that the world is ruled by divine Providence, and this we have 
shown in the Prima Pars, it is evident that the whole community of the universe is 
governed by God’s mind.”127 What immediately stands out from this explanation is that 
Aquinas’s discussion of positive law is parallel to his discussion of eternal law. More 
precisely, human law stands to human communities in a relationship analogous to that 
of the eternal law and the universe. The account of human and natural law that follows 
is thus dependent on the eternal law, that is, divine reason and Providence. 
 Having begun his classification of the varieties of law with the eternal law, 
Aquinas moves on to natural law in the second article of quæstio 91.128 In this question, 
Aquinas rejects the possibility that the eternal law can be directly understood by 
humans and that therefore there is no natural law. Instead, natural law is the “sharing in 
the Eternal Law by intelligent creatures” and “the light of natural reason by which we 
discern what is good and what is evil, is nothing but the impression of divine light on 
us.”129 For Aquinas, we call natural law a law properly speaking because it is a sharing in 
the eternal law by rational creatures: “Even non-rational creatures share in the Eternal 
Reason in their own way. The way, however, for rational creatures is intelligent and 
                                                     
127 Ia-IIae, q. 91, art. 1. 
128 In my reading of Aquinas on the law and practical reason, I am indebted to MacIntyre’s account in Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality?, 173-82. 
129 Ia-IIae, q. 91, art. 2. 
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reasonable; that is why their sharing is called law properly speaking, since law, as we 
have seen, belongs to mind.”130 That is, natural law is how humans, as reasonable 
creatures, perceive the eternal law.131 What about human laws? In article 3, Aquinas 
gives the description of law that Rogers appropriates: “law is a kind of dictate of 
practical reason.”132 A significant change occurs in Aquinas’s discussion as he shifts 
focus from natural to human law. He notes that positive laws are the product of 
practical, rather than theoretic reason. However, just as human law is presented in 
parallel to eternal and natural law, in the Summa, the functioning of practical reason is 
discussed in parallel with theoretic reason: 
Now the processes of the theoretic and practical reasons are parallel; both, we 
have held, start from certain principles and come to certain conclusions. 
Accordingly we say this, that just as from indemonstrable principles that are 
instinctively recognized the theoretic reason draws the conclusions of the various 
sciences not imparted by nature, but discovered by reasoned effort, so also from 
natural law precepts as from common and indemonstrable principles the human 
reason comes down to making more specific arrangements. Now these particular 
arrangements human reason arrives at are called ‘human laws.’133 
 
                                                     
130 Ia-IIae, q. 91, art. 2, ad. 3. 
131 There is a crucial element in Aquinas’ account of the relationship between reason and law that is not 
immediately evident from his preliminary discussion on the law of nature. In Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality?, MacIntyre point out that for “Aquinas the single most important experience of human beings in 
relation to the divine law, whether in the form in which reason apprehends its precepts as the natural law or 
as revealed directly by God in the Ten Commandments, is that of disobedience to it, a disobedience 
ineradicable by even the best moral education in accordance with reason. Each particular act of disobedience 
is a consequence either of a corruption of reason by the force of some passion or of bad habit or some 
undisciplined natural tendency” (181). I will return to the problem of how fallen reason can be led astray 
when I revisit Aquinas in my discussion of shared moral deliberation and Milton’s The Readie and Easie Way 
below. 
132 Ia-IIae, q. 91, art. 3. 
133 Ia-IIae, q. 91, art. 3.  
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It is important to note, however, that Aquinas does not view practical reason as simply 
an application of theoretic reason. More precisely, Aquinas, following Aristotle, argues 
that both theoretic and practical syllogisms involve the same notion of logical 
entailment, but that practical reason is directed towards action while theoretic reason is 
directed towards knowledge.134 Consequently, an appropriate action follows the 
conclusion of a practical syllogism in the same way that a concluding statement follows a 
theoretic syllogism. However, a rational action will only follow a true practical syllogism 
for an individual who has been habituated in the virtues and has therefore redirected his 
desires towards the good. It follows that only the virtuous person can be practically 
rational.135 In Sagrir, Rogers also develops the same parallel between theoretic and 
practical reason.136 I will return to his treatment below in greater detail below, but at this 
point, it suffices to note that Rogers emphasizes the parallel between theoretic and 
practical reason without maintaining Aquinas’ distinction regarding the functions of the 
two. 
 Aquinas’s analogy between theoretic and practical reason and its further 
development in question 94 brings out an important aspect of how members of a 
community perceive natural law. In article 2 of quæstio 94, Aquinas notes that all 
theoretical inquiries are based on self-evident axioms that cannot be proved, such as the 
                                                     
134 Ia, q. 79, art. 11. 
135 See MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 136-41. 
136 Rogers, Sagrir, 31. 
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principle of non-contradiction. Similarly, “the first principle for the practical reason is 
based on the meaning of good, namely that it is what it seeks after. And so this is the 
first command of law, ‘that good is to be sought and done, evil to be avoided’; all other 
commands of natural law are based on this.”137 When discussing the self-evident axioms 
of theoretical inquiry, Aquinas notes that, while they may be self-evident, they are not 
equally known to all men.138 Given that Aquinas develops his discussion of practical 
reason by analogy of speculative reason, it becomes clear that not all persons will 
equally know what the good is. Such inequalities can, however, be remedied. By living 
in society, individuals can develop the moral virtues and acquire and exercise good 
practical reasoning.139 There are of course obstacles to an individual’s development in 
moral reasoning. In Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 4, Aquinas continues the analogy between 
theoretic and practical reason. While both practical and theoretic reason “proceed from 
common principles to particular conclusions,” they do so in different ways.140 This is 
because practical reason is concerned with the particular and contingent cases in which 
humans act:   
So then it is evident that with respect to general principles of both theory and 
practice what is true or right is the same for all and is equally recognized. With 
                                                     
137 Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 2. 
138 “No a truth is self-evident at two stages, one, in itself, two, in our minds. A proposition is self-evident in 
itself when the Predicate is of the essence of the Subject. At the same time the proposition may not be self-
evident to a man who does not know the definition of the Subject. […] Sometimes, […] propositions are self-
evident only to the well-informed, who know what the terms of the proposition mean” (Ia-IIae., q. 94, art. 2). 
139 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 174. 
140 Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 4. 
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respect to specific conclusions of theory the truth is the same for all, though all 
do not equally recognize it, for instance some are not aware that the angles of a 
triangle together equal two right angles. With respect to particular conclusions 
come to by the practical reason there is no general unanimity about what is true 
or right, and even when there is agreement there is not the same degree of 
recognition.141 
 
Aquinas considers two main forms of difficulty in deciding a just course of action. In 
certain complex cases, while one may know the general principles of just action, their 
application to our specific circumstances may prove difficult.142 In addition, the Summa 
considers a much more important type of difficulty. Aquinas argues that our desires to 
act according to the law of nature may be impeded by our own education and culture. 
As an example, Aquinas points to the report by Julius Caesar in The Gallic War that 
German tribes condoned theft: “the knowledge […] of what is right may be distorted by 
passion or bad custom or even by racial proclivity; for instance, as Julius Cæsar narrates, 
the Germans did not consider robbery wicked, though it is expressly against natural 
law.”143 Thus, for Aquinas, certain human laws can be pernicious to development in the 
virtues. 
 Such cases, however, are rare. The example of the Germans notwithstanding, 
Aquinas sees human laws as essential in forming a community within which individuals 
                                                     
141 Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 4. 
142 To illustrate how the details of a specific situation make it difficult to decide a just course of action, 
Aquinas turns to a traditional example in casuistry. While, in general, it is right to return a possession to its 
owner, nonetheless there are particular cases when doing so does not amount to acting according to reason. 
For instance, if the owner of the goods wishes to attack our country and his possessions would make that 
possible, we may abstain from returning them (Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 4). 
143 Ia-IIae, q. 94, art. 4. 
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can be educated in the virtues. Just as bad customs and bad positive laws can hinder our 
apprehension of the natural law, and thus hinder our ability to act justly, so do good 
laws and customs, by agreeing with the natural law, help us to pursue the good. In 
question 95, Aquinas considers the usefulness of human laws. Here, we see that good 
laws help to educate human beings. While all individuals are naturally inclined towards 
virtue, they nonetheless need to be educated in order to become fully virtuous.144 Thus, 
good human laws, by threatening with punishment those who act unjustly, can help to 
lead to virtue those who are not sufficiently inclined to it by other processes of 
habituation: 
for the young apt for deeds of virtue by good natural disposition or by custom 
or, better still, by divine gift, all that is required is the fatherly discipline of 
admonition. Not all the young, however, are like that; some are bumptious, 
headlong in vice, not amenable to advice, and these have to be held back from 
evil by fear and force, so that they at least stop doing mischief and leave others in 
peace. Becoming so habituated they may come to do of their own accord what 
earlier they did from fear, and grow virtuous. This schooling through the 
pressure exerted through the fear of punishment is the discipline of human 
law.145 
 
                                                     
144 Ia-IIae, q. 95, art. 1. 
145 Ia-IIae, q. 95, art. 1. In question 90, discussing the nature of laws in general, Aquinas explains that a law 
“is a kind of direction or measure for human activity through which a person is led to do something or held 
back,” and that “direction and measure come to human acts from reason.” Practical syllogisms, in Aquinas’ 
discussion, have the character of laws: “because the practical reason makes use of a sort of syllogism in 
settling on a course of action, as already noted in accordance with the teaching of Aristotle, a proposition 
can be discerned which is to practice what a premise is to the conclusions the theoretic reason draws. 
General propositions of this type in the practical reason which bears on what has to be done have the 
character of law; sometimes they are actually adverted to, sometimes they are convictions held merely as 
habits of mind” (Ia-IIae, q. 90, art. 1, ad. 2).  
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Thus, while Aquinas acknowledges that bad human laws, as in Caesar’s example of the 
Germans, can be detrimental to moral development, he does not take such cases to be 
paradigmatic of positive law. Human laws, though imperfect, are essential in the 
education of individuals in the virtues. By contrast, Rogers’ own account of human law 
and reason latches onto the cases in which human reason misapprehends the law of 
nature and bad laws corrupt a community. 
 Rogers’ distrust of human laws becomes fully evident in his discussion, 
developed in the third and fourth chapters of Sagrir, of the origin and authority of laws. 
Chapter three discusses the “right RISE and ORIGINAL of all good LAWS” and here, 
again, Rogers borrows extensively and without attribution from the Summa.146 Quoting 
from Ia-IIae, q. 96, art.1, Rogers reaffirms Aquinas’ point that the law should be made 
for the common good of all the members of a society.147 Then, further supporting his 
argument with Aquinas’ discussion of judgement and justice in IIa-IIae, q. 60, art. 6, 
                                                     
146 Rogers, Sagrir, 45; emphasis original. In this chapter of Sagrir, Rogers uses passages from both Ia-IIae, q. 
96 and from IIa-IIae, q. 60, art. 6. While Rogers does not cite Aquinas directly, the source is unmistakable. 
See, for instance, footnote 147 below. 
147 “Constituitur enim Communitas Cavitatis [sic] ex multis personis, &c. The commonality makes Laws 
consisting of many persons that represent the publick” (Rogers, Sagrir, 44-5). Rogers misattributes this quote 
to Isidore’s Etymologies, but the passage is from Aquinas, Ia-IIae, q. 96, art.1. In the Summa this passage is 
preceded by a quote from Book II of the Etymologies, which might account for Rogers’ mistake. Rogers’ 
translation of the passage is loose, but captures the general sense of Aquinas’ original argument. In Thomas 
Gilby’s translation: the law “should cover all manner of personalities, occupations, and occasions. Many 
types go to make up the political community, a variety of business serves its common interest, and, as 
Augustine observes, law is not instituted as a temporary measure but to persist throughout generations of 
citizens” (Ia-IIae, q. 96, art.1). 
 530 
Rogers concludes that “Law cannot be made but by the peoples voice.”148 While at first 
Rogers seems to argue that the people are the sources of all just laws, he immediately 
reins in this concession by specifying that “all this while I speake of a rightly principled, 
people that are in their capacity.”149 It is worth pausing over this specification that only a 
“rightly principled people” can justly legislate. As we have seen, Fifth Monarchists insist 
that the legislative power belongs only to Christ. How does Rogers reconcile divine and 
human authority to legislate? The key to this apparent contradiction is his discussion of 
how laws command obedience. In addressing the position that “Humane Laws do bind 
the Conscience to obedience,” Rogers makes the traditional point that only “just and 
honest” laws do so.150 This statement, in turn, raises the question of what it means for a 
law to be just and honest. Here again, Rogers heavily relies on Aquinas’ treatment of just 
laws in the Summa, but with one important and glaring omission. In Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 4, 
Aquinas argues that just human laws do have force in the foro conscientiae because they 
are derived from the eternal law. In contrast, laws that are unjust are not properly called 
laws and do not bind the conscience. According to Aquinas, a law is unjust if, first, it 
does not promote the common good; second, it is imposed by a lawgiver who does not 
have the appropriate authority; and, third, if it imposes a disproportionate burden on 
                                                     
148 Rogers, Sagrir, 46; emphasis original. 
149 Rogers, Sagrir, 47; emphasis original. 
150 Rogers, Sagrir, 42. 
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some members of the community. Rogers presents a similar definition of unjust laws.151 
However, while he adopts the first and third conditions for a just law as those in the 
Summa, Rogers omits the qualification that the legislator must have the appropriate 
authority. Instead, he substitutes a condition that to be considered just a law must also 
be executed fairly.152 
 The consequences of this modification become apparent in chapter four of Sagrir, 
a chapter on the “END, the OBJECT, and FOUNDATION of the LAW.”153 There, Rogers 
further explains that just laws are “not a spark struck out of humane Intellectuals […], but 
from an eternall light and wisdom, shining, ruling and irradiating the whole Universe,” 
that is, from Divine Reason.154 Thus, for Rogers, the true “fundamental law” is not the 
set of customs of England, but rather the eternal law, which should be the foundation of 
all human laws.155 What becomes evident in Rogers’ discussion of the relationship 
between human and eternal law is a relentless emphasis on laws that are immutable, an 
                                                     
151 Rogers quotes from Augustine’s De Libero Arbitrio and from the Summa, Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 4 to support his 
conclusion: unjust laws “are flaws not Laws, magis violentiae sunt quam leges, and as Aug. de lib. arbit. l. 1 c. 5, 
Lex esse non videtur, quae justa non fuerit, unde tales leges on obligant in foro conscientiae” (Rogers, Sagrir, 43; 
emphasis original). However, while Rogers attribute the entire quote to Augustine, the clause starting with 
“unde tales leges,” is Aquinas’s. 
152 Rogers, Sagrir, 42-3. 
153 Rogers, Sagrir, 97; emphasis original. 
154 Rogers, Sagrir, 105; emphasis original. 
155 Rogers, Sagrir, 106-7. As we saw in chapter three, the language of the fundamental laws of England had 
been used during the early 1640s primarily by Parliamentarian authors to justify actions that were at times, 
strictly speaking, illegal. Behind the term “fundamental law” was the idea that the law of England existed to 
promote certain fundamental liberties and ends of government. When “necessity” dictated, Parliament 
could act against the letter of the law in order to follow the spirit of the fundamental laws. As we see in the 
case of Charles I’s chaplain Henry Ferne, however, royalist writers could also appropriate this language to 
argue that the king’s duty was to uphold the fundamental laws of the land against Parliamentary disruption 
of the mixed constitution of England (see chapter three, page 188). 
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emphasis that we had already encountered earlier in the case of Aspinwall. Laws that 
closely agree with the eternal law are “unalterable” and “absolute,” and hence, for 
Rogers, more “excellent.”156 By contrast, customary laws are presented as corrupting 
departures from eternal law: “men make mere notions fundamental Lawes, and cry up 
such customes as are of eldest date for their fundamentals, they make Idols of their forms, 
and oberre from the real, unalterable Fundamentall Law.”157 Those who rely on custom for 
the fundamental law of the nation, stray into error; they “oberre”—wander off—from 
the real in order to worship mere “forms.”158 Non-Biblical laws are represented in Sagrir 
as idols of the fourth monarchy that require human sacrifices as they imposed on the 
Saints: “For though the Forme promises protection to its own Followers, yet the lives of 
others that prefer Reason must be sacrificed, and their blood poured out the quench the 
flame and the fury of enraged Formes and unreasonable Laws.”159 All deviations from 
                                                     
156 “The more agreeable the Laws are to this Eternall Law, the more unalterable they are; and the more they 
partake of this Fundamentall Law, the more absolute they are, and to be obeyed; and the more proper, 
excellent, and profitable are the acts and ends of such Laws” (Rogers, Sagrir, 107). 
157 Rogers, Sagrir, 106; emphasis original. 
158 An oberration is a “wandering about.” The term is derived from the post-classical Latin “oberrare,” that 
is, ob+errare, thus allowing Rogers to explicitly gesture towards an erroneous form of deviation from the 
original (Oxford English Dictionary, OED online, s.v.  “oberration” (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). 
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/view/Entry/129575?rskey=3CwI7F&result=5&isAdvanced=false 
(accessed January 16, 2013).  
159 Rogers, Sagrir, 43; underlining mine. This contrast between human custom and eternal law encapsulates a 
tension that is implicit through all of Sagrir. On the one hand, Rogers condemns human laws as too mutable 
and unstable and thus must be replaced by unalterable divine laws. On the other hand, he castigates 
Englishmen for viewing their customary laws as fundamental and, therefore, untouchable: “such an Idoll as 
men make of it, as if a noli me tangere were writ upon it, because it hath been of long continuance, and 
therefore must not bee altered” (Rogers, Sagrir, 107; emphasis original). These idols distract men from the 
laws of God, which are already set out in Scripture and ready to be implemented (Rogers, Sagrir, 140). As 
such, human laws and customs must be destroyed: “in the worke which is to doe for Christ, by burning the 
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Scriptural laws are but “Formes” and, as such, “unreasonable.” Human legislation is 
collapsed into the application of Scriptural law. Rogers can remove Aquinas’s condition 
that just laws must be enacted by a legislator with the appropriate authority because, in 
his account, there is no just human legislative authority. Rogers’ use of such a static 
image of the law is an attempt to negate the need for human reason to discern what laws 
are needed in each community and how these laws may change through the historical 
development of different nations. The notion that one set of laws applies to all nations at 
all times allows Rogers to present a reduced role for human reason.  
 Aquinas, on the other hand, provides a greater role for human reason and laws. 
Unlike Rogers, Aquinas argues that mutability is important in human laws as they adapt 
to a given community. Not all the principles of Scriptural law are equally intelligible to 
all people at all times. Consequently, for laws to be effective in educating individuals 
and communities in the virtues, they have to take into account the particular conditions 
of that community. A good lawmaker, like a good teacher, will craft laws that are suited 
for educating that given community:  
                                                     
 
Images, and pulling downe the Groves, wherein so much sinne hath been committed; so by burning those 
Lawes, and pulling downe those Courts, Termes and Lawyers” (Rogers, Sagrir, 138; emphasis original). In 
chapter four above, I considered the use of iconoclastic language by Sexby and Urquhart in attacking, 
respectively, Cromwell and the Rump (419-23). Both polemicists linked the work of the iconoclast with that 
of the political reformer: the iconoclast sets Englishmen free from the tyranny of idol-like laws and forms of 
government. In Sexby’s Killing No Murder, in particular, I argued that Sexby’s attack of the “formalities” of 
the common law ironically undermines the authority and reason of the common people even as it claims to 
defend them. Rogers goes further. As we have just seen, he insists that human reason is idolatrous as soon 
as it attempts to legislate rather than to implement Scriptural law. 
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law is established as a kind of rule or measure for human acts. Now, as noted in 
the Metaphysics, a measure ought to be of the same kind as the thing it measures; 
different things have different standards. Hence laws should be appointed to 
men according to their condition; Isidore remarks how law should be possible both 
according to nature and the custom of the country. The ability of and resource for 
action and a certain way spring from an interior disposition or habit; the same 
course of action is not possible for a man who has a habit of virtue and for a man 
who lacks it, nor for a grownup and a child.160 
 
Hence, human laws can change over time to adapt to changing conditions in a 
community, as Aquinas discusses in question 97. More precisely, for Aquinas, while 
“natural law comprises universal commands which are everlasting,” human law 
“comprises particular commands to meet the various situations that arise.” That is, the 
general principles of natural law can be expressed in the particular principles embodied 
by positive laws in a variety of ways that can be adapted through time both as we learn 
how to write better laws and as we see abuses of current laws.161 Therefore, for Aquinas, 
changing human laws that vary from community to community are not a sinful 
deviation from divine or natural law. On the contrary, human laws—when they are just 
and thus do not violate natural law—form an educative framework for the members of a 
community. Moreover, Aquinas argues that humans are naturally inclined towards the 
precepts of natural law via their participation in the eternal law by the means of 
                                                     
160 Ia-IIae, q. 96, art. 2. 
161 However, Aquinas cautions about changing laws too easily since older laws bring greater respect due to 
tradition (Ia-IIae, q. 97, art. 2). 
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reason.162 Because of this, just human laws are implementations within a specific 
historical and political context of the precepts of natural law. 
 The contrast with Rogers could not be starker. As we have seen, Rogers argues 
that only just laws, promulgated by a “rightly principled people” bind in foro 
conscientiae. However, in his or other Fifth Monarchists’ writings, there is no account of 
how a people may become “rightly principled.” While Rogers insists that the end of 
good laws is “the publick good, freedome, and safety,” even the best laws cannot help in 
educating the people into the virtue necessary for liberty. As Rogers vividly expresses it:  
The Object of the Law […], about which the Law is conversant and takes most speciall 
congnizance [is] wicked men, in their wicked actions, whom the Law is to curb and restraine 
[…] the Apostle therefore in 1 Tim. 1.9 sayes, We know the Laws is not made for a righteous 
man, but for the lawless, and disobedient, for ungodly, and for sinners, for unholy, and prophane, 
for murderers, &c., and whoremongers, for men-stealers, and liars, and liars, and perjured 
persons, &c., that is, for their punishment, to the muzzling of the mad world, and their 
wolvish natures, that would tear a peeces the innocent, and destroy the Lambs of equity, 
truth, and honesty.”163 
 
                                                     
162 Ia-IIae, q. 93, art. 2. 
163 Sagrir, 103-4; underlining mine. 
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The law’s only concern is to separate the “wicked” from the “innocent” and to “muzzle” 
“the mad world, and their wolvish natures.” While Sagrir follows the Summa in arguing 
that human reason can discriminate between just and unjust laws by discerning whether 
they agree with the law of nature, Rogers comes to a drastically different view of human 
law and legislative authority than that proposed by Aquinas. What Rogers leaves out 
from his adaptation of the account of the law in the Summa is the legislative authority 
granted to custom. As I will argue in the next section, Aquinas views custom as a 
legitimate form of expression of human rationality and, as such, an expression of the 
common people’s legislative authority. This omission of the role of custom, in turn, leads 
to an impoverished conception of rationality, one shared by John Milton in The Readie 
and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth (1660).  
5.3: Milton’s “Readie and Easie Way” and the Rational Citizen 
 Why focus on the similarities of the concept of reason between Milton in The 
Readie and Easie Way and the Fifth Monarchists? Milton demonstrated little interest in the 
kind of millenarianism found in the writings of Aspinwall or Rogers and, in the first 
edition of The Readie and Easie Way, explicitly attacks those who attempted to bring about 
a theocracy by “pretending to a fifth monarchie of the saints” (CPW VII: 380-1).164 This 
                                                     
164 David Loewenstein notes that while Milton removes his rebuke in the second edition of The Readie and 
Easie Way, he nonetheless opposes “extreme militant radicals like the zealous Fifth Monarchists with their 
chiliastic ideology” and that Jesus’ calm demeanor in Paradise Regained can be read as, in part, reflecting on 
the failure of Thomas Venner’s rising in London (Representing Revolution in Milton and His Contemporaries, 
256). 
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first edition of the pamphlet (February, 1660) was composed and published as the Rump 
Parliament, which had been recalled by the Council of State in December 1659, prepared 
writs for elections to replenish its numbers. The second edition (April, 1660) was 
published after the Rump had been forced to readmit the secluded members by General 
Monck. The newly-reassembled Long Parliament called for general elections for a new 
Parliament, issuing writs that did not disqualify royalists from voting or standing for 
election.165 Even as the return of monarchy looked like a foregone conclusion, Milton 
“thought it best not to suppress what I had written, hoping that it may now be of much 
more use and concernment to be freely publishd, in the midst of our Elections” (CPW 
II:408). The Readie and Easie Way warns England of the danger of the imminent return of 
the king and advocates instead for a Commonwealth governed by a permanent Grand 
Council.166 Historical and literary scholarship on Milton’s proposals for England’s 
                                                     
165 Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution: 1625-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 765-73. See 
also, the introduction to The Readie and Easie Way, CPW VII:398-9. For a discussion of the difference between 
the two editions, see Stanley Stewart, “Milton Revises The Readie and Easie Way,” Milton Studies 20 (1984): 
205-24. Stewart places Milton’s pamphlet in dialogue with The Censure of the Rota and compares the two 
editions of The Readie and Easie Way. 
166 There is a consensus in the scholarship that while The Readie and Easie Way provides constitutional 
recommendations, these are secondary to the tract’s main purposes. Jonathan Scott argues that the tract’s 
“much-derided” Grand Council is Milton’s attempt to deal with emergent political instability and not a plan 
for long-term governance of England (Commonwealth Principles: Republican Writing of the English Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 146). Barbara K. Lewalski also views the proposals in The 
Readie and Easie Way as responding to the contemporary constitutional crisis. In “Milton: Political Beliefs and 
Political Methods,” she places the two editions of The Readie and Easie Way within the rapidly changing 
political situation of early 1660 and argues that rather than being ‘utopian,’ the tract is “in fact endeavoring 
to deal directly with existing conditions” (“Milton: Political Beliefs and Political Methods, 1659-60” in PMLA 
74 (Jun., 1659): 191-202; 194). In her more recent The Life of John Milton, Lewalski argues that “there is nothing 
of utopia in [The Readie and Easie Way], but equally clearly it runs counter to political reality, given the 
vociferous demand of the English people to be rid of the all-too-permanent Long Parliament and its Rump” 
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government describes this late prose work as “republican” and therefore more closely 
aligned with writers such as Machiavelli and Marchamont Needham than with the Fifth 
Monarchists.167 For Nigel Smith, The Readie and Easie Way, especially the first edition, is a 
                                                     
 
(Barbara K. Lewalski, The Life of John Milton (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 375). Laura Lunger 
Knoppers, “Milton’s The Readie and Easie Way and the English Jeremiad” in Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics 
deemphasizes the document’s constitutional recommendations. Instead of considering the details of the 
political events surrounding the publication of the pamphlet, she focuses on the question of form and argues 
that The Readie and Easie Way is primarily a jeremiad (Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton’s Prose, ed. 
David Loewenstein and James Grantham Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 213-25). 
This classification, thought occasionally contested, has been reconciled with Milton’s “persuasive” and 
“republican” aims in The Readie and Easie Way. David Norbrook, in Writing the English Republic, argues that 
while Milton rhetorically presents himself as the isolated Jeremiah speaking only to trees and stones, 
nonetheless, the pamphlet aims at persuasion and reflects Milton familiarity with the rapidly evolving 
political arguments of 1660 (Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 415-6). However, Thomas Corns, in Uncloistered Virtue, argues against 
the usefulness in applying the term “jeremiad” to The Readie and Easie Way and warns against creating 
“redundant genre categories” since “only intermittently does Milton slip into the jeremiad mode” 
(Uncloistered Virtue: English Political Literature, 1640-1660 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 283-4). Nigel 
Smith, in Literature and Revolution in England, 1640-1660, argues that the jeremiad classification ought to be 
taken seriously, but highlights the republican nature of the proposals in the pamphlet (Literature and 
Revolution in England, 1640-1660 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 193-5).  
167 I put the term “republican” in quotations because it has been used to describe a variety of modes of 
political thought. Pocock emphasizes the debt that classical republicanism owes to Aristotle’s conception of 
citizenship. The central aspect of republicanism is not a specific constitutional recommendation, but rather a 
form of self-governing citizenship. In this version of republican theory, man is “naturally a citizen and most 
fully himself when living in a vivere civile” (J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political 
Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 39). As 
explained more fully in his magisterial account of republicanism, The Machiavellian Moment, Pocock argues 
that in republican thought, humans are seen as political animals who participate in the life of the 
community by both ruling and being ruled through the cultivation and exercise of the virtues (The 
Machiavellian Moment, 66-74; I will return to this definition in greater detail below in the main text). In 
tracing the emergence of republicanism in England, Pocock argues that republicanism could not take roots 
in England before the onset of the Civil Wars. In Pocock’s account, James Harrington is the paradigmatic 
figure in English republicanism. Blair Worden, agreeing with Pocock’s timeline for the origins of English 
republicanism, argues that republicanism is distinguished by its constitutional recommendations; 
republicans are committed to government without a king (Blair Worden, “Republicanism, Regicide and 
Republic: the English Experience,” in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, vol. 2. Republicanism and 
Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, ed. Martin Van Geldern, and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 307). David Norbrook, on the other hand, argues for a broader definition 
of republicanism, deemphasizing the constitutional aspect highlighted by Worden. He recognizes a 
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republican, even Machiavellian, text. While Smith does acknowledge the pamphlet’s 
pessimistic view of the English people, he argues that it is “in fact a development 
consistent with Milton’s own republicanism. It is possible to regard the two The Readie 
and Easie Ways as equivocating pamphlets, yet still as republican as the earlier works: 
less democratic but equally republican.”168 Similarly, David Norbrook concedes that 
Milton’s proposals in The Readie and Easie Way for a government by a permanent 
“oligarchy” represent “opinion-forming and the active life [as] burdens to be taken by 
the few.” Nonetheless, Norbrook argues that Milton “both practices and preaches a 
commitment to the power and value of republican language.”169 Thomas Corns, 
surveying the development of Milton’s political views from the late 1640s to the 
Restoration, describes Milton’s republicanism as being “more an attitude of mind than 
                                                     
 
definable group of English republicans in the mid-seventeenth-century who, though divided on whether 
good government could include a monarchical element, shared a concern with “civic virtue and 
responsibility” (Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 19). Quentin Skinner focuses on the concept of liberty as central to 
republican (or neo-Roman) thinkers in the 1640s and 1650s (Visions of Politics, vol. 2, Renaissance Virtues, 
chapters eleven and twelve). The neo-Roman concept of libertas posits that subject are only free if they live 
under the rule of law, rather than by the will of the ruler, though benevolent (Visions of Politics II: 315). 
Having singled out this understanding of (personal) liberty, Skinner sees neo-Roman writers, and above all, 
Machiavelli, as concluding that libertas can only be obtained if a community is organized by a system of self-
government (Visions of Politics II: 198-9). More broadly, some scholars have taken to describing specific 
idioms as “republican.” For instance, Michael Mendle sees the language of “common good” and of “salus 
populi,” at least when deployed by Parliamentarian polemicists, as republican (Michael Mendle, Henry Parker 
and the English Civil War, 40). 
168 Nigel Smith, Literature and Revolution in England, 1640-1660 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 193-
6; emphasis mine. Jonathan Scott concurs with Smith’s assessment that The Readie and Easie Way is consistent 
with Milton’s earlier political writings, even as it attempts to respond to the emergency of the impending 
Restoration (Jonathan Scott, Commonwealth Principles: Republican Writing of the English Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 146). 
169 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, 412. 
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any particular governmental configuration,” but republicanism nonetheless. In 
particular, in Corns’ account, The Readie and Easie Way sketches a proposal for a “free 
commonwealth founded on the service of the godly.”170 Like Corns, Martin Dzelzainis 
argues that Milton’s political writings produced in the 1640s and 1650s are based on an 
unwavering emphasis on a people’s “right to self-determination.”171 The Readie and Easie 
Way constitutes a continuation of Milton’s earlier republican thought and presents 
“familiar arguments in a familiar idiom.”172 Along similar lines, in his account of 
seventeenth-century republicanism, Blair Worden argues that Milton adopts the classical 
republican language introduced in England by Marchamont Nedham. The Readie and 
Easie Way is an attempt to pragmatically preserve a republican government in the 
commonwealth as the people rush back to monarchy.173 The picture that emerges from 
the scholarship on The Readie and Easie Way is of Milton as a divided author. On the one 
hand, he is a republican writer, concerned with educating citizens to become capable of 
virtuous self-government. On the other hand, the pamphlet articulates his political 
despair; for Milton, most Englishmen are simply not ready to participate in this form of 
                                                     
170 Thomas Corns, “Milton and the Characteristics of a Free Commonwealth,” in Milton and Republicanism, 
ed. David Armitage, Armand Himy and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
41. 
171 Dzelzainis, “Milton’s Classical Republicanism,” in Milton and Republicanism, 20-1. In a more recent essay, 
following Quentin Skinner’s definition of republican libertas, Dzelzainis describes Milton’s republicanism as 
a “commitment to a politics of virtue” and traces Milton’s conception of liberty to his readings of Justinian’s 
institutes in the early 1640s (Martin Dzelzainis, “Republicanism,” in A Companion to Milton, ed. Thomas 
Corns (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 300-2). 
172 Dzelzainis, “Republicanism,” 308. 
173 Blair Worden, Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England: John Milton, Andrew Marvell, Marchamont 
Nedham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 350-7. 
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political life.174 By considering The Readie and Easie Way in light of my discussion of the 
writings of Fifth Monarchists, I aim to address what conception of rational life underlies 
this text’s argument for “republican” forms of government while representing 
Englishmen as irrational. If rational and virtuous political participation is an essential 
prerequisite to republican conception of social life, what are the consequences of a 
“republican” text ruling out most members of the community from political life? 
 Before turning to the text of The Readie and Easie Way, the term “republican” itself 
deserves more attention. As I noted above, this term has come to acquire a variety of 
shades of meaning in the scholarship. However, the most influential account of 
republicanism is found in J. G. A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment (1975). In his study 
of classical republicanism, Pocock reconstructs the emergence of “a civic consciousness” 
in England in the mid-seventeenth-century. In this account, while in Italy republican 
ideals had been articulated in the late-fifteenth- and sixteenth-centuries, the 
development of an English civic consciousness had to wait until the Civil Wars and the 
                                                     
174 Recently, however, Ethan H. Shagan has argued that this tension is an intrinsic part of the early modern 
republican view of liberty: seventeenth-century English republican writers, including Milton, supported a 
theory of “moderate liberty” found in “a complex vision of good government as equally free both from 
external domination and from unbridled will or unrestrained appetites of its people” (Ethan H. Shagan, The 
Rule of Moderation: Violence, Religion and the Politics of Restraint in Early Modern England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 257). In Shagan’s account, republicans who adopted such view of liberty 
did not balk at excluding large sections of the people: “republicans did not seem to mind a commonwealth 
in which many or even most English people existed in [a] state of unfreedom” because “the poor” were 
denied citizenship (The Rule of Moderation, 270). Shagan concludes that republican discourse attempted, by 
proposing a moderate conception of liberty, to produce a much more limited version of political 
participation than that experienced by Englishmen during the revolutionary years (The Rule of Moderation, 
285-6). Republican authors depicted the moderate, “middle sort” as examples virtuous self-rule; they were 
seen, to use Milton’s characterization in the first Defence, as prudentissimi, most prudent and capable of 
rational participation in the political life of the commonwealth (The Rule of Moderation, 245). 
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regicide displaced other forms of political thought.175 Republican ideals had to displace 
the traditional conceptualization of England as a “territorial monarchy” and could not 
do so until the monarchy was abolished. The drastic change in the facts of England’s 
political situation in the 1640s and 1650s forced an ideological reorientation.176 Pocock 
argues that in the traditional view of England as a “territorial monarchy,” the English 
people form “a fellowship of reason, capable of cognizing rational laws, a fellowship of 
experience, capable of generating a body of remembered customs which became its 
second nature,” but not a “fellowship” of citizens. Only after the regicide, a new 
understanding of political association could supplant the traditional view. Drawing 
from classical and particularly Aristotelian sources, republicanism furnishes what 
Pocock sees as a new political language. Through it, the English people could come to 
understand themselves as forming “a fellowship of action or a partnership of directing 
virtues in which men were intelligently participant according to the diversity of their 
individualities.”177 The introduction of republican language forms a decisive break with 
pre-Civil War political thought. While Pocock recognizes the presence of a humanist 
political language prior to the constitutional crisis of the seventeenth-century, he argues 
that it is limited to “the image of the humanist as counselor to his prince.” This kind of 
                                                     
175 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 333-341. 
176 “In the unheralded collapse of the forties and fifties, attempts both radical and conservative were made to 
restate the terms on which Englishmen as civic beings lived with one another; and in this endeavor theories 
of classical republicanism played their part” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 348). 
177 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 334; emphasis mine. 
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humanism does not produce a republican “citizen”: “the community of counsel does not 
become a republic in the acephalous sense; […] it remains a corpus of which the prince is 
head, a hierarchy of degree in which counsel is given by every man sitting in his 
place.”178 In Pocock’s account of the emergence of “civic consciousness” in England, we 
see Englishmen learning to see themselves as “citizens” or “political animals,” 
participating “intelligently” “according to the diversity of their individualities.” As I will 
argue in this section, central to Pocock’s characterization of the change from 
“traditional” to republican political understanding is the claim about “rational” political 
participation. Only once they start to see themselves within a republican framework do 
Englishmen become capable of being fully rational as members of a commonwealth.179 
                                                     
178 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 339. Though not unchallenged, Pocock’s timeline for the development 
of republicanism in England has dominated scholarship of the period. For instance, Blair Worden has 
argued that English republicanism does not begin until the execution of the king and the declaration of 
England as a “free state” (Blair Worden, “Milton’s Republicanism and the Tyranny of Heaven,” in 
Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. Giselda Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 225-6). Worden’s account of the sources of English republican though 
varies from Pocock’s. While in The Machiavellian Moment, Pocock emphasizes the role of Aristotelian virtue 
in shaping Renaissance and early modern republicanism, Worden focuses on the influence of Ciceronian 
accounts of virtue and of Livy’s histories (Blair Worden, “Marchmont Nedham and the Beginnings of 
English Republicanism, 1649-1656,” in ed. Wootton, Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society (1994), 45-
81). Glenn Burgess, drawing on Pocock’s earlier work, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, posits that 
the dominant language of English political thought in the first half of the seventeenth-century was that of 
the common law (Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political 
Thought (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press,1993), 19-59). Burgess sees, however, 
a “crisis of the common law” beginning, after 1625, to disturb the early Stuart consensus. This crisis, 
deepening throughout Charles I’s rein, arose from a sense that English law had been unable to protect the 
property rights of the subject (“Repacifying the Polity: The Responses of Hobbes and Harrington to the 
‘Crisis of the Common Law,’” in Soldiers, Writers, and Statesmen of the English Revolution, ed. Ian Gentles, John 
Morrill, and Blair Worden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 202-28). 
179 As will become evident in my discussion, this is not simply a matter of how seventeenth-century authors 
represented Englishmen. Pocock argues that the “traditional” conceptualization of England as a territorial 
monarchy involves a less than rational form of political participation. This outlook has seeped into 
 544 
 How is rational political participation and legislation represented in Pocock’s 
account? In the Machiavellian Moment, Pocock argues that the earlier notion of England 
as a territorial monarchy could not produce a concept of the individual as rationally and 
actively participating in the political life of a commonwealth. In a territorial monarchy, 
the individual took on positive being primarily as the possessor of right—rights 
to land, and to justice affecting his tenure of land—and a structure of ‘ascending 
authority’ existed mainly as a structure of customs, jurisdictions, and liberties, in 
which such rights were embodied and preserved and which rose to meet the 
descending structure of authority that existed to command its continuance and 
enforcement. […] It can be strongly affirmed, however, that to define the 
individual in terms of his rights and his duties, his property and his obligation, is 
still not enough to make him an active citizen or a political animal.180 
 
Pocock further argues in Virtue, Commerce, and History, that there is a unbridgeable 
conceptual difference between the understanding of political life in, on the one hand, the 
“traditional” or “juristic” outlook and, on the other, in the republican mode of 
thought.181 Central to both of these traditions is “political liberty,” but the term “liberty” 
is used differently in the juristic and republican context. Adopting the terminology 
made famous by Isaiah Berlin, Pocock argues that the juristic tradition employs a 
                                                     
 
subsequent scholarship of Milton’s political prose works, aided by Milton’s own depiction of the people as 
irrational when yearning for the return of the monarchy. 
180 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 335. 
181 “We have, then, two vocabularies in which political thought has been conducted that are markedly 
discontinuous with one another because they premise different values, encounter different problems, and 
employ different strategies of speech and argument” (Pocock, “Virtue, Rights, and Manners,” in Virtue, 
Commerce, and History (1985), 39). In this essay, Pocock uses the term “juristic” to describe the tradition of 
political thought that bases its understanding of political organization on natural and divine law (Pocock, 
“Virtue, Rights, and Manners,” in Virtue, Commerce, and History, 37).  
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negative notion of liberty, while the republican model a positive one. Put simply, in 
Pocock’s formulation, the juristic tradition views liberty as being free from restraint and 
impediments; the republican tradition understands humans as Aristotelian rational 
animals with certain ends and thus posits that liberty entails an individual’s ability to 
fulfill his or her telos.182 Concomitant with these two notions of liberty are two traditions 
of thought about human association: “jurisprudence can be said to be predominantly 
social, concerned with the administration of things and with human relations conducted 
through the mediation of things, as opposed to a civic vocabulary of the purely political, 
concerned with the unmediated personal relations entailed by equality and by ruling 
and being ruled.”183 It is the central thesis of The Machiavellian Moment that the “purely 
political” tradition which takes “citizenship as its ideal” came to be formulated in the 
Italian communes with the recovery of Aristotle’s Politics in the late thirteenth-century: 
“The theory of the polis—which is, in a certain sense, political theory in its purest 
original form—was cardinal to the constitutional theory of Italian cities and Italian 
                                                     
182 The seminal essay is Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 166-217. For an argument in defense of the positive conception of liberty, see 
Charles Taylor, ‘What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty,” in The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah 
Berlin, ed. Alan Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 175-193. Quentin Skinner, in “The Idea of 
Negative Liberty: Machiavellian and Modern Perspectives,” proposes a third conception of liberty in which 
a negative conception of liberty is combined with a commitment to civic virtue and service as necessary to 
the preservation of social freedom (Visions of Politics II:186-212). Skinner sees Milton as “eventually” 
adopting this third concept of liberty (“The Paradoxes of Political Liberty,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, vol. 7, ed. Sterling M. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1986), 241).  
183 Pocock, “Virtue, Rights, and Manners,” in Virtue, Commerce, and History, 44. 
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humanists.”184 In Pocock’s account, Aristotelian political theory as reconstructed by civic 
humanists filled a conceptual need by offering a truly new way to formulate political 
life: “one which depicted human social life as a universality of participation rather than 
a universal for contemplation. Particular men and the particular values they pursued 
met in citizenship to pursue and enjoy the universal value of acting for the common 
good and the pursuit of all lesser goods.”185  
 There are two lines of criticism of Pocock’s claim for the innovative quality of 
republican thought that are relevant to my argument. First, the question of Pocock’s 
dating the beginning of republicanism in England to the Interregnum is intimately 
connected with his definition of “intelligent” political participation. This becomes clear 
by comparison with Patrick Collinson’s argument, in “The Monarchical Republic of 
Queen Elizabeth I,” that Elizabethan England can be best described not as a pure 
monarchy, but as a monarchy mixed with republican structures.186 Collinson objects to 
Pocock’s argument in The Machiavellian Moment that “in sixteenth-century English 
thought the theory of corporate rationality served merely as an ideal and historical 
account of how political society had begun, and of how the single ruler emerged whose 
government subsequently excluded the intelligent participation of the subject. In no way 
                                                     
184 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 64-66, 74. 
185 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 75. 
186 Patrick Collinson, “The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I,” in Elizabethan Essays (London: The 
Hambledon Press, 1994), 31-57. 
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was Tudor England a polis or its inhabitants citizens.”187 In this essay, Collinson has 
shown that in the Tudor period a tradition of “localized self-government, involving men 
of very humble status” was well alive.188 Alongside this humbler form of republicanism, 
he also finds evidence, in the 1584 Bond of Association, of the ability of Elizabethan 
statesmen and clergy to envision and “condone an irregular, acephalous, quasi-
republican state of emergency” in case of the Queen’s demise.189 Collinson emphasizes 
that he is not arguing for the existence of a “coherent republican movement” in 
Elizabethan England, but rather that Tudor Englishmen could intelligently respond to 
the need or possibility of self-government.190 While recently some scholars have 
supported Collinson’s argument, English republicanism is mostly seen as starting on 30 
January 1649.191 This consensus has an important conceptual consequence. To anticipate 
                                                     
187 Collinson, “The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I,” 38. 
188 Collinson, “The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I,” 33. Collinson’s argument is supported by 
Mark Goldie’s account of the strong participation in local governance by householders in the seventeenth-
century (Mark Goldie, “The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in Early Modern England,” in The 
Politics of the  Excluded, c. 1500-1850, ed. Tim Harris (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 153-194). Goldie argues that 
officeholding provided a form of political participation that was republican, and indeed Aristotelian, in 
nature: “rotation of office was held to be crucial, so citizens were sometimes rulers and sometimes ruled” 
(154). Goldie demonstrates how local officeholding, unlike Parliamentary election, was a mark and 
requirement of citizenship for economically independent heads of households: “governance was the 
required activity of any, and every, citizen. It was expected that people would take up the burdens of office 
when their turn came around” (168; on the limitations of participation in local politics, see 170-175). 
However, Goldie ultimately argues that the “idealization of the rural parish republic” in the sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century is ideologically based on the “tradition of celebration of the perfections of the Anglo-
Saxon constitution” (182). His argument, therefore, does not address Pocock’s insistence, noted by 
Collinson, on the difference between juristic and republican traditions. 
189 Collinson, “The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I,” 51. 
190 Collinson, “The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I,” 55. 
191 David Norbrook has argued that republican modes of thinking flourished in early Stuart times. While 
following Pocock’s reading of Italian Renaissance republicanism, Norbrook takes issue with The 
Machiavellian Moment’s assessment that before 1649, “English republicanism was ‘a language, not a 
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part of my argument, by connecting the emergence of English “civic consciousness” 
with the regicide, the literary scholars and historians who follow Pocock’s account have 
come to discount earlier forms of political reasoning. Consequently, Milton’s 
representation of Englishmen who yearned for the return of the monarchy as an 
“impatient or disaffected people” (CPW VII:430) has largely been accepted in Milton’s 
own terms, that is, as the disappointment of a republican “citizen” with the 
“irrationality” of vicious “subjects” clinging on to a customary form of government. 
 Alongside the question of the beginning of republican thought in England, there 
is a second concern with Pocock’s characterization of the innovative quality of the 
republican concept of political participation. Brian Tierney’s work on the conciliar 
theory of the medieval Church has demonstrated the existence of a process of cross-
                                                     
 
programme’” (Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, 5). Norbrook argues that, starting with Thomas May’s 
1627 translation of Lucan’s Pharsalia, “republican language was a more powerful presence than has been 
recognized” in Stuart England (Writing the English Republic, 6). In the specific context of Milton’s studies, 
Martin Dzelzainis has argued that there is a “republican moment” in 1644 in Milton’s composition of Of 
Education (“Milton’s Classical Republicanism,” in Milton and Republicanism, ed. David Armitage, Armand 
Himy, Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3-24). More recently, Quentin 
Skinner has argued that the theory of neo-Roman liberty played a role in Parliamentary opposition to the 
king as early as 1640. According to Skinner, this strand of republican thinking has been neglected by 
historian because of the focus on the language of common law (Quentin Skinner, “Classical Liberty and the 
Coming of the English Civil War,” in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, vol. 2, The Values of 
Republicanism in Early Modern Europe, ed. Martin Van Geldern and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 9-28, see particularly, 14. For how Skinner’s interpretation of Parker’s thought has 
changed over time, see n. 21 to p. 332 in chapter four above. However, even this modest re-dating of the 
influence of republican ideals in English political thought has been criticized by Perez Zagorin as likely to 
“be received with skepticism by historians who are knowledgeable about the political literature” of the 
period (Perez Zagorin, “Republicanisms,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (2003): 711). 
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pollination between secular and ecclesiastical constitutional thought.192 Addressing 
Pocock’s account in The Machiavellian Moment, Tierney argues that to understand the 
development of seventeenth-century political theory it is not enough to focus on civic 
humanism. The ideal of a mixed constitution is a case in point for Tierney’s argument. 
Pocock traces its influence on Renaissance and Early Modern thought to the revival of 
Polybius’s Histories as well as Aristotle’s Politics.193 Tierney, while acknowledging the 
role played by these classical sources, points to medieval ecclesiastical constitutional 
thought as an alternative source for the early modern incarnation of the theory of mixed 
constitutions. This source provided a political language that was still in use in the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries.194 This is not simply a matter of tracing a fuller 
picture of the “ancestors” of early modern political theory. The crucial point is that 
Tierney’s corrective addresses the structural differences between Aristotelian political 
theory and the developing early modern state in ways consonant with Collinson’s 
analysis: “The major change in the formulation of the doctrine that occurred during the 
Middle Ages was that, in classical thought, the idea of a mixed constitution was applied 
only to the small-scale society of the polis, the city-state; in medieval thought it was 
                                                     
192 Tierney describes an ongoing process of adaptation between Church and secular law: “The typical 
process that occurred was the assimilation of a text of Roman private law into church law, its adaptation 
and transmutation there to a principle of constitutional law, and then its reabsorption into the sphere of 
secular government in this new form” (Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 
1150-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 22) 
193 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 76-80.  
194 Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 87. 
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applied to a whole nation or a whole church.”195 Medieval constitutional theory 
addressed the tensions between local and central government, tensions that were an 
inescapable part of the political life of seventeenth-century England, in a way that 
theories based on the organization of the classical polis could not do.196 Tierney’s account 
points to a tradition of medieval political thought that early modern political theorists 
drew upon in concert with classical republican ideals of citizenship to formulate 
conceptions of political participation. 
 Nonetheless, Pocock has argued that constitutional theories that drew on 
medieval legal and natural law thought should not be confused with those arising from 
republicanism. He insists on an insurmountable conceptual difference between the 
republican and juristic traditions.197 In Pocock’s account, “the two modes remained 
incommensurate”: 
Virtue was not reducible to right, and if a full-bodied republic should be found 
emerging from the jurist’s state of nature, it was for the less than republican 
                                                     
195 Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 87-8. More recently, in his work on natural 
rights, Tierney has pointed out how the influence of medieval thought could be masked in early modern 
texts by reference to common classical sources. In particular, in the case of Hugo Grotius, Tierney argues 
that his conception of natural rights and permissive law was supported by quotes from Aristotle, Philo, 
Cicero, Seneca, Florentius, and Augustine in De jure belli ac pacis, but that “Grotius was presenting a 
medieval and late scholastic structure of argument” (The Idea of Natural Rights, 326). Similarly, Tierney traces 
the roots of Grotius’s account of the relationship of individual to community and of the right of resistance to 
twelfth century canon law. 
196 Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 105-6. 
197 Pocock insists that the two languages—republicanism and natural law and rights—cannot be reduced to 
one another and that, consequently, republicanism introduced a deeply novel way for individuals to 
understand themselves as political agents. Because of this, the rejoinder by, for instance, Jonathan Scott that 
“the political languages of classical republicanism and natural law theory were more often combined by 
early modern republicans than separated” does not properly address Pocock’s claim (Scott, Commonwealth 
Principles, 25; emphasis mine). 
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purpose of creating and transferring the rights which were all that a state of 
nature could generate. Populism, therefore, which arose from investing a populus 
with dominium, jus, and imperium, was linguistically and politically distinct from 
republicanism, which arose from investing them with virtus.198  
 
What is the conception of reason and “rational” that forms the foundation of Pocock’s 
analysis of this distinction? The opening sections of The Machiavellian Moment describe 
the contrast between the conception of a subject living in a territorial monarchy, that is, 
living in a community organized on principles of laws and rights, and a citizen in a 
republic, organized along principles of Aristotelian virtue and shared political action. 
For Pocock, the traditional understanding of a subject is exemplified in English political 
thought by Fortescue’s account in De Laudibus Legum Anglie (1468-1471). To this work, 
Pocock contrasts the conception of the republican citizen derived from Aristotle’s 
political theory and then revived by Italian civic humanists. In the Machiavellian Moment, 
the distinction couldn’t be starker. While the republican ideal of a citizen implies active 
political participation and a voice in the legislative process, the individual described by 
Fortescue chooses the contemplative over the active life.199 
 De Laudibus is written as a dialogue between the Prince of Wales and a Lord 
Chancellor of England.200 By choosing this text as paradigmatic of “traditional” political 
                                                     
198 Pocock, “Virtue, Rights, and Manners,” in Virtue, Commerce, and History, 47. Quentin Skinner’s argument 
for a “third” version of liberty found in Machiavelli implicitly addresses part of Pocock’s claim that the 
juristic and republican traditions are conceptually incompatible by connecting negative liberty with civic 
virtue (see, in particular, Visions of Politics II: 190, 192, 211). 
199 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 56. 
200 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 10. 
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and legislative theory, Pocock focuses on the prince as would-be law maker in his 
description of medieval conceptions of political reasoning and participation. 
Consequently, when Pocock asks what conception of “rational” political action was 
available in the “traditional” formulation, the focus in on prince’s role in legislation. In 
De Laudibus, Fortescue divides all human laws into three categories: the law of nature 
and its deductible consequences, laws that are derived from custom, and those that are 
enacted as statutes.201 The definition of the law of nature sets the stage for how laws can 
be understood to be “rational” in The Machiavellian Moment: “The law of nature consists 
of those self-evident principles of justice, and their universally deducible consequences, 
which are true and have binding force among all men. Human laws may be simply the 
translation of the commands of natural law into the formalized command or rules of a 
particular kingdom.”202 These human laws are the result of the work of deductive reason 
which recognizes the universal principles of justice and derives laws from them.203 It 
follows that English law can be demonstrated to be “rational” or “reasonable” by 
showing that it does not contradict the first principles of natural law and justice.204 Such 
a definition of rational law, however, creates a problem. “Rational knowledge” is a 
deductive process that starts from first principles: “In the philosophy which Fortescue is 
outlining here, all rational knowledge is essentially deductive. Knowledge, of whatever 
                                                     
201 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 11.  
202 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 11-12. 
203 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 10-12. 
204 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 13. 
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kind, starts with the acceptance of certain basic principles […]. The rational proof of any 
statement is arrived at by demonstrating that it is the necessary logical consequence of 
some principle or combination of principles.”205 However, Pocock argues that, in this 
account, a deductive process that starts from universal first principles cannot logically 
arrive at particular, and in this case specifically English, laws.206 That is, the conformity 
of human law with natural law via reason does not distinguish English law from the law 
of any other nation. Specifically English laws, then, are not derived through a process of 
deduction from natural law. They are produced through repeated usage as customs or 
they are enacted as statutes. It’s important to note that by considering both custom and 
statutes as categorically different from natural law and its corollaries, Pocock places them 
in the realm of the not strictly “rational”: “English law contains—as does the law of any 
nation—an element other than the purely rational, based on the cognition of 
circumstances and conditions peculiar to England and on the application or adaptation 
of universal principles to these local and peculiar conditions.”207  
 If such laws are not the product of “reason,” how are they devised? By focusing 
on Fortescue’s discussion on the creation of positive law, Pocock arrives at the 
conclusion that law systems based on custom and tradition contain dominant non-
rational elements. Customary laws are not the product of a rational deductive process: 
                                                     
205 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 10-1; emphasis mine. 
206 “Principles, inescapably, are universal statements; and from universals we can deduce only universals” 
(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 11). 
207 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 13; emphasis mine. 
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the cognition of concrete cases and the discernment of how principles are to be 
applied to them [as explained by Fortescue] is a sharply different intellectual 
process from the cognition of principles and the deduction of their logical 
consequences. Indeed, it is scarcely an intellectual process at all; it is a matter of 
pure trial and error, since the test of a custom’s goodness is not its demonstrable 
rationality, but the simple fact of its having remained in usage. […] It is very 
possible that Fortescue’s main intention was still to argue that English law was 
reasonable, in the sense that it could be shown to be consonant with deductions 
performed form the principles of jurisprudence or the maxims characteristic of 
common law itself. But there exists in his thought an inexpugnable level at which 
it appeared that English law was not rational, in the sense that it could never be 
reconstructed by the performance of any such deductions.208 
 
I have quoted this passage at length because it reflects Pocock’s account of the 
difference, to use Aristotelian and Thomistic terminology, between theoretic and 
practical reasoning. As we have seen earlier in the context of Rogers’ adaptation of the 
questions on the law in the Summa, theoretic and practical reasoning differ from each 
other. Aristotle and, subsequently, Aquinas distinguish between theoretic reason, 
directed towards knowledge, and practical reason, directed towards action. Pocock’s 
account of the rational deductive process outlined by Fortescue is Aristotelian enough: it 
constructs the “rational proof of any statement” by logical steps from basic principles. 
But this is not the only form of rationality found in Aristotle; as we have seen earlier, 
practical reasoning is not concerned with the proof of statements. Pocock recognizes a 
certain sense in which customary law can be shown to be rational if it does not 
                                                     
208 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 16-7; emphasis mine. 
 555 
contradict natural law. However, he rules out the possibility that the process of 
judgment involved in constructing the specific dictates of positive law is a rational one.  
 It is crucial to note that Pocock does not consider this understanding of the 
“irrationality” of practical reason and of the formation of custom as an idiosyncratic 
feature of Fortescue’s thought. Strikingly, he finds a similar understanding of custom in 
the Summa Theologiæ. As we saw earlier, Aquinas holds that human laws have a crucial 
function in the education of individuals in the virtues and in practical reasoning.209 
However, Pocock’s short account of Aquinas’ formulation of prudence and law confirms 
his reading of Fortescue:   
[Aquinas in ST Ia-IIae, question 57] continues by quoting Cicero as mentioning 
‘three other parts of prudence, namely memory of the past understanding of the 
present and foresight of the future,’ and concludes that these ‘are not virtues 
distinct from prudence,’ but ‘integral parts or components.’ Prudence, it should 
now be evident, was the present and future, where custom was the perfect, tense 
of experience. In custom, experience judged what had proved good and 
satisfactory; it judged also what had proved adapted to the particular nature, or 
‘genius,’ of the people, and this judgment was likely to be self-fulfilling, since use 
and custom created this ‘second nature’ as well as evaluating it—the past was 
perfect indeed.210 
 
Pocock’s pun on custom as the “perfect, tense of experience” hints at a sharp temporal 
division between custom and developing prudence. But, as I argued above, this division 
is not present in Aquinas. In arguing for the mutability of laws, Aquinas cautioned 
against breaking with custom and established law; a long-standing custom is more 
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easily obeyed than a new law and therefore laws should only be changed for the 
strongest reasons. However, Aquinas does not stop there. He also describes custom as 
an ongoing process by which “a law can be changed and explained.”211 Strikingly, 
Aquinas argues that the people’s repeated actions function, in terms of legislation, just 
like the law-giver’s words: “As manifesting interior concepts and motions of the human 
mind it is clear that words serve to alter a law as well as express its meaning. So also by 
repeated deeds, which set up a custom, a law can be changed and explained […] and 
this because what we inwardly mean and want is most effectively declared by what 
outwardly and repeatedly we do.”212 Because he adopts Aristotle’s account of action, 
Aquinas, unlike Pocock, does not argue that only statements are the result of deductions. 
A practical syllogism ends in a rational action.213 In the Summa, legislating through 
custom is not a “scarcely intellectual” process of “trial and error” and neither is custom 
an inert frame of laws firmly established in past. It is an ongoing process that, in the 
present tense, expresses the legislative authority and rationality of the people. 
 By not taking into account Aquinas’s notion of practical reasoning, Pocock fails 
to see that in the Summa custom is an expression of the rationality of the people. In turn 
this leads to a false dichotomy between the rationality of a would-be law-maker and the 
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213 It is worth remembering that, as discussed earlier, Aristotle’s conception of the deductive logic involved 
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process of experience producing custom and “operating at the lowest and least articulate 
level of intelligence.”214 This becomes particularly evident when Pocock turns to the role 
of the prince as legislator in De Laudibus. Pocock argues that Fortescue’s prince cannot 
justly reform customary laws because “[t]here is no method, other than that of 
experience itself, by which the intellect can reason from the needs and nature of the 
people to their customs.” Consequently, the experience of one man, the prince’s, cannot 
be pitted against the experience of the generations upon generations that have vetted 
England’s long-standing customs.215 It is only when contingencies arise which require 
that law be promulgated in a shorter time frame than it would take for a custom to 
develop that the individual law-maker’s reason comes into play. While overall, 
experience, in the form of the collective prudence of the Parliament, is better suited to 
frame laws than the reason of one individual, there are rare occasions when the prince 
must act on his own.216 When a truly novel emergency arises, since action must be taken 
quickly and it might not be possible to convene a group of advisors, the prince’s own 
reason can then take precedence over custom or collective prudence. However, while in 
these occasions the prince is not bound by either custom or counsel, his decisions do not 
become laws unless further repetition and experience confirm them as such.217 From this 
discussion of the prince’s legislative action in emergencies, Pocock generalizes how any 
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“individual” situates himself in social and political life in a “traditional territorial 
monarchy.” In the account of The Machiavellian Moment, an individual employs his 
reason to place himself within a hierarchical, unchanging, natural system by 
prudentially matching his experience to the traditional actions which custom dictates. 
He also accepts that in unique emergent occasions, the monarch should employ his own 
decision-making process to respond to the situation.218 With this understanding of the 
very limited scope for human reason to act in political life, Pocock sees the individual in 
a “territorial monarchy” as choosing the contemplative over the active social life: “the 
individual of Fortescue, obedient to natural law and custom and politically active only 
on the rare occasions when statutes were to be made, could scarcely imagine his civic life 
as in serious rivalry with his philosophic contemplation, if he engaged in the latter at 
all.”219 
 Pocock describes the concept of a citizen in an Aristotelian republic in contrast to 
this understanding of the role of a subject in a traditional monarchy. A citizen, unlike 
Fortescue’s subject, cannot rely on custom and a conception of a universal order to 
organize political life and is therefore “constantly involved with his fellows in the 
making of public decision.”220 Most importantly, in Pocock’s account, the form of 
decision making undertaken by the citizen of a republic closely resembles the very rare 
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occurrences of rational political activity in Fortescue’s De Laudibus: “both acts of 
knowledge and acts of decision assume some of the character of what Fortescue called 
‘statutes’; they are agreed upon by living men, located in time and employing the 
intellectual resources possessed by beings so located.”221 But there is difference of crucial 
importance between the prince’s decision making and the citizen’s as described in The 
Machiavellian Moment. Central to Pocock’s reading of civic humanism in both its 
“intellectual” dimension (knowledge-making) and its political dimension (decision-
making) is the idea of conversation. As we have just seen, Pocock argues that in 
Fortescue’s description of political activity, the prince can act according to his own 
reason and prudence only when he must act in response to an emergency that precludes 
resorting to shared experience and counsel with Parliament. This means that Pocock’s 
account of medieval political theory creates two opposed poles. On the one hand, truly 
social and shared political action is less than rational because based on custom and 
experience. On the other, rational political action is the province of the prince acting 
alone. By contrast, Pocock describes rational political activity as understood by civic 
humanists as dependent on the idea of rational conversation.222 This, in turn, relies upon 
Pocock’s reading of Aristotle and Renaissance Aristotelianism as the basis for the 
humanist view of citizenship.  
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 Pocock’s account of Aristotle’s thought forms the basis for his explanation for the 
integration of the idea of active citizenship into seventeenth-century English political 
thought. However, Pocock distorts Aristotle’s account of citizenship in a fundamental 
way. The Machiavellian Moment’s discussion centers on the Politics as the most influential 
and fullest exposition of Aristotle’s “theory of citizenship and polity.”223 Pocock argues 
that in, the Politics, Aristotle portrays all human activity as “value-oriented”—in pursuit 
of some good—and “social”—goods are pursued in association with other humans. The 
polis is “the association within which all particular associations pursued their particular 
ends.”224 These “particular ends” are united in the polis in the pursuit of a “universal” 
good, participation in the association itself: “participation in the association whose end 
was the good of all particular associations, and the attainment of all particular goods, 
was in itself a good of a very high, because universal, character.”225 That is, in Pocock’s 
account, life in the polis is a universal good in so far as it allows for the pursuit of 
particular ends and goods. These numerous “individual value-priorities” create 
equivalent particular associations, each of them constituting an “elite,” whose aim is to 
pursue these priorities: “it is important to remember that such elites were in theory as 
many as the identifiable value-goals which men pursued, and that since every citizen 
had been defined as possessing his own value-priorities, there was in principle no 
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citizen who did not belong to as many of these elites as he had chosen values for special 
emphasis.”226 According to Pocock, there is, however, a fundamental problem facing the 
polis. Association in the polis is a necessary condition in order for each individual to 
pursue his own particular ends and goods. For this universal good of political 
association to be achieved, each individual must function as a “citizen,” that is, someone 
who both “rules and is ruled.” It is in assigning each citizen his specific role in the 
“universal activity of making decisions aimed at distributing the common good” that the 
central problem of political association arises: each citizen, qua citizen, is equal to all 
others, but each individual, as a “result of their individual value-priorities,” attains a 
distinct “social personality” fitting him for a particular role in participating to the rule of 
the polis.227 The problem is how to reconcile the two: “On the one hand, it was his pursuit 
of particular goods as an individual that made him a citizen; on the other, it was only in 
his concern for and awareness of the common universal good that his citizenship could 
persist; and there was always the possibility of conflict between the two.”228 This conflict 
becomes one of the central threads in Pocock’s thesis. The Machiavellian Moment is an 
account of the solutions proposed by civic humanists to this problem and their 
afterlives.229 More broadly, on a conceptual level, Pocock claims that this problem of 
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political participation is the hallmark of European political theory distinguishing it from 
the “social” concerns of juristic and medieval modes of thought.230  
 This distinction, however, may not be as stark as Pocock argues. Two points 
stand out from his reading of Aristotle’s Politics. First, Pocock describes each individual 
as “choosing” values and associating into particular elites. For this description, he relies 
on the Politics 1289b-1290a. In Pocock’s paraphrase, Aristotle lists the following elites in 
a polis: “the good, the wise, the brave, the rich, the wellborn, and so on.”231 However, in 
the original, Aristotle’s description of “elites” does not give general categories, such as 
“the brave,” but rather focuses on specific differences of wealth, occupation, and merit: 
the various members of the polis belong to different families, characterized by 
“differences in wealth and property” as well as “differences in rank and merit.”232 In the 
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Politics, these examples of elites clearly owe much to tradition and accidents of birth. In 
The Machiavellian Moment, however, they are generalized into a list of elites which can be 
expanded to include as many categories as individuals can formulate “identifiable value-
goals.”233 This generalization obscures the fact that these categories are dependent on 
accidents rather than on a “rational choice” of “value-goals.”234 In turn, this elision 
allows Pocock to emphasize his original dichotomy between, on the one hand, the  
“other than rational” reliance on tradition and custom in the political life of territorial 
monarchies and, on the other, the rational, conversation-based, and participatory 
humanist view of the citizen. The second point regards Pocock’s account of the conflict 
between each individual’s “value-priorities” and the “universal good” of association. In 
describing this conflict, Pocock is extrapolating from the Politics and does not give a 
direct reference to Aristotle’s text.235 This is of course not a problem on its own, as a 
reading of the Nicomachean Ethics, for instance, would be appropriate in explaining the 
Politics. The question, however, arises of whether Pocock’s characterization of the 
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conflict between “individual value-priorities” and how to allocate resources in the 
“universal good” of association is faithful to Aristotle and to subsequent Aristotelian 
traditions. Central to the overall argument of The Machiavellian Moment is Pocock’s 
reading of Aristotle’s conception of “tyranny”: in order to avoid “tyrannical” 
government in the polis, the “particular good” of any one group of citizens could not be 
pursued to the detriment of the goods of other groups of citizens.236 However, since the 
goods of different groups of citizens cannot be ranked, the problem of government is to 
formulate an arrangement that allows for the pursuit of the “universal good” of 
association in the polis without neglecting the pursuit of particular goods, which are 
incommensurable.237 As Pocock sums up the problem: “what was the common good if it 
led to the abnegation of all particular goods?”238 In this account, the constant threat of 
conflict is built into the very definition of political life: each individual’s chosen good is 
equivalent to any other’s and there is no a priori way to decide between conflicting 
goods. The solution to this problem, according to Pocock, is not to be found in Aristotle’s 
political theory. It rather had to wait until Italian humanists set aside the alternative 
language of civil and canon law to formulate a theory of vivere civile.239 
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 Is conflict, however, truly an intrinsic part of Aristotle’s conception of life in the 
polis? In his discussion, Pocock fails to note that Aristotle gives various “value-goals” 
different rankings within the polis. Crucially, such ordering remains central to the 
Aristotelian conception of political life embodied in Aquinas’s questions on legislation 
and laws. In the Summa, Aquinas’s account of natural law and political life presupposes 
an Aristotelian ordering of goods in the political community and it tackles what Pocock 
views as the central problem of political association. What is the basis for Aquinas’s 
account? It is founded on a central, and well-known, claim of The Nicomachean Ethics. 
There, Aristotle argues that practical reason and the virtues are fundamentally 
interrelated: all practical syllogisms stem from a first principle of what is good in a given 
situation for a given individual and what is good “is evident to the good person 
alone.”240 To be practically rational, then, one must be habituated in the virtues. The 
importance of the connection between virtue and practical rationality is brought out by 
MacIntyre in both Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and After Virtue. The unity of the 
virtues and their connection to rationality has important consequences for Aristotle’s 
account of the life in the polis. It is only by living in the polis that an individual can 
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become educated in the virtues.241 Conversely, the unity of the virtues and rationality 
imposes an intrinsic shared agreement on the life of a well-ordered polis: 
The interrelationship of the virtues explains why they do not provide us with a 
number of distinct criteria by which to judge the goodness of a particular 
individual, but rather with one complex measure. The application of that 
measure in a community whose shared aim is the realization of the human good 
presupposes of course a wide range of agreement in that community on goods 
and virtues, and it [is] this agreement which makes possible the kind of bond 
between citizens which, on Aristotle’s view, constitutes the polis.242 
 
For Aristotle, conflict within the polis is not an intrinsic aspect of constructing a shared 
political life by individuals pursuing various, incommensurable, “value-priorities,” it is 
rather an avoidable defect that needs to be overcome: “the good life for man is itself single 
and unitary, compounded of a hierarchy of goods.”243 
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 567 
 How does Aquinas incorporate Aristotle’s account of political life? As we saw 
earlier, Aquinas acknowledges that not all persons will equally know what the good is. 
While human reason comprehends as good that “towards which man has a natural 
tendency [naturalem inclinationem],” we need further direction in deciding how to 
act.244 Our natural tendencies can be classified and ordered based on how they relate to 
humans as considered according to their natures as, first, beings; second, animals; and, 
third, rational creatures. Just as these aspects of human nature can be ordered, so can 
natural tendencies. In turn, the ranking of natural tendencies corresponds to the ranking 
of the commands of natural law: “[t]he order in which commands of the law of nature 
are ranged corresponds to that of our natural tendencies.”245 On the first order, we find 
the natural inclination which man shares with all beings, namely, self-preservation. 
Next, we see that there are natural tendencies that man shares with other animals, such 
as sex and rearing of the young. Third, we find the natural tendencies that man has as a 
rational creature: “there is in man an appetite for the good of his nature as rational, and 
this is proper to him, for instance, that he should know truths about God and about 
living in society. Correspondingly whatever this involves is a matter of natural law, for 
instance that a man should shun ignorance, not offend others with whom he ought to 
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live in civility, and other such related requirements.”246 As MacIntyre argues, this 
ordering is important in Aquinas’ account:  
we educate our children for the sake of their being able to participate in the 
pursuit of knowledge; we subordinate our need for self-preservation if the lives 
of our children or the security of our community are gravely endangered. It is 
not of course that everyone always order their inclinations this way, but that the 
general patterns of distinctively human behavior evince those directednesses in 
such a way that it is the ends toward which they are directed that provide our 
primary experiences of the pursuit of particularized good.247 
 
Aquinas’ account that inclinations are ordered is in agreement with Aristotle’s 
discussion of rationality and practical reason. In Aristotle’s account, acting rationally 
involves acting according to a practical syllogism and, in order to do so, a rational agent 
has to construct his premises in a way that identifies a true good to be pursed in a given 
situation.248 But a good will only be a true good if it can be derived through deliberation 
from “the set of ultimate first principles and concepts which specifies the good and the 
best for human beings as such.”249 Such process of deliberation sets up a series of 
hierarchical relationships in which particular goods are ordered for the sake of obtaining 
the good.250 Both Aquinas and Aristotle, then, present a conception of political life in 
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which the fundamental political activity of citizens is not, as Pocock argues, to balance 
“individual value-priorities,” but to engage in rational activity in pursuit of the good.251 
 Pocock’s account of republicanism has an important consequence for the 
understanding of Milton’s political thought. By discounting custom as an expression of 
the people’s rationality, Pocock depicts republican discursive reason as the model for all 
rational political participation. In turn, given the influence of his account, Pocock’s 
emphasis on rational and virtuous political participation frames the discussion of 
seventeenth-century literature, in general, and Milton’s works, in particular. 
Consequently, when, for instance, Nigel Smith argues that the second edition of The 
Ready and Easy Way is “less democratic but equally republican,” he is arguing that 
Milton is committed to a form of government that requires (some) English citizens to 
rationally participate in the decision-making process of the commonwealth. But how do 
such accounts portray the disagreement between Milton’s republicanism and the 
royalist demands of the “rabble”? As we have seen, critics largely side with Milton’s 
representation and argue that it is a disagreement between Milton’s attempt to refashion 
Englishmen into rational citizens and his fellow countrymen’s desire for a settled and 
customary—and therefore not fully rational—form of government after the tumults of 
the Civil Wars and the Interregnum. Sharon Achinstein’s comments in Milton and the 
                                                     
251 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 133-4. For MacIntyre’s explanation of how this enquiry into 
an account the supreme good is directed, see his discussion of on pages 79-81. 
 570 
Revolutionary Reader are typical: Milton’s depiction of the people in his prose works are 
meant to “define what I call the ‘revolutionary public’ as a political entity by fashioning 
his audience as a valuable participant in political discussion. […] It is true that in many 
places Milton scorns the rabble, but it is equally true that in many instances, including 
[The Ready and Easy Way], Milton explains how any rank of citizen may become 
virtuous—by proper discipline, trial, and reading.”252 The problem with this statement, 
however, is that it assumes that the “rabble” is not already “a valuable participant in 
political discussion” during the constitutional crises of the mid-seventeenth-century. As 
I will argue in the rest of this chapter, in The Readie and Easie Way, Milton’s scorn for “the 
rabble” has disastrous consequences for his argument for virtuous citizenship in a 
commonwealth. In the pamphlet, Milton’s plan for self-government is presented as 
necessary for preserving civic and religious liberty. However, Milton’s view of the 
people as irrational and therefore incapable of participating in shared political reasoning 
at a time of disagreement ultimately undermines the claim that The Readie and Easie Way 
aims at promoting virtuous and rational citizenship. 
 Milton’s conception of the prerequisites for shared political reasoning begins to 
surface at the very opening of The Readie and Easie Way. On the eve of the Restoration, 
the second edition of the pamphlet reflects on earlier constitutional crises. The struggles 
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of the Civil Wars and the Interregnum are used as examples to urge Milton’s readers not 
to abandon the project of the commonwealth. On 5 March 1660, with the return of its 
Presbyterian members, Parliament had reestablished the Solemn League and Covenant, 
including its third article promising to safeguard the king.253 Milton, revisiting the events 
and debates of 1648 in the opening pages of The Readie and Easie Way, reminds his 
readers of the reasons for Parliamentarian opposition to Charles I. Having defeated and 
brought to trial the king, the “Parliament of England, assisted by a great number of the 
people who appeered and stuck to them faithfullest in defence of religion and thir civil 
liberties, judging kingship by long experience a government unnecessary, burdeson and 
dangerous, justly and magnanimously abolishd it” (CPW VII:409; emphasis original). 
Milton insists that those republican members of Parliament who condemned Charles I 
and broke the Covenant: “took themselves not bound by the light of nature or religion, 
to any former covnant, from which the King himself by many forfeitures of a latter date 
or discoverie, and our own longer consideration theron had more & more unbound us, 
both to himself and his posteritie as hath bin ever the justice and the prudence of all wise 
nations that have ejected tyrannie” (CPW VII:409).254 These opening passages capture 
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two central features of The Readie and Easie Way. In the first passage, the verb “assisted” 
allows Milton to blur the distinction between the Parliament and “a great number of the 
people.” As the sentence develops, the concatenation of clauses obscures whether the 
subject of “judging” and “abolishd” is Parliament or the people.255 It is also worth noting 
that the sentence works hard to obscure how many of “the people” assist Parliament and 
for which reasons. The clause, “a great number of the people who appeered and stuck to 
them faithfullest in defence of religion and thir civil liberties,” raises a series of 
questions. For instance, how do the first six words parse: “a great number of {the people 
who}” or “{a great number of the people} who”? The second option indicates a larger 
support for Parliament’s actions. Does “faithfullest” modify “them,” indicating that the 
members of Parliament are “faithfullest,” or does it modify “the people who”? And, 
finally, what is the antecedent of “thir”?256 Throughout the pamphlet, the effect of this 
                                                     
 
presents itself as written by James Harrington and as reporting a meeting of the Rota in which The Readie and 
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form of grammatical complexity is to hide or blur political and power relationships. In 
the second passage, Milton argues that English law and the Parliament’s oaths and 
promises may be broken if “justice” and “prudence” dictate. However, Milton’s use of 
the example of recent history raises a problem that echoes throughout The Readie and 
Easie Way. Why is England now rushing back to monarchy if in abolishing it Parliament 
took the most rational and prudent course of action? Milton’s answer to this question is 
tied to his conception of rational political deliberation. As I will argue, the two passages 
taken together point to central tension in The Readie and Easie Way: while Milton’s 
republicanism implies a commitment to shared reasoning within a commonwealth, at a 
time of political and constitutional crisis, he subordinates this commitment to the task of 
forestalling the Restoration. 
 How does this tension arise in the pamphlet? Milton warns his readers that they 
will suffer the scorn of Europe if England allows the return of the Stuarts. Comparing 
the commonwealth to a building, Milton uses Christ’s parable in Luke 14 to admonish 
those who will not commit to completing the construction of the Commonwealth: “what 
will they at best say of us and of the whole English name, but scoffingly as to that foolish 
builder, mentiond by our Saviour, who began to build a tower, and was not able to 
finish it” (CPW VII:423).257 The image suggested by the parable in Luke 14 is one of poor 
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planning. Laying the foundations without a full commitment to the resources necessary 
to finish the project is what a “foolish builder” would do. In Milton’s text, this image 
develops into that of a different, and this time sinful, building of a biblical tower: 
“Where is this goodly tower of a Commonwealth, which the English boasted they would 
build to overshadow kings, and be another Rome in the west? The foundation indeed 
they laid gallantly; but fell into a wors confusion, not of tongues, but of factions, then 
those at the tower of Babel; and have left no memorial of thir work behind them 
remaining, but in the common laughter of Europ” (CPW VII:423). The cacophony of the 
linguistic confusion of the tower of Babel is turned into the “common laughter of Europ” 
with its different languages united in a shared contempt of divided England. In this 
second image, as in the previous, the foundations have been laid, but in this case what is 
missing is not commitment, but rather harmony. England has been divided by factions 
and the building of the commonwealth cannot proceed. The image of the tower of Babel 
had been used by Charles I in Eikon Basilike to predict the fall of the cause of the 
regicides. “God” warned Eikon Basilike, will not “suffer those men long to prosper in 
their Babel, who build it with bones and cement it with the blood of their Kings.”258 In 
Eikonoklastes, Milton replied that the Saints’ work was “not to build Babel (which was 
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Nimrods work the first King, and the beginning of his Kingdom was Babel) but to destroy it, 
especially that spiritual Babel” (CPW III:598). Turning upside-down the royalist image of 
the rebellion as the building of a new Babel, in Eikonoklastes Milton associates the sinful 
tower with the “first King,” Nimrod. In The Readie and Easie Way, the image of the tower 
of Babel returns to warn Milton’s audience. The building of the commonwealth will fail 
not because it was founded on the “blood of their King,” but rather because the builders 
divided into factions and allowed for the return of a new king. In this image, division, 
confusion, and disagreement prevent the foundations that had been “laid gallantly” 
from coming to fruition. Much of the body of the pamphlet is dedicated to showing why 
the building of the commonwealth was not completed and, at the same time, how 
England can finally build on those foundations. 
 In The Likelies Means, Milton had called the Protectorate a “short but scandalous 
night of interruption.”259 In The Readie and Easie Way, Milton reflects that the 
commonwealth should have been firmly installed as soon as the regicide was 
accomplished: “Tis true indeed, when monarchie was dissolvd, the form of a 
Commonwealth should have forthwith bin fram’d; and the practice therof immediately 
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Woolrych, “Milton and Cromwell: ‘A Short but Scandalous Night of Interruption’?”, in Achievements of the 
Left Hand: Essays on the Prose of John Milton, ed. Michael Lieb and John T. Shawcross (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press,  1974), 185-218; and Martin Dzelzainis, “Milton and the Protectorate in 1658,” in Milton 
and Republicanism, ed. David Armitage, Armand Himy and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 3-24. 
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begun” (CPW VII:430). Why wasn’t it? If this had been done, the people of England 
would have quickly learnt to enjoy that form of government:  
that the people might have soon bin satisfi’d and delighted with the decent 
order, ease and benefit therof: we had bin then by this time firmly rooted past 
fear of commotions or mutations, & now flourishing: this care of timely settling a 
new government instead of ye old, too much neglected, hath bin our mischief. 
Yet the cause therof may be ascrib’d with most reason to the frequent 
disturbances, interruptions and dissolutions which the Parlament hath had 
partly from the impatient or disaffected people, partly from som ambitious 
leaders in the Armie. (CPW VII:430). 
 
In this passage, Milton faults the constant “fear of commotions or mutations” for the 
English people’s desire for the return of the king.260 If a commonwealth had been quickly 
established immediately after the regicide, Milton argues that the people of England 
would have been persuaded against monarchy by the “decent order, ease and benefit” 
of living in a republic. Strikingly, however, the passage depicts “the people” as both 
those who would have been convinced by the advantages of a free commonwealth, and, 
at the same time, as one of the causes of the “commotions or mutations” that have 
prevented its establishment in the first place. Similarly, in a passage closely preceding 
the one quoted above, Milton concludes that only a mad or irrational people could pine 
for the return of the king: “Certainly then that people must need be madd or strangely 
infatuated, that build the chief hope of thir common happiness or safetie on a single 
                                                     
260 In chapter three, I had argued that Milton in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, unlike Parliamentarian 
writers such as Henry Parker, deemphasized the dangers inherent in the dissolution and reformation of 
governments (292). In The Readie and Easie Way, instead, the “fear of commotions or mutations” is presented 
as a constant background of the hope to construct a free Commonwealth in the early 1650s. 
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person […]. The happiness of a nation must needs be firmest and certainest in a full and 
free Councel of thir own electing, where no single person, but reason only swaies” (CPW 
VII:427; underlining mine). Here, Milton juxtaposes the rule of reason in an elected 
council to the madness and infatuation of those who want the return of the king. 
Problematically, the structure of the passage indicates that those same subjects who are 
under the sway of a “strange infatuation” with monarchy are those citizens who ought 
to realize that a representative council elected by them is the most rational form of 
government.  
 Such double depictions of the English people recur throughout The Readie and 
Easie Way. Milton represents the people as both “mad and strangely infatuated” with 
monarchy and capable of self-government as rational members of a commonwealth. But 
does The Readie and Easie Way provide an account of how to turn the madness of the 
people into rational self-government? Or are there members of the community that are 
so irrational that they must be excluded from shared political reasoning? To illustrate 
how a rational commonwealth should govern itself, Milton turns to the advice in 
Proverbs 6.6-8: the citizens of a commonwealth should be like the wise and self-
governing ant who industriously gathers her food in the summer without the need of a 
ruler.261 In the first edition of The Readie and Easie Way, Milton briefly glosses this passage 
                                                     
261 “Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways, and be wise:/ Which having no guide, overseer, or 
ruler,/ Provideth her meat in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest” (KJV). Comparisons 
between animal and human government were, of course, quite common. For medieval examples of defenses 
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to scold those who want the return of the king: rather than behaving like rational 
citizens, they “have not so much true spirit and understanding in them as a pismire” 
(CPW VII:363). In the second edition, Milton substantially expands his commentary on 
this Scriptural passage: “neither are these diligent creatures hence concluded in lawless 
anarchie, or that commended, but are set the example to imprudent and ungovernd 
men, of a frugal and self-governing democratie or Commonwealth; safer and more 
thriving in the joint prudence and counsel of many industrious equals, then under the 
single domination of one imperious Lord” (CPW VII:427). The Biblical ants behave like 
ideal citizens who “need depend on none but God and our own counsels, our own 
active vertue and industrie” (CPW VII:427). While for Milton the society of ants is 
exemplary in its self-rule, Roman history provides an example of failed self-government. 
Describing the struggle for power between the Roman tribunes and the Senate, Milton 
finds a clear depiction of the instability that follows upon allowing the people a voice in 
government. Milton interprets the fight between tribunes and patricians as a proof that 
the common people hanker after power as much as the patricians: “the main reason 
urg’d why popular assemblies are to be trusted with the peoples liberties, rather then a 
Senat of principal men, because great men will be still endeavoring to inlarge thir 
                                                     
 
of societal hierarchy based on the pecking order of chickens and the rule of “the king of the bees,” see Brian 
Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 44. 
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power, but the common sort will be contented to maintain thir own libertie, is by 
experience found false; none being more immoderate and ambitious to amplifie thir 
power, then such popularities” (CPW VII:438-9). Strikingly, this is not simply an 
argument against direct democracy.262 The “common sort” cannot be trusted with any 
say in government as their representatives will attempt to gain ever more power: the 
Tribunes “little availd the people or brought them to such licentious and unbridl’d 
democratie, as in fine ruind themselves” (CPW VII:438). This passage indicates a break 
with Milton’s earlier account of the role of “the common sort” in political life. In a note 
from 1651-52(?) in the Commonplace Book, Milton comments that “[t]he rebellion of a 
people has often been the means of their regaining their freedom, and therefore they 
should not be blamed, because very often they act from just causes and complaints” 
(CPW I:505).263 There, he supports this conclusion with his own paraphrase of 
Machiavelli’s argument in book one, chapter four of the Discorsi that discord and 
“disturbances” between the common people and patricians leads to “good laws” (CPW 
I:505). In The Readie and Easie Way, disagreement and the “disturbances” of the people 
are no longer seen as a source of good laws. 
                                                     
262 As we saw in chapter three with the example of Henry Parker, representative government was touted by 
Parliamentarian writers as necessary to both safeguard the rights of the people and to “to regulate the 
motions of the peoples moliminous body” by providing an outlet for their grievances (209). In this passage, 
Milton breaks with this strand of argument. 
263 On the dating of the entries of the Commonplace Book, see Ruth Mohl’s introduction, CPW I: 347-52. 
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 At the same time, Milton argues that the actions of the army and the people 
during the Interregnum stand witness to the fact that the English people are “well 
fitted” for liberty and self-government: “Nor were thir actions less both at home and 
abroad then might become the hopes of a glorious rising Commonwealth: nor were the 
expressions both of armie and people, whether in thir publick declarations or several 
writings other then such as testif’d a spirit in this nation no less noble and well fitted to 
the liberty of a Commonwealth, then the ancient Greeks or Romans” (CPW VII:420). While 
the promising actions of the “armie and the people” could not firmly establish a 
Commonwealth, Milton exhorts England to not give up hope for self-government and 
avoid a relapse into monarchy. He dismisses the lapses in the republican cause as 
“interruptions” which are now passed: “After our liberty and religion thus prosperously 
fought for, gaind and many years possessd, except in those unhappie interruptions, 
which God hath remov’d, now that nothing remains, but in all reason the certain hopes 
of a speedie and immediate settlement for ever in a firm and free Commonwealth” 
(CPW VII:421; underlining mine).264 The past obstructions to a free nation are reduced to 
“unhappie interruptions” on already “possessd” liberty and religion. At the writing of 
the pamphlet, Milton insists, these interruptions have been completely removed by God. 
The syntax of the underlined clause—“except in those unhappie interruptions, which 
                                                     
264 The first edition of The Readie and Easie Way represented an even more secure attainment of liberty by 
saying “thus successfully fought for” (CPW VII:356) rather than “thus prosperously fought for.” In The 
Censure of the Rota, Butler attack Milton on this very point: “for if by liberty, you mean Common-wealth, (as 
you do) There was never such thing, as either the one, or the other” (7). 
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God hath remov’d, now that nothing remains, but in all reason the certain hopes”—
works to minimize the effects of the breaks in free government and religion. In this line, 
“nothing remains” is placed as a hinge between two clauses with complex temporality. 
It links the now-past interruptions with the present hopes. These, in turn, point to the 
near-future, “speedie and immediate,” settlement of a “firm and free Commonwealth”; a 
settlement that once achieved will be permanent, “settlement for ever.” Thus, at first, the 
“nothing remains” can be read to refer to the now-removed past interruptions. However, 
as we move through the line, the “but” tips over the sentence and “nothing remains” 
points to the lack of present and future obstacles to the perpetual settlement of a free 
commonwealth.265 In this passage, the obstacles to the forming of a free commonwealth 
are made to disappear in a forward move that indicates that the republican ideal can 
easily be reached if the English people only recollect how close they came to achieving it. 
 These kinds of exhortative moves are in tension with passages that depict 
England as rushing back into the slavery of monarchy. The people of England are 
depicted as unthinkingly rushing towards the restoration: “On the contrarie, if ther be a 
king, which the inconsiderate multitude are now so madd upon, mark how far short we 
                                                     
265 This vision of an almost achieved liberty is reflected in the passage which we considered earlier (CPW 
VII:430). There, we saw that the commonwealth was not securely established because “the frequent 
disturbances, interruptions and dissolutions” of Parliament due to “the impatient or disaffected people” and 
“som ambitious leaders in the Armie” (CPW VII:430). But Milton quickly diminishes this threat by 
rehabilitating the army itself, as opposed to “som ambitious leaders.” The dissolutions of Parliament were 
“much contrarie, I believe, to the mind and approbation of the Armie it self and thir other Commanders, 
once undeceivd, or in thir own power” (CPW VII:430). 
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are like to com of all those happinesses” (CPW VII:446; emphasis mine). The desire for 
the return of the monarchy is presented as an illness that leads the people to erring 
judgment based on incorrect premises: “this noxious humour of returning to old 
bondage, instilld of late by som deceivers, and nourished from bad principles and fals 
apprehension among too many of the people” (CPW VII:407-8). Those who wish for the 
return of Charles II are “past reason and recovery […] devoted to kingship” (CPW 
VII:455). In the last section of the pamphlet, Milton depicts the English people as lured 
back to Egypt by the false idols of wealth and prosperity. Forgetting the “frequent 
plagues and pestilences” that affected England under Charles I, the nation yearns for the 
return of Charles II under the misapprehension that a settled monarchy will bring 
prosperity. The people are “so affected, as to prostitute religion and libertie to the vain 
groundless apprehension, that nothing but kingship can restore trade” (CPW VII:461). In 
hope of prosperity, the English people are willingly relinquishing “all this [religious] 
light among us”: “the same reason shall pass for current to put our necks under 
kingship, as was made use of by the Jews to returne back to Egypt and to the worship of 
thir idol queen, because they falsly imagind that they then livd in more plentie and 
prosperity, our condition is not sound but rotten” (CPW VII:462). These false 
apprehensions, the disease spread by “som deceivers,” are representative of the very 
essence of kingship, which, unlike a free commonwealth, aims to keep its subjects docile: 
“Monarchs will never permit: whose aim is to make the people, wealthie indeed perhaps 
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and well fleec’t, for thir own shearing and the supplie of regal prodigality; but otherwise 
softest, basest, vitiousest, servilest, easiest to be kept under; and not only in fleece, but in 
minde also sheepishest” (CPW VII:460). 
 The corrupting nature of life under the rule of a king informs Milton’s response 
to royalist arguments that most Englishmen want a monarchy and that “the rest therfor 
must yield.” For Milton, royalists do not have a right to participate in the government of 
the country. Those who fought against Parliament in the Civil Wars have lost such right 
by their military defeat: “Not so much to convince these, which I little hope, as to 
confirm them who yield not, I reply; that this greatest part have both in reason and in 
the trial of just battle, lost the right of their election what the government shall be” (CPW 
VII:455). More broadly, all who desire the return of monarchy are to be deprived of the 
right to determine the form of government whether they fought for Charles I or not: 
of them who have not lost that right, whether they for kingship be the greater number, 
who can certainly determin? Suppose they be; yet of freedom they partake all alike, one 
main end of government: which if the greater part value not, but will degenerately 
forgoe, is it just or reasonable, that most voices against the main end of government 
should enslave the less number that would be free? […] They who seek nothing but thir 
own just libertie, have alwaies right to winn it and to keep it, when ever they have 
power, be the voices never so numerous that oppose it. (CPW VII:455) 
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In defending liberty by suppressing the participation in government of potentially the 
majority of the nation, Milton can envision that this liberty will benefit all, even those 
who would “degenerately forgoe” it. As we have seen, Milton insists that living in a free 
commonwealth will persuade the people of its advantages, even if they now oppose it. 
In this passage, however, those who desire the return of the king are characterized as so 
unreasonable or “degenerate” that they cannot be argued or reasoned with. In The Readie 
and Easie Way, shared reasoning is subordinated to the good of establishing a free 
commonwealth. 
 Warning that “if we returne to Kingship, and soon repent, as undoubtedly we 
shall, […] we may be forc’d perhaps to fight over again all that we have fought” (CPW 
VII:423), Milton urges his readers not to give up the liberty that they will certainly obtain 
in a commonwealth. Unlike an idolatrous monarchy, a commonwealth is seen as the 
only form of government that is Scripturally prescribed:  
[it is] held by the wisest men in all ages the noblest, the manliest, the equallest, 
the justest government, the most agreeable to all due libertie and proportiond 
equalitie, both human, civil, and Christian, most cherishing to vertue and true 
religion, but also (I may say it with greatest probabilitie) planely commended, or 
rather enjoind by our Saviour himself, to all Christians. (CPW VII:424) 
 
Quoting Matthew 20.25-7 or Luke 22.25-6 in support of this characterization, Milton 
argues that Christ’s words spoken to curb the “ambitious desire of Zebede’s two 
children” forbid “heathenish” kingship and enjoin life in a commonwealth (CPW 
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VII:424-5).266 In both Matthew and Luke’s versions, Jesus urges the apostles to serve one 
another and reminds them of his own ministry as an example of fellowship (Matthew 
20.28 and Luke 22.27). From this Scriptural passage, Milton proceeds to argue that this 
ideal Christian community can be realized in a free commonwealth, where the rulers are 
“perpetual servants and drudges to the public.”267 In Luke 22, Christ’s injunction is 
uttered at the Last Supper and it links Passover—the old covenant between God and the 
nation of Israel—with the new covenant and the Second Coming.268 The use of these 
passages from the gospels echoes in Milton’s proposal for the establishment of a 
permanent governing “Grand Councel.” Milton argues that if such a form of 
government is adopted, England will enjoy the benefits of a Christian commonwealth 
that will last until the eschaton: 
The Grand Councel being thus firmly constituted to perpetuitie, […] there can be 
no cause alleag’d why peace, justice, plentifull trade and all prosperitie should 
not thereupon ensue throughout the land; with as much assurance as can be of 
human things, that they shall so continue […] even to the coming of our true and 
rightfull and only expected King. (CPW VII:444-5) 
 
                                                     
266 Zebedee is mentioned only in Matthew 20 and not in Luke 22. However, Milton’s rendition of Jesus’ 
words follows Luke’s more closely than Matthew’s. 
267 “And what government coms neerer to this precept of Christ, then a free Commonwealth, wherin they 
who are greatest, are perpetual servants and drudges to the public at thir own cost and charges, neglect thir 
own affairs yet are not elevated above their brethren; live soberly in thir families, walk the street as other 
men, may be spoken to freely, familiarly, friendly, without adoration” (CPW VII:425) 
268 For Passover: “And he sent Peter and John, saying, Go and prepare us the passover, that we may eat” 
(Luke 22.8). For the coming of the Kingdom of God: “For I say unto you, I will not any more eat thereof, 
until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God” (Luke 22.16); and “That ye may eat and drink at my table in my 
kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel” (Luke 22.30). 
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Just as Milton sweeps away as easily overcome the “unhappie interruptions” of the 
Protectorate, he represents establishing a permanent governing council as sufficient to 
secure the Christian commonwealth described in Matthew and Luke. Ironically, this 
proposal is undermined by Milton’s own comment on the request of the mother of 
Zebedee’s children: they desired “to be exalted above thir brethren in his kingdom, 
which they thought was to be ere long upon earth” (CPW VII:424). The words of Jesus at 
the Last Supper promise the coming of Christ’s kingdom, but this promise is not to be 
fulfilled on earth soon. Milton’s comment on Matthew 20 acknowledges that Christ’s 
sacrifice and the establishment of the Church do not coincide with His rule on earth.  
 Running against the grain of this acknowledgment, the description of the “Grand 
Councel” equates the foundation of the commonwealth with the institution of a 
changeless, ideal government; England’s political life is frozen until the Second Coming. 
The description of the rule of the grand council is strikingly static and lifeless. England 
becomes a homogenous “land” in which “peace, justice, plentifull trade and all 
prosperitie” “ensue” upon the election of the council. The passage stands in striking 
contrast to the unruly and ever-changing history of the Interregnum presented in the 
rest of The Readie and Easie Way. The affirmation that “there can be no cause alleag’d why 
peace, justice, plentifull trade and all prosperitie should not thereupon ensue 
throughout the land” strains against the repeated reminders throughout the pamphlet of 
the failed attempts at securing a stable commonwealth. To hide this strain, Milton’s 
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grammatical construction suppresses all agency in the passage. The clause is organized 
around two negatives, “there can be no cause alleag’d” and “should not ensue.” These 
two negatives avert the reader’s attention away from any questions of political agency 
and relationships. The first negative, “there can be no cause alleag’d,” hides agency in 
two ways. As a passive, it suppresses the agent of “alleag’d.” More importantly, 
alongside “should not ensue,” it shifts the focus away from the agency by which the goals 
“peace,” “justice,” “plentifull trade,” and “all prosperitie” are achieved and towards the 
(suppressed) agent of “alleag’d.” The result is to focus the reader’s attention on the 
presumably automatic ensuing of these goals. 
 The frozen quality of Milton’s commonwealth is reflected in his model for 
electing the permanent council. Rejecting proposals for the frequent rotation of ruling 
magistrates, Milton argues that England could avoid a return of the recent instabilities 
by eliminating frequent elections and the consequent changes in government: “The 
much better way doubtless will be in this wavering condition of our affairs, to deferr the 
changing or circumscribing of our Senat, more then may be done with ease, till the 
Commonwealth be thoroughly setl’d in peace and safetie” (CPW VII:441). In developing 
his proposal for a permanent council, Milton reiterates his warning against allowing the 
“rude multitude” to participate in electing magistrates: “not committing all to the noise 
and shouting of a rude multitude, but permitting only those of them who are rightly 
qualif’d, to nominat as many as they will” (CPW VII:442-3). Ironically, Milton follows 
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this warning with a characterization of the new Commonwealth as teaching the English 
people to become progressively educated in the electing and running of government: 
“To make the people fittest to chuse, and the chosen fittest to govern, will be to mend 
our corrupt and faulty education, to teach the people faith not without vertue, 
temperance, modestie, sobrietie, parsimonie, justice; not to admire wealth or honour; to 
hate turbulence and ambition; to place every one his privat welfare and happiness in the 
public peace, libertie and safetie” (CPW VII:443). Here again, the grammatical structure 
points to a tension between Milton’s stated purpose in establishing a commonwealth 
and his plans for bringing it about. This sentence is dominated by verbs in the infinitive: 
“to make,” “to chuse,” “to govern,” “to mend,” “to teach,” “not to admire,” “to hate,” 
and “to place.” The clause starting with “will be to mend” is dependent on the first 
clause of the sentence. In turn, this first clause, “to make the people fittest to chuse,” 
represents the process by which “our corrupt and faulty education” will be mended. 
However, the infinitive “to make,” which governs the opening clause, hides who or 
what will make “the people fittest to chuse, and the chosen fittest to govern.” The 
passage develops Milton’s image of civic and religious virtue that will lead to a stable 
and free Commonwealth. Its grammatical structure, however, implies that the process of 
education will follow automatically upon the implementation of Milton’s version of a 
permanent ruling council. Thought citizens are not to participate in the process of 
decision-making, they are nonetheless to be made into “people fittest to chuse, and the 
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chosen fittest to govern.” Milton’s use of infinitives begs two questions: by whom and 
how? 
 If it is dangerous for the “common sort” to have a voice in government, how are 
political decisions to be made and how are the people to be educated in virtuous 
citizenship? Milton turns again to the history of the Civil Wars and recalls the divisions 
within Parliament over negotiations with the king: “[t]he best affected also and best 
principl’d of the people, stood not numbring or computing on which side were most 
voices in Parlament, but on which side appeerd to them most reason, most safetie, when 
the house divided upon main matters” (CPW VII:414; underlining mine). Milton insists 
that the “best principl’d of the people” supported the best arguments, not the “most 
voices.” However, the yoking of “appeerd” with “most reason, most safetie” is loud 
reminder that the history of the Civil Wars and Interregnum can undermine the 
argument of The Readie and Easie Way. What may have appeared as the most reasonable 
policy at the time did not result in a well-established commonwealth. In case of 
disagreement, then, how do we discern which argument has the “most reason”? As the 
paragraph develops, Milton adds further criteria for political judgment:  
what was well motiond and advis’d, [the best affected also and best principl’d of 
the people] examind not whether fear or perswasion carried it in the vote; neither 
did they measure votes and counsels by the intentions of them that voted; 
knowing that intentions either are but guessed at, or not soon anough known, 
and although good, can neither make the deed such, nor prevent the 
consequence from being bad: suppose bad intention in things otherwise welldon; 
what was welldon, was by them who so thought, not the less obey’d or followd 
in the state. (CPW VII:414; underlining mine) 
 590 
 
These criteria are, however, all in the negative; the reader is told what is not a basis for 
judgment, “they examind not whether fear or perswasion carried it in the vote; neither 
did they measure votes and counsels by the intentions.” More problematically, the 
passage moves from stating that a minority in Parliament may choose and advocate a 
better action than a majority to arguing that neither the intentions nor the methods of 
carrying a motion through, if “well motiond and advis’d,” matter. Here, Milton splits 
doing well from intending well in the crucial activity of political deliberation. 
 In this account, a political action can be judged as “welldon” independently of 
the intentions of the actors or the means they employ to carry it through. Earlier in the 
pamphlet, Milton argued that the Long Parliament acted according to “prudence” and 
“the light of nature” in rebelling against the king. In the passage just quoted, however, 
Milton indicates that such actions, though “welldon,” could have been carried through 
by members of Parliament who acted from “fear” or other poor intentions. Taken 
together, the two passages indicate that the “best principl’d of the people” can judge the 
“prudence” and rationality of the actions of rulers independently of the intentions 
motivating those actions. This indicates that, in The Readie and Easie Way, the rationality 
of “the rabble” and of the “best principl’d of the people” are represented in profoundly 
different terms. On the one hand, the “rabble” is to be excluded from political 
deliberation at a crucial moment of disagreement because incapable of judging correctly 
in political matters. The already-virtuous few, on the other hand, can discern the most 
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prudent actions in government even if proposed by potentially vicious magistrates.269 At 
the same time, as we have just seen above, Milton argues that the implementation of his 
Grand Council will “mend our corrupt and faulty education,” teach the “common sort” 
virtuous political participation, and secure liberty even for those who “degenerately 
forgoe” it. More strikingly, Milton justifies the permanent membership in the council by 
appealing to the need for common deliberation. This argument is framed in opposition 
to the proposals of James Harrington’s Oceana. In Pocock’s reading, Harrington 
maintains that frequent rotation in office is necessary to ensure that individuals 
participate in the civic functions of the commonwealth.270 This process also selects a 
natural ruling aristocracy: “aristocracy, although a function of property as well as 
personality, was a natural rather than institutional phenomenon, which worked best 
                                                     
269 Milton argues that it is better to “follow Iscariot or Simon the magician, though to covetous ends, 
preaching, then Saul, though in the uprightness of his heart persecuting the gospel” (CPW VII:415). Recently, 
Bryan Adams Hampton has argued that Milton’s conception of “prudence” is a version of Aristotelian 
phronēsis (Fleshly Tabernacles: Milton and the Incarnational Poetics of Revolutionary England (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 170). However, Milton’s separation of doing well from intending 
well in political deliberation indicates a problem with this characterization. For Milton, the “best principl’d 
of the people” do not need to examine the intentions of those who voted in Parliament; “what was welldon” 
was obeyed by “them who so thought.” But, as we have seen above, for Aristotle, only the individual 
habituated in the virtues can be practically rational. This has a profound consequences for Aristotle’s 
conception of political life. To become practically rational and habituated in the virtues, one must learn from 
those who have already acquired the virtues. In turn, this requires that political life be organized so as to 
promote education in the virtues and, most importantly, that those who rule adhere to the virtue of justice 
(Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 37-9). While Milton’s reference to the “best principl’d of the people” may 
gesture in the direction of the Aristotelian conception of the virtuous citizen, Aristotle’s phronimos would not 
“follow Iscariot or Simon the magician […] preaching” because a vicious ruler cannot possess the practical 
rationality necessary to organize the life of the polis. 
270 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 393-4. As Pocock explains, this was Harrington’s “method of 
mechanizing virtue, of distinguishing and distributing the elements of the decision process so that men were 
obliged to act disinterestedly” (The Machiavellian Moment, 394).  
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when it was not entrenched but left to the recognition of the many.”271 In The Readie and 
Easie Way, Milton attacks Harrington’s proposal as trusting too much in the process of 
mechanical selection. In Harrington’s assembly, Milton sees the members “unweildie 
with thir own bulk, unable in so great a number to mature thir consultations as they 
ought, if any be allotted them” (CPW VII:441). By voting without deliberation in 
Harrington’s system,272 they choose “without reason shewn or common deliberation” 
(CPW VII:441). Those who participate in political life should not do so silently, but ought 
to deliberate together and give reasons for their choice. What of the “inconsiderate 
multitude” who are to benefit from the “liberty” of a commonwealth they did not 
choose? That is, what is the consequence of excluding from deliberation those who 
disagree with the proposed commonwealth on the grounds that they are unreasoning? 
 To see the consequences of Milton’s restriction of participation, I turn back to 
Aquinas’ account of the law and custom. For Aquinas, human laws need to be drafted 
with the understanding that they govern the actions of human subjects, that is, rational 
animals. That means that laws must appeal to human reason and that ultimately even 
punishment must have an educational role, habituating the subject into political and 
social life.273 It is important that in this account Aquinas follows Aristotle because, as we 
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273 Like Aristotle, and unlike Rogers, Aquinas then argues that just laws bind individuals because, in 
breaking them, a person harms himself as well as others (see Ia-IIae., q. 90, art. 1 and Ia-IIae., q. 94, art. 3). 
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have seen earlier, Aristotle considers conflict in a community as a defect to be avoided, 
not as an integral part of political life.274 The question is, then, how is conflict resolved? 
Aquinas’s approach to the question of political disagreement can further bring into relief 
the importance of rational shared decision making in his political theory. In considering 
Aquinas’ response to the fact of disagreement in political life, therefore, I aim to 
compare an Aristotelian natural law solution to conflict with Milton’s “republican” 
answer. As we will see, pace Pocock, Aquinas’s formulation requires a commitment to 
shared deliberation. What happens when there is a disagreement about which laws to 
adopt or, on a larger scale, which form of government to implement? To see Aquinas’ 
answer to this question, we need to return to the distinction between practical and 
theoretic reason. In understanding Aquinas’ treatment of rational solution to 
disagreement, I follow MacIntyre’s discussion in “Aquinas and the Extent of Moral 
Disagreement” in Ethics and Politics.275 In this essay, MacIntyre begins by considering a 
set of fundamental contemporary moral disagreements, disagreements that arise out of 
rival accounts of the “first principles” of moral life grounded in “some account of 
human nature and action, and more especially in some account of how the reasons that 
                                                     
 
For the educational role of punishment, see Ia-IIae., q. 95, art. 1. On Aristotle’s version of this account, see 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 37-8. 
274 See my discussion on page 33 above. 
275 Alasdair MacIntyre, Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays, vol. 2, (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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justify actions are related to the causes of actions.”276 Aquinas’ account of rationality 
presupposes a specific conception of human flourishing aimed at a specific good and 
thus, acting rationally involves taking actions that move us towards that good.277 The 
nature of that ultimate good is a matter of theoretic reason; the specific actions to be 
taken in a given situation by a given human being are matters of practical reason. Thus, 
which actions we take at any given time will depend on our conception of the good, and, 
conversely, our daily actions, if we act rationally, will bear witness to our notion of 
human flourishing. This means that disagreement about matters of practical reason can 
point towards disagreements about the ultimate good.278  
 Both Aristotle and Aquinas point out that in important matters we must 
deliberate with others, including those with whom we disagree.279 This is true both for 
theoretic and practical reasoning, since in either type of thinking we are limited by our 
own point of view and deliberating with others allows us to consider their standpoint.280 
However, deliberating with others is particularly important in the case of practical 
reason. This is because in matters of practical thinking we are prone to deceive ourselves 
about our desires. What we desire isn’t necessarily what is good and we “have to 
recognize that we always remain liable to suppose that we want this or that because and 
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only because it is good, when in fact what will primarily be satisfied by our obtaining or 
achieving this or that is our desire for pleasure or power or money or some such.”281 This 
means that we “should always therefore treat solitary deliberation as peculiarly liable to 
error.”282 This is not to say that deliberating with others will unerringly guide us 
towards the good. Others can be a source of “deliberative corruption” and we “need 
from others, as they need from us, the exercise of the virtues of objectivity.”283  
 At this point in his discussion of disagreement and deliberation, MacIntyre turns 
to Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ statements that deliberation is about means and not ends.284 
However, shared deliberation and, in particular, deliberation done with others with 
whom we disagree can lead us to better understand our ultimate end. How does 
deliberation about means help us in understanding our telos? As we have seen earlier, 
while Aquinas in the Summa Theologiæ describes practical reason in analogy with 
theoretic reason, the two do not work in the exact same way. When we develop practical 
knowledge of our telos, we do so differently than when we gain theoretical knowledge of 
a proposition.285 With practical knowledge of our ultimate end, “we begin by 
discovering a directedness in our particular actions and in our particular deliberation, so 
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that we find ourselves inclined, first by nature, then by habituation acquired through 
education by others, to move towards certain types of goal, ordered and understood in 
certain specific ways.”286 In the process of acquiring such knowledge and discovering 
such directedness, we will find out that some of our inclinations and part of our 
education are inadequate. This kind of realization will often come about through “the 
discovery of disagreement with others as to whether this or that particular judgment or 
action, choice or project, is or was the best to undertake in this or that particular set of 
circumstances. […] theoretical disagreements about the nature of the end of human life 
emerge from immediate practical disagreements in the context of shared deliberation.”287 
By following Aristotle in ordering goods, Aquinas finds a positive function for certain 
types of disagreement. In shared practical reasoning in case of disagreement we can 
come to realize that some of our inclinations are inadequate in the pursuit of the good. 
Crucially, such positive forms of disagreement presuppose that an ordering of the goods 
of moral life is possible. Pocock’s representation of Aristotle’s elites as pursuing 
incommensurable goods does not allow for the kind of positive disagreement presented 
by Aquinas. 
 The difference between a form of political life presupposing an ordering of the 
goods, as I have argued both Aristotle and Aquinas propose, and a form of political life 
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presupposing no a priori ranking of each elite’s “value priorities,” as found in Pocock’s 
account of republicanism, leads to fundamentally different views of political 
disagreement. In Aquinas’s and MacIntyre’s account, if there can be no way to order the 
goods in political life shared rational deliberation will fall apart. But, in situations where 
shared deliberation breaks apart and a community can no longer come to a decision on 
which actions to take based on practical reason, the members of the community:  
will have to base their communal decision-making either on inherited patterns of 
authority that are endowed with nonrational legitimacy or on some implicit or 
explicit social contract whereby individuals and groups, each trying to maximize 
their own advantage, arrive at some arrangement about the allocation of costs 
and benefits. In both cases it will be inequalities of power that determine the 
outcomes of decision-making processes. Power rather than practical reason will 
now have the last word.288 
 
In The Readie and Easie Way, Milton turns to this form of non-rational resolution of 
political disagreement by excluding “the rabble” from political participation. Milton 
argues that those who wish for the return of the monarchy are not to be included in 
settling the new government. However, in the argument of The Readie and Easie Way, 
once a republican government has been securely in place for a long enough time—as it 
should have been done immediately after the regicide—those who now long for the 
return of monarchy will learn to enjoy living in a commonwealth. But by persistently 
avoiding the question of how “the rabble” will be rationally persuaded of the benefits of 
life in a commonwealth, Milton suppresses the necessary function of shared reasoning in 
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resolving disagreement. Problematically, The Readie and Easie Way short-circuits the very 
rational debate that it portrays as a necessary element in the life of a free 
commonwealth. Pocock’s distortion of Aristotle’s account of life in the polis has served to 
hide that, in championing “republican” virtue and rationality in The Readie and Easie 
Way, Milton ends up undermining the form of rational activity that helps members of a 
political community better understand the telos of human life. 
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